Japan’s diplomacy of sympathy towards Ukraine 2022–2024

Introduction

This article investigates Japan’s diplomacy of sympathy (henceforth DoS) towards Ukraine in response to the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. The ongoing war in Ukraine constitutes another act in a long list of inter-state conflicts that occurred in the post-Cold War period. Yet, in this case, Japan has taken a clear-cut stance on the subject of multiple responsibilities of the aggressor (Russia) and rights of the victimised party (Ukraine) stemming from this particular man-made disaster. The article offers a case study of sympathy strategically deployed. By focusing on the Kishida administration’s response to the Ukraine conflict, it effectively bridges the Abe and post-Abe eras, expanding the geographic and thematic scope beyond Japan’s historical focus on neighbouring countries to a highly significant global foreign policy event to which the Japanese government responded strongly.

The post-2022 chapter of the Ukraine conflict has had far reaching implications not only for Europe but the whole global system in terms of its socio-economic and (geo-)political consequences, challenging further the rules-based international order and accelerating the transformation towards a (polarised) multi-order world (see Flockhart and Korosteleva Citation2022; Brunk and Hakimi Citation2022; and Ikenberry Citation2024). Furthermore, the conflict has drawn sharp divisions between Western powers, such as the United States (US) and European Union (EU), committed to the aiding of Ukraine on the one side and Russia gaining various levels of backing from countries such as North Korea, Iran and, most importantly, China. Hence, the significance of the conflict, together with the deepening involvement of Japan’s allies and regional competitors and outright adversaries, have both motivated and facilitated Japan’s support for the war-torn country. Furthermore, Japan’s engagement in DoS towards Ukraine has offered reputational and practical foreign policy gains for itself, unlike other ongoing conflicts, such as the Israel-Gaza war toward which Japan’s diplomatic response has been more restrained. While this is not to detract from moral, ethical and humanitarian concerns that drive Japan’s support for Ukraine, Japan’s strategic considerations and interests have been advanced in and by its display of DoS towards Ukraine.

Despite the fact that the extant literature has provided insights into emotional responses offered by a number of actors to the Ukraine War (for example, Gürkan Citation2024 on the EU’s ‘emotional community’; Szabó and Lipiński Citation2026 on emotional discourses deployed by Polish and Hungarian PMs; Jones Citation2024 on Ukraine and UN Security Council as an ‘emotionscape’; and Zemanová and Madarászová Citation2024 on NATO’s political communication), Japan’s official emotional response has yet to be investigated. The recent publications have offered important insights on how the Ukraine War has impacted Japan’s foreign and security policies (for example, O’Shea and Maslow Citation2024) and the forms and extent of Japan’s humanitarian and development aid to Ukraine (Szczepanska, Barbasiewicz and Voytsekhovska 2024; see also Sumi Citation2022). Additionally, Japanese political parties’ discourses on the Ukraine War, international world order and issues of the country’s defence capabilities and nuclear disarmament, among the others, were illuminated by the extant research (Isaksson Citation2025). Hence, adding to the existing scholarship, this paper explores how expressions of sympathy have been utilised by Japan to craft a response to a war of aggression and subsequently what has been the significance and utility of DoS towards Ukraine for Japan’s foreign and domestic policies. In other words, what does this case of DoS achieve for Japan?

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss the methodological approach used in our work. Second, we offer a succinct summary of the Japanese government’s response to the 2014 Donbas War and annexation of Crimea in order to provide background information for our further discussion. Third, we investigate how and to what extent Japan engaged in and performed the DoS towards Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 to express ‘solidarity’ with and a ‘benign attitude’ towards the country victimised by the Russian aggression. For this purpose, we examine both symbolic and tangible support measures offered by Japan – as represented by the Kishida government – over the first three years of the conflict. Next, we elucidate to what extent both symbolic and substantial expressions of sympathy have served more strategic ends. Hence, the paper investigates the presence of more utilitarian components in DoS aimed at recognising the victimisation of the ‘other’.

Our research illuminates that, in the case of the Ukraine War, Japan has engaged in a robust DoS at both symbolic and tangible levels, which contrasts starkly with the Japan’s reaction to the events in Ukraine in 2014, which constitute the first chapter of the current conflict. The emotionally-rich language used by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio (2021–2024) offered a clear-cut distinction between victim/victimiser and it acknowledged the perseverance of the Ukrainian people. In terms of strategic and practical value, Japan’s DoS enabled the country to present itself as a principled and value-driven actor in international affairs, to revitalise the country’s relationship with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) (often at the expense of Chinese influence), to potentially obtain a useful argument in regional conflicts over the past. Moreover, it contributed to domestic discussions on anti-militarist societal attitudes and active defending of Japan in the eventuality of future conflict in the region.

Theoretical concepts: emotional diplomacy and diplomacy of sympathy

The key concept utilised in this paper is Todd H. Hall’s diplomacy of sympathy, one type of emotional diplomacy (ED). According to Hall (Citation2015, 2, 37), the latter denotes a:

The diplomacy of sympathy, in particular, is ‘a response to other states having suffered a perceived tragedy’, entailing ‘symbolic displays of solidarity and condolences’ and demonstration of ‘a benign attitude toward the victim’ by state actors. It requires not only symbolic but also tangible measures to express support for the victim and these ‘offers of assistance should be free from clear demands for compensation’ (Hall Citation2015, 4).

‘Sincerity’ occupies a key place in ED, as states need to maintain ‘a consistent and coherent performance of emotional response without slips and discrepancies’ that is reflected in its expressive gestures – involving rhetorical and symbolic acts – and, on a higher level, in its substantive gestures, which denote measures incurring material and other potential costs (Hall Citation2015, 27–28). Hall’s observation on ‘slips and discrepancies’ underscores the need to maintain coherence of the message across different platforms and publics. In this paper, DoS is used to investigate how Japan phrased its verbal statements of support toward Ukraine. This paper will also explore the presence (or absence) of more substantial means of assistance, strengthening the ‘performative sincerity’ of Japan’s emotional diplomacy. This allows us to assess the extent and depth of expressed ‘sympathy’. Beyond Hall’s criterion of sincerity, we propose that, in order to provide a more in-depth assessment of consequentiality and effectiveness of a country’s DoS, it is useful to consider other characteristics, too. Yamazaki’s (Citation2005, 19–20) work on apologies in international relations provides input in this respect. For instance, the criteria of naming the offence and expression of regret can be applied to exploring instances of DoS. For both criteria, the focus is on the level of clarity and specificity while addressing a particular offence and offering condolences for the suffering experienced by the victim. Yamazaki (Citation2005, 20) argues that ‘[T]he challenge for apologizing nations is how detailed and explicit should articulation of wrongdoing and expressions of regret be’. Similar challenges stand before the states engaging in DoS (or the diplomacy of guilt for that matter), with DoS requiring decisions on how detailed references to the nature of damage and suffering experienced by the party stricken by a tragedy should be and the selection of wording used to offer solidarity with and compassion to, the victim. This is especially relevant in the case of man-made disasters, such as armed conflict. In such instances, non-party states are required to make complex decisions about the extent to which they should pass moral and value judgements about the aggressors and victims. Hence, in conducting multifaceted explorations of DoS instances, in addition to evaluating the extent of (performative) sincerity, we will also attend to the above-mentioned elements – which we can tentatively refer to as naming the disaster and expression of sympathy – in order to improve our ability to illuminate the extent and depth of existing articulations of sympathy in international affairs.

Second, as noted previously, ED is ‘intentional and strategic’ and it ‘can serve instrumental purposes’ (Hall Citation2015, 38–39). Thus, under DoS, we should be able to inspect to what extent Japan’s foreign policy and domestic concerns have been served by official symbolic expressions of sympathy offered to Ukraine.

Third, although the strands of ED presented by Hall are analytically separate, they do not exist in a void nor in separation from broader audiences, regional or global. Hall (Citation2015, 29) mentions that ED generates its ‘own emotion-specific games’ between states; however, Hall focuses on the situation between the state actor that engages in ED and its specific targets rather than broader audiences to this social interaction. The larger question that could be posed is how the demonstration of sympathy and recognition towards the suffering of a specific state may play or feed into the pre-existing legacy of conflicts and war in particular regions. That is, deploying a given type of ED by one state towards a specific target takes place against the possible background of this state’s own legacy of violent behaviour and could potentially set off a different type of ED from third states/parties.

Finally, in our analysis of Japan’s DoS, we focus on how Japan performatively responded to the crisis, rather than why the Japanese government chose to act in this manner. In other words, we are interested in exploring the symbolic and tangible steps taken by Japan, rather than pondering which specific concerns might have motivated Japan’s behaviour and to what extent they were relevant. However, we will briefly address this motivational issue to identify important factors.

First, the significance of geopolitical and interest-based factors is aptly encapsulated in the phrase, ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’, which has been used regularly by PM Kishida and his successors to point to the significance of the Ukraine War for a possible Taiwan contingency (Tsuruoka Citation2024) and draw a parallel between Russian and Chinese expansionism. Second, the need to maintain strategic alignment with Japan’s allies in relation to the Ukraine War has been of significant concern to Japanese authorities, as demonstrated by Kishida’s insistence that Japan will respond to the crisis in line with the ‘international community’ (de facto the EU and US). Third, Japan’s concerns about upholding international law and values and about the country’s role in the international community are a significant explanatory factor (e.g. Bibilashvili Citation2025). All of the above-mentioned considerations, albeit to varying extents, must influenced the governmental decisions on the advisability or necessity of acting in this particular way towards Ukraine.

Although analytical priority in this paper is given to the performative how, the questions of why and how are interlinked, with the concerns underlying a decision influencing the steps taken to operationalise the public diplomatic response. The application of the DoS approach here helps us explore to a larger extent the quality and depth of symbolic and tangible response measures. As such, DoS can be a useful analytical tool for assessing sincerity and level of commitment to solidarity and strategic alignment with allies, as well as how far a given country is invested in protecting international norms. Furthermore, it reflects Japan’s post-war principle of a peace-oriented state and its willingness to offer aid to developing or distressed countries. Nevertheless, a further exploration of the abovementioned relationships are beyond the scope of this article.

Data gathering and analysis

In terms of specific sources of data, this paper analyses speeches by actors with ‘directive governance’ and ‘dramatic dominance’ (Hall Citation2015, 23–24), which in practice primarily means official communications of PM Kishida. For the purpose of this article, all speeches and statements available on the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office of Japan) website between February 2022 and June 2024 were reviewed to select a body of suitable documents. The speeches and statements directed specifically to the Ukrainian audience were analysed in order to elucidate the focal points of expressive gestures of Japanese DoS whilst addressing the victimised party. However, as discussed in the previous section, consistency and coherence of the message across different platforms and publics is significant for projecting ‘sincerity’ in DoS. For this reason, we further investigated PM Kishida’s selected communications on the Ukraine War directed to the Japanese public when Ukraine featured as a meaningful subject of interest and in which ‘emotions are either explicitly expressed or tacitly implied’ (Koschut Citation2022, 170). Overall, 17 speeches and statements were selected. The corpus of documents underwent a qualitative reading and was subsequently analysed using NVIVO software to illuminate how Japan discursively operationalised DoS.

The selected documentary corpus was analysed using a mix of qualitative content analysis (QCA) and elements of emotional discourse analysis (EDA). QCA is a method that enables the investigation of instances of communication produced by societal actors through the analysing of ‘recorded and fixed symbolic material’ (de Buitrago Citation2018, 310). In the contexts of research on emotions, QCA is helpful in illuminating the emotional substance of particular piece of communication and how the speaker constructs and represents the object of their emotional interest (cf. Buitrago 2018). EDA, in turn, underscores ‘how foreign policy actors talk about emotions and how they employ emotion categories when talking about subjects, events or social relations’ (Koschut Citation2022, 168).

After familiarisation with the selected data set, a mix of deductive and inductive categories was utilised to capture the expressions of sympathy in PM Kishida’s official communication. The deductive categories were rooted in the general research interest of the paper (following de Buitrago Citation2018) and focused on:

• Japan’s declared emotional understanding of the Russia-Ukraine conflict

• Japan’s declared emotional assessment of Russian conduct in Ukraine

• Japan’s symbolic acknowledgements of loss and damages suffered by Ukraine

Following the deductive analysis, we introduced inductive categories and sub-categories, which had emerged during the first round of analysis. These inductive categories reflected:

• Japan’s emotional responses to specific Russian offences against Ukrainian populace

• Japan’s articulated emotional representation of Ukrainian citizens’ resistance

• Japan’s demands for international justice

QCA of the selected documentary materials has enabled us to elucidate how PM Kishida framed his – and by extension Japan’s – understanding of the Russia-Ukraine war, how he assigned roles of victim and victimiser and which specific aspects he underscored in their DoS communication. Whereas QCA provides insights on how Japanese leader generally constructed the emotional symbolic response to the crisis, EDA – with its focus on linguistic choices of the speaker – enriches the analysis by revealing specific emotional elements of the language used to operationalise Japan’s DoS. Here, following Koschut’s methodological compass (2022, 172) on exploring the emotional potential of texts, we pay attention to the presence of emotion terms, connotations, metaphors, comparisons and analogies in the selected documents.

Finally, the data on substantive gestures in Japanese DoS was gleaned from the selected documentary corpus and other governmental documents on humanitarian, fiscal and other forms of support provided since February 2022, as well as secondary sources.

A look back: an asymmetrical (?) diplomacy of sympathy after the 2014 Donbas war

Shortly after the outbreak of the Donbas War (February 2014), PM Abe formulated his response to the events unfolding in Ukraine. He portrayed the crisis as a challenge to international law, asserting that ‘[W]e must never condone changes to the status quo with force in the background’. The Japanese government confirmed that the annexation of Crimea had ‘no legal effect and Japan does not recognise its [add. the independence referendum’s] outcome’ and that this measure violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine (MOFA Citation2014).

On the symbolic level, Japanese official communications focused on what the crisis in eastern Ukraine meant for Europe and the broader international community from the perspective of international rules and order. In addition to the admission of violations committed against Ukraine in his statements, PM Abe also called on ‘all parties concerned to respect the rule of law and territorial integrity and to behave responsibly with maximum self-restraint’ (Kantei Citation2014; italics added). Though measured, we assess that this approach seems to apply the responsibility to show restraint to both the perpetrator and the victim and assigns co-responsibility to the latter for appropriate conduct that would lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Although PM Abe’s statements underscore the importance of the crisis for Ukraine, he does not offer a direct criticism of Russia. The focus is placed on the regrettable outcome of events in eastern Ukraine, rather than on the actions of Russia that led to it, thereby de-emphasising the role of the victimiser country. Even during Abe’s historic visit to Ukraine in June 2015, there were no new expressive gestures meant specifically for the Ukrainian audience, such as offering more emotional and empathetic words of recognition for the damage that the Ukraine and its people suffered as a result of Russian actions (MOFA Citation2015a). In the following years, there is a clear decline in the presence of Ukraine in Abe’s communications while expressions of affinity to Russia (e.g. Abe’s speech at the Eastern Economic Forum, Kantei Citation2019) increase in the same period.

Hence, in terms of ‘symbolic displays of solidarity and condolences’ to Ukraine in the aftermath of the 2014 Donbas War, Abe’s communications were decidedly cool and devoid of any deeper focus on Ukraine beyond the generic acknowledgement that it is not acceptable to flaunt international rules and seek to ‘ change the status quo through force whether in Ukraine, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or anywhere else on earth’ (Kantei Citation2015).

On the other hand, ‘a benign attitude toward the victim’ by the Japanese government was demonstrated through a selection of diplomatic initiatives impacting Ukraine since 2014. As noted earlier, Abe visited Kiev in 2015 – the first Japanese PM in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries. Prior to the visit, the Agreement on Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments between Ukraine and Japan was signed (MOFA Citation2015b). Moreover, the Japanese government decided to extend new loans and grants to Ukraine funded through the foreign aid channel. The declared priorities guiding Japan’s support and engagement with Ukraine in the post-2014 climate were to improve Ukraine’s economic standing and democratic credentials, as well as to aid a ‘nation-wide dialogue for national integrity’, both of which were seen as contributing to stability and internal reforms of the country (MOFA Citation2016).

Hence, Japan’s emotional diplomacy in the wake of the 2014 chapter of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its aftermath was visibly skewed towards the benefit of Russia. The focus of the Abe administration rested firmly on the fostering of a positive relationship with Putin and projecting an (inflated) image of mutual friendship between the two leaders, accompanied by a lack of substantial criticism directed towards Russia. Consequently, the emotional response offered to Ukraine was uneven and asymmetrical. Whereas there was a conspicuous dearth of expressions of sympathy for the damage experienced by Ukraine on the symbolic level, the Abe administration did increase its material support to the country in the name of enhancing Ukraine’s stability and institutional reforms – expressing in this manner the backing for Kiev’s pro-European course. As such, Japan’s response could be at best seen as a stunted DoS, prioritising limited substantive over expressive gestures and subjugated to the overarching quest of building friendship with Russia.

This asymmetrical DoS pursued by Abe should be seen against the backdrop of his ‘new approach’ to Russia.Footnote¹ It prioritised the rapprochement with Moscow to, first, negotiate a solution to the conflict over Japan’s Northern Territories – a step that would finally pave the way for a peace treaty with Russia – and, second, to leverage a positive relationship with Moscow to lure it away from China (see Brown Citation2018 and Brown Citation2019). Dian and Kireeva (Citation2022) discuss the Russia-Japan rapprochement from the perspective of wedge strategies, pointing out that both sides managed to achieve some gains, although they credit Russia as the main beneficiary of these strategies. Moscow – leveraging Japan’s interest in resolving the territorial dispute – achieved a degree of dis-alignment between Tokyo and its G7 allies, as Abe pressed forward with his engagement with Russia despite US dissatisfaction and he searched for ways to minimise the impact of Japanese sanctions on Russian economy (Dian and Kireeva Citation2022, 874–876).

While the invasion made it impossible for Japan to achieve its own foreign policy objectives, it opened new avenues for PM Kishida to reshape the course of Japan’s foreign policy toward Russia. Although Kishida initially expressed hope that diplomatic efforts would lead to de-escalation – and the dialogue with Putin was maintained (Kantei Citation2022a, Citation2022b , see also KanteiCitation2022g) – in the face of the full-scale invasion, official Japanese communications began to change. The following sections discuss the significant characteristics of Japan’s DoS and how they developed and solidified in the months and years after February 2022.

Japan’s diplomacy of sympathy towards Ukraine 2022–2024: expressive gestures

Japan’s diplomacy of sympathy towards Ukraine 2022–2024: substantive gestures

The expression of ‘solidarity’ with Ukraine and standing together with Ukraine and its people – appearing regularly in official PM communications since 2022 (for example, Kantei Citation2022h and Citation2023d) – did not only remain in the realm of symbolic expressions, but it was also operationalised through a number of policy measures in practice on the ground. First, in terms of costly consequences, already in March 2022, Japan was designated as a country that is ‘engaging in unfriendly activities toward Russia’ (The Mainichi Citation2022) in response to Japan’s decision to join sanctions against the aggressor. Unlike in 2014, the level of Japan’s commitment to joining and continuing with new rounds of sanctions was substantially higher (see Ashhurst Citation2024). Russia’s war against Ukraine put an end to any potential lingering hopes for the resolution of Northern Territories issue and concluding the peace treaty. The deteriorating views on Japan held by Russian leadership in the years prior to the eruption of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the failure of PM Abe’s ‘new approach’ to Russia already made a breakthrough on these matters unlikely. Nevertheless, the choices of PM Kishida in the wake of the 2022 Russian aggression led to the increase of tensions on Japan’s northern border (Brown Citation2023, 156–157). Furthermore, Japan provided extensive financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine as well as supported Ukrainian demands for justice on the international arena. These tangible policy measures – in addition to sanctions – were meant to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to supporting Ukraine at the time of deep existential crisis and ‘…restore peace on the beautiful land of Ukraine’ (Kantei Citation2023d).

Diplomacy of sympathy towards Ukraine after 2022: practical gains and prospects

The unprecedented Japanese DoS towards Ukraine has offered reputational foreign policy benefits to Japan. In the first instance, it reinforced the self-representation of Japan as a reliable and principled global actor defending the international rule of law. Unlike in the wake of the 2014 crisis, since 2022 Japan has been a vocal critic of Russia and a generous supporter of Ukraine. The country’s aligning of its DoS symbolic and tangible responses with the approaches of its most important allies – the USA and EU – allowed the country to confidently project an image of a trustworthy and dependable partner in the time of existential crisis. Beyond that, in the following sections, we examine the significance and utility of Japan’s DoS to the broader relationship with Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC) (EU members), conflicts over the wartime past in East Asia and, on the domestic front, to the shouldering of financial expense of Japan’s solidarity with Ukraine and rethinking anti-militarist societal attitudes in the country.

Conclusions

This paper explored Japanese DoS towards Ukraine between 2022 and 2024. We have shown that the expressive gestures provided by PM Kishida include a notable number of instances where emotionally rich and evocative language was deployed. In terms of criteria of sincerity, naming the offence and expressions of sympathy in his official communications, Kishida has consistently projected an image of Japan as a deeply concerned country, siding with the victimised Ukraine and its people and recognising Ukrainian civilians’ unjust suffering. The emotionally loaded connotations such as ‘war crimes’ and ‘atrocities’ were incorporated in Kishida’s utterances, demonstrating the presence of a clear moral and value judgement on Russian actions in Ukraine and validating the Ukrainian stance on Russia conduct. Against the background of Japan’s diplomacy of guilt towards its Asian neighbours, the choice of historically charged terms and their application to Russia are consequential. The use of emotional language strengthens the message of recognising and sympathising with Ukrainian suffering and sacrifice, while at the same time demonstrates a strong condemnation of Russia. The feeling of admiration towards Ukrainian people for their resolve to defend their country is also clearly discernible.

The expressive emotional labour of Kishida was supported by considerable substantive gestures. These included the imposing of sanctions on Russia, humanitarian and financial aid for Ukraine and the undertaking of diplomatic steps congruent with many – but not all – Ukrainian demands. Additionally, in 2024, Japan took an increasingly proactive role in supporting wartime recovery and post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, a step that should secure a key position for Japan in the post-conflict Ukraine.

Japan’s DoS towards Ukraine has allowed the former to secure image benefits as a trustworthy and dependable partner for the EU and US, as well as a generous supporter of Kiev in the ongoing conflict. Beyond the upgrading and deepening of the relationship between Japan and Ukraine, Japan’s DoS has contributed to revitalising the image and cooperation with other CEEC. Moreover, it provides Japan with a solid discursive argument regarding the regional contention on the wartime past and territorial disputes, in the face of increasing alignment between Moscow and Beijing. Finally, looking at the domestic arena, we proposed that the expressive gestures of Kishida’s DoS underlining civilian suffering may have helped to justify the level of support extended to Ukraine in the eyes of Japanese public opinion. Moreover, the validation of the Ukrainian people’s proactive response to defending their country is relevant from the point of view of Japanese attitudes towards fighting for their own state.

Hence, the article shows that sympathy can be a potent political tool. Japan’s approach demonstrates how combining emotional solidarity with strategic interests allows a nation to highlight shared value violations, even across great distances. By expressing sympathy for Ukraine while voicing its own fear of China’s Indo–Pacific ambitions, Japan has confirmed its place on the side of the Euro–Atlantic security community.

In terms of the broader relevance of our case, the following points merit mentioning. First, this article – and other contributions to the special issue – extend to a new actor the empirical application of conceptual frameworks that utilise the notion of emotions.

Second, although the why question is not of primary concern in this article, the analysis of Japan’s DoS towards Ukraine directs our attention towards the significance of strategic concerns in the official emotional responses of states, as mentioned earlier in the text. The unequivocal condemnation of Russia and its actions in Ukraine combined with the commendation of Ukraine’s resistance and perseverance have allowed Japan to demonstrate its commitment to a victim of unprovoked international aggression. On the other hand, Japan has not used equally emotional language while providing its response to other conflicts inflicting horrendous human toll, such as the Gaza War (2023 onwards) or the Myanmar civil war (2021 onwards). Although for now the DoS towards Ukraine constitutes a singular case, it may yet become a diplomatic blueprint of Japan’s future responses to conflicts abroad impacting states that Japan considers to be ‘like-minded’ partners – or sufficiently ‘like-minded’ partners – adjacent states, as in the case of Ukraine.

Third, the case of Japan’s DoS towards Ukraine offers glimpses of how a former aggressor state with a contested record of addressing its own wartime past engages in diplomacy of sympathy towards a country victimised by armed aggression. The article demonstrates some of the challenges inherent in crafting DoS from this vantage point, yet further research is needed to systematically investigate the links between Japan’s collective memory and its symbolic and tangible expressions of sympathy to countries – such as Ukraine – stricken by man-made crises.

Finally, in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy, the country’s DoS towards Ukraine constitutes an illustrative example of how the country has pursued value-based diplomacy, cultivating its identity as an active and engaged defender of democratic ideals and the rules-based world order.