״בַּמְּאֵרָה אַתֶּם נֵאָרִים וְאֹתִי אַתֶּם קֹבְעִים הַגּוֹי כֻּלּוֹ״, אִי אִיכָּא גּוֹי כּוּלּוֹ — אִין, אִי לָא — לָא. It is the verse: “You are cursed with the curse, yet you rob Me, even this whole nation” (Malachi 3:9). This teaches that if there is the acceptance of the whole nation, yes, an ordinance may be instituted, but if not, no, the ordinance may not be instituted.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר בָּאלִי אָמַר אֲבִימִי נִוְתָאָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: פִּיתָּן וְשַׁמְנָן, יֵינָן וּבְנוֹתֵיהֶן — כּוּלָּן מִשְּׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר דָּבָר הֵן. בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן מַאי הִיא? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: גָּזְרוּ עַל בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן נִידּוֹת מֵעֲרִיסוֹתָן. § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Balei says that Avimi of Nota says in the name of Rav: The prohibitions with regard to gentiles’ bread and their oil, their wine and their daughters, are all from the eighteen matters issued in a single day in the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel. The Gemara asks: With regard to their daughters, what is the decree? Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon their daughters that they should be classified as menstruating women from the time they are in their cradle, i.e., they decreed that from when they are young, gentile women are always considered to be menstruating.

וּגְנִיבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב אָמַר: כּוּלָּן מִשּׁוּם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה גָּזְרוּ בָּהֶן, דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב אַחָא בַּר אַדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: גָּזְרוּ עַל פִּיתָּן מִשּׁוּם שַׁמְנָן, מַאי אוּלְמֵיהּ דְּשֶׁמֶן מִפַּת? The Gemara presents another opinion. And Geneiva says in the name of Rav: Gentiles’ bread, oil, wine, and daughters were all decreed upon due to the concern that Jews might participate in idol worship with gentiles as a result of intermingling with them. As, when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They decreed a prohibition upon their bread due to their oil. The Gemara asks: In what way is the prohibition with regard to oil stronger than the prohibition with regard to bread? That is, why does the primary concern relate to the oil of gentiles rather than their bread?

אֶלָּא, עַל פִּיתָּן וְשַׁמְנָן מִשּׁוּם יֵינָן, וְעַל יֵינָן מִשּׁוּם בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן, וְעַל בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר, וְעַל דָּבָר אַחֵר מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר. The Gemara offers a different interpretation: Rather, they issued a decree prohibiting their bread and their oil due to their wine. And they issued the decree prohibiting their wine due to the fact that this leads to familiarity, and Jews will come to marry their daughters. And they issued a decree prohibiting their daughters due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else, which will be explained by the Gemara.

בְּנוֹתֵיהֶן, דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא, דִּכְתִיב: ״לֹא תִתְחַתֵּן בָּם״, דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא שִׁבְעָה גּוֹיִם, אֲבָל שְׁאָר אוּמּוֹת — לָא, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ וּגְזוּר אֲפִילּוּ דִּשְׁאָר אוּמּוֹת. It was stated that the prohibition against marrying the daughters of gentiles was decreed on account of idolatry. The Gemara raises an objection: But the prohibition against marrying their daughters is prescribed by Torah law, as it is written: “Neither shall you make marriages with them” (Deuteronomy 7:3). The Gemara explains: By Torah law intermarriage is prohibited only with the seven Canaanite nations, but intermarriage with the other nations of the world is not prohibited, and the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that intermarriage is prohibited even with the other nations.

וּלְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַי, דְּאָמַר: ״כִּי יָסִיר אֶת בִּנְךָ מֵאַחֲרַי״ לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל הַמְּסִירוֹת, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא אִישׁוּת דֶּרֶךְ חַתְנוּת, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ גְּזוּר אֲפִילּוּ דֶּרֶךְ זְנוּת. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that the subsequent verse: “For he will turn away your son from following Me” (Deuteronomy 7:4) serves to include all who turn away one’s son from God, i.e., all gentiles, what is there to say? Rather, by Torah law only sexual relations by way of marriage are prohibited, and they came and decreed that sexual relations are prohibited even by way of licentiousness.

זְנוּת נָמֵי בְּבֵית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁם גָּזְרוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוּדָה הוֹצִיאוּהָ וְתִשָּׂרֵף״! The Gemara raises an objection: Licentious sexual intercourse was also prohibited earlier, as they decreed a prohibition in this regard in the court of Shem, as it is written: “It was told to Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot; and moreover, behold, she is with child by harlotry. And Judah said: Bring her forth, and let her be burned” (Genesis 38:24). This proves that the prohibition against licentious intercourse with a gentile was in force long before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.

אֶלָּא, דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא — גּוֹי הַבָּא עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּמָשְׁכָה בָּתְרֵיהּ; אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַגּוֹיָה — לָא, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ גְּזוּר אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַגּוֹיָה. The Gemara explains: Rather, the prohibition prescribed by Torah law applies to the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, as she is drawn after him toward idolatry, but the case of a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman is not included in the prohibition by Torah law. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that the prohibition applies even to a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman.

יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַגּוֹיָה — הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי הִיא, דְּאָמַר מָר: הַבּוֹעֵל אֲרַמִּית — קַנָּאִין פּוֹגְעִין בּוֹ. The Gemara rejects this: The prohibition concerning a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, not a rabbinic ordinance. As the Master said: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots may attack him, as Pinehas did to Zimri in the wilderness (see Numbers 25:6–8).

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא, וּכְמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ גְּזוּר אֲפִילּוּ בְּצִינְעָא. בְּצִינְעָא נָמֵי בֵּית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל חַשְׁמוֹנַאי גָּזְרוּ! He said to him: By Torah law intercourse with a gentile is prohibited in public, and only in situations like the incident that occurred, as described in Numbers, chapter 25. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that the prohibition applies even in private. The Gemara raises another difficulty: This was also prohibited in private, as the court of the Hasmoneans decreed that it is prohibited.

דְּכִי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל חַשְׁמוֹנַאי גָּזְרוּ, יִשְׂרָאֵל הַבָּא עַל הַגּוֹיָה חַיָּיב מִשּׁוּם נשג״א. As when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: The court of the Hasmoneans decreed that a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman bears liability for transgressing four prohibitions, represented by the mnemonic: Nun, shin, gimmel, alef. These letters stands for: Menstruating woman [nidda], maidservant [shifḥa], gentile [goya], and married woman [eshet ish]. By rabbinic law, a man who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman is considered to have violated the prohibitions involved in having intercourse with all four of these women.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר מִשּׁוּם נשג״ז. And when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: He bears liability for four prohibitions represented by the mnemonic: Nun, shin, gimmel, zayin, which stands for: Menstruating woman [nidda], maidservant [shifḥa], gentile [goya], and prostitute [zona]. In any case, it is apparent that this decree was in force before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.

כִּי גָּזְרוּ בֵּית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל חַשְׁמוֹנַאי בִּיאָה, אֲבָל יִיחוּד לָא, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ גְּזוּר אֲפִילּוּ יִיחוּד. יִיחוּד נָמֵי בֵּית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל דָּוִד גָּזְרוּ! The Gemara answers: When the court of the Hasmoneans decreed, they prohibited only sexual intercourse, but with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman, no, they did not prohibit that. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that even seclusion with a gentile woman is prohibited. The Gemara raises an objection: Seclusion was also prohibited earlier, as the court of King David decreed that with regard to this matter.

דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה גָּזְרוּ עַל יִיחוּד. אָמְרִי: הָתָם יִיחוּד דְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲבָל יִיחוּד דְּגוֹיָה — לָא, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ גְּזַרוּ אֲפִילּוּ אַיִּיחוּד דְּגוֹיָה. As Rav Yehuda says: At that time, after the incident involving Amnon and Tamar (see II Samuel 13:1–19), they decreed with regard to seclusion. The Sages said in response to the objection: There, in David’s court, seclusion with a Jewish woman was prohibited, but seclusion with a gentile woman was not prohibited. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed a prohibition even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman.

יִיחוּד דְּבַת יִשְׂרָאֵל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא! דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוֹצָדָק: רֶמֶז לְיִיחוּד מִן הַתּוֹרָה מִנַּיִן? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי יְסִיתְךָ אָחִיךָ בֶן אִמֶּךָ״, וְכִי בֶּן אֵם מֵסִית, בֶּן אָב אֵינוֹ מֵסִית? The Gemara raises yet another difficulty: Seclusion with a Jewish woman is prohibited by Torah law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Where is there an allusion in the Torah to the prohibition against seclusion? As it is stated: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” (Deuteronomy 13:7). And does only a half brother who is the son of a mother entice one to sin, whereas the son of a father does not entice?

אֶלָּא, בֵּן מִתְיַיחֵד עִם אִמּוֹ, וְאֵין אַחֵר מִתְיַיחֵד עִם כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה! Rather, there is a greater concern that a maternal half brother might entice one to sin, as a son secludes himself with his mother, and no other may seclude himself with any of those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah. Since an individual and his maternal half brother both seclude themselves with their shared mother, they are frequently together in private, and this facilitates enticement. In any case, it is clear that the prohibition against seclusion with a Jewish woman preceded King David.

יִיחוּד דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא דְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וַאֲתָא דָּוִד וּגְזַר אֲפִילּוּ אַיִּיחוּד דִּפְנוּיָה, וַאֲתוֹ תַּלְמִידֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל גְּזוּר אֲפִילּוּ אַיִּיחוּד דְּגוֹיָה. The Gemara explains: The prohibition against seclusion prescribed by Torah law applies specifically to a married woman, and David came and decreed a prohibition even with regard to seclusion with an unmarried woman. And later the students of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel came and decreed even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman.

מַאי עַל דָּבָר אַחֵר מִשּׁוּם דָּבָר אַחֵר? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: גָּזְרוּ עַל תִּינוֹק גּוֹי שֶׁיְּטַמֵּא בְּזִיבָה, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא תִּינוֹק יִשְׂרָאֵל רָגִיל אֶצְלוֹ בְּמִשְׁכַּב זְכוּר. § It was stated above that they issued a decree prohibiting the daughters of gentiles due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon a male gentile child that he imparts ritual impurity as though he were a Jew who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva], so that a Jewish child will not become familiar with him, leading to homosexual intercourse. The Sages employed a euphemism when referring to this decree.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: צַעַר גָּדוֹל הָיָה לִי אֵצֶל רַבִּי אַסִּי, וְרַבִּי אַסִּי אֵצֶל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֵצֶל רַבִּי יַנַּאי, וְרַבִּי יַנַּאי אֵצֶל רַבִּי נָתָן בֶּן עַמְרָם, וְרַבִּי נָתָן בֶּן עַמְרָם אֵצֶל רַבִּי: תִּינוֹק גּוֹי מֵאֵימָתַי מְטַמֵּא בְּזִיבָה? וְאָמַר לִי: בֶּן יוֹמוֹ, וּכְשֶׁבָּאתִי אֵצֶל רַבִּי חִיָּיא אָמַר לִי: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד. As Rabbi Zeira says: I had great trouble with Rabbi Asi when I asked him the following question, and likewise Rabbi Asi experienced trouble with Rabbi Yoḥanan when he posed it to him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan had trouble with Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai had trouble with Rabbi Natan ben Amram, and Rabbi Natan ben Amram had trouble with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The inquiry was as follows: With regard to a male gentile child, from when, i.e., from what age, does he impart ritual impurity as one who experiences ziva? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to me: From when he is one day old. And when I came to Rabbi Ḥiyya, he said to me: From when he is nine years and one day old.

וּכְשֶׁבָּאתִי וְהִרְצֵיתִי דְּבָרַי לִפְנֵי רַבִּי, אָמַר לִי: הַנַּח דְּבָרַי וֶאֱחוֹז דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא. דְּאָמַר: תִּינוֹק גּוֹי אֵימָתַי מְטַמֵּא בְּזִיבָה — בֶּן תֵּשַׁע שָׁנִים וְיוֹם אֶחָד, And when I came back and relayed Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he said to me: Discard my statement, and grasp the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who says: From when does a gentile child impart ritual impurity as one who experiences ziva? From when he is nine years and one day old.

פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הַאי יָדַע לְאַרְגּוֹלֵי, וְהָא לָא יָדְעָה לְאַרְגּוֹלֵי? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara explains: It was necessary to state this ruling, lest you say that the halakha that a gentile who is suited for intercourse imparts impurity does not apply to a female. The possible difference between a male and female child is based on the fact that whereas that child, a nine-year-old male gentile, knows how to accustom others to sin by employing persuasion, this child, a three-year-old female gentile, does not know how to accustom others to sin until she matures. Therefore, Ravina teaches us that the halakha nevertheless applies to both male and female children.

מִיסְתְּמִיךְ וְאָזֵיל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה נְשִׂיאָה אַכַּתְפֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׂמְלַאי שַׁמָּעֵיהּ, אָמַר לוֹ: שִׂמְלַאי, לֹא הָיִיתָ אֶמֶשׁ בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ כְּשֶׁהִתַּרְנוּ אֶת הַשֶּׁמֶן. אָמַר לוֹ: בְּיָמֵינוּ תַּתִּיר אַף אֶת הַפַּת! אָמַר לוֹ: אִם כֵּן קָרוּ לַן ״בֵּית דִּינָא שָׁרְיָא״! דִּתְנַן: הֵעִיד רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן יוֹעֶזֶר אִישׁ צְרֵידָה עַל אַיַּיל קַמְצָא דְּכַן, וְעַל מַשְׁקֵה בֵּית מַטְבְּחַיָּא דְּכַן, וְעַל דְּיִקְרַב לְמִיתָא מְסָאַב, וְקָרוּ לֵיהּ ״יוֹסֵף שָׁרְיָא״. The Gemara relates a relevant incident: Rabbi Yehuda Nesia was traveling while leaning upon the shoulder of Rabbi Simlai, his attendant. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: Simlai, you were not in the study hall last night when we permitted the oil of gentiles. Rabbi Simlai said to him: In our days, you will permit bread of gentiles as well. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: If so, people will call us a permissive court. As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the eil kamtza, a type of locust, that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, as soon explained by the Gemara. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם שְׁרָא תְּלָת, וּמַר שְׁרָא חֲדָא, וְאִי שָׁרֵי מָר חֲדָא אַחֲרִיתִי, אַכַּתִּי תַּרְתֵּין הוּא דְּהָוְיָין! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא [נָמֵי] שְׁרַאי אַחֲרִיתִי. מַאי הִיא? Rabbi Simlai said to him: There, Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted three matters, but the Master has permitted only one, and even if the Master permits one other matter, these will still constitute only two permissive rulings. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: I have already permitted another matter. The Gemara asks: What is the other matter that he permitted?

דִּתְנַן: זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן עַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ — אֵינוֹ גֵּט, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְרַבּוֹתֵינוּ הִתִּירוּהָ לִינָּשֵׂא, וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן ״רַבּוֹתֵינוּ״? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בֵּית דִּינָא דִּשְׁרוֹ מִשְׁחָא. The Gemara explains that this is as we learned in a mishna (Gittin 76b) that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not arrive from now until twelve months’ time, and he died within twelve months, then it is not a valid bill of divorce because it would not take effect until after the husband’s death. And it is taught with regard to that mishna that our Rabbis nevertheless permitted her to marry. The Gemara continues: And we say: Who is the mishna referring to when it mentions our Rabbis? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is referring to the court that permitted the oil of gentiles.

סָבְרִי לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא הוֹרָה, וְלֹא הוֹדוּ לוֹ כׇּל שְׁעָתוֹ, וְאָמְרִי לָהּ: כׇּל סִיעָתוֹ. Tangentially, the Gemara examines the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court concerning a bill of divorce. They hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. In other words, the bill of divorce takes effect at the time written on it. Therefore, the divorce actually goes into effect before the husband’s death, because it is retroactively initiated on the day that the bill was issued. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: In an earlier period, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled that the bill of divorce should be valid, but the other Sages did not concede to his opinion during his entire lifetime [sha’ato]. And some say that all of his colleagues [si’ato] did not concede to his opinion.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר) [אֶלְעָזָר] לְהָהוּא סָבָא: כִּי שְׁרִיתוּהָ — לְאַלְתַּר שְׁרִיתוּהָ, דְּלָא אָתֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ, דְּהָא אִיקַּיַּים לֵיהּ תְּנָאֵיהּ? Rabbi Elazar said to a certain elderly man, who was a member of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court: When you permitted this woman to remarry, did you permit her immediately after the husband died, as he certainly will not arrive within the twelve months, or perhaps you permitted her only after twelve months, because only then was the condition fulfilled?

וְתִיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַמַּתְנִיתִין, דִּתְנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם לֹא בָּאתִי מִכָּאן עַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ״, וּמֵת בְּתוֹךְ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ — הָוֵי גֵּט, דְּהָא אִיקַּיַּים לֵיהּ תְּנַאי. That elderly man said to Rabbi Elazar: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to the mishna itself, as we learned in the next line of the mishna in Gittin: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until twelve months have elapsed, and he died within twelve months, this is a valid bill of divorce. The reason is that its condition was fulfilled, as the husband stated explicitly that the bill takes effect immediately.

וְתִיבְּעֵי לָךְ: לְאַלְתַּר הָוֵי גִּיטָּא, דְּהָא לָא אֲתָא, אוֹ דִּלְמָא לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֶשׁ, דְּהָא אִיקַּיַּים לֵיהּ תְּנָאֵיהּ? אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דַּהֲוֵית בְּהָהוּא מִנְיָינָא. He explains: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to this case: Is the bill of divorce valid immediately upon the husband’s death because he will certainly not arrive? Or perhaps the bill of divorce is valid only after twelve months have elapsed, because only then is his condition fulfilled? Rabbi Elazar answered: Yes, it is indeed so; this question can be asked with regard to the case of the mishna itself. The Gemara adds: But Rabbi Elazar asked that elder about the decision of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court because he was present at that assembly, and therefore he could report on what had actually occurred.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים ״לִכְשֶׁתֵּצֵא חַמָּה מִנַּרְתִּיקָהּ״ — לְכִי נָפְקָא קָאָמַר לַהּ, וְכִי מָיֵית בְּלֵילְיָא — גֵּט לְאַחַר מִיתָה הוּא. Abaye says: All concede that one who says that a bill of divorce will take effect once the sun emerges from its sheath is saying to his wife that it will be valid once the sun comes out in the morning. And therefore, if the husband dies during the night, before sunrise, it is a posthumous bill of divorce, which is invalid.

״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּצֵא חַמָּה מִנַּרְתִּיקָהּ״ — מֵעַכְשָׁיו קָאָמַר לָהּ, וְכִי מָיֵית בְּלֵילְיָא — הָא וַדַּאי תְּנָאָה הָוֵי, וְגֵט מֵחַיִּים הוּא, כִּדְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי. Furthermore, if he said to her: On the condition that the sun will come out of its sheath, then he is saying to his wife that the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively from now, on the condition that the sun emerges. And accordingly, if he dies during the night, this is certainly a fulfilled condition, and it is a bill of divorce which takes effect retroactively, while he is alive; in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna says: With regard to anyone who states a provision employing the language: On the condition, it is tantamount to his stating in the provision that the document takes effect retroactively from now.

לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּ״אִם תֵּצֵא״, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּ״מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי״, כְּ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם מַתִּי״, וְרַבָּנַן לֵית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ אִם מַתִּי״ גְּרֵידָא. They disagreed only in the case of one who said to his wife: This will be your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath, and the husband died during the night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and it is therefore considered as though the husband said: From today if I die, or as though he said: From now if I die. And the Sages do not accept the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and consequently they maintain that it is considered as though the husband said only: This is your bill of divorce if I die, in which case the bill of divorce is not valid, as it would take effect only after the husband’s death.

גּוּפָא: הֵעִיד יוֹסֵי בֶּן יוֹעֶזֶר אִישׁ צְרֵידָה עַל אַיַּיל קַמְצָא דְּכַן, וְעַל מַשְׁקֵה בֵּי מַטְבְּחַיָּא דְּכַן, וְעַל דְּיִקְרַב לְמִיתָא מְסָאַב, וְקָרוּ לֵיהּ ״יוֹסֵף שָׁרְיָא״. מַאי אַיַּיל קַמְצָא? רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: שׁוֹשִׁיבָא, וְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא אָמַר: סוּסְבִּיל. § The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the eil kamtza that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara asks: What is the eil kamtza? Rav Pappa says: It is a long-headed locust called shoshiva, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla: It is a locust called susbil.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: שׁוֹשִׁיבָא, וְקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּרֹאשׁוֹ אָרוֹךְ. מָר סָבַר: רֹאשׁוֹ אָרוֹךְ אָסוּר, וּמָר סָבַר: רֹאשׁוֹ אָרוֹךְ מוּתָּר. רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא אָמַר: The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa says it is a shoshiva, and accordingly Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the other Rabbis disagree with regard to a long-headed locust: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a long-headed locust is prohibited, and one Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that a long-headed locust is permitted. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla that

סוּסְבִּיל, בְּרֹאשׁוֹ אָרוֹךְ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּאָסוּר, וְהָכָא בִּכְנָפָיו חוֹפִין אֶת רוּבּוֹ עַל יְדֵי הַדְּחָק קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר רוּבָּא כֹּל דְּהוּ בָּעֵינַן, וּמָר סָבַר רוּבָּא דְּמִנְּכַר בָּעֵינַן. it is a susbil, and accordingly, with regard to a long-headed locust, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. And here they disagree with regard to a locust whose wings barely cover most of its body: One Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that we require only a minimal majority of the locust’s body to be covered by its wings, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we require a noticeable majority of the body to be covered.

וְעַל מַשְׁקֵה בֵּי מַטְבְּחַיָּא דְּכַן. מַאי ״דְּכַן״? רַב אָמַר: דְּכַן מַמָּשׁ, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: דְּכַן מִלְּטַמֵּא אֲחֵרִים, אֲבָל טוּמְאַת עַצְמָן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן. § It was stated above: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure. The Gemara asks: What did Yosei ben Yo’ezer mean when he said they are pure? Rav says: He meant that they are actually ritually pure. And Shmuel says: They are pure in the sense that they do not impart ritual impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity.

רַב אָמַר: ״דְּכַן מַמָּשׁ״, קָסָבַר: טוּמְאַת מַשְׁקִין דְּרַבָּנַן, וְכִי גְּזוּר רַבָּנַן טוּמְאָה בְּמַשְׁקִין דְּעָלְמָא, אֲבָל בְּמַשְׁקֵה בֵּי מַטְבְּחַיָּא לָא גְּזַרוּ רַבָּנַן. The Gemara explains the reasons for these opinions. Rav says that these liquids are actually pure, as he maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids applies by rabbinic law, and when the Sages decreed impurity upon liquids, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But the Sages did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: דְּכַן מִלְּטַמֵּא אֲחֵרִים, אֲבָל טוּמְאַת עַצְמָן יֵשׁ בָּהֶן, קָסָבַר: טוּמְאַת מַשְׁקִין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לְטַמֵּא אֲחֵרִים דְּרַבָּנַן, וְכִי גְּזַרוּ רַבָּנַן בְּמַשְׁקִין דְּעָלְמָא, בְּמַשְׁקִין בֵּי מַטְבְּחַיָּא לָא גְּזַרוּ. And Shmuel says: The liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not impart impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity, as Shmuel maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids themselves is by Torah law, whereas their capacity to impart impurity to other substances is by rabbinic law. And when the Sages issued this decree, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But they did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.

וְעַל דְּיִקְרַב לְמִיתָא מְסָאַב, וְקָרוּ לֵיהּ ״יוֹסֵף שָׁרְיָא״. ״יוֹסֵף אָסְרָא״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! וְעוֹד, דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע עַל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב אוֹ בְמֵת וְגוֹ׳״! § It was stated: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, and as a result they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara questions this: Since he issued a stringent ruling, they should have called him: Yosef the Prohibiting. And furthermore, this halakha is explicitly written in the Torah, as it is written: “And whosoever in the open field touches one that is slain with a sword, or one that is dead, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:16).

דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּיִקְרַב — טָמֵא, דְּיִקְרַב בִּדְיִקְרַב — טָהוֹר, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ וּגְזוּר אֲפִילּוּ דְּיִקְרַב בִּדְיִקְרַב, וַאֲתָא אִיהוּ וְאוֹקְמַהּ אַדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. The Gemara explains: By Torah law one who touches a corpse is ritually impure, but one who touches another who has touched a corpse is pure. And the Sages came and decreed that even one who touches another who has touched a corpse is also impure. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the halakha in accordance with the original, more lenient Torah law.

דְּיִקְרַב בִּדְיִקְרַב נָמֵי דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בּוֹ הַטָּמֵא יִטְמָא״! The Gemara raises a difficulty: One who touches another who has touched a corpse is also rendered impure by Torah law, as it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22).

אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא, מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּמָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, דְּאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא דְּיִקְרַב בִּדְיִקְרַב, בְּחִיבּוּרִין — טוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה, שֶׁלֹּא בְּחִיבּוּרִין — טוּמְאַת עֶרֶב, וַאֲתוֹ אִינְהוּ וּגְזוּר אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּחִיבּוּרִין טוּמְאַת שִׁבְעָה, וַאֲתָא אִיהוּ וְאוֹקְמַהּ אַדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. The Sages stated this difficulty before Rava in the name of Mar Zutra, the son of Rav Naḥman, who said a response in the name of Rav Naḥman: By Torah law, one who touches another who touches a corpse while the second individual is in concurrent contact with the corpse is impure with seven-day impurity. If this occurs while the second individual is not in concurrent contact with the corpse, he contracts impurity until the evening. And the Sages came and decreed that even where there is no concurrent contact, one still contracts seven-day impurity when he touches someone who touched a corpse. And subsequently Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the halakha in accordance with the original Torah law.

דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מַאי הִיא? דִּכְתִיב: ״הַנֹּגֵעַ בְּמֵת לְכׇל נֶפֶשׁ אָדָם וְטָמֵא שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בּוֹ הַטָּמֵא יִטְמָא״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ הַנֹּגַעַת תִּטְמָא עַד הָעָרֶב״, הָא כֵּיצַד? The Gemara asks: What is the source of this halakha, prescribed by Torah law? As it is written: “He that touches the dead, even any man’s dead body, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:11), and it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22). These two verses indicate that one contracts ritual impurity for seven days. And yet it is also written: “And the soul that touches him shall be impure until evening” (Numbers 19:22). How can these texts be reconciled?

כָּאן בְּחִיבּוּרִין, כָּאן שֶׁלֹּא בְּחִיבּוּרִין. The Gemara answers: Here, in the first two verses, the Torah is discussing concurrent contact, which results in impurity of seven days; there, in the last verse, it is discussing a case where there is no concurrent contact, and therefore the individual in question is impure only until the evening.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: לָאו אָמֵינָא לְכוּ לָא תִּתְלוֹ בֵּיהּ בּוּקֵי סְרִיקֵי בְּרַב נַחְמָן? הָכִי אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: סְפֵק טוּמְאָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים הִתִּיר לָהֶן. Rava said to the Sages who suggested that explanation citing Rav Naḥman: Didn’t I tell you not to hang empty pitchers [bukei] upon Rav Naḥman, i.e., not to attribute incorrect statements to him? Rather, this is what Rav Naḥman said: Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted for them a case of uncertain impurity contracted in a public domain. In other words, Yosei ben Yo’ezer ruled leniently that one who is unsure whether or not he came in contact with a corpse in the public domain is ritually pure.

וְהָא הִלְכְתָא מִסּוֹטָה גָּמְרִינַן לַהּ, מָה סוֹטָה רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד, אַף טוּמְאָה רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד! The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn this halakha from the case of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota]: Just as a sota can be made to drink the bitter waters only when she is suspected of engaging in adultery in a private domain, so too, uncertain ritual impurity is considered impure only when one suspects that he came into contact with it in a private domain? This shows that even by Torah law one who is unsure whether or not he touched a corpse in the public domain remains pure.

הָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה וְאֵין מוֹרִין כֵּן, וַאֲתָא אִיהוּ וְאוֹרִי לֵיהּ אוֹרוֹיֵי. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in explanation: This is the halakha, but a public ruling is not issued to that effect. Consequently, the masses treated this matter with stringency. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and instructed the masses to follow the original instruction of the Torah. Therefore, his ruling was in fact a leniency.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר, קוֹרוֹת נָעַץ לָהֶם, וְאָמַר: עַד כָּאן רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, עַד כָּאן רְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד. כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי, אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָא מַיָּא בְּשִׁיקַעְתָּא דִּבְנַהֲרָא, זִילוּ טְבוּלוּ. The Gemara provides support for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation. This is also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that Yosei ben Yo’ezer drove stakes into the ground for the people and said: Until here is the public domain, and until there is the private domain, so that they would know the halakha if they suspected that they had touched a corpse. The Gemara relates that when people came before Rabbi Yannai because they suspected that they might have come into contact with a source of impurity in the public domain, he said to them: Why involve yourselves in matters of uncertainty? There is deep water in the river; go immerse yourselves in it, and resolve the problem in this manner.

וְהַשְּׁלָקוֹת. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אָמַר קְרָא ״אֹכֶל בַּכֶּסֶף תַּשְׁבִּרֵנִי וְאָכַלְתִּי וּמַיִם בַּכֶּסֶף תִּתֶּן לִי וְשָׁתִיתִי״, כַּמָּיִם — מָה מַיִם שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנּוּ, אַף אוֹכֶל שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנָּה. § The mishna teaches: And boiled vegetables prepared by gentiles are prohibited. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse states that when Moses asked Sihon, King of the Amorites, for passage through his land, he said: “You shall sell me food for money, that I may eat; and give me water for money, that I may drink” (Deuteronomy 2:28). By juxtaposing food and water, the verse teaches that food is like water: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was unchanged, so too, he wished to purchase food that was unchanged, i.e., uncooked. Evidently, this is because foods cooked by gentiles are prohibited.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חִטִּין וַעֲשָׂאָן קְלָיוֹת — הָכִי נָמֵי דַּאֲסוּרִין? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתַנְיָא: חִיטִּין וַעֲשָׂאָן קְלָיוֹת — מוּתָּרִין! אֶלָּא, כְּמַיִם — מָה מַיִם שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנּוּ מִבְּרִיָּיתָן, אַף אוֹכֶל שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנָּה מִבְּרִיָּיתוֹ. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, then in a case where a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains by roasting it in the oven, the wheat should also be prohibited, as it was cooked. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the halakha, as isn’t it taught in baraita: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted? The Gemara suggests a different explanation: Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state. Roasting wheat kernels does not alter their original state.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חִיטִּין וּטְחָנָן הָכִי נָמֵי דַּאֲסוּרִין? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָתַנְיָא: חִיטִּין וַעֲשָׂאָן קְלָיוֹת, הַקְּמָחִים וְהַסְּלָתוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן מוּתָּרִין! אֶלָּא כַּמָּיִם — מָה מַיִם שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנּוּ מִבְּרִיָּיתָן עַל יְדֵי הָאוּר, אַף אוֹכֶל שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּנָּה מִבְּרִיָּיתוֹ עַל יְדֵי הָאוּר. The Gemara raises another difficulty: If that is so, then if a gentile had wheat and ground it into flour, the flour should also be prohibited, as the wheat has been altered from its original state. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the case, as isn’t it taught in baraita: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted; similarly, flours and fine flours belonging to gentiles are permitted? Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state by fire, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state by fire. Although wheat ground into flour is altered from its original state, this change is not accomplished by means of fire.

מִידֵּי אוּר כְּתִיב? The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is fire written in the verse? There is no mention of fire in the verse at all. How can it be assumed that this is the similarity between water and food?

אֶלָּא מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא. Rather, the cooking of gentiles is prohibited by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support.

אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב: כָּל הַנֶּאֱכָל כְּמוֹת שֶׁהוּא חַי — אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם. בְּסוּרָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי, בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא מַתְנוּ הָכִי: אָמַר רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק אָמַר רַב: כׇּל שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֶאֱכָל עַל שׁוּלְחַן מְלָכִים לְלַפֵּת בּוֹ אֶת הַפַּת — אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם. The Gemara discusses the particulars of the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is eaten as it is, i.e., raw, is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. The Gemara remarks: In the study hall in Sura, they taught it this way. In Pumbedita, they taught it like this: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is not eaten together with bread on the table of kings is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. In other words, foods that are not eaten by distinguished individuals are not subject to this prohibition.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ: דָּגִים קְטַנִּים, וְאַרְדֵי, וְדַיְיסָא. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two opinions? The practical difference between them is with regard to small fish, mushrooms, and porridge. These foods are not eaten raw, but they are not eaten by distinguished individuals. Consequently, these foods are prohibited according to the version taught in Sura, but permitted according to the version taught in Pumbedita.

אָמַר רַב אַסִּי אָמַר רַב: דָּגִים קְטַנִּים מְלוּחִים אֵין בָּהֶן מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אִם צְלָאָן גּוֹי סוֹמֵךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל עֲלֵיהֶם מִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי תַבְשִׁילִין, וְאִי עַבְדִינְהוּ גּוֹי כָּסָא דְּהַרְסָנָא — אָסוּר. Rav Asi says that Rav says: Small, salted fish are not subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles, because they can be eaten raw. Rav Yosef says: If a gentile roasted these fish, a Jew may rely upon them for use in the mitzva of a joining of cooked foods, which must be prepared in order to permit cooking for Shabbat on a Festival that occurs on a Friday. And if a gentile made them into kasa deharsena, a dish of fish fried in oil and flour, the dish is prohibited. In this case, since the flour had not been edible, it is considered the cooked food of a gentile.

פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הַרְסָנָא עִיקָּר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: קִימְחָא עִיקָּר. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? What reason would there be to think that kasa deharsena prepared by a gentile is permitted? The Gemara answers: This is taught lest you say that the salted fish, which one is permitted to eat even if cooked by gentiles, is the essential component. Therefore, Rav Yosef teaches us that the flour is the essential component, and the dish is therefore considered the cooked food of a gentile.

אָמַר רַב בְּרוֹנָא אָמַר רַב: גּוֹי שֶׁהִצִּית אֶת הָאוּר בַּאֲגַם — כָּל הַחֲגָבִים שֶׁבָּאֲגַם אֲסוּרִין. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא יָדַע הֵי טָהוֹר וְהֵי טָמֵא, מַאי אִירְיָא גּוֹי? אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם. Rav Beruna says that Rav says: In the case of a gentile who ignited a fire in the meadow, all the locusts that were burned in the meadow are prohibited. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that the reason they are prohibited is that one no longer knows which are kosher and which are non-kosher as a result of their burning, why does Rav Beruna specifically discuss a case involving a gentile? Even if a Jew burned the meadow, they would also be prohibited for the same reason. Rather, this is referring to a case where all the locusts were kosher, and the prohibition is due to the cooking of gentiles, as the locusts were effectively cooked by a gentile.

כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי אֲסִיר? וְהָאָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי פְּדָת אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַאי גּוֹי דְּחָרֵיךְ רֵישָׁא שְׁרֵי לְמֵיכַל מִינֵּיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ מֵרֵישׁ אוּנֵּיהּ. אַלְמָא לְעַבּוֹרֵי שֵׂעָר קָמִיכַּוֵּין, הָכָא נָמֵי לְגַלּוֹיֵי אַגְמָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין! The Gemara raises an objection: Does anyone actually prohibit the cooking of gentiles in a case like this? But doesn’t Rav Ḥanan bar Ami say that Rabbi Pedat says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to this gentile who singed the head of an animal, it is permitted to eat part of it, even from the tip of the ear, which is fully cooked? The Gemara remarks: Evidently, this is permitted because the gentile merely intends to remove the hair and not to cook the ears. Here, too, it ought to be permitted because he merely intends to clear the meadow, not to cook the locusts.

לְעוֹלָם, דְּלָא יָדַע הֵי טָהוֹר וְהֵי טָמֵא, וּמַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה בְּגוֹי הָיָה. The Gemara answers: Actually, this is referring to a case where there is a mixture of different types of locusts, and they are prohibited because one does not know which are kosher and which are non-kosher. And the reason Rav Beruna specified that the case involved a gentile is because the incident that occurred happened to have occurred with the involvement of a gentile.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַאי גּוֹי דְּחָרֵיךְ רֵישָׁא — שְׁרֵי לְמֵיכַל מִינֵּיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ מֵרֵישׁ אוּנֵּיה. אָמַר רָבִינָא: הִלְכָּךְ, הַאי גּוֹי דִּשְׁדָא סִיכְּתָא לְאַתּוּנָא, וּקְבַר בָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל קָרָא מֵעִיקָּרָא — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לְבַשּׁוֹלֵי מָנָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: לְשָׁרוֹרֵי מָנָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין. § The Gemara addresses the matter itself: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to this gentile who singed the head of an animal, it is permitted to eat part of it, even from the tip of the ear, which is fully cooked. Ravina said: Therefore, with regard to this gentile who threw a moist peg into the oven in order to dry it out and harden it, and a Jew had already inserted a gourd in the oven from the outset, the gourd is permitted, even though it was in effect cooked by a gentile. The reason is that the gentile had no intention to cook the vegetable. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach this, lest you say that the gentile intends to cook the vessel, i.e., the peg, by softening it. Therefore Ravina teaches us that he intends only to harden the vessel.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הִנִּיחַ יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים, וּבָא גּוֹי וְהִפֵּךְ בּוֹ — מוּתָּר. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִי לָא הַפֵּךְ בֵּיהּ הֲוָה בְּשִׁיל — פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא לָאו דְּאִי לָא הַפֵּךְ לָא הֲוָה בְּשִׁיל, אַמַּאי מוּתָּר? בִּישּׁוּלֵי שֶׁל גּוֹיִם נִינְהוּ! § The Gemara continues the discussion with regard to the cooking of gentiles by examining the halakha of meat cooked by both a gentile and a Jew. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If a Jew placed meat upon flaming coals and a gentile came and turned the meat over, the meat is permitted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is a case where if the gentile had not turned over the meat it would have cooked anyway, it is obvious that the meat is permitted, as the gentile’s actions did not actually alter the food. The Gemara suggests: Rather, is it not a case where, if the gentile had not turned it over, it would not have cooked? But if so, why is it permitted? In such a case, the meat is certainly considered to be the cooking of gentiles and ought to be prohibited.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי לָא הַפֵּךְ הֲוָה בְּשִׁיל בְּתַרְתֵּי שָׁעֵי, וְהַשְׁתָּא קָא בְשִׁיל בַּחֲדָא שַׁעְתָּא, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: קָרוֹבֵי בִּישּׁוּלָא מִילְּתָא הִיא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha with regard to a case where if the gentile had not turned over the meat, it would have cooked in two hours, and now that he did turn it over, it will cook in only one hour. Lest you say that hastening the cooking process is a significant matter, and therefore food whose preparation is expedited by a gentile is prohibited, Ravina teaches us otherwise.

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל שֶׁהוּא כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי — אֵין בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם, הָא אֵינוֹ כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוֹסַאי — יֵשׁ בּוֹ מִשּׁוּם בִּשּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם! The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Any item that has been cooked like the food of ben Derosai, i.e., partially cooked so that it is just about edible, is not subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles? Consequently, if it is not cooked like the food of ben Derosai, it is subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles. Accordingly, meat whose cooking was expedited by a gentile ought to be prohibited, as this ruling includes cases where it had not been cooked like the food of ben Derosai at the time of the gentile’s intervention.

הָתָם, כְּגוֹן דְּאוֹתְבֵיהּ בְּסִילְתָּא, וְשַׁקְלֵיהּ גּוֹי וְאוֹתְבֵיהּ בְּתַנּוּרָא. The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Asi was referring to a case where the Jew had placed the meat that was not yet cooked like the food of ben Derosai in a basket where it would not have cooked at all, and a gentile took it and placed it in the oven. Rabbi Asi was teaching that in such a case, when the current cooking process has yet to begin, the meat is prohibited if it had not already been cooked like the food of ben Derosai. By contrast, in the case addressed by Rabbi Yehuda, the meat was already cooking and the gentile’s actions hastened the process, but did not initiate it. In other words, the issue of cooked food like the food of ben Derosai is relevant only if the gentile takes a dish that is not being cooked at present.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מַנִּיחַ יִשְׂרָאֵל בָּשָׂר עַל גַּבֵּי גֶּחָלִים, וּבָא גּוֹי וּמְהַפֵּךְ בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא יִשְׂרָאֵל מִבֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת אוֹ מִבֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. שׁוֹפֶתֶת אִשָּׁה קְדֵירָה עַל גַּבֵּי כִּירָה, וּבָאת גּוֹיָה The Gemara adds: This is also taught in a baraita: A Jew may place meat on hot coals and let a gentile come and turn it over as necessary until the Jew comes back from the synagogue or from the study hall, and the Jew need not be concerned for the prohibition of eating cooking of gentiles. Similarly, a Jewish woman may set a pot upon the stove and let a gentile woman come

וּמְגִיסָה, עַד שֶׁתָּבֹא מִבֵּית הַמֶּרְחָץ אוֹ מִבֵּית הַכְּנֶסֶת, וְאֵינָהּ חוֹשֶׁשֶׁת. and stir it until she comes back from the bathhouse or from the synagogue, and she need not be concerned.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הִנִּיחַ גּוֹי וְהִפֵּךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַהוּ? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: קַל וָחוֹמֶר — גְּמָרוֹ בְּיַד גּוֹי מוּתָּר, גְּמָרוֹ בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a gentile placed meat on a fire and a Jew turned it over, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The halakha can be derived by an a fortiori inference: If the meat is permitted when it finished cooking by the hand of a gentile, then where it finished cooking by the hand of a Jew, all the more so is it not clear that it should be permitted?

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בֵּין שֶׁהִנִּיחַ גּוֹי וְהָפַךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל, בֵּין שֶׁהִנִּיחַ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְהָפַךְ גּוֹי — מוּתָּר, וְאֵינוֹ אָסוּר עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא תְּחִלָּתוֹ וּגְמָרוֹ בְּיַד גּוֹי. Along these lines, it was also stated: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say Rav Aḥa bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whether the gentile placed the meat on the fire and the Jew turned it over, or whether the Jew placed the meat on the fire and the gentile turned it over, the meat is permitted, and it is not prohibited unless its cooking from beginning to end was performed by the hand of a gentile.

אָמַר רָבִינָא, הִלְכְתָא: הָא רִיפְתָּא דִּשְׁגַר גּוֹי וַאֲפָה יִשְׂרָאֵל, אִי נָמֵי שְׁגַר יִשְׂרָאֵל וַאֲפָה גּוֹי, אִי נָמֵי שְׁגַר גּוֹי וַאֲפָה גּוֹי וַאֲתָא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְחַתִּה בַּהּ חַתּוֹיֵי — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי. Ravina says: The halakha is that this bread baked in an oven that a gentile lit and a Jew subsequently baked, or, alternatively, if a Jew lit the oven and a gentile baked, or, alternatively, even if a gentile lit, and a gentile baked, and a Jew came and stoked the coals to heat the fire, it is permitted, as the act of the Jew speeds up the baking process.

דָּג מָלִיחַ — חִזְקִיָּה שָׁרֵי, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָסַר. בֵּיצָה צְלוּיָה — בַּר קַפָּרָא שָׁרֵי, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָסַר. כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: אֶחָד דָּג מָלִיחַ וְאֶחָד בֵּיצָה צְלוּיָה — חִזְקִיָּה וּבַר קַפָּרָא שָׁרוּ, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָסַר. The Gemara continues: With regard to fish salted by a gentile, Ḥizkiyya deems it permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited. As for an egg roasted by a gentile, bar Kappara deems it permitted and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to both salted fish and roasted eggs, Ḥizkiyya and bar Kappara deem them permitted even if they were prepared by a gentile, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems them prohibited.

רַבִּי חִיָּיא פַּרְוָואָה אִיקְּלַע לְבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: בֵּיצָה צְלוּיָה מַאי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: חִזְקִיָּה וּבַר קַפָּרָא שָׁרוּ, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָסַר, וְאֵין דְּבָרָיו שֶׁל אֶחָד בִּמְקוֹם שְׁנַיִם. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב זְבִיד: לָא תְּצִיתוּ לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הִלְכְתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אַשְׁקְיוּהּ נָגוֹטָא דְּחַלָּא וְנָח נַפְשֵׁיהּ. The Gemara relates a relevant incident. Rabbi Ḥiyya of Parva arrived at the home of the Exilarch, whose attendants said to him: With regard to an egg roasted by a gentile, what is the halakha? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: Ḥizkiyya and bar Kappara deem it permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited, and the statement of one Sage has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two, i.e., the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan because he is in the minority. Rav Zevid said to them: Do not listen to him, as this is what Abaye said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Due to the stringency Rav Zevid sought to impose, the attendants gave Rav Zevid a cup [negota] of spiced vinegar to drink, and he died as a result.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַקַּפְרֵיסִין, וְהַקַּפְלוֹטוֹת, וְהַמִּטַלְיָא, וְהַחַמִּין, וְהַקְּלָיוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן — מוּתָּרִין, בֵּיצָה צְלוּיָה — אֲסוּרָה, שֶׁמֶן — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא וּבֵית דִּינוֹ נִמְנוּ עָלָיו וְהִתִּירוּהוּ. § The Gemara continues to discuss the halakhic status of various foods with regard to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. The Sages taught in a baraita: Caper buds [kafrisin], and leeks [kaflotot], and matalya, and hot water, and roasted grains that belong to gentiles and were cooked by them are permitted. An egg roasted by a gentile is prohibited. With regard to oil, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court were counted, i.e., voted on the matter, and permitted it.

תַּנְיָא: הִיא הַמִּטַלְיָא הִיא פַּשִׂלְיָא הִיא שִׁיעֲתָא. מַאי שִׁיעֲתָא? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָא אַרְבְּעִין שְׁנִין דְּנָפֵיק הַאי עוֹבָדָא מִמִּצְרַיִם, וְרַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה דִּידֵיהּ אָמַר: הָא שִׁתִּין שְׁנִין דְּנָפֵיק הַאי עוֹבָדָא מִמִּצְרַיִם, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי — מָר בִּשְׁנֵיהּ וּמָר בִּשְׁנֵיהּ. It is taught in a baraita: Matalya is the same as the black-eyed pea [pashalya], which is also called shiata. What is shiata? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is forty years since this item emerged from Egypt and was imported here. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana himself said: It is sixty years since this item emerged from Egypt and was imported here. The Gemara remarks: And they do not disagree, as one Sage issued his statement in his year, and the other Sage issued it in his year. Whereas sixty years had passed by the time of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, only forty had elapsed when Rabbi Yoḥanan issued his statement.

מַיְיתוּ בִּיזְרָא דְּכַרְפְּסָא וּבִיזְרָא דְּכִיתָּנָא וּבִיזְרָא דְּשַׁבְלִילְתָּא, וְתָרוּ לְהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי בְּפָשׁוֹרֵי, וְשָׁבְקוּ לֵיהּ עַד דִּמְקַבֵּל, וּמַיְיתֵי חַצְבֵי חַדְתֵי וּמָלוּ לְהוּ מַיָּא, וְתָרוּ בְּהוּ גַּרְגִּישְׁתָּא וּמְדַבְּקִין בֵּיהּ, וְעָיְילִין לְבֵי בָנֵי (אַדְּנָפְקוּ) [אַדְּנָפְקִי] מְלַבְלְבִי, וְאָכְלִי מִינַּיְיהוּ, וְקָיְירִי מִבִּינְתָּא דְּרֵישַׁיְיהוּ עַד טוּפְרָא דְּכַרְעַיְיהוּ. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אֲמַר לִי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מִילִּין, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: בְּמִילִין. The Gemara describes the preparation of shiata. They take parsley seeds and flax root and fenugreek root, and soak them together in lukewarm water, and leave them until they sprout. And then they take new earthenware pots, and fill them with water, and soak red clay [gargishta] in them, and then stick the seeds and roots in the clay. And after that they go to the bathhouse, and by the time they come out, the plants have blossomed, and they eat from them. And as they eat them, they cool down from the heat of the bathhouse from the hair of their head until the toenails of their feet. Rav Ashi says: Rabbi Ḥanina said to me: These are mere words, i.e., this is false, as it is impossible for the plants to blossom so quickly. And some say: This was performed by means of magic words that caused the plants to grow faster.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַכּוּסְפָּן שֶׁל גּוֹיִם שֶׁהוּחַמּוּ (חַמִּין) [חַמָּיו] בְּיוֹרָה גְּדוֹלָה — אָסוּר, בְּיוֹרָה קְטַנָּה — מוּתָּר. וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא יוֹרָה קְטַנָּה? אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: כֹּל שֶׁאֵין צִפּוֹר דְּרוֹר יָכוֹל לִיכָּנֵס בְּתוֹכָהּ. § The Sages taught in a baraita: The halakha with regard to date husks [kuspan] that belong to gentiles and that were heated in hot water depends on the size of the pot in which they were prepared: If they were cooked in a large pot they are prohibited, as prohibited foods are often cooked in large pots; if they were cooked in a small pot they are permitted, because non-kosher foods, which are usually large, are not generally cooked in these pots and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the pot has not absorbed a prohibited substance. The Gemara asks: And what is a small pot? Rabbi Yannai says: It is any pot that is so small that a swallow cannot enter into it.

וְדִלְמָא אַדְמוֹיֵי אַדְמוּהּ וְעַיְּילוּהּ! אֶלָּא, כֹּל שֶׁאֵין רֹאשׁ צִפּוֹר דְּרוֹר יָכוֹל לִיכָּנֵס בְּתוֹכָהּ. The Gemara challenges: But even if non-kosher foods are not generally cooked in pots of this size, perhaps they sliced the food into smaller pieces and inserted them into the small pot. Since large non-kosher foods can be cooked in small pots once they have been sliced, the concern should apply to these pots as well. The Gemara accepts this point and amends Rabbi Yannai’s definition: Rather, a small pot is any pot that is so small that a swallow’s head cannot enter into it. Such small pots would not be used to cook even sliced non-kosher foods.

וְהָתַנְיָא: אַחַת יוֹרָה גְּדוֹלָה וְאַחַת יוֹרָה קְטַנָּה מוּתָּר! לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר: נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם אָסוּר, הָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר: נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם מוּתָּר. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in any case, isn’t it taught in a baraita that food cooked in both a large pot and a small pot is permitted? This directly contradicts the baraita cited here, which permits only food cooked in a small pot. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult; this first baraita cited above is written in accordance with the one who says: A prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is prohibited, whereas that baraita mentioned here is written in accordance with the one who says: A prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is permitted.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַאי מִישְׁחָא שְׁלִיקָא דַּאֲרַמָּאֵי אָסוּר. אָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי מִשּׁוּם אִיעָרוֹבֵי — מִיסְרָא סְרֵי, אִי מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם — נֶאֱכָל הוּא כְּמוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַי, אִי מִשּׁוּם גִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם — נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם הוּא וּמוּתָּר. Rav Sheshet said: This oil that was cooked by an Aramean is prohibited. Rav Safra rejected this ruling and said: With regard to what need we be concerned? If it is due to the concern that it might have been mixed with wine used for an idolatrous libation, this cannot be correct, as wine ruins oil and therefore gentiles would not mix them together. If it is due to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles, this also cannot be true because oil is eaten as it is, i.e., raw. And if it is due to the oil being cooked in vessels of gentiles that require purging on account of the prohibited taste they have absorbed, and now the forbidden flavor from the vessel is in the food, this concern is also invalid as the absorbed substance is one that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, and in this case the mixture is permitted.

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבִּי אַסִּי: הָנֵי אֲהִינֵי שְׁלִיקֵי דַּאֲרַמָּאֵי מַאי? חוּלְיֵי — לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּוַדַּאי שְׁרוּ. מְרִירֵי — לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּוַדַּאי אֲסִירִי. כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ מְצִיעָאֵי, מַאי? אֲמַר לְהוּ: מַאי תִּיבְּעֵי לְהוּ? דְּרַבִּי אָסַר. וּמַנּוּ? לֵוִי. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi: With regard to these boiled dates [ahinei] of an Aramean, what is the halakha? The Gemara interjects: Do not raise the dilemma with regard to sweet dates, as they are certainly permitted, since they can be eaten raw. Similarly, do not raise the dilemma with regard to bitter dates, as they are certainly prohibited, since they are rendered edible through cooking. Rather, let the dilemma be raised with regard to dates whose flavor is moderate, neither sweet nor bitter. What is the halakha? Rabbi Asi said to them: What is your dilemma? The halakha is clear, as my teacher prohibited such dates. The Gemara asks: And who was Rabbi Asi’s teacher? Levi.

שַׁתִּיתָאה — רַב שָׁרֵי, אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל וְלֵוִי אָסְרִי. בְּחִיטֵּי וּשְׂעָרֵי כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּשְׁרֵי, בִּטְלָפְחֵי דְּחַלָּא כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דַּאֲסִיר. כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בִּטְלָפְחֵי דְּמַיָּא: מָר סָבַר גָּזְרִינַן הָא אַטּוּ הָא, וּמָר סָבַר לָא גָּזְרִינַן. § With regard to shetita’a, a sweet porridge made from roasted grains and honey, Rav deemed it permitted even when it was prepared by a gentile, whereas Shmuel’s father and Levi deemed it prohibited. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to shetita’a made of wheat or barley, everyone agrees that it is permitted. Similarly, with regard to shetita’a prepared from lentils to which vinegar is added, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, on account of the vinegar of gentiles. When they disagree, it is with regard to lentils made only with water: One Sage, Levi, holds that we decree a prohibition with regard to this porridge made without vinegar due to that porridge made with vinegar. And one Sage, Rav, holds that we do not decree for this reason.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּטְלָפְחֵי דְּמַיָּא כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דַּאֲסִיר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בְּחִיטֵּי וּשְׂעָרֵי, מָר סָבַר: גָּזְרִינַן הָא אַטּוּ הָא, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא גָּזְרִינַן. The Gemara notes: And some say that with regard to lentils made only with water, everyone agrees that the shetita’a is prohibited on account of lentils made with vinegar. When they disagree, it is with regard to shetita’a made of wheat and barley: One Sage, Levi, holds that we decree a prohibition with regard to this porridge prepared with wheat and barley due to that porridge made with lentils. And one Sage, Rav, holds that we do not decree for this reason.

אָמַר רַב: תְּרֵי מִינֵי שַׁתִּיתָאה שַׁדַּר בַּרְזִילַּי הַגִּלְעָדִי לְדָוִד, דִּכְתִיב: ״מִשְׁכָּב וְסַפּוֹת וּכְלִי יוֹצֵר חִטִּים וּשְׂעֹרִים וְקֶמַח וְקָלִי וּפוֹל וַעֲדָשִׁים וְקָלִי״, וְהַשְׁתָּא הוּא דְּקָא מַפְּקִי צַנֵּי צַנֵּי לְשׁוּקֵי דִּנְהַרְדְּעָא, וְלֵית דְּחָיֵישׁ לְהָא דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל וְלֵוִי. Apropos the mention of shetita’a, the Gemara relates that Rav said: Barzillai the Gileadite sent two kinds of shetita’a to David, as it is written: “And Barzillai the Gileadite of Rogelim brought beds, and basins, and earthen vessels, and wheat, and barley, and meal, and parched grain, and beans, and lentils, and parched pulse” (II Samuel 17:28). Barzillai brought two kinds of parched foods: Grain and pulse. The Gemara concludes: And now shetita’a is taken out in baskets upon baskets to the markets of Neharde’a, and there is no one who is concerned about that stringent ruling of Shmuel’s father and Levi.

וּכְבָשִׁין שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לָתֵת בְּתוֹכָן יַיִן. אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁדַּרְכָּן, אֲבָל בְּיָדוּעַ — אָסוּר אֲפִילּוּ בַּהֲנָאָה. וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִמּוּרְיָיס דְּשָׁרוּ רַבָּנַן בַּהֲנָאָה? הָתָם — לְעַבּוֹרֵי זוּהֲמָא, הָכָא — לְמַתּוֹקֵי טַעְמָא. § The mishna teaches: And boiled and pickled vegetables of gentiles, whose usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar to them, may not be consumed, but one may derive benefit from them. Ḥizkiyya says: They taught that this prohibition applies solely to consumption only where their usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar, though there is no information about how these particular vegetables were prepared. But where it is known for certain that these vegetables were prepared with wine or vinegar, it is prohibited even to derive benefit from them. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from fish stew, which the Sages permitted one to derive benefit from? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to fish stew, wine is added merely to remove the stench of the fish and does not actually contribute any taste to it, whereas here, with regard to pickled vegetables, it is added to sweeten the taste.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּיָדוּעַ נָמֵי מוּתָּר, וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִמּוּרְיָיס לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דַּאֲסִיר בַּהֲנָאָה? The Gemara cites a dissenting opinion. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even where it is known that wine or vinegar was added to the vegetables, it is also permitted to derive benefit from them. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from fish stew, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who prohibited deriving benefit from the fish stew? Why does Rabbi Meir permit one to derive benefit from vegetables pickled in gentiles’ wine but prohibit deriving benefit from fish stew that contains wine or vinegar?

הָתָם יְדִיעַ מַמָּשׁוֹ, הָכָא לָא יְדִיעַ מַמָּשָׁן. The Gemara explains: There, the substance of the wine is a recognizable component of the fish stew; here, its substance is not a recognizable component of the pickled vegetables.

וְטָרִית טְרוּפָה, וְצִיר שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ דָּגָה וְכוּ׳. מַאי חִילֵּק? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַב: זוֹ סוּלְתָּנִית, וּמִפְּנֵי מָה אֲסוּרָה? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁעֵרְבוֹנָהּ עוֹלֶה עִמָּהּ. § The mishna teaches: And minced tarit fish, and brine that does not have a kilbit fish floating in it, and ḥilak are all prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is ḥilak? Rav Naḥman bar Abba says that Rav says: This is sultanit, a type of small fish that is generally caught before its scales have developed. And for what reason is it prohibited? It is because its size causes it to be intermingled with other fish, and as a result sultanit rises out of the water with non-kosher fish when it is caught.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין לוֹ עַכְשָׁיו וְעָתִיד לְגַדֵּל לְאַחַר זְמַן, כְּגוֹן הַסּוּלְתָּנִית (וְהָעַפְיָץ) [וְהָעַפְיָין] — הֲרֵי זֶה מוּתָּר. יֵשׁ לוֹ עַכְשָׁיו וְעָתִיד לְהַשִּׁיר בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁעוֹלֶה מִן הַיָּם, כְּגוֹן אֲקוּנָס וַאֲפוּנָס, כְּטַסְפַּטְיָיס וְאַכְסְפַּטְיָיס וַאֲטוּנָס — מוּתָּר. The Sages taught: If a fish does not currently possess scales but will grow them after a period of time, such as the sultanit and afiyatz fish, it is permitted. Likewise, if it has scales now but will shed them when it is caught and rises from the sea, such as akunas and afuna, ketasfatiyas and akhsaftiyas and otanas fish, it is permitted.

אַכְרֵיז רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ בְּקֵיסָרִי: קִירְבֵי דָגִים וְעוּבָּרָן נִיקָּחִין מִכׇּל אָדָם. חֶזְקָתָן אֵינָן בָּאִים אֶלָּא מִפִּלּוּסָא וְאַסְפַּמְיָא, כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי צַחַנְתָּא דְּבָב נַהֲרָא שַׁרְיָא. Rabbi Abbahu announced in Caesarea: Fish entrails and their eggs may be purchased from any person, as the presumption with regard to them is that they come only from Pelusium [Pilusa] and Spain [Aspamya], and non-kosher fish are not found in those areas. This is similar to that which Abaye says: These small fish [tzaḥanta] of the Bav River are permitted, as non-kosher fish are not found in that river.

מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דִּרְדִיפִי מַיָּא, וְהַאי דָּג טָמֵא כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ חוּט הַשִּׁדְרָה, בְּדוּכְתָּא דִּרְדִיפִי מַיָּא לָא מָצֵי קָאֵי, וְהָא קָא חָזֵינַן דְּקָאֵי! The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Abaye unequivocally permitted eating these fish and was not concerned about the potential presence of non-kosher fish among them? If we say that it is due to the fact that the water flows rapidly, and these non-kosher fish, since they do not have a spinal cord, are not able to exist in a place where the water flows rapidly, as the current carries the non-kosher fish out of the Bav River, and consequently all the remaining fish are kosher, that is not the case, since we see that non-kosher fish exist in rivers with strong currents.

אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דִּמְלִיחִי מַיָּא, וְהַאי דָּג טָמֵא — כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ קִלְפֵי, בְּדוּכְתָּא דִּמְלִיחִי מַיָּא לָא מָצֵי קָאֵי. וְהָא קָחָזֵינַן דְּקָאֵי! אֶלָּא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְרַבֵּה טִינָא דָּג טָמֵא. אֲמַר רָבִינָא: הָאִידָּנָא דְּקָא שָׁפְכִי בֵּיהּ נְהַר גּוֹזָא וּנְהַר גַּמְדָּא — אֲסִירִי. Rather, perhaps Abaye permitted the fish because the water is salty, and these non-kosher fish are not able to exist in a place of salty water since they do not have scales. This, too, is not the case, since we see that non-kosher fish exist in salty water. Rather, Abaye permitted the small fish in the Bav River because the mud in that river is not suitable for non-kosher fish to reproduce. The conditions in the river render it an unproductive habitat for non-kosher fish. Ravina says: Nowadays, as the government built canals between the rivers, and the Goza River and the Gamda River spill into the Bav and carry non-kosher fish there, it is prohibited to eat the small fish without thorough inspection.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי חַמְרָא דְּיַמָּא — שְׁרֵי, תּוֹרָא דְּיַמָּא — אֲסִיר, וְסִימָנָיךְ: טָמֵא טָהוֹר, טָהוֹר טָמֵא. The Gemara cites several other statements of amora’im that concern the halakhic status of fish. Abaye says: This creature known as the sea donkey [ḥamara deyamma] is permitted; the creature known as the sea ox [tora deyamma] is prohibited, and your mnemonic to remember this halakha is: Impure is pure, and pure is impure, i.e., the name of an animal which is non-kosher on land is kosher in the sea, and that which is kosher on land is non-kosher in the sea.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: שְׁפַר נוּנָא שְׁרֵי, קְדַשׁ נוּנָא אֲסִיר, וְסִימָנָיךְ: ״קֹדֶשׁ לַה׳״. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: קְבַר נוּנָא אָסוּר, וְסִימָנָיךְ: קִבְרֵי גוֹיִם. Rav Ashi said: The type of fish known as shefar nuna is permitted, and the type of fish known as kadesh nuna is prohibited, and your mnemonic to remember this halakha is: That which is holy [kodesh] is to the Lord, and not for humans. And some say that Rav Ashi said: The type of fish known as kevar nuna is prohibited, and your mnemonic is: The grave [kever] is impure like the graves of gentiles.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אִיקְּלַע לְגִינְזַק, אַיְיתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ הָהוּא נוּנָא דַּהֲוָה דָּמֵי לְחִיפּוּשָׁא, חַפְּיֵיהּ בְּדִיקּוּלָא, חֲזָא בֵּיהּ קִלְפֵי וְשַׁרְיֵיהּ. רַב אָשֵׁי אִיקְּלַע לְטַמְדוֹרְיָא, אַיְיתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ הָהוּא נוּנָא דַּהֲוָה דָּמֵי לִצְלוֹפְחָא, נַקְטֵיהּ לַהֲדֵי יוֹמָא, חֲזָא דַּהֲוָה בֵּיהּ צִימְחֵי וְשַׁרְיֵיהּ. The Gemara relates several incidents involving Sages and their rulings with regard to fish. Rabbi Akiva happened to come to Ginzak and they brought before him a certain fish that was similar to a ḥippusha, a non-kosher aquatic creature. When he enclosed it in a basket he saw that it had scales which it shed as it struggled to escape from the basket, and he permitted it on that basis. Rav Ashi happened to come to Tamduria where they brought before him a certain fish that was similar to an eel [tzelofḥa]. He took it out and held it against the light of day and saw that there were thin scales on it, and he permitted it.

רַב אָשֵׁי אִיקְּלַע לְהָהוּא אַתְרָא, אַיְיתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ נוּנָא דְּהָוֵי דָּמֵי לִשְׁפַרְנוּנָא, חַפְּיֵיהּ בִּמְשִׁיכְלֵי חִיוָּרֵי, חֲזָא בֵּיהּ קִלְפֵי וְשַׁרְיֵיהּ. רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אִיקְּלַע לְאַקְרָא דְאַגְמָא, קָרִיבוּ לֵיהּ צַחַנְתָּא, שַׁמְעֵיהּ לְהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״בָּאטֵי״. Rav Ashi also happened to come to a certain land where they brought before him a fish that was similar to a shefarnuna. He enclosed it in a white vessel and saw that it shed dark scales, which he could see against the white background of the container, and he permitted it. Rabba bar bar Ḥana happened to come to Akra DeAgma and they brought him some tzaḥanta, a dish prepared from small fish. He heard a certain man calling it batei, the name of a non-kosher sea creature.

אֲמַר: מִדְּקָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״בָּאטֵי״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ דָּבָר טָמֵא אִית בֵּיהּ, לָא אֲכַל מִינֵּיהּ. לְצַפְרָא עַיֵּין בֵּהּ, אַשְׁכַּח בֵּיהּ דָּבָר טָמֵא, קָרֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ: ״לֹא יְאֻנֶּה לַצַּדִּיק כׇּל אָוֶן״. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to himself: From the fact that he called it batei, I can conclude from here that there is a non-kosher substance in the tzaḥanta. And he did not eat from it that night. In the morning, he examined the dish and in fact found a non-kosher substance in it. He read the following verse about himself: “No sin shall befall the righteous” (Proverbs 12:21).

וְהַקּוֹרֶט שֶׁל חִילְתִּית. מַאי טַעְמָא? מִשּׁוּם דְּמַפְסְקִי לֵיהּ בְּסַכִּינָא. אַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר מָר: נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם מוּתָּר, אַגַּב חוּרְפֵּיהּ דְּחִילְתִּיתָא מְחַלְּיָא לֵיהּ שַׁמְנוּנִיתָא, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם לְשֶׁבַח, וְאָסוּר. § The mishna teaches: And a sliver of ḥiltit may not be consumed, although one may derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that it is prohibited? It is because they slice it with a knife on which there is presumably non-kosher residue. And even though the Master said that a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is permitted, that principle does not apply in this case because as a result of the sharpness of the ḥiltit, the act of slicing it with a knife sweetens, i.e., enhances, the taste of the non-kosher residue. And therefore it is like a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the enhancement of the mixture, and it is prohibited.

עַבְדֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי לֵוִי הֲוָה קָא מְזַבֵּין חִילְתִּיתָא, כִּי נָח נַפְשֵׁיהּ דְּרַבִּי לֵוִי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: מַהוּ לְמִיזְבַּן מִינֵּיהּ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: עַבְדּוֹ שֶׁל חָבֵר הֲרֵי הוּא כְּחָבֵר. The Gemara relates that the gentile slave of Rabbi Levi would sell ḥiltit, and it was permitted to purchase it from him as he was the slave of a Sage. When Rabbi Levi passed away, they came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: Now that Rabbi Levi has passed, what is the halakha with regard to whether or not it is permitted to purchase ḥiltit from his gentile slave? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: The slave of a ḥaver, one devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially halakhot of ritual purity, teruma, and tithes, is as a ḥaver himself, and therefore it is permitted to buy ḥiltit from him.

רַב הוּנָא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי זְבֵן תְּכֵילְתָּא מֵאֱנָשֵׁי דְּבֵיתֵיהּ דְּרַב עַמְרָם חֲסִידָא, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, לָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ. The Gemara relates another incident that involves the status of a ḥaver and his household. Rav Huna bar Minyumi purchased sky-blue dye [tekhelta] from the people of the household, i.e., the wife, of Rav Amram the pious. One may purchase sky-blue dye for ritual fringes only from a reliable individual, as it is easy to counterfeit it. Rav Huna then came before Rav Yosef to ask if he could rely on her assurance that it was usable for the mitzva. The answer was not available to Rav Yosef.

פְּגַע בֵּיהּ חָנָן חַיָּיטָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: יוֹסֵף עַנְיָא מְנָא לֵיהּ? בְּדִידִי הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא, דִּזְבֵינִי תְּכֵילְתָּא מֵאֱנָשֵׁי דְּבֵיתֵיהּ דְּרַבְנָאָה אֲחוּהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא, וַאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב מַתְנָא, לָא הֲוָה בִּידֵיהּ. אֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה מֵהַגְרוֹנְיָא, אָמַר לִי: נְפַלְתְּ לְיָד, הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵשֶׁת חָבֵר הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחָבֵר. Later, Ḥanan the tailor happened to meet Rav Huna, and he said to him: From where could poor Rav Yosef have known the answer to this question? Ḥanan continued: There was an incident in which I was involved, as I purchased sky-blue dye from the people of the household, i.e., the wife, of Rabena’a, brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and I came before Rav Mattana to ask him the same question, and the answer was not available to him either. I then came before Rav Yehuda of Hagronya, who said to me: You have fallen into my hand, i.e., I am the only one who can answer your question. This is what Shmuel says: The wife of a ḥaver is herself considered like a ḥaver, and you may therefore rely on her statement.

תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵשֶׁת חָבֵר הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחָבֵר, עַבְדּוֹ שֶׁל חָבֵר הֲרֵי הוּא כְּחָבֵר, חָבֵר שֶׁמֵּת — אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וּבְנֵי בֵיתוֹ הֲרֵי הֵן בְּחֶזְקָתָן עַד שֶׁיֵּחָשְׁדוּ, וְכֵן חָצֵר שֶׁמּוֹכְרִין בָּהּ תְּכֵלֶת הֲרֵי (הֵן בְּחֶזְקָתָן) [הִיא בְּחֶזְקָתָהּ] עַד שֶׁתִּיפָּסֵל. The Gemara comments: We learn here that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: The wife of a ḥaver is like a ḥaver; the slave of a ḥaver is like a ḥaver. Furthermore, with regard to a ḥaver that died, his wife and children and members of his household remain in their presumptive status until they are suspected of engaging in inappropriate deeds. And similarly, with regard to a courtyard in which they sell sky-blue dye, it remains in its presumptive status as a place in which kosher sky-blue dye is sold until it is disqualified due to unscrupulous behavior.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵשֶׁת עַם הָאָרֶץ שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְחָבֵר, וְכֵן בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל עַם הָאָרֶץ שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְחָבֵר, וְכֵן עַבְדּוֹ שֶׁל עַם הָאָרֶץ שֶׁנִּמְכַּר לְחָבֵר — כּוּלָּן צְרִיכִין לְקַבֵּל דִּבְרֵי חֲבֵרוּת, אֲבָל אֵשֶׁת חָבֵר שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְעַם הָאָרֶץ, וְכֵן בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל חָבֵר שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְעַם הָאָרֶץ, וְכֵן עַבְדּוֹ שֶׁל חָבֵר שֶׁנִּמְכַּר לְעַם הָאָרֶץ — אֵינָן צְרִיכִין לְקַבֵּל דִּבְרֵי חֲבֵרוּת לְכַתְּחִלָּה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. The Sages taught: The wife of one who is not careful to keep the particulars of certain halakhot [am ha’aretz], who later marries a ḥaver, and likewise the daughter of an am ha’aretz who marries a ḥaver, and likewise the slave of an am ha’aretz who is sold to a ḥaver, must all accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with ḥaver status. But the wife of a ḥaver who later marries an am ha’aretz, and likewise the daughter of a ḥaver who marries an am ha’aretz, and likewise the slave of a ḥaver who was sold to an am ha’aretz, these people need not accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with ḥaver status ab initio. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף הֵן צְרִיכִין לְקַבֵּל דִּבְרֵי חֲבֵרוּת לְכַתְּחִלָּה. וְכֵן הָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה אַחַת שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת לְחָבֵר, וְהָיְתָה קוֹשֶׁרֶת לוֹ תְּפִילִּין עַל יָדוֹ, נִשֵּׂאת לְמוֹכֵס, וְהָיְתָה קוֹשֶׁרֶת לוֹ קִשְׁרֵי מוֹכֵס עַל יָדוֹ. Rabbi Yehuda says: They too must accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with ḥaver status ab initio. And similarly, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would illustrate this point and say: There was an incident involving a certain woman who married a ḥaver and would tie for him phylacteries on his hand, and she later married a tax collector and would tie for him tax-seals on his hand, which shows that her new husband had a great influence on her level of piety.

אָמַר רַב: חבי״ת אָסוּר בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד, חמפ״ג מוּתָּר בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד. חָלָב, בָּשָׂר, יַיִן, תְּכֵלֶת. § Rav says: The substances represented by the acronym ḥet, beit, yod, tav are prohibited if they were deposited with a gentile while they were sealed with only one seal. Those represented by the acronym ḥet, mem, peh, gimmel are permitted if they were deposited with a gentile while they were sealed with one seal. The Gemara elaborates: Milk [ḥalav], meat [basar], wine [yayin], and sky-blue dye [tekhelet]

אֲסוּרִין בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד. חִילְתִּית, מוּרְיָיס, פַּת, גְּבִינָה — מוּתָּרִין בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד. are all prohibited when they are found with only one seal; ḥiltit, fish stew [morayes], bread [pat], and cheese [gevina] are all permitted when they are found with one seal.

פַּת, לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי מִשּׁוּם אִיחַלּוֹפֵי קָרִירָא בְּחַמִּימָא — מִידָּע יְדִיעַ, דְּחִיטֵּי בְּדִשְׂעָרֵי נָמֵי מִידָּע יְדִיעַ, אִי כִּי הֲדָדֵי — כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא חוֹתָם אֶחָד לָא טָרַח וּמְזַיֵּיף. The Gemara explains why only one seal is necessary for bread. With regard to what need we be concerned in the case of bread, that one might have thought it requires two seals? If it is due to the concern for the gentile exchanging the fresh bread of the Jew with his own bread that is less fresh, the difference between cold bread and warm bread is known, and the Jew will realize that there has been an exchange. Likewise, if there is a concern that a gentile might exchange the more valuable wheat bread of the Jew with his own less valuable barley bread, the Jew will also know about it in this case. And if it is due to the concern that a gentile might exchange similar kinds of bread with each other, it can be assumed that since there is one seal the gentile will not trouble himself and forge another seal just to exchange bread of equal value.

וְרַב, מַאי שְׁנָא גְּבִינָה? דְּלָא טָרַח וּמְזַיֵּיף? חָלָב נָמֵי לָא טָרַח וּמְזַיֵּיף! אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַפֵּיק חָלָב, וְעַיֵּיל חֲתִיכַת דָּג שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ סִימָן. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav, what is different about cheese that it requires only one seal whereas milk requires two? If the reason is that a gentile will not trouble himself and forge a different seal, as cheese is generally inexpensive and the small profit he might make is not worth such an effort, this reasoning should apply to milk also, as he will not trouble himself and forge a new seal in this case either. Rav Kahana said: Remove the term: Milk, from Rav’s statement, and enter instead: A piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut.

הַיְינוּ בָּשָׂר! תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי בָּשָׂר. The Gemara raises an objection: Rav could not have been teaching that a piece of fish with no signs of kashrut requires two seals, as fish is the same as meat, which is already included in the list of items that require two seals. The Gemara explains that there are two categories of meat: Animal meat and fish meat. Since one might have thought that they are subject to different halakhot, Rav therefore teaches that both require two seals.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אוֹמֵר: בי״ת אָסוּר בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד, מח״ג מוּתָּר בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד. בָּשָׂר, יַיִן, תְּכֵלֶת אֲסוּרִין בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד; מוּרְיָיס, חִילְתִּית, גְּבִינָה מוּתָּרִין בְּחוֹתָם אֶחָד. לִשְׁמוּאֵל, חֲתִיכַת דָּג שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ סִימָן הַיְינוּ בָּשָׂר, תְּרֵי גַּוְונֵי בָּשָׂר לָא אָמְרִינַן. The Gemara cites a different set of lists than that presented by Rav. And Shmuel says: The substances represented by the acronym beit, yod, tav are prohibited when sealed with one seal; those represented by the acronym mem, ḥet, gimmel, are permitted when sealed with one seal. The Gemara explains: Meat [basar], wine [yayin], and sky-blue dye [tekhelet] are prohibited when sealed with a single seal; fish stew [morayes], ḥiltit, and cheese [gevina], are permitted when sealed with a single seal. The Gemara comments: According to Shmuel, a piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut is the same as meat, and we do not say that there is a difference between two categories of meat. Consequently, he does not include in his list a piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין לוֹקְחִין ימ״ח מח״ג בְּסוּרְיָא, לֹא יַיִן וְלֹא מוּרְיָיס וְלֹא חָלָב וְלֹא מֶלַח סַלְקוֹנְדְּרִית וְלֹא חִילְתִּית וְלֹא גְּבִינָה, אֶלָּא מִן הַמּוּמְחֶה, וְכוּלָּן אִם נִתְאָרַח אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת — מוּתָּר. The Sages taught: One may not purchase foods represented by the acronym yod, mem, ḥet; mem, ḥet, gimmel in Syria, not even from Jews. The Gemara elaborates: One may not purchase wine [yayin], nor fish stew [morayes], nor milk [ḥalav], nor salkondarit salt [melaḥ salkondarit], nor ḥiltit, nor cheese [gevina], except when purchased from an expert with a reputation for knowing and upholding the halakhot of kashrut. And with regard to all of them, if one is a guest in the home of his host, they are permitted, as a Jew is assumed to keep the halakhot of kashrut in his own home.

מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: שִׁגֵּר לוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לְבֵיתוֹ — מוּתָּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶיתֵּירָא וְאָכֵל אִיסּוּרָא, וְכִי מְשַׁגַּר לֵיהּ, מִמַּאי דְּאָכֵיל מְשַׁדַּר לֵיהּ. The Gemara adds: This supports the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: If a homeowner sent someone a package of food to his house, the food is permitted. What is the reason? It is because a homeowner does not leave aside permitted foods and eat prohibited foods, and when he sends food to another, he sends it from that which he eats himself, even though one may not be allowed to purchase food from that individual.

וּמֶלַח סַלְקוֹנְדְּרִית. מַאי מֶלַח סַלְקוֹנְדְּרִית? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מֶלַח שֶׁכׇּל סַלְקוֹנְדְּרֵי רוֹמִי אוֹכְלִין אוֹתָהּ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מֶלַח סַלְקוֹנְדְּרִית, שְׁחוֹרָה — אֲסוּרָה, לְבָנָה — מוּתֶּרֶת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: לְבָנָה — אֲסוּרָה, שְׁחוֹרָה — מוּתֶּרֶת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: זוֹ וְזוֹ אֲסוּרָה. § The mishna teaches that salkondarit salt is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is salkondarit salt? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is the salt that all Roman bakers [salkondarei] eat. The Sages taught: With regard to salkondarit salt, black salt is prohibited, whereas white salt is permitted; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: White salt is prohibited; black salt is permitted. The Gemara cites a third opinion: Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: This and that, i.e., both white and black salkondarit salt, are prohibited.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר לְבָנָה אֲסוּרָה, קִירְבֵי דָּגִים לְבָנִים טְמֵאִים מְעוֹרָבִין בָּהּ. לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר שְׁחוֹרָה אֲסוּרָה, קִירְבֵי דָּגִים שְׁחוֹרִים טְמֵאִים מְעוֹרָבִין בָּהּ. The Gemara cites an explanation of this dispute. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the statement of the one who says that white salkondarit salt is prohibited, it is suspected that the intestines of white non-kosher fish are mixed in it, and this is the reason for the prohibition. According to the statement of the one who says that black salt is prohibited, it is suspected that the intestines of black non-kosher fish are mixed in it.

לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר זוֹ וְזוֹ אֲסוּרָה, זֶה וָזֶה מְעוֹרָבִין בָּהּ. אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: זָקֵן אֶחָד הָיָה בִּשְׁכוּנָתֵנוּ, שֶׁהָיָה מַחְלִיק פָּנֶיהָ בְּשׁוּמַּן חֲזִיר. According to the statement of the one who said this and that are prohibited, he is concerned that this and that, i.e., the intestines of both white and black fish, are mixed in white and black salt, respectively. The Gemara mentions an additional problem with salkondarit salt: Rabbi Abbahu says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: There was a certain elder in our neighborhood who would smooth its surface with pig fat.

הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִים. לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְחִזְקִיָּה — לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּיָדוּעַ, לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן — לְמַעוֹטֵי מוּרְיָיס וּגְבִינַת בֵּית אוּנְיָיקֵי, וּסְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. § The mishna further teaches that the list of items it mentioned are all prohibited. The Gemara asks: Since the mishna began by stating that the items it lists are prohibited for consumption, what does this apparently redundant conclusion serve to exclude? The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Ḥizkiyya cited on 38b, it serves to exclude cases where it is known that wine of gentiles was added to the foods, as one may not even derive benefit from such foods. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, it serves to exclude fish stew and cheese of Beit Unyaki, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from these, and accordingly, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, cited in the previous mishna (29b).

מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין בַּאֲכִילָה — חָלָב שֶׁחֲלָבוֹ גּוֹי וְיִשְׂרָאֵל רוֹאֵהוּ, וְהַדְּבַשׁ, וְהַדֻּבְדְּבָנִיּוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמְּנַטְּפִין — אֵין בָּהֶן מִשּׁוּם הֶכְשֵׁר מַשְׁקֶה, וּכְבָשִׁין שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכָּן לָתֵת לְתוֹכָן יַיִן וָחוֹמֶץ, וְטָרִית שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְרוּפָה, וְצִיר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ דָּגָה, וְעָלֶה שֶׁל חִילְתִּית, וְזֵיתֵי גְלוּסְקָאוֹת הַמְגוּלְגָּלִין. MISHNA: And these are permitted for consumption: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew watched him doing so; and honey; and grape clusters [davdevaniyyot] which, despite the fact that they are dripping juice, are not subject to the halakhot of susceptibility to ritual impurity caused by contact with that liquid; and pickled vegetables whose usual manner of preparation does not involve adding wine and vinegar to them; and tarit fish that is not minced; and brine that has fish in it; and the leaf of a ḥiltit plant; and rolled olive cakes [geluskaot].

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: הַשְּׁלָחִין אֲסוּרִין, הַחֲגָבִים הַבָּאִים מִן הַסְּלוּלָה אֲסוּרִין, מִן הַהֶפְתֵּק מוּתָּרִין, וְכֵן לִתְרוּמָה. Rabbi Yosei says: Overripe olives are prohibited. Locusts that come from a salesman’s basket are prohibited, whereas those that come from the storeroom [heftek] are permitted; and likewise with regard to the portion of the produce designated for the priest [teruma], as will be explained in the Gemara.

גְּמָ׳ תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: יוֹשֵׁב יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּצַד עֶדְרוֹ שֶׁל גּוֹי, וְגוֹי חוֹלֵב וּמֵבִיא לוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּלֵיכָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא בְּעֶדְרוֹ — פְּשִׁיטָא, וְאִי דְּאִיכָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא בְּעֶדְרוֹ — אַמַּאי? GEMARA: We learn from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A Jew may sit beside a gentile’s flock and wait while the gentile milks his animals and brings the milk to the Jew, and he need not be concerned, even if he cannot see the milking process from his seated position. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is known that there is no non-kosher animal in the gentile’s flock, isn’t it obvious that the milk is permitted? Why would the baraita teach an obvious halakha? And if there is a non-kosher animal in his flock, then why is the milk permitted, considering the fact that the Jew could not see the gentile from where he sat?

לְעוֹלָם דְּאִיכָּא דָּבָר טָמֵא, וְכִי קָאֵי חָזֵי לֵיהּ, וְכִי יָתֵיב לָא חֲזֵי לֵיהּ; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דְּיָתֵיב לָא חָזֵי לֵיהּ, נֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַיְיתֵי וּמְעָרֵב בֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כֵּיוָן דְּכִי קָאֵי חָזֵי לֵיהּ, אִירְתוֹתֵי מִירְתַת וְלָא מְיעָרֵב בֵּיהּ. The Gemara explains: Actually, this is referring to a case where there is a non-kosher animal in the flock, and when the Jew is standing he can see the gentile, but when he is sitting he cannot see the gentile. Lest you say: Since when the Jew is sitting, he cannot see the gentile, we should be concerned that perhaps the gentile will bring non-kosher milk and mix it with the kosher milk, the baraita therefore teaches us that since when the Jew is standing, he can see him, the gentile is fearful of being caught and does not mix anything into the milk.

וְהַדְּבַשׁ. דְּבַשׁ לְמַאי נֵיחוּשׁ לַהּ? אִי מִשּׁוּם אִיעָרוֹבֵי — מִיסְרָא סְרֵי, אִי מִשּׁוּם בִּישּׁוּלֵי גוֹיִם — נֶאֱכָל כְּמוֹ שֶׁהוּא חַי, אִי מִשּׁוּם גִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם — נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם הוּא וּמוּתָּר. § The mishna teaches: And the honey of gentiles is permitted. The Gemara explains: For what need we be concerned with regard to honey? If it is due to the concern that a gentile might mix wine with it, honey spoils when it is mixed with wine, and therefore a gentile would not do so. If it is due to the cooking of gentiles, this too does not apply, because it is eaten as it is, i.e., raw. If it is due to the concern that the honey might have absorbed prohibited taste from vessels of gentiles that require purging, this does not apply either, as it is a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, and such a case is permitted. Since none of these concerns are relevant, the honey is permitted.

וְהַדֻּבְדְּבָנִיּוֹת. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמְּנַטְּפוֹת, אֵין בָּהֶן מִשּׁוּם הֶכְשֵׁר מַשְׁקֶה. וּרְמִינְהִי: הַבּוֹצֵר לַגַּת — שַׁמַּאי אוֹמֵר: הוּכְשַׁר, הִלֵּל אוֹמֵר: לֹא הוּכְשַׁר, וְאוֹדִי לֵיהּ הִלֵּל לְשַׁמַּאי! § The mishna further teaches: And grape clusters which, despite the fact that they are dripping juice, are not subject to the halakhot of susceptibility to ritual impurity caused by contact with that liquid. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita: With regard to one who harvests grapes in order to take them to the press and crush them, there is a dispute as to whether or not the liquid that seeps from the grapes renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Shammai says: It has become susceptible to ritual impurity, and Hillel says: It has not become susceptible. And eventually Hillel conceded to the opinion of Shammai. This shows that the juice that seeps out of grapes does render them susceptible to ritual impurity, which apparently contradicts the ruling of the mishna.

הָתָם קָא בָעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַשְׁקֶה, הָכָא לָא קָא בָעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַשְׁקֶה. The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the baraita, he wants the juice as a beverage, and one’s intention influences the capability of certain liquids to render substances susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, the liquid that seeps from the grapes renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Here, in the case of the mishna, he does not want the juice as a beverage, and therefore the grapes are not rendered susceptible to impurity.

וְטָרִית שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְרוּפָה: תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, אֵיזוֹ הִיא טָרִית שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְרוּפָה? כֹּל שֶׁרֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר. וְאֵיזוֹ צִיר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ דָּגָה? כָּל שֶׁכִּילְבִּית אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתֵּי כִּילְבִּיּוֹת § The mishna further teaches: And tarit fish that is not minced and brine that has fish in it are permitted. The Sages taught: What is considered tarit that has not been minced? Any fish whose head and spine are recognizable. And what is considered brine that has fish in it? Any brine that has one kilbit or two kilbiyot

שׁוֹטְטוֹת בּוֹ. הַשְׁתָּא כִּילְבִּית אַחַת אָמְרַתְּ שְׁרֵי, שְׁתֵּי כִּילְבִּיּוֹת מִבַּעְיָא? לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּפְתוּחוֹת, כָּאן בִּסְתוּמוֹת. floating in it. The Gemara asks: Now that you have said that brine which has only one kilbit in it is permitted, is it necessary to teach that brine that has two kilbiyot in it is also permitted? The Gemara explains that it is not difficult: Here, two kilbiyot are required to permit the brine, as it is contained in open barrels, but there, only one is required, since it is in sealed barrels.

אִיתְּמַר: רַב הוּנָא אָמַר: עַד (שֶׁתְּהֵא) [שֶׁיְּהֵא] רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר, רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אוֹ רֹאשׁ אוֹ שִׁדְרָה. מֵתִיב רַב עוּקְבָא בַּר חָמָא: וּבַדָּגִים כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת! אֲמַר אַבָּיֵי: כִּי תַּנְיָא הָהִיא בְּאָרָא וּפַלְמוּדָא, דְּדָמוּ רֵישַׁיְיהוּ לִטְמֵאִים. § It was stated that Rav Huna says: Tarit is not permitted for consumption until its head and spine are recognizable. Rav Naḥman says: It is permitted if either the head or the spine is recognizable. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama raises an objection from a mishna (Ḥullin 59a): And with regard to fish, any that has fins and scales is permitted. Evidently, the kashrut of fish is determined only by its fins and scales, not its head or its spine. Abaye said: When that mishna is taught, it is in reference to the ara’a and falmuda fish, whose heads are similar to the heads of non-kosher fish.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְטַבֵּל בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מֵרֵישׁ הֲוָה מְטַבֵּילְנָא בְּצִירָן, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁמַעְנָא לְהָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְטַבֵּל בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר, בְּצִירָן נָמֵי לָא מְטַבֵּילְנָא. The Gemara analyzes the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute applies to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies, everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Zeira said: Originally, I would dip foods in their brine, but once I heard that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute is only with regard to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable; I too no longer dip foods in their brine.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, הִלְכְתָא: עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר שֶׁל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. מֵיתִיבִי: חֲתִיכוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן סִימָן, בֵּין בְּכוּלָּן בֵּין בְּמִקְצָתָן, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּאֶחָד מִמֵּאָה שֶׁבָּהֶן — כּוּלָּן מוּתָּרוֹת, וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּגוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁהֵבִיא גָּרָב שֶׁל חֲתִיכוֹת, וְנִמְצָא סִימָן בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְהִתִּיר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אֶת הַגָּרָב כּוּלּוֹ! Rav Pappa said: The halakha is that tarit is prohibited until the head and spine of each and every fish is recognizable. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappa’s statement from a baraita: With regard to pieces of fish that have a sign of kashrut, whether this sign is present in all of them or only in a minority of them, and even if it is present in only one fish out of one hundred of them, they are all permitted. And there was an incident involving a certain gentile who brought a large jug of pieces of fish, and a sign of kashrut was found in one of them, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted the entire jug of fish. This apparently contradicts Rav Pappa’s assertion that all the pieces must be recognizable for them to be permitted.

תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: כְּשֶׁחֲתִיכוֹת שָׁווֹת. אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא נֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא אִתְרְמִי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. Rav Pappa interpreted that baraita as referring to a case where the pieces correspond to each other, i.e., they fit together so that it is clear that they are all from the same fish. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating this explicitly? If the pieces correspond it is obvious that they are permitted, as they evidently come from the same kosher fish. The Gemara explains that this was taught lest you say that one should be concerned that perhaps the pieces merely happened to fit together; the baraita therefore teaches us that in such a case the pieces are permitted.

הָהוּא אַרְבָּא דְּצַחַנְתָּא דַּאֲתַי לְסִיכְרָא, נְפַק רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא וַחֲזָא בֵּיהּ קִלְפֵי וְשַׁרְיֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וּמִי אִיכָּא דְּשָׁרֵי כְּהַאי גַּוְונָא בְּאַתְרָא דִּשְׁכִיחִי קִלְפֵי? נָפֵק שִׁיפּוּרֵי דְּרָבָא וְאָסַר, שִׁיפּוּרֵי דְּרַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא וְשָׁרֵי. The Gemara relates that there was a certain ship carrying tzaḥanta which came to the city of Sikhra. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana went out and saw that the fish had scales on them and permitted them, as any fish with scales is kosher. Rava said to him: But is there anyone who permits tzaḥanta in a case like this, when it is from a land where fish with scales are common and it is very possible that the scales are from kosher fish that had been in the boat previously? Shofarot went out from the court of Rava to herald a declaration promulgating his ruling, and he thereby prohibited all the fish on that boat. And shofarot went out from the court of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana, and he thereby permitted the fish.

אָמַר רַב יִרְמְיָה מִדִּפְתִּי: לְדִידִי אָמַר לִי רַב פַּפֵּי, כִּי שְׁרָא רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא — בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן לָא. אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: לְדִידִי אָמַר לִי רַב פָּפָּא, כִּי שְׁרָא רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא — אֲפִילּוּ בְּגוּפָן. The Gemara presents two interpretations of the above ruling. Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: Rav Pappi said to me that when Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana permitted the fish on the ship, he was referring only to their brine, but with regard to their bodies, no, he did not permit them. Rav Ashi said: Rav Pappa said to me that when Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana permitted the fish, he was referring even to their bodies.

וַאֲנָא לָא מֵיסָר אָסַרְנָא, דְּקָאָמַר לִי רַב פָּפָּא, וְלָא מִישְׁרֵא שָׁרֵינָא, דְּהָא אָמַר (לִי) רַב יְהוּדָה מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְטַבֵּל בְּצִירָן, אֲבָל בְּגוּפָן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא רֹאשׁ וְשִׁדְרָה נִיכָּר שֶׁל כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד. Rav Ashi continued: And I do not prohibit the fish, as Rav Pappa said to me that Rav Huna permitted it, but I also do not permit the fish, as Rav Yehuda said to me in the name of Ulla that the dispute between Rava and Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana is referring to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies, everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and spine of each and every fish are recognizable.

יָתֵיב רַב חִינָּנָא בַּר אִידִי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: גּוֹי שֶׁהֵבִיא עֲרֵיבָה מְלֵאָה חָבִיּוֹת, וְנִמְצֵאת כִּילְבִּית בְּאַחַת מֵהֶן — פְּתוּחוֹת, כּוּלָּן מוּתָּרוֹת; סְתוּמוֹת, הִיא מוּתֶּרֶת וְכוּלָּן אֲסוּרוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְנָא לָךְ הָא? מִתְּלָתָא קְרָאֵי שְׁמִיעַ לִי, מֵרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi sat before Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he sat and said: With regard to a gentile who brought a boat that was full of barrels of fish brine, and a kilbit was found in one of the barrels, the halakha is as follows: If the barrels were open, they are all permitted; if they were closed, then the barrel with the kilbit is permitted, and all the others are prohibited. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: From where do you know this? Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi responded: I heard this from three verses, i.e., great Sages upon whom one can rely as though their statements were recorded in verses: From Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan.

אָמַר רַב בְּרוֹנָא אָמַר רַב: קִירְבֵי דָּגִים וְעוּבָּרָן אֵין נִקָּחִין אֶלָּא מִן הַמּוּמְחֶה. רָמֵי לֵיהּ עוּלָּא לְרַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי דְּמִן בֵּירֵי, מִדְּקָאָמַר רַב: קִירְבֵי דָּגִים וְעוּבָּרָן אֵין נִקָּחִין אֶלָּא מִן הַמּוּמְחֶה — מִכְּלָל דְּדָג טָמֵא אִית לֵיהּ עוּבָּר, וּרְמִינְהִי: דָּג טָמֵא מַשְׁרִיץ, דָּג טָהוֹר מֵטִיל בֵּיצִים! § The Gemara discusses the halakha with regard to other parts of fish. Rav Beruna says that Rav says: Fish intestines and their roe may be purchased only from an expert. Ulla raises a contradiction to Rabbi Dostai of Biri: From the fact that Rav says: Fish intestines and their roe may be purchased only from an expert, it may be inferred that a non-kosher fish has roe, as otherwise there would be no reason to permit only roe purchased from an expert. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this claim from the following baraita: A non-kosher fish gives birth whereas a kosher fish lays eggs.

סְמִי מִכָּאן ״עוּבָּרָן״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: לָא תִּיסְמֵי, תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מְטִילֵי בֵּיצִים נִינְהוּ, אֶלָּא זֶה מַשְׁרִיץ מִבַּחוּץ, וְזֶה מַשְׁרִיץ מִבִּפְנִים. Rabbi Dostai accepted this opinion and said: Delete the phrase: Their roe, from here. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Do not delete it, as both kosher and non-kosher fish are fish that lay, i.e., produce, eggs, but this kosher fish propagates externally by laying eggs in the water which later hatch, and that non-kosher fish propagates internally by keeping the eggs in its own body until they develop. Nevertheless, both produce roe, and there is therefore reason to be concerned that a Jew might purchase non-kosher roe.

לְמָה לִי מוּמְחֶה? לִבְדּוֹק בְּסִימָנִין! דְּתַנְיָא: כְּסִימָנֵי בֵיצִים כָּךְ סִימָנֵי דָגִים. סִימָנֵי דָגִים סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? סִימָנֵי דָגִים ״סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׁקֶשֶׁת״ כְּתִיב בְּהוּ! אֶלָּא, כְּסִימָנֵי בֵיצִים כָּךְ סִימָנֵי עוּבְּרֵי דָגִים. The Gemara asks: But even so, why do I need an expert? Let one check the signs of kashrut on the roe himself, as it is taught in a baraita: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish. The Gemara interjects: Does it enter your mind to say that the signs of kashrut for fish are the same as the signs of kashrut for eggs? This is not so, as the signs of kosher fish are the possession of fins and scales, as written in the Torah with regard to them. Rather, the baraita means to say: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish roe.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן סִימָנֵי בֵיצִים: כֹּל שֶׁכּוֹדֶרֶת וַעֲגוּלְגֹּלֶת, רֹאשָׁהּ אֶחָד כַּד וְרֹאשָׁהּ אֶחָד חַד — טְהוֹרָה, שְׁנֵי רָאשֶׁיהָ חַדִּין וּשְׁנֵי רָאשֶׁיהָ כַּדִּין — טְמֵאָה, חֶלְמוֹן מִבַּחוּץ וְחֶלְבּוֹן מִבִּפְנִים — טְמֵאָה, חֶלְבּוֹן מִבַּחוּץ וְחֶלְמוֹן מִבִּפְנִים — טָהוֹר, חֶלְבּוֹן וְחֶלְמוֹן מְעוֹרָבִין זֶה בָּזֶה — זוֹ הִיא בֵּיצַת הַשֶּׁרֶץ. אָמַר רָבָא: כְּשֶׁנִּימּוֹחוּ. The baraita continues: And these are the signs of bird eggs: Any egg that narrows at the top and is rounded, so that one of its ends is wide and the other one of its ends is pointed is kosher. If both of its ends are sharp or both of its ends are wide, it is non-kosher. If the yolk is on the outside and the albumen is on the inside, it is non-kosher; if the albumen is on the outside and the yolk is on the inside, it is kosher. If the yolk and albumen are mixed with each other, this is the egg of a creeping animal. Considering that one can easily determine the kashrut of such eggs, why are only those purchased from an expert permitted? Rava says: Rav’s ruling refers specifically to a case where the eggs have melted together and it is impossible to determine whether or not they are kosher based on these signs.

וּלְרַבִּי דּוֹסְתַּאי דְּמִן בֵּירֵי, דְּאָמַר: סְמִי מִכָּאן ״עוּבָּרָן״, The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dostai of Biri, who accepted the idea that non-kosher fish do not lay eggs and says: Delete from here the phrase: Their roe, it is difficult.

וְהָתַנְיָא: כְּסִימָנֵי בֵיצִים כָּךְ סִימָנֵי עוּבְּרֵי דָגִים! לָאו תָּרוֹצֵי מְתָרְצַתְּ לַהּ? כָּךְ סִימָנֵי קִירְבֵי דָגִים. The Gemara elaborates: But isn’t it taught in the baraita, as it was interpreted above: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish roe? Apparently, the baraita assumes that non-kosher fish roe exists. The Gemara answers: Didn’t you yourself find it necessary to explain and reinterpret the baraita, as it cannot be understood according to its straightforward meaning? Rabbi Dostai can also explain the baraita so that it effectively reads: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish intestines. Accordingly, the baraita never actually mentions fish roe at all.

וְהֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ בְּסִימָנֵי קִירְבֵי דָגִים שֶׁיְּהֵא כַּד וְחַד? מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּשִׁילְפּוּחָא. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But where do you find that one of the signs of fish intestines is that they must be round and pointed? The Gemara answers: You find this with regard to the swim bladder of a fish, which is considered to be kosher if it is shaped like a kosher egg.

אִם אֵין שָׁם מוּמְחֶה, מַאי? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״אֲנִי מְלַחְתִּים״ — מוּתָּרִין. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״אֵלּוּ דָגִים וְאֵלּוּ קִירְבֵיהֶן״. אוֹרִי לֵיהּ רַב יְהוּדָה לַאֲדָא דַּיָּילָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״אֲנִי מְלַחְתִּים״ — מוּתָּרִין. The Gemara asks: If there is no expert there, and one cannot determine whether or not the fish roe is kosher, what is the halakha? Rav Yehuda says that once the seller says: I salted the fish from which this roe came and they were kosher, the roe is permitted. Rav Naḥman says: The roe is prohibited until the seller shows kosher fish to the buyer and says: These are the fish, and these are their intestines. That is, the roe is permitted only if the seller can present the fish that produced it. The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda instructed Adda, his attendant: Once the seller says: I salted them, they are permitted.

וְעָלֶה שֶׁל חִילְתִּית. פְּשִׁיטָא! לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִקְרָטִין שֶׁבּוֹ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: נֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא מַיְיתֵי וּמְעָרֵב בֵּיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּהָא אִישְׁתְּרוֹקֵי הִיא דְּאִישְׁתְּרוּק וַאֲתָא בַּהֲדַהּ. § The mishna teaches: And the leaf of a ḥiltit plant is permitted. The Gemara asks: Since the previous mishna (35b) prohibited a sliver of ḥiltit only due to the concern that it might have been sliced with a non-kosher knife, isn’t it obvious that a leaf, which has not been sliced, is permitted? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach this only with regard to the slivers of ḥiltit that might be found on the leaf, lest you say that one should be concerned that perhaps a gentile might bring slivers sliced with a non-kosher knife and mix it with the slivers on the leaf. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is assumed that the slivers on the leaf had stuck to it and came off with the plant when it was pulled from the ground.

וְזֵיתֵי גְלוּסְקָאוֹת הַמְגוּלְגָּלִין. פְּשִׁיטָא! לֹא נִצְרְכָא אַף עַל גַּב דְּרָפֵי טוּבָא. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חַמְרָא רְמָא בְּהוּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: הָנֵי מֵחֲמַת מִישְׁחָא הוּא דִּרְפוּ. § The mishna teaches: And rolled olive cakes. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that these are permitted? For what reason might they be prohibited? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are permitted even though they are very soft. Lest you say that there is a concern that they softened because a gentile placed wine in them, the mishna therefore teaches us that these olives have softened due to the oil they possess.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: שְׁלָחִין אֲסוּרִין. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שְׁלָחִין? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: כֹּל שֶׁאוֹחֲזוֹ בְּיָדוֹ וְגַרְעִינָתוֹ נִשְׁמֶטֶת. § The mishna further teaches: And Rabbi Yosei says: Overripe olives are prohibited. The Gemara asks: What are overripe olives like? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: This is referring to any olive that if one grasps it in his hand, its pit slips out, due to the softness of the olive.

הַחֲגָבִין הַבָּאִין כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחֲגָבִין, וְהַקַּפְרֵיסִין, וְהַקַּפְלוֹטוֹת הַבָּאִין מִן הָאוֹצָר וּמִן הַהֶפְתֵּק וּמִן הַסְּפִינָה — מוּתָּרִין, הַנִּמְכָּרִין בְּקַטְלוּזָא לִפְנֵי חֶנְוָנִי — אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּזַלֵּף יַיִן עֲלֵיהֶן. וְכֵן יֵין תַּפּוּחִים שֶׁל גּוֹיִם הַבָּאִין מִן הָאוֹצָר וּמִן הַהֶפְתֵּק וּמִן הַסְּלוּלָה — מוּתָּרִין, הַנִּמְכָּר בְּקַטְלוּזָא — אָסוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּעָרְבִין בּוֹ יַיִן. § The mishna teaches: Locusts that come from a salesman’s basket are prohibited while those that come from the storeroom are permitted. The Sages taught in a baraita: Locusts, and caper buds, and leeks [kaflotot] that come from the storehouse, and from the storeroom, and from a gentile’s ship are all permitted. Those that are sold in the market [bekatluza] from baskets that are in front of the storekeeper are prohibited, because it is assumed that the gentile storekeeper sprinkles wine upon them. And similarly, with regard to apple wine that belongs to gentiles: Those that come from the storehouse or from the storeroom or from a salesman’s basket are permitted. Apple wine that is sold in the market is prohibited, because they mix grape wine of gentiles in it.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: פַּעַם אַחַת חָשׁ רַבִּי בְּמֵעָיו, אָמַר: כְּלוּם יֵשׁ אָדָם שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ יֵין תַּפּוּחִים שֶׁל גּוֹיִם אָסוּר אוֹ מוּתָּר? אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בֶּן רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: פַּעַם אַחַת חָשׁ אַבָּא בְּמֵעָיו, וְהֵבִיאוּ לוֹ יֵין תַּפּוּחִים שֶׁל גּוֹיִם שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה, וְשָׁתָה וְנִתְרַפֵּא. אָמַר לוֹ: כׇּל כָּךְ הָיָה בְּיָדְךָ וְאַתָּה מְצַעֲרֵנִי! The Gemara cites a relevant incident: The Sages taught: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi felt discomfort in his stomach and knew that apple wine would alleviate it. He said: Isn’t there any person who knows whether apple wine of gentiles is prohibited or permitted? Rabbi Yishmael ben Rabbi Yosei said before him: Once my father felt discomfort in his stomach and they brought him apple wine of gentiles that was seventy years old, and he drank it and was cured. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You had so much knowledge in your hand that could have relieved me, and yet you caused me to suffer by withholding it until now.

בָּדְקוּ וּמָצְאוּ גּוֹי אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת גַּרְבֵי יַיִן שֶׁל תַּפּוּחִים שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה, וְשָׁתָה וְנִתְרַפֵּא, אָמַר: בָּרוּךְ הַמָּקוֹם שֶׁמָּסַר עוֹלָמוֹ לְשׁוֹמְרִים! They checked and found one gentile who had three hundred large jugs of apple wine that was seventy years old, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi drank from it and was cured. He said: Blessed is the Omnipresent who delivered His universe to keepers. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi thanked God for causing the gentile to keep the wine for seventy years so that it could be used to heal him.

וְכֵן לִתְרוּמָה. מַאי ״וְכֵן לִתְרוּמָה״? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: וְכֵן לְכֹהֵן הֶחָשׁוּד לִמְכּוֹר תְּרוּמָה לְשֵׁם חוּלִּין, לְפָנָיו הוּא דְּאָסוּר, אֲבָל הַבָּא מִן הָאוֹצָר וּמִן הַהֶפְתֵּק וּמִן הַסְּלוּלָה מוּתָּר, אִירְתוֹתֵי מִירְתַת, סָבַר: שָׁמְעִי בִּי רַבָּנַן (וּמַפְסְדוּ) [וּמַפְסְדִי] לֵיהּ מִינַּאי. § The mishna further teaches: And likewise with regard to teruma. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: And likewise with regard to teruma? Rav Sheshet says: This means: And likewise the same halakha applies to a priest who is suspected of selling teruma, which is less expensive, as non-sacred food. It is only when the food is in front of the priest that it is prohibited; but food that comes from the storehouse or from the storeroom or from a salesman’s basket is permitted. The reason is that the priest is fearful, because he thinks to himself: If I sell teruma in public, the Sages will hear of it and deprive me of all my wares.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אֵין מַעֲמִידִין. May we return to you chapter “One may not place”

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַצְּלָמִים אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן נֶעֱבָדִין פַּעַם אַחַת בְּשָׁנָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ מַקֵּל אוֹ צִפּוֹר אוֹ כַדּוּר. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ כׇּל דָּבָר. MISHNA: All statues are forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from them, because they are worshipped at least once a year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The only type of statue that is forbidden is any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry. If the statue is holding a different item, it may be assumed that the statue was fashioned for ornamental purposes and not for worship. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is prohibited to derive benefit even from any statue that has any item whatsoever in its hand.

גְּמָ׳ אִי דְּנֶעֱבָדִין פַּעַם אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בִּמְקוֹמוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָיוּ עוֹבְדִין אוֹתָהּ פַּעַם אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיעוּטָא — גָּזַר שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם, וְרַבָּנַן דְּלָא חָיְישִׁי לְמִיעוּטָא — לָא גָּזְרוּ שְׁאָר מְקוֹמוֹת אַטּוּ אוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. GEMARA: If it is true that the statues to which Rabbi Meir is referring are worshipped at least once a year, what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit deriving benefit from them? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In Rabbi Meir’s locale, people would worship statues once a year. And therefore, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one must be concerned for a minority occurrence (see Yevamot 61b), issued a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places, due to that locale where people would worship statues. And the Rabbis, by contrast, who do not maintain that one must be concerned for a minority occurrence, did not issue a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places due to that locale.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּאִנְדְּרָטִי שֶׁל מְלָכִים שָׁנִינוּ. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וּבְעוֹמְדִין עַל פֶּתַח מְדִינָה שָׁנִינוּ. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: We learned that this dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to the statues [be’andartei] of kings. Rabbi Meir decreed that they are forbidden as perhaps they were designated for worship. The Rabbis assumed that they were designed for ornamental purposes, not for worship. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And furthermore, we learned that the dispute is only with regard to statues that stand at the entrance to the region. Since these statues were erected in an important location, there is concern that they are worshipped.

אָמַר רַבָּה: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁל כְּפָרִים, אֲבָל בְּשֶׁל כְּרַכִּים — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּרִין, מַאי טַעְמָא? לְנוֹי עָבְדִי לְהוּ. Rabba says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to statues that are erected in villages. But with regard to those that are erected in cities, all agree that they are permitted, i.e., that it is permitted to derive benefit from them. What is the reason? It is because they were fashioned for ornamental purposes and not for worship.

וְדִכְפָרִים, מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְנוֹי קָעָבְדִי לְהוּ? דִּכְפָרִים וַדַּאי לְמִיפְלְחִינְהוּ עָבְדִי לְהוּ! The Gemara asks: But with regard to those erected in villages, is there anyone who says that they are fashioned for ornamental purposes? Those in villages were certainly fashioned for idol worship. How, then, can the Rabbis maintain that such statues are permitted?

אֶלָּא אִי אִתְּמַר, הָכִי אִתְּמַר: אָמַר רַבָּה: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁל כְּרַכִּים, אֲבָל בְּשֶׁל כְּפָרִים — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֲסוּרִים. The Gemara answers: Rather, if such a distinction was stated, this is what was stated: Rabba says that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to statues that are erected in cities, where they may have been fashioned simply for ornamental purposes. But with regard to those erected in villages, all agree that they are used for idol worship and are therefore forbidden.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינָן אֲסוּרִין וְכוּ׳. מַקֵּל — שֶׁרוֹדֶה אֶת עַצְמוֹ תַּחַת כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ כְּמַקֵּל, צִפּוֹר — שֶׁתּוֹפֵשׂ אֶת עַצְמוֹ תַּחַת כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ כְּצִפּוֹר, כַּדּוּר — שֶׁתּוֹפֵשׂ אֶת עַצְמוֹ תַּחַת כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ כְּכַדּוּר. § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The only statues that are forbidden are: Any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry. The Gemara explains that each of these items symbolizes the statue’s supposed divinity, indicating its dominion over the world: A staff symbolizes dominion as the idol rules itself under the entire world, i.e., it rules the entire world, like one rules over an animal with a staff. A bird symbolizes dominion as the idol grasps itself under the entire world, i.e., it grasps the entire world, as one grasps a bird in his hand. An orb symbolizes dominion as the idol grasps itself under the entire world, i.e., it grasps the entire world, as one grasps a ball in his hand.

תָּנָא, הוֹסִיפוּ עֲלֵיהֶן: סַיִיף, עֲטָרָה, וְטַבַּעַת. The Sages taught in the Tosefta (6:1) that they added the following to the list of items that, when added to a statue, indicate that it is worshipped as an idol: A sword in its hand, a crown on its head, and a ring on its finger.

סַיִיף — מֵעִיקָּרָא סְבוּר לִסְטִים בְּעָלְמָא, וּלְבַסּוֹף סְבוּר שֶׁהוֹרֵג אֶת עַצְמוֹ תַּחַת כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ. The Gemara explains why these items were initially believed to be insignificant and were later understood as symbolizing idol worship. With regard to a statue holding a sword, the Sages initially thought that this merely indicates that it is a statue of a bandit. But in the end they reasoned that it symbolizes the notion that the idol has the power to kill itself under the whole world, i.e., to kill the entire world.

עֲטָרָה — מֵעִיקָּרָא סְבוּר גָּדֵיל כְּלִילֵי בְּעָלְמָא, וּלְבַסּוֹף סְבוּר כַּעֲטָרָה לַכֶּלֶב. טַבַּעַת — מֵעִיקָּרָא סְבוּר אִישְׁתְּיָימָא בְּעָלְמָא, וּלְבַסּוֹף סְבוּר שֶׁחוֹתֵם אֶת עַצְמוֹ תַּחַת כָּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ לְמִיתָה. With regard to a crown, the Sages initially thought that it is merely a woven wreath. But in the end they reasoned that it is like the crown of a king. With regard to a ring, the Sages initially thought that this merely symbolizes the bearer of a signet ring [ishtayema]. But in the end they reasoned that it is symbolic of the idol’s supposed ability to seal its fate under the whole world, i.e., to seal the fate of the entire world, for death.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל כּוּ׳. תָּנָא: אֲפִילּוּ צְרוֹר, אֲפִילּוּ קֵיסָם. § The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is prohibited to derive benefit even from any statue that has any item whatsoever in its hand. The Sages taught in a baraita: It is prohibited to derive benefit from a statue even if it is merely holding a stone, or even a twig.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: תָּפַשׂ בְּיָדוֹ צוֹאָה, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא זִילוּ בְּאַפֵּיהּ כִּי צוֹאָה, אוֹ דִילְמָא הוּא מִיהוּ דְּזִיל בְּאַפֵּי כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא כְּצוֹאָה? תֵּיקוּ. Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If the idol is grasping excrement in its hand, what is the halakha? Is this meant to honor the statue, indicating that it is an object of idol worship? Do we say that the statue is forbidden, as this indicates that the entire world is inferior to it like excrement, or perhaps does this indicate that the idol itself is inferior to the entire world like excrement? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹצֵא שִׁבְרֵי צְלָמִים, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין. מָצָא תַּבְנִית יָד אוֹ תַּבְנִית רֶגֶל, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן נֶעֱבָד. MISHNA: In the case of one who finds unidentifiable fragments of statues, these are permitted, i.e., one may derive benefit from them. If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֲפִילּוּ שִׁבְרֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: שִׁבְרֵי צְלָמִים! GEMARA: Shmuel says: It is permitted to derive benefit even from fragments of objects that have been seen used in idol worship. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that fragments of nondescript statues are permitted? This indicates that it is prohibited to derive benefit from fragments of idols that were known to be worshipped.

הוּא הַדִּין דַּאֲפִילּוּ שִׁבְרֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי שִׁבְרֵי צְלָמִים — מִשּׁוּם דְּקָבָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: מָצָא תַּבְנִית יָד תַּבְנִית רֶגֶל — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן נֶעֱבָד. The Gemara answers: The mishna means that fragments of statues are permitted, and the same is true even of fragments of objects of idol worship. And that which is taught in the mishna: Fragments of statues, is not meant to exclude fragments of idols. Rather, this expression is used because the mishna sought to teach in the last clause: If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, even if they are not known to be objects of idol worship, as objects similar to those are worshipped. If the first clause in the mishna had referred to fragments of idols, it would have been inferred that the latter clause was referring specifically to the figure of a hand or foot that was known to have been worshipped, and that otherwise such figures would not be forbidden.

תְּנַן: מָצָא תַּבְנִית יָד תַּבְנִית רֶגֶל — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁכַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ נֶעֱבָד. אַמַּאי? We learned in the mishna: If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped. The Gemara asks: Why?

וְהָא שְׁבָרִים נִינְהוּ! תַּרְגְּמַהּ שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּעוֹמְדִין עַל בְּסִיסָן. But aren’t they fragments of idols, which are permitted according to Shmuel? The Gemara answers that Shmuel interpreted the mishna as follows: It is referring to a case where these objects that are in the figure of a hand or a foot are standing on their pedestals, which shows that they were designed this way initially and are not merely fragments.

אִתְּמַר: עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּבְּרָה מֵאֵילֶיהָ, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת. § It was stated: With regard to objects of idol worship that broke by themselves, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is prohibited to derive benefit from them. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: It is permitted.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲסוּרָה, דְּהָא לָא בָּטְלָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת, מִסְּתָמָא בַּטּוֹלֵי מְבַטֵּיל לַהּ, מֵימָר אָמַר: אִיהִי נַפְשַׁהּ לָא אַצְּלָה, לְהָהוּא גַּבְרָא מַצְּלָה לֵיהּ? The Gemara explains the sides of the dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is prohibited, as its owner did not revoke its status as an object of idol worship. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that it is permitted, as the owner presumably revoked its status as an object of idol worship, having said to himself: If the idol could not save even itself from harm, can it save that man, i.e., myself?

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: ״וְרֹאשׁ דָּגוֹן וּשְׁתֵּי כַּפּוֹת יָדָיו כְּרֻתוֹת וְגוֹ׳״, וּכְתִיב: ״עַל כֵּן לֹא יִדְרְכוּ כֹהֲנֵי דָגוֹן וְגוֹ׳״! Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the passage in the book of Samuel recounting the downfall of the Philistine god Dagon: “And when they arose early the next morning, behold, Dagon was fallen on his face to the ground before the Ark of the Lord; and the head of Dagon and both the palms of his hands lay cut off upon the threshold; only the trunk of Dagon was left to him” (I Samuel 5:4). And from the next verse it seems that Dagon’s worshippers accorded it honor despite its destruction, as it is written: “Therefore, the priests of Dagon, and anyone who comes into Dagon’s house, do not tread on the threshold of Dagon in Ashdod until this day” (I Samuel 5:5). Evidently, when an idol breaks, its worshippers do not stop worshipping it.

אָמַר לוֹ: מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה? הָתָם שֶׁמַּנִּיחִין אֶת הַדָּגוֹן, וְעוֹבְדִין אֶת הַמִּפְתָּן, דְּאָמְרִי הָכִי: שַׁבְקֵיהּ אִיסָרֵיהּ לְדָגוֹן, וַאֲתָא אִיתֵּיב לֵיהּ עַל הַמִּפְתָּן. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: Is there proof from there? There, the reason people did not tread on the threshold of Dagon is that they had abandoned their worship of the Dagon and would instead worship the threshold upon which Dagon was found, as they stated this reasoning: The spirit of Dagon has left the Dagon idol and instead it came and rested upon the threshold.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: הַמּוֹצֵא שִׁבְרֵי צְלָמִים — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין. הָא שִׁבְרֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — אֲסוּרִין! Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the mishna: In the case of one who finds fragments of statues, these are permitted. This indicates that fragments of known objects of idol worship are forbidden.

לָא תֵּימָא שִׁבְרֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אֲסוּרִין, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: הָא צְלָמִים עַצְמָן אֲסוּרִין, וּסְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish replied: Do not say that the indication is that fragments of objects of idol worship are forbidden; rather say that the indication is that full statues themselves are forbidden, and the unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who, in the previous mishna, prohibits any statue as it is possible that it is worshipped annually.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, מִדְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר נִשְׁמַע לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן, לָאו אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: צְלָמִים אֲסוּרִין, שִׁבְרֵי צְלָמִים מוּתָּרִין, לְרַבָּנַן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָמֵי הִיא אֲסוּרָה וּשְׁבָרֶיהָ מוּתָּרִין! The Gemara asks: But how does Rabbi Yoḥanan refute the following logic: From the opinion of Rabbi Meir one can learn a detail with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis. Doesn’t Rabbi Meir say that statues are forbidden, while fragments of statues are permitted? From this, one can derive that this is true according to the Rabbis as well with regard to objects of idol worship: The object itself is forbidden, but its fragments are permitted.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם אֵימַר עֲבָדוּם אֵימַר לֹא עֲבָדוּם, וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר עֲבָדוּם — אֵימַר בִּטְּלוּם. עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וַדַּאי עֲבָדוּהָ, מִי יֵימַר דְּבַטְּלֻהָ? הָוֵי סָפֵק וּוַדַּאי, וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי! The Gemara rejects this comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of statues, the fragments are permitted because there is room to say that people worshipped them, and there is also room to say that people did not worship them; and even if you say that people worshipped them, there is room to say that their owners subsequently revoked them. This is not comparable to an object of idol worship, which people certainly worshipped, and who is to say that its owner certainly revoked it? It is a conflict between an uncertainty as to whether or not it was revoked, and a certainty that it was worshipped, and the principle is that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.

וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא: חָבֵר שֶׁמֵּת, וְהִנִּיחַ מְגוּרָה מְלֵאָה פֵּירוֹת, אֲפִילּוּ הֵן בְּנֵי יוֹמָן — הֲרֵי הֵן בְּחֶזְקַת מְתוּקָּנִין. The Gemara asks: And does an uncertainty not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of a ḥaver who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, it has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., properly tithed. This is due to the presumption that the ḥaver tithed the produce himself or instructed others to do so.

וְהָא הָכָא דְּוַדַּאי טְבִילִי, סָפֵק עַשְּׂרִינְהוּ, סָפֵק לָא עַשְּׂרִינְהוּ, וְקָאָתֵי סָפֵק וּמוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי! The Gemara infers: And here, in this case, the produce was certainly untithed at the outset, and there is uncertainty whether the ḥaver tithed it, and there is uncertainty whether he did not tithe it, and despite this conflict, the uncertainty whether it was tithed comes and overrides the certainty that it was untithed produce.

הָתָם וַדַּאי וּוַדַּאי הוּא, דְּוַדַּאי עַשְּׂרִינְהוּ, כִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא חוֹזָאָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא חוֹזָאָה: חֲזָקָה עַל חָבֵר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוֹצִיא דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְתוּקָּן מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ. The Gemara rejects this claim: There, in that case, conflict is between certainty and certainty, as the ḥaver certainly tithed the produce. This presumption is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a; as Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a says: There is a presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not release an item from his possession that is not ritually prepared.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: מֵעִיקָּרָא לָא טְבִילִי, סָפֵק וְסָפֵק הוּא. And if you wish, say instead that perhaps the produce did not initially have the status of untithed produce, and therefore the conflict is between uncertainty and uncertainty.

אֶפְשָׁר דַּעֲבַד כִּדְרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא, דְּאָמַר: מַעֲרִים אָדָם עַל תְּבוּאָתוֹ וּמַכְנִיסָהּ בַּמּוֹץ שֶׁלָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁתְּהֵא בְּהֶמְתּוֹ אוֹכֶלֶת וּפְטוּרָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר. This is because it is possible that there was never an obligation to tithe the produce, as the ḥaver may have acted in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Oshaya, who says that a person can employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and bring it into his courtyard in its chaff so that his animal may eat from it. And this grain is exempt from tithes. Although the obligation to tithe produce that has been fully processed applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that has not been fully processed. In light of this halakha it is possible that the produce in the storehouse of the ḥaver never needed to be tithed. Consequently, this case is a conflict between two uncertain factors, as it is uncertain whether or not the owner was obligated to tithe the produce in the first place, and even if he was required to do so, it is uncertain whether or not he tithed it.

וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּשִׁפְחָתוֹ The Gemara raises another objection: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the maidservant