World

The Gaza Peace Deal That Isn’t

Israeli soldiers patrol in Gaza City, November 22, 2023(Ronen Zvulun/Reuters)
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In such agreements, it is often the case that ‘phase 2’ never comes.

As a rule of thumb, it’s wise to assume that multistage peace deals with Islamist terrorist organizations will not progress much beyond stage 1. Despite Donald Trump’s announcement this week that Hamas has finally agreed to terms for its “complete disarmament,” that rule still applies.

To hear the president tell it, the agreement he has secured will beget a durable and lasting peace. It will pave the way for the Gaza Strip to at last be “governed by a new Palestinian government that will work closely with the Board of Peace,” provide Israel with “the security it deserves,” and ensure that the Strip no longer serves “as a base for terrorist attacks.” Those are the president’s goals, at least, and they are noble objectives. But how will they be achieved?

Somewhat inauspiciously, the Board of Peace revealed on Friday its “roadmap” for peace in the Middle East (perhaps its authors were unaware of the context and provenance of that turn of phrase). Even more disconcertingly, the board described the terms that have supposedly been agreed to as mere “principles.”

The first point compels parties to this agreement to profess their commitment to the cease-fire that was hammered out last September. It also requires all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities and prepare the way for the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) to enter the Strip, although the deadline for compliance is subject to extension. Hamas “and other factions” in Gaza must then allow the NCAG to govern independently and with “the continuity of civilian institutions and public services.”

The deal envisions all this, and the financial rewards for Gaza that will follow the implementation of this agreement over the next three years. But there will be no progress unless Israel goes first. “Israel shall fully complete, without delay, all remaining commitments under Sharm Sheikh Protocol, particularly the cessation of military operations as detailed in annex,” the second article of this 15-point plan begins.

Even though the deal requires Israel to make the first moves, much of this is unobjectionable, if aspirational. However, the biggest stumbling block here, “security,” is not addressed until point 6 in the board’s list of “principles.”

“Gaza shall be governed according to the principle of One Authority, One Law, One Weapon,” the document reads. All security personnel in the new regime will undergo a thorough “vetting,” and the candidates who fail — presumably because of their association with a violent Islamist terrorist militia — will be “offered alternative civilian roles consistent with their earlier experience.” Lucky them!

At point 8, we get into the process through which Hamas will be demilitarized, but the plan is light on details. Without expounding the mechanism for it or contending with the likely prospect of resistance to it, the agreement envisions a status quo in which “only NCAG shall hold, store, or control weapons in Gaza,” save regulated personal firearms. There isn’t even an “agreed upon timetable” for all this to be realized. Indeed, it’s not clear that much has been “agreed upon” at all.

Despite the implication from the Trump administration that the deal is a fait accompli, the parties to it have been cagier. “Hamas leader Khalil Al-Hayya, for example, suggested the group would only hand over its weapons to a future Palestinian state,” CNN reported. That’s consistent with what Hamas negotiator Ghazi Hamad told the Wall Street Journal. “We didn’t say disarmament, we didn’t say handing over the weapons, and we didn’t agree on any Israeli involvement,” he insisted.

Hamas’s sources contend that the terrorist organization will not surrender any of its weapons until Israel ceases defensive operations in Gaza and withdraws to the “yellow line” in the Strip. The Israeli government has yet to publicly comment on this proposal, as of this writing. Yet Israeli diplomatic sources told the Jerusalem Post that the Netanyahu government will reject any terms that compel concessions from it before Hamas demonstrably disarms. An unnamed Israeli official confirmed to CNN that the IDF will not withdraw “from the current ‘yellow line’ without the genuine disarmament of Hamas.”

For all the reasons that Donald Trump’s memorandum of understanding with Iran was suboptimal, the cease-fire deal in the Gaza Strip was eminently desirable: stage 1. With Iran, stage 1 required the U.S. to provide Tehran with vital financial relief in exchange for a variety of commitments that Iran never met. By contrast, the Gaza cease-fire deal required nothing of either America or Israel. Rather, it forced Hamas to release its remaining hostages and observe the legitimacy of the IDF’s presence in the Gaza Strip — an arrangement backed by eight Muslim-majority nations and codified in a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Point 2 of this deal notes that a variety of non-state observers must certify that all parties to this agreement will have met “their commitments under the Roadmap before proceeding to the implementation of Phase 2.” That may be the most important line in this document. More often than not, “phase 2” never comes.

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