TREATISE

Concerning the

PR IN C I P LES Human Loolden

PART I

Wherein the chief Caufes of Error — Dif.

ficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of § Scepticifm, Atheifm, and en are inquird into. |

| By ion Berkeley, M. A. Fellow of| |. ?

Trinity-College, Dublin.

DUBLIN:

Printed by Aaron RHAMES, forJexemy

PzeryaT, Bookfellerin SriPaCrs Rows1 FIO.

WEECACY TE

ore

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TO THE. Right Honourable

EARL OF | PEMBROKE, &e.

—— of the Moft Noble Order of sae Gaataa,

5 One of ne tad of Her M AFESTYS Moft Honourable

RIVY Councet. 7 A

My Lorp, | Ou'll, perhaps, wonder ‘that an obfcure Perfon,

who hasnot the Honour

to be known to Your Lord.

fhip, fhou’d prefume ta Ad. | drels You in this manner. But. A232 | that |

SUPT VIVIF ES TTE TP Perera oi Ore Sie eietee? 390 rpeeaee . gg eee ee Min Co He in Adare a

i0n.

an | a & he Dedixat

Loe

fomething withadefigntopro-

mote alfa Koomlge and Relig rin the World, thou’d make

Choice of Your Lordfhip for his Patron, will not be thought

‘ftrange by any one that is not pi hah ate ie ie with _theprefent StateoftheChurch - and Learning, and confequently ignorant how great an Or-nament.and Support You. are

. to poth. » Yet, nothing coud

_ have induced metomake You this prefent of my poos Endéavours, were Inot Encourag’d

by that Candour and Native —

Goodnefs,which is fo bright a

Part in Your Lordfhip’sChara- |

éter.Lmight add,myLord, that

the Extraordinary Favour.and

Bounty You have been pleas'd

The Dedication. fi. to fhew towards out Society, gave me Hopes; You'd not be unwilling to countenance the Studies of one of its Members. Thefe Confiderations -determin’dmetolay this Trea:

tife at Your Lordthip’s Feet. And the rather, becaufe I was ‘Ambitious to have it known, that I am with the trueft and. | —-moft profound Refpeé,on ac-count: of: that Learning‘ and > Vertue which the World fo juftly Admires i in 1 Your Lord. Ahip, oe My Lord; = i - Your Lordfips Ay os Me oft Humble 7 And moft Devoted

Se evant.

ie 3

‘Goons Berkeley

Wherein the chief Caufes of Error — Dif.

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ficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of § Scepticifm, Atheifm, and en are inquird into. |

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| By ion Berkeley, M. A. Fellow of| |. ?

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EARL OF | PEMBROKE, &e.

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—— of the Moft Noble Order of sae Gaataa,

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5 One of ne tad of Her M AFESTYS Moft Honourable

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Choice of Your Lordfhip for his Patron, will not be thought

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_ have induced metomake You this prefent of my poos Endéavours, were Inot Encourag’d

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… fi. to fhew towards out Society, gave me Hopes; You'd not be unwilling to countenance the Studies of one of its Members. Thefe Confiderations -determin’dmetolay this Trea:

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… ‘Ambitious to have it known, that I am with the trueft and. | —-moft profound Refpeé,on ac-count: of: that Learning‘ and > Vertue which the World fo juftly Admires i in 1 Your Lord. Ahip, oe My Lord; = i - Your Lordfips Ay os Me oft Humble 7 And moft Devoted

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thofe who are tainted with Sceptici{m, of

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manta Demonfiration of the Exiftence and bomateriality of Gov; of the Natural In pyiortality of the Souk. Whether it be fo orno,

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I am content the Reader fhou’d impartially Examine.’ Since Ido not think, my felf any farther concern'd for the Succefs of what

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at leaft, read the whole through with that degree of Attention and Thought which. the fubjett Matter fhall feem to deferve. For - asthere are fome Paffages that,taken by themeS folges

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… ing Reader, I flatter my felf, it. wilk be througheut Clear and Obviows. As for the Characters of Novelty and Singularity, which fome of the following Notians may. feem to bear, "tis, E hope, needlefs to make any Apology on that account. He mut furely be either very weak, or ery. bite tle acquainted with the Sciences, who. foal reject a Truth, that is capable of Demonftration, for no other Reafon bur becaufe it’s newly keown and contrary to the Prejudices of Mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premife, in order to prevent, if pofible, the _bafly Cenfures of a fort of Men, who'are too’

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_ Which two laft are the proper Acceptations of 4bfraGion.

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.R-WHILOSOPHY being no| y thing elfe but the ftudy of | f Wildom and Truth, it may | with reafon be expected, that thofe who have {pent moft Time and Pains - in it fhou’d enjoy a greater’ calm and ferenity of Mund, a greater clearnefs : and evidence of Knowlege, and be lefs difturb’d with Doubts and Difhculties than other Men. Yet fo it 1s, we fee the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Senfe, and are govern’d by the Dictates of Nature, for the maft part eafy and undifturb’ d. ‘To them nothing that’s familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. - They com-

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plain not of any want of Evidence in

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their. Senfes,, and are out of all danger — of becofning Sceptics.. Butno fooner do we depart from Senfe and Inftinct to follow the Light of 4 Superior Prin-

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9 Introduttion. ciple, to reafon, meditate and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thoufand Scruples {pring up in our Minds, — concerning thofe Things which before we feem’d fully to comprehend. Preju-

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dices and Errors of Senfe do from all. .

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~ G2..The caufe of this is thought to _ be the Obfcurity. of things, or the na| tural Weaknefs and Imperfection of our Underftandings. It is faid the Faculties we have-are few, and thofe defign'd by Nature for the Support and -Pleafure of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Effence and Conftitution of Things. Befides, the Mind of | | | - Man

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Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity,. it’s not to be wonder'd at, if 1¢ run intoAbfurdities and ‘Contradictions, out of which it is impoffible it thou ‘d ever extricate it felf, ic being of the nature

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of Infinite not to be comprehended by ~

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$ 3 . But, perhaps, we may be too sent to our felves in placing the Faule originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong, ufe we make of theny. It is a hard thing to {uppofe,

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cconfiftent. We fhou’d believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a ftrong

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had placed quite out of their reach.

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_ ed, indulgent Methods of Providence,

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rightly made ufe of, will not fail to fa-

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—tusfie them. ‘Upon the whole, I am inclin’d to think that the far greater Part, — if not all, of thofe Difficulties which have hitherto amus’d Phitofophers, and block’d up the way:to Knowlege, are. inturely owing to our felves. That we

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- furdities and Contradictions into the fe_ veral Sects of Philofophy ; infomuch that the Wifeft Men have thonght our Ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arife from the natural dulnefs and limitation of our Faculties. And furely it is a Work well deferving our Pains, to make .a trict inquiry concerning the firft Principles of Human Knowlege, to Sift and . examirfe them on all fides, efpecially. fince there may be fome Grounds to fufpect that thofe Lets and Difficulties, which lacie and empbarrals the Mind in

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confider what a number of very great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the like Defigns: Yee I am not without fome Hopes, upon the Confideration that the largeft Views are not - always the Cleareft, and that he who is

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€ 6. Inorder to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the eafier conceiving © what follows, I thought it proper to premife fomewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abufe of Language. But the unraveling: this Matter leads me in fome gestae ta. anticipate |

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6 Introduétion. anticipate my Defign, by taking notice of what feems to have had a chief pare in rendering: Speculation intricate and perplexid, and to have occafion’d innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almoft all parts of Knowlege.: And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a powex of framing Abfraédt Ideas or Noti‘ons of Things. He who is not a per— fect Stranger to the Writings and Difputes of Philofophers, muft needs ac-. knowlege that no {mall pare of them

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are {pent about abftract Ideas. Thefe are, ina more efpecial manner, thought to be the Object of thofe Sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphyfics, and of all that which pafles under the Notion of the moft abftracted and fublime Learning, in all which one fhall {carce find any Queftion handled in fuch ___a manner, as does not fuppofe their Ex“iftence inthe Mind, and that 3 it is well

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§ 7. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never i exift each vs them apart by |

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Parts, and viewing each by 1 felf, exclufive of the ref{t, does frame the ab{tract Ideas of Extenfion, Colour & Mo~ tion. Not that it is poffible for Colour or Motion to exiftwithout Extenfion, but only that the Mind can frame to it. felf by Abffraction the Idea of Colour exclufive of Extenfion, and of Motion —

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7 exclufive of both Colour and Extenfion.

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… apart or fingles out by it felf that which is common, making thereof a moft ab| ‘ ftraét Idea of Extenfion ;which is neither“ Line, Surface nor Solid, nor has any 7 Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea in - -tirely prefcinded from all thefe. So like-. wife the Mind by leaving outof the particular Colours perceiv’d by Senfe, that which diftinguifhes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common toall,makesan Idea of Colour in abftraét which is neither | Red, nor Bltic, nor White, ¢c. And in like manner by confidering Motion abftrattedly not only from the Body moved, butlikewife from the Figure 1¢ defcribes, andall .particular Directions and Velocities, the abftract Idea of Motion isframed; which equally correfponds to: all particular Motions whatfoever that may be perceiv’d by Senfe,

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~. § 9. And as the Mind fais to it | fel abttradt Ideas of Qualities or Modes, fo does it, by the fame precifion or

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— Introduétion. mental Separation, attain abftract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include feveral coexiftent Qualities. For example, the Mind having obferv’d that Peter, Fames and fFohn, &c. refemble each other, 1n certain common Agree| ments of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of Peter, ames, &c. that -which is peculiar to each, retaining only: what 1s common to all; and fo makes an abftract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abftracting intirely from and cutting off all thofe - Circumftances and Differences, which — might determine it to any particular Exiftence.. And after this manner it 1s faid we come by the abftraét Idea of Man or, if you pleafe, Humanity or Humane Nature. wherein ‘tis true, there’s included Colour, becaufe there is no Man but has fome Colour, but ” then it can be neither White,nor Black, nor any particular Colour; becaufe there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewife there is included Stature, but then ’tis neither Tall » | | C Stature

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Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but fomething abftracted from all thefe; and fo of thereft. Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in fome Parts, but not all,of the complex Idea of Maz,

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ving Creatures, frames the Idea of Axi-

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particular Men,but alfo all Birds, Beafts, Fifhes and Infects. The conftituent Parts of the abftract Idea of Animal are

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… or Figure,there ‘being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, dc. nor yet Naked : Hair, Feathers, Scales, and ’ Nakednefs being the diftinguifhing Properties of. particular Animals, and for that reafon left out of the Abfiradt ‘Idea. Upon the fame account. the

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wonderful Faculty of Abftraéting their

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indeed a Faculty of imagining, or re-

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prefenting to my felf the Ideas of thofe |

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particular things I have perceiv’d and of varioufly compounding and divid-

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Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joyn’d to the Body of a Horfe. I can. confider the Hand, the Eye, the Nofe each by it felf abftracted or feparated from the reft of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it muft have fome particular Shape and Colour. Likewife the Idea of Man that — I frame to my felf, mutt be either of

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Streight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a. Low, or a Middle-fized. Man. I can not by any effort of Thought conceive - the abftract Idea above defcribed. And it is equally impoffi ble for me to form

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the abftraét Idea of Motiondiftint from © the Body moving, and which 1s neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear ; and the like may be faid of all other abftract general Ideas whatfoever. And there’s Grounds to think moft Men

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_ my Cafe. The generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to abfiraét Notions. It’s faid they are difficult and not to be attain’d without Pains and Study ; we may . therefore reafonably conclude that, if fuch there be, they are confin’d only to the ‘Learned.

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G11. I proceed to examine what can be alleg’d in defence of the Doétrine of Abftraction, and try if I can difcover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Ofinion, fo remote from common Senfe as that feems _ tobe. There hasbeena late excellent and defervedly Efteem’d Philofopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Coun. ’ tenance by feeming to think the having en — Ideas 1s what puts the

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Introduétion. = 13 wideft difference in point of Underftanding betwixt Man and Beaft. “ The ha/_ Ving of general Ideas (faith be) is that — “ which puts a perfect diftinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Ex“ cellency which the Faculties of Brutes

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“is evident, we obferve no Foot-f{teps “in them of making ufe of general . , Dgns for univerfal Ideas; from which ‘ we have reafon to imagine that they have not the Faculty of ab/tracting ‘or making general Ideas, fince they “have no ufe of Words or any other. “general Signs. And a little after.

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“ Therefore, I think, we may fuppofe “that ’tis in this that the Species of © Brutes are difcriminated from Men, “ and “tis that proper difference wherein “ they are wholly feparated, and which at laft widens :to fo.wide a Diftance. For if they have any Ideas at all; and are not bare Machines (as fome. wou 'dhave em) we cannot deny “em | to have fome Reafon. It feems as evident to me that they do fome of * “em in certain Inflances Reafon as that they

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* cicular Ideas, juft as they receive them “ fom their Senfes. They are the beft * of ’em tied up within thofe narrow “ Bounds, and have not (as I think) * the Faculty to enlarge ’em by any

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“kind of Abftrattion. Effay on Hum.

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that the Faculties of Brutes can by no - means attain to Abfraction. But then

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if this be made the diftinguifhing property of that fort of Animals, I fear a great many of thofe that pafs for Men muft be -reckon’d into their number. The reafon that ishere affign’d why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have

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ferve in-’em no ufe of Words or any other general Signs;- which is built on _ this Suppofition, viz. that the making ufe of Words, implys the having geneyal Ideas. From which i it follows, that

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ftract or Generalize their Ideas. That this: is the Senfe and Arguing of the

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… the Signsof generalIdeas. Effay “ on Hum. Underft. B.3. C.3. $6. To this © I cannot affent being of opinion that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abftract general.

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Idea but, of feveral particular Ideas,

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any one of which it indifferently fuggef{ts to the Mind. For Example, When — it is faid the change of Motion is propor

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fitions are to be qnderitood of Motion ©

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… in general,and neverthelefs it will not follow that they fuggeft to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body movd, or any determinate Direction, Velocitie, doc. or that I muft con-. ceive an abftraét general Idea of Extenfion, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, d¢. *Tis only implied that whatever Motion I con-

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… or Oblique, _ or inwhatever Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every. particular Extention, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or chat Magnitude or Figure, doc.

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of general Ideas, it is always fuppofed that they are formed by Abftraction, after the manner fet forth in Sed. VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning ~ to our Words, and fpeak only of what we can conceive, I believe we fhall ac_ knowledge, that ar Idea, which confider’d ‘in it felf is particular, becomes general, by being made to reprefent or ftand for all other particular Ideas of

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is demonttrating the Method, of cut-

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ting a_-Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for inftance, a Black Line of an

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Lines whatfoever ; fo that what is demonttrated of it, isdemonttrated of all Lines or, nother Words, of a Line in

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the Sign of an abftract or general Line,

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but of all particular right Lines that may poffibly exift, fo the latter mutt

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| 61 13. To give the il a ” . clearer Vicw of the Nature of abftract Ideas, and the Ufes they are thought neceffary to, I thall add one miore Paf{age out of ‘the Effay on Human Under| flanding, which is as follows. “ Ab* " eafy to Children or the yet unexercif-

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“ly reflect upon them, we fhall find “that general Ideas are Fictions and “ Contrivances of the Mind, that carry “ Difficuley with them, and do not fo ", eafily offer thenifelves, as We are apt

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/_ the general Idea of a Triangle (which © ‘is yet none of the moft abftraét com-.

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“ be neither Oblique nor Rectangle,neither autlacetal, Equicrural, nor Sca“enon, but all and none of thefe at “ once. In effect itis fomething imperte 2 * fect

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Introduétion. 19 . __ fect that cannot exift, an Idea where“in fome Parts of feveral different and " « inconf fient Ideas are put eogether : * Tis true the Mind in this imperfect “ State has need of fuch Ideas, and makes _all the haftetothem it can for the con“ veniency of Communication and En“largement of Knowledge, to both : |, Which it 1s naturally very much in“-clin’d. But yee one has reafon to fu- ", fpect fuch Ideas.are Marks of our Im“ perfection. At leaft this is enough to ‘thew that the moft abftract and ge-’ , neral Ideas are not thofe that the Mind ‘is firft and moft eafily acquainted with, nor fuch as its earlieft Know* lege 1s converfant about. B. 4. C. 7, § 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind fuch an Idea of a

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to pretend to difpute him out of it, nor . woud I go about it. All I defire is, ‘that the Reader wou’d fully and and cet tainly inform himfelf whether he has fuch an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for any one to perform, What more eafy than for anyone | D2 <<. ta

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… has, or can attain to have, an Idea that fhall corre{pond with the defcription that is here given of the General Idea of a Triangle, which 1s, either Oblique nor Retlangle, Fquilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon, but | all and none 7 thefe at once ? a.

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~~ § 14. Much is here faid of the Diffs |

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… Pains and Skill requifite to the forming them. And it is on all] ~ Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind,to Eman-

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~ - har to all forts of Men. But we are told

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… helps for Difcourfe. It cannot be when.they are grown up, for then it feems they are net confcious of any — fuch Pains-taking; ic remains therefore to be the bufinefs of their Childhood. ‘And furely, the great and multiply’dLa| bour of framing abftract Notions will — be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is 1c nota hard thing to imagine that a couple -of Children can’t Prate | cogether,of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the reft of their little Trinkets, till they have firft Tack'd together numberlefs Inconfiftencies, and fo framed _in their Minds eb/fract general Ideds, and

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annexed them to every common Name > they make ufe of? |

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§ 15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Azlargement of Knowlege than for Communication. It 1s I know a Point much infifted on, that all Knowlege and Demonftration are a‘bout unverfal Nouons, to which I — |

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… fo far as I can comprehend, not confifting in the abfolute, pofitive Nature or Conception of any thing, but

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of a Triangle; which ought not to be underftood as if I cou’d frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon, dc. But only

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whether of this or that fort 1t matters

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§ 16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Propofition to be crue of all particular Triangles, except we have firft feen it demonftrat-

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ed of the abftract Idea of a Triangle

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… in all refpeéts is not the fame with it. For Example, Having demonftrated that the three Angles of an Ifo{celes, Rectangular Triangle are equal to

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… Demonftration for every particular Triangle, which 1s impoffible, or once for all demontftrate it of the 2b flra&t Idea of a Triangle, in which all the - Particulars do indifterently partake, and by which they are all equally ——

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Demonftration be, for inftance, that of

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an Hafceles, Reétangular Triangle whofe Sides are of a determinate Length, I may neverthelefs be certain it extends. | to alk other Reétilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bignefs foever. And that,- . becaufe neither the right Angle, nor the equality, nor determinate Length of the — - Sides are at all concern’d in the Demonftration. Tis true, the Diagram I have in - view includes all thefe Particulars, but then there’ s not the leaft mention made of em in the Proof of the Propofition. Ic is-not faid the three Angles are equal: totwaright Ones,becaufe oneofthemis a right Angle, or becaufe the Sides comprehending it are of the fame Length. Which fufficiently fhews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all thatthe Demonftration have held good. And| for this reafon it is, that I conclude that - to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonttrated of a | particular Right-angled, Equicrural

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——— -Lntroduétion. - os Triangle; and not becaufe I demon_ ftrated the Propofition of the abftract

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- Idea of a Triangle.

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§ 17. It were an endlefs,as well as an ufelefs Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, thofe great Mafters of abftraction, thré all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Difpute, which their Doctrine of abftract Natures and Notions feems to haveled’em into. What Bickerings and Controverfies,and whata learns ed Duft have been raifed about thofe | Matters,and what mighty Advantage has been from thence deriv’d. to Mankind — are things at this Day tooclearly known toneed being infifttedon. Andithadbeen © well if the ill effects of that Doctrine were confin’d to thofe only who make the moft avow’d Profeffion of 1t. When | Men confider the great Pains, Induftry and Parts, that have for fo many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that —

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Part of them remain full of Darknefs. and Uncertainty, and Difputes, that | E are

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Underftandings of Men, and that taking altogether, avery {mall Portionof them does fupply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwafe than by being an innocent Diverfion and Amufement. I fay, the Confideration of all this is apt to throw. them into a Defpondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But

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_ this may perhaps ceafe, upon a view of the falfe Principles that have obtain’d in the World, amongft all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended Sway over the Thoughts

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of Speculative Men, than that we have _

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§ 18. I come now to confider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that feems to me to be Language. And furely nothing of lefs extent than Reafon it felf-cou’d have been the Source

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of an Opinion fo univerfally receiv’d. | - The .

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Tntroduétion. 27: The truth of this appears as from other Reafons, fo alfo from the plain Confeffion of the ableft Patrons of abftract Ideas, who acknowlege that they are | made in order to naming, from which | it is a clear Confequence that if there had been no fuch thing as Speech or Univerfal Signs, there never had been any ‘thought of Abftraction. See B. 3, C. 6. § 39. and elfewhere of the -Effay on Human Underftanding. But let us examine the manner wherein Words — have contributed to the Origine of that Miftake. Firft then, *Tis thought that. . every Name has, or ought to have, one only precife and fettled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are eertain abftratt, determinate Ideas that conftitute the true and only immediate ~ Signification of each general Name, And that it is by the mediation of thefe abftract Ideas, that a general Name comes to fignifie any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no fuchthing as one precife and definite Signification pence to any general Name, they all | fignifying indifferently a great ner — F2 of

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28 § — Introduttion. of particular Ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has been already faid, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this, YT doubt not, it will be objeéted that every Name that has a Definition is. is thereby reftrain’d to one certain Sig— ; nification. e. g. a Triangle is defin’'d to”; be a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines; by which that Name 3s himuted to denote one certain Idea and _ no other. To which I anfwer, that in the Definition it is not faidwhether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or ~ White, doc, nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal ot Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclin’d to _ each other, in all which there may be great varicty, and. confequently there is no one. fettled Idea which limits the _ Signification of the word Triangle, ’Tis one thing for to keep a Name conftantly co the fame Definition, and another to make it ftand every where for the - fame Idea, the one is neceflary, the other ufelefs and impracticable.

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G1 19. But to give a farther hsstdend how Words came to produce the Doétrine of abftract Ideas, it muft be ob| fery’d that it’s a receiv ‘d Opinion, that | Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every fignificant Name ftands for an I— dea. This being fo, and it being withe | all certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether Infignificant, do not always mark out particular cons ceivable Ideas, it is ftraightway concladed thag they ftand for abftract Notions. - That there are many Names in ufe amongft Speculative Men, which do not always fuggeft to others determinate, particular Ideas, or in truth any thing at all, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will difcover, that it is not neceffary (eveninthe tricteft Reafonings) fignificant Names which ftand for Ideas fhou’d, every time they are ‘usd, excite in the Underftanding the Ideas they are made to ftand for : ‘In Reading and Difcourfing Names being _ for the mott part ufed as Letters are in

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§ 20. Befides, the communicating of ¥deas marked by Words 1s not the chief and only end of Language,as iscommonly fuppos’d. There. are other Ends, as the raifing of fome Paffion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in fome particular Difpofition - to which the former is in manv Cafes barely fubfervient, and fometimes intirely omitted, when thefe can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen inthe familiar ufe of Language. Iintreat the Reader _to reflect with himfelf, and fee if it does not oft happen either in’ Hearing or Reading a Difcourfe, that the Pafftons ‘ of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admuiration, _ Difdain, we. arife immediately in his Mind upon the perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming bes

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… but, if I miftake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with thofe Paffions, which at firft were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promife of a Good thing, tho we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threaten’d with * Danger fufficient to excite a Dread, thd we think not of any particular Evil like-

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felves an Idea-of Danger in Abftract? | If any one fhall join ever fo little Refie€tion of his own to what has been faid, I believe ic will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often

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_ufed in the propriety of Language with_ out the Speakers defigning them. for marks of Ideas in his own, which he woud have -’em raife in the Mind. of the Hearer. Even proper Names them-

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… Introduétion. — felves do not feem always fpoken, with a defign to bring into our view the Ideas of thofe Individuals that are fup pofed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells mé | . Ariftotle hath faid it, all I conceive. he | means by it, is to difpofe metoem= - brace his Opinion with the Deference ~ and Submiffion which Cuftom has annex’d to that Name. And this effect is-oft fo inftantly produced in the Minds of thofe who are accuftom’d to refign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philofopher, as it is impoffible any Idea either of his Perfon, Writings, or Re=: | putation fhou’d go before. So clofe and - immediate a Connexion may Cuftomr — eftablith, betwixt the very word Ariffotle and the Motions of Affent and Reverence in the Minds of fome Mert. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why fhou’d I infift on thofe things, which every one’s Experi= - ence, will, I. doubt not, plentifully. fuggeft unto him? =

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§ 21. We have, I think, fhewn the Impoffibility of abftratt Ideas. We have. confider’d what has been faid for them by their ableft Patrons; and endeavor'd - to fhew they are of no Ufe for thofe Ends, to which they are thought neceffary. And laftly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow,

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_ which appears evidently to be Language. _ Jt cannot be deny’d that. Words are of . excellent Ufe, in that by their means all _ ‘that Stock of Knowlege which has _ been purchas'd by the joint Labours of

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| may be drawn into the view and made the poffleffion of one fingle Perfon. But moft parts of Knowlege have been fo - ftrangely perplcx’d and darken’d by the abufe of Words; and general ways of Speech wherein they are deliver’d, that it may almoft be made a Queftion whe-_ ther Language, has contributed more | to the hindrance or advancement of the. Sciences, Since therefore Words are fo © apt to impofe on the Underftanding, I : 7 ‘a am

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"am refolv’d in my Inquiries to make as lictle ufe of them as poffibly Ican.What-

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- to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, fo far as I am able, thofe Names which long and conftant Ufe hath fo ftrialy united with them ; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages. -

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§ 22. Firft, I thall be fure to get clear of all Controverfies purely Verbal; the — f{pringing up of which weeds in al~ moft all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and

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to be a fure way to extricate my felf, out of that fine and fubtile Net of ad-

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perplex’d and entangled thg Minds of _

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Men, and that with this peculiar Circumftance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by fo much the deeper was he like to be enfnar’d, and fatter held there-

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Introduétion. 25 in. Thirdly, fo long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divefted of Words, I do not fee how I can eafily be miftaken. The ObjectsI confider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv’d in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not poffible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike,that are not truly fo. To difcern the Agreements or Difagreements there are between my Ideas, to fee what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what’ not, there is nothing more requifite, chan an attentive Perception of what. paffes in my own Underftanding. | 7

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§ 23. But the attainment of all thefe Advantages does prefuppofe an intire deliverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promife my felf ; fo difficult a thing it 1s to diffolve anUnion fo early begun,and confirm’d by fo long a Habit asthat betwixt Words and "Ideas. Which Difficulty feems tohave been very much inereas'd by the Do-~

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Ctrine of Ab/traétion. For fo long as Men

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me the principal Caufe, why thofe Men - who have fo emphatically recommended to others, the laying afide all ufe of Words in their Meditations, and Con-

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fail’d to perform it themfelves. Of late many have been very fenfible of the abfurd Opinions and infignificant Difputes, which grow out of the abufe of Words. And in order to remedy thefe Evils they advife well, that we attend to the Ideas fignified, and draw off. our Attention, from the Words which fignifie them, But how good foever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they cou’d not have a due regard to it themfclves, fo long as they thought the

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only immediate ufe of Words was to .

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fignification of every general mane was a determinate, abjtratt Idea.

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… to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always ftand for Ideas, will fpare himfelf. the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had, It were, therefore, to be with'd that every one woud ufe his utmoft Endeavors, to obtain a clear view of , the Ideas he'd confider, feparating from ~ thern all that drefs and incumbrance of Words which fo much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention, In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into © the Encrails of the Earth, in vain do we confult the Writings of Learned

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Men, and trace the dark Foot-fteps of Antiquity, we need only draw the Cur-

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tain of Words;"to behold the faireft -

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Tree of Knowlege, whofe Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

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- § 2. Unlefs we oii care to clear the firft Principles-of Knowlege, from the embarras and delufion of Words, we may make infinite Reafonings upon them tono purpofe; we may draw Confequences from Confequences, and be never the Wifer. The farther we go we fhall only lofe our felves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled —in Difficulties and Miftakes. Whoever , therefore defigns to Read the following Sheets, I do Intreat him that, he wou'd make my Words the Occafion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the fame Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in Writing them. By this means, it will be eafy for him _ to difcever the Truth or Falfity of what

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T fay. He will be out of all danger.

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of

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Introduttion. — 29 of being deceiv’d by my Words, and Ido'not fee how he can be led into

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an Error by confidering his own Naked, undifguifed Ideas,

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Gx. T is evident to any oric wis ; BZ takes a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowlege, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the - Senfes, or elfe fuch as are perceiv’d by attending tothe Paflioris arid Operations of the Mind, or laftly Ideas formed by help: of Memory and Imagination; either compounding, dividing, or barely reprefencing thofe originally per ceiv’d in the aforefaid ways: By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their feveral Degrees and Variations: By Tough J perceive Hard

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42 Of the Principles Part I.

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and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and | R cfiftance, isc, and of all thefe more and lefs cither as to Quantity or Deevec. Simclling furnifhes me with O; do: s; the Palate with Taftes,and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind ‘in all their variety of Tone and Compofition.

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And as ‘feveral of thefe are obferv’d to - |

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… to go together, are accounted onediftinct Thing, fignified by the name Apple. Other Collections of Ideas conftitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book and the like fenfible Things; which as they are pleafing or. difagreeable excite the Paffions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, de.

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6 2. But befides all that endlefs variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowlege, thereislikewife fomething which knows or perceives them, and exercifes divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering, dc. about them. This per| ceiving,

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Part I. of Human Knowlese. 43 — ceiving,active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self By which Words

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I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intyely diftin@ from chem, wherein they Exift, or, which 1s ‘the ; fame thing, whereby they are Perceiv’d,

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_. for the Exiftence of an Idea confifts in being Perceiv'd.

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… Exift otherwife than ina Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowlege may be. obtain'd of this, by any one that fhall attend to © what is meant by the Term Fxift when apply'd to fenfible Things. The Table | I Write on, I fay, Exifts, z..e. I See and Feel it, and if I were out of my Study I fhow’ d fay it Exifted, meaning there| by that if I was in my Study I might

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AA, Of the Principles Part I. perceive it, or that fome other Spirig actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, i. e. it was Smelt; There wasa Sound, 2. e. it was Heard ; a Colour or Figure and it was perceiy ‘d by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can una | derftand by thefe and the like Expreffi.

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ons. For as to what is faid of the Abe,

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folute Exiftence of unthinking Things — without any. rclationto their being per|

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ceiv'd, that is to. me perfectly Unintel-. ligible. Their Efe is Percipi, nor is it poffible they thou’d have any Exiftence, out of the Minds. or. thinking yhngs | which = them.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 45 it to involve a manifeft Contradiction. For what are the foremention’d Objects but the things we perceive by Senfe, and. what, I pray you, do we perceive befides our own Ideas or Senfations, and is it nor plainly repugnant that any one of thefe or any. Combination of them fhou’d Exift unperceivid 2

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… we throughly examine this Tenent, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Dodétnne of bz fraét Ideas. For can there be a nicer “Strain of Abftraction then to diftinguith | the Exiftence of fenfible Objects from their being PRerceiv’d, fo as'to conceive them Exifting Unperceiv ‘d? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extenfion and _ Figures, ina word the Things we See. and Feel what are they but fo many _ Senfations,Notions,Ideas ‘or Impreffions on the Senfe, and is it poffible to fepas ‘rate, even in thought, any of thefe from Perception : ? For-my part I might as cafily dividea Thing from it Self. I may, indeed, divide in my Thoughts or cone. ceive apart from edch other thofe Things -

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46 | Of the Principles ‘Part L

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ere perhaps, I never perceiv’d by | | Senfe fo divided. Thus I imagine the - Trunk of a Human Body without the - Limbs, or conceive the Smell of.a Rofe | without thinking on the Rofe it felf. So — far I will not deny I can Abftract, if - that may properly be called Abftrattion, which extends only to the conceiving feparately fuch Objedts, as it is poffible may really exift or be actually perceived afunder. But my conceiving or — imagining Power doés not extend be- yond the poffibility of real Exiftence or — Perception. Hence as it is impoffible, for me to See or Feel any Thing with| — out an actual Senfation of that Thing, | — fois it impoffible for me to conceive in | _ my Thoughts any fenfible Thing or Object diftine from the Senfation or Pers ception of it. In truth the Objeé&t and | the Senfation are the fame thing, and — cannot therefore bs. =. from | ant other, |

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' take this Important one.to be, viz. that ' all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all thofe Bodies

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which compofe the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subfiftence

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quently fo long as they are not actually Perceiv'd by Me, or do not: Exift in my: Mind or that of any other Creat-

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~ aftence at all, or elfe fubfift in the Mind: of fome Eternal Spirit : It being per-

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- the Abfurdity of Abftraction, to attri-

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~ bute to any fingle part of them an Ex. itence independent of “4” Spirit. To _ make this appear with all the Light - and Evidence of an Axiom, it feems

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fufficient if I can but awaken the Reflexion of the Reader, that he may take

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- -an impartial View of his own Meaning, -

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and turn his Thou hts upon the Subject it felf, free and difengaged from all | Embarras of Words and Prepoffeffion

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in favour of received Miftakes.

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48° of the Principles ‘Part i |

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… not any other Subftance | than Spirit or that which perceives. But for the fuller Derhonftration of this - Point, let it be confider’d, the fenfible Qualities are Colour, Figure, Mo| _ tion, Smell, Tafte, dc. i. e. the Ideas — -perceiv'd by Senfe.. Now for an Idea _

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¢ there can be no unthinking Subftance . 8 or Subjiratunt of thofe Ideas.

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t Part I. of Human Knowlege. 49 our Thoughts, we fhall find it impoffible for us to conceive a Likenefs except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether thofe fuppos’d Originals or External Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures. or Reprefentations, be themfelves Perceivable or no? If they are, then they are Ideas and we have gaind our Point; but if you fay they. are not, -I appeal to any one whether it be Senfe, to affert a Colour islike fome-: thing which 1s invifible; Hard or Soft, * like fomething which 1s Intangible, and

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fo of the reft. to. - § 9. Some there are who make a ditinction betwixt Primary and Secondary Qualities : By the former, they mean Extenfion, Figure, Motion, Reft, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number : By the latter they denote all other Senfible Qualitics as Colours, Sounds, ’ aftes, dc. the Ideas we have of thefe ' they acknowlege not to be the Refemblances, of any thing exifting without | the Mind or unperceiv’d, but they will have our Ideas of ——— Qualities _ - of. : to

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300 (Of the Principles. Part-Le to bePacterns or Images of things which exift without the Mind, in an unthink|

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… their Archetypes can Exift in an unperceiving Subftance. Hence it is‘plain, that thé very Notion of what is called Matter or Corporeal Subftance, involves a Contradiction in it. Infomuch that I fhou’d-not think it neceflary to.

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» dity. But becaufe the Tenent of the Exiftence of Matter feems to have taken fo deep a Root in the Minds of Philofonhers, and draws after it fo many ill Confequences, 1 chufe rather to be thought Prolix and Tedious, than omit ‘any thing thac might conduce to the ‘ull Difcovery and Extirpation of that Prejudice. . | ~§iu1o. They |

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 51

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Motion, and the reft of the Primary or Original Qualities do Exift without the Mind, in unthinking Subftances, do at. the fame timeacknowlege that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, ¢vc. do not, which

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‘Motion,.c. of the: minute Particles of ~ \Matter.This they take for an undoubted

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… are infepa_ vably united with the other fenfible Qualities, and not, evenin Thought, capable . of being Abftracted from them, it plainly follows that they Exift only in the Mind.. Buc I defire any one to reflect and try, -

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-wwhether he can by any Abftraction of -'Thought, conceive the Extenfion and ‘Motion ofa Body, without all other ‘fenfible Qualities. For my own part, I : fee evidently that it is not in my power © . t0 frame an Idea of a Body. Extended -and Moying, _ muft withal give it

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52 Of the Principles Part l. . fome Colour or other fenfible Quality which 1s acknowleg’d to Exift-only -in the Mind. In fhort, Extenfion, Figure,

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… Exift ne where without the Mind, being intirely rela— tive. and changing asthe Frame or: Pofition of the Organs of Senfe varies. The Extenfion therefore which Exifts without the Mind, is neither Great nor Small, che Motion, neither Swift nor Slow, that j 1S, they are ’ nothing at all. But fay you they are Extenfion in General, and .Motion in General : Thus. we fee how much the Tenent of extended, moveable Subftances Exifting without the Mind depends | on: that ftrange Doctrine of Abftradt E . deas. And here 1 can’t but remark, how nearly the Vague and indetermi-

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nate D-fcription of Matter ‘or Gorpo2al anne which the Modern Phi-. lofophers

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7 Part’ I. 1 of Hunan Knawlege

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fo much cidicul’d Notion of Materia Prima, to be met with in -Ariffotde and his Followers. Without Extenfion Solidi-

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it has been fhewn that Estenfion Exits not in an unthinking Subftance,. he fans mutt alfo be true of Salidiny, |

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S$ 12. That Number 3 is intircly: . cea of the Mind, even tho the o-

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out, will be evident to whoever confiders, that the fame thing bears.a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind viewsit with different refpects, Thus, the fame Extenfion is One or Three or Thirty Six, :according as the Mind confiders it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is fo vifibly relative, and dependent on Mens Underftanding, that ic is ftrange to think how any one fhou’d give it an abfolute Exiftence without the Mind. We fay one Book, one Page, one Line,

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54 ~~ Of the Principles Part I: fome contain feveral of the others.And in each Inftance ’tis plain, the Unite relates | to fome particular Combinationof Ideas

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… Underftanding fince if is faid to accompany’ all.other Ideas, and to be perceiv’d by all the ways of Senfation and -Reflexion. To fay no more it is an abfraét Idea. °

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-likewife prov’d of all other fenfible Qua— lities whatfoever. Thus, for Inftance,. jt is faid chat Heat and Cold, are Affections only of the Mind, and not 7

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Part 1. of Human Knowlese. 55 all Patterns of real Beings, exifting: in the Corporeal Subftances which excite .- them, for that the fame Body which appears Cold to one Hand, feems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extenfion, are not Patterns or Refemblances of Qualities exifting in Matter, becaufe to the fame Eycat different Stations,or Eyes of--a different Texture at the fame Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing feteled and determinate without the Mind ? again, “Tis prov’d that Sweetnefs is not-really in: the Sapid Thing, becaufe the thing remaining unalter’d the Sweetnefs is changed into Butter,as in cafe of a Fever orotherwife vitiated PalateIs | it not as reafonable to fay,that Motionis not without the Mind, fince if the Succeffion of Ideas in the Mind: become Swifter, the Motion, it is acknowledg’d, fhall appear Slower without any external Alteration. ~ . = - §- 35. In fhort, let any one confider thofe Arguments, which are thought : | = manifeftly

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86 Of the Principles Part I.

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find they may with equal force, be brought. to prove the fame thing of Extenfion, Figure, and Motion. Tho it mutt be confefs'd this method of Arguing does not fomuch prove that there

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Colour of the Objeé&t. But the Arguments foregoing plainly thew it to be

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Isa mode ot accident of Matter, and. that Matter is the Subftratam chat fup- ports it. Now I defire that you wou’d

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 57 cannot explain ic. I anfwer, tho you | have no pofitive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you muft at Icaft have a Relative Idea of Matter; thd you know not what it is, yet you muft be fuppofed to know whd&e Relation it — bears to Accidents, and what 1s meant by-its fupporting them. ’Tis evident ~ Support cannot here be taken in its ufual-or literal Senfe, as when we fay that Pillars fuppore a Building ; in what Senfe therefore muft it be taken ? For my part I am not able to difcover any Senfe at all that can be applicable to it.

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… ; we fhall find them acknowlege, they have no other meaning annexed to thofe Sounds, but the Idea of Being in

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tion of its fupporting Accidents. The gencral Idea of Being appeareth to mie the moft abftra& and incomprchenfible of all other, and as for its fupporting — Accidents, this, aswe have*juft now ob-

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58. Of the Principles Part I.

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ferv’d, cannot beunderftood in thecommon Senfe of thofe Words, it mutt therefore be taken in fome other Senfe,

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difcuffing this Material Subftratum or Support of Figure and Motion, @c. —

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… folid, Figur’d moveable Subftances may Exift without the Mind, correfponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it poffible for us to kn@w this? Either we muft know it by Senfe or by Reafon. As for our Senfes, by them

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we have the Knowlege only of ourSen|

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Part I. of Human Knowlese. 59 what you will : But they do not inform us that things Exift without the Mind, or unperceivd, like to thofe which are perceivd. This the Materialifts themfelves acknowlege. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowlege at all of External Things, it muft be by Reafon, inferring their Exiftence from what is immediately perceiv’d by Senfe. But I do not fee what reafon can induce us to believe the Exiftence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, fince the very Patrons of Matter themfelves do not pretend, there is any neceflary Connexion betwixt them

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… thd there were no Bodies Exifting without refembling them. | Hence it is evident the Suppofition of External Bodies is not neceflary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced fometimes, and might poffibly be produced always in

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60 Of the Principles Part I.

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yet perhaps it may be thought eafier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by fuppofing External Bodies in their likenefs rather than otherwife, and fo it might be at leaft probable there are fuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be faid, for tho we give the Materialifts their External Bodies, they by their one confeffion are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are. produced : Since they own themfelves. unable to comprehend in what manner. Body can aét upon Spirit, or how 1t 1s poflible icfhou’d imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it 1s evident the Production of Ideas or Senfations in our Minds,

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_ Part 1. of Human Kiowlege. 61

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ry precarious Opinion; {ince it Js to fuppofe, without any reafon at all, thac God has Created innumerable Beings that are intirely ufelefs, and ferve to no manner of purpofe. a

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with the fame train of Senfations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in the fame order and with hike vividnefs in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reafon to believe the Exiftence of Corporeal Subftances, reprefented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can poffibly have for beheving the fame thing ? Of this there can be no Queftion, which one Confideration were enough to make any reafonable Perfon,fufpect the ftrength of whatever

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62 Of the Principles Part I. Arguments he may think himfelf to have,

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for the Exiftence of Bodies without the Mind. - |

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§ 2x. Where it neceflary to add any farther Proof againft the Exiftence of Matter, after what‘has been faid,I cou’d inftance fevcral of thofe Errours and Difficulties (not to mention Impieties) which have fprung from that Tenent. ~ Jt has occafion’d numberlefs Controverfies and Difputes in Philofophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I fhall not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well becaufe I chink, Arguments a2 Pofteriori are unneceflary for confirming what has been, if I miftake not, fufficiently demonttrated @ Priori, as becaufe I thall hereafter find occafion to fpeak fomewhat of them.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 63 in a Line or Two, to any one that’s capable of the leaft Reflexion ? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, and fo trying whether you can conceive it poffible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour to Exift without the Mind, or Unperceiv’d. This eafy Try-

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… than in a Mind perceiving it, I fhall readily give up the Caufe : And as for all that compages of External Bodies you contend for, I fhall grant you its Exiftence, tho you cannot ¢ither give me any Reafon why you believe it Exifts, or aflign any — ufe to it when it is fuppofed to Exift. I fay, the bare poffibility of your Opinions being truce, fhall pafs for an Argument that it 1s fo.

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64. Of the Principles Part 1

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… Mind certain Ideas which you call Books and Trees, and at the fame time omitting to frame the Idea of any one that may perceive them ? But do not you your felf Perceive or Think

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of them all the while > This, therefore ©

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is nothing to the purpofe : It only fhews - you have the power of Imagining or Forming Ideas in your Mind; but it does not fhew that you can conceive it poffible, the Objects of your Thought ~ mayExift without cheMind; to make out this, itis neceflary that you conceaivethem Exifting unconceivd‘or unthought of, which is a manifeft Repugnancy. When we do our utmoft to concerve the Exiftence of External Bodies, we are all the while only Contemplating our own Ideas. ‘But the Mind taking no ie , an?

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Part L of Mies Knowlege. 65

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of it felf, is deluded to think it canand

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-doesconceive Bodies Exifting unthought of or without the Mind; thdat the fame time they are apprchended by or Exift init felf. A little Attention will difcover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here faid, and make it un— neceffary to infift on any other Proofs a-

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gaintt ‘the Exiftence of —— sie {tance. . |

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… to know whether it be poffible for us to underftand what is meant, by the abfolute Exiftence of fenfible Objetis in them ~

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all. And to convince others of this,I

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know no readier or fairer way, than to - intreat they wou'dcalmly attend to their _ own Thoughts: And jf by this Attention, the Emptinels or Repugnancy of ©

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66 Of the Principles Sia IL.

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… for their Conviction. “Tis on this therefore that I infift; wz. that the abfolute Exiftence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradition. This 1s what I repeat and inculcate, and earneftly recommend to _ the attentive Thoughts of the Reader.

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… we perceive by whatfoever Namies they may be diftinguih’d, are vifibly Inactive, there 1s nothing of Power, or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Objeé& of

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Thought cannot Produce,or make any Alteration in another. To be fatisfied of

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_. the Truth of this, there 1s nothing elfe re-

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-quifite but abare Obfervation of our Ide-

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as. For fince they and every part of them ' -Exift only in the Mind, it follows that there 1s nothing in them but what 1s

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his Ideas, whether of Senfe or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Pow© er or Activity, there 1 Is, therefore, no

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Part I. of Human Knowlege, 67 fuch thing contained in them. Ai little Attention will. difcover to us that thé very Being of an Idea implies Paflivenefs and Inertnefs in it, infomuch that. — it is impoflible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ftrictly fpeaking, to be the Caufe of any thing ; Neither can it be . the Refemblance or Pattern‘of any active Being, as is evident from Seéf. VIII. Whence it plainly follows that - Extenfion, Figure and Motion, cannot — be the Caufe of our Senfations. To fay, therefore, that thefe are the effects of Powers refulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, Size, We. of Corpufcles muft certainly be falfe.

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§ 26. We perceive a continual Succeffion of Ideas, fome are anew Excited, others are Changéd or totally Difappear. There is therefore {ome Caufe of thefe Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this — Caufe cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It muft therefore be _ a Subftance, but it has been fhewn that

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68 Of the Principles PartlL there is no Corporeal or Material Sub{tance : It remains therefore that the Caufe of Ideas is an Incorporeal, active

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there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, be-

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they cannot reprefent unto us, by way of Image or Likenefs, that which Acts. - _ A little Attention will make it plain to

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fhall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is abfolutely — impoffible. Such isthe Nature of Spi— rit or that which Acts, that it cannot

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- be of it {elf Perceived,. but only by the

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fhall doubt of the Truth of what 1s here : delivered, let him but refle& and try if | he can frame the Idea of any Power or :

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 69

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. of two Principal [Powers, mark’d by . the Names Will and Underflanding, die

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a third Idea of Subftance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of |

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its {upporting or being the Subject. of the aforefaid Powers, which 1s fignified

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… And by the fame Power it 1s obliterated, and makes way for another. This make . ing and unmaking of Ideas doth very. properly denOminate the Mind —

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4 0 . of the Pr inciples Par t J,

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Experience: But when we talk of un-

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thinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas ex-

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— clufive of Volition; we only arnufe our felves with Words.

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… And fo likewife as to the Hearing and other Senfes, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is _therefote fome other Will or je aia chat produces them.

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§ 30. The‘Ideas of Senfe are more ftrong, lively and diftinét-than thofe of the Imagination, they have likewifea | Steddinefs, Order and Coherence, and are not excited at Random,.as thofe | which are the effects of . Human Wills,

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 71 © often are, but ina regular Train or

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Series, the admirable Connexion whereof fufficiently teftifies the Wifdom and

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. Benevolence of its Author. Now the

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of Nature: And thefe we learn by Ex-

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fuch Ideas are attended with fuch and fuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courfe of ie tee | |

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31. This ; gives us a fort of Forefight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefice of Life. And without this we fhou’d be eternally at a lofs, we cou’d not know how to ac any thing that might procure us the leaft Pleafure, or remove thé leaft Pain of Senfe. That Food Nourifhes, Sleep Refrefhes, and Fire Warms us ; that to Sow in the Sced-time is the ‘way to Reap in the Harveft, and, in general, that to obtain fuch or fuch Ends, fuch or fuch Means are conducive, all this we know, not by difcovering any ne-

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“¢ «Of the Principles Part I. — ceflary Connexion between our Ideas, © but only by the Obfervation of the fet— tled Laws of Nature, without which © we fhou’d be all in Uncertainty and | Confufion, and a grown Man no more | know how to manage himfelf in the Af_ fairs of Life, than an Infant juft Born. |

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… And yet this confiftent, uni — form Working which fo evidently dif — playsthe Goodnecfsand Wifdom of that — Governing Spirit whofe Will conftitutes — the Laws of Nature, is fo far from lead— ing our Thoughtsto Him, that it rather ' fends’em a wandering afterfecondCau| - fes. For when we perceive certain I. deas of Senfe conftantly follow’d by o- ther Ideas, and we know this is not of - eur own doing, we forthwith attribute —

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felyes, and make one the Caufe of ano| ther, than which nothing can be more | Abfurd and Unintelligible. .Thus, for _

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| Part L. | of Human Knowlege. 73.

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clude the Sun to be the caufe of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Mo-.

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tion and Collifion of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to. think the latter the effect of the former.

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§ 33. The Ideas imprinted on the Senfes by the Author of Nature are c¢alled real things, and thofe excited in the Imagination being lefs Regular, Vivid and Conftant, are more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and reprefent. But then our Senfations, be they never fo Vivid and Di{tinct, are nevertheléfs Ideas, i. e. they _Exift in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Senfe are allow’d to. have more reality in them, i.e. to be more Strong, Orderly and Coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; bute this is no Argument that they Exift without the Mind.’ They are alfo lefs dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Subftance which ‘perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of a-

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14. Of the Principles Part I. nother and more Powerful Spirit : yet ftill they are Ideas, and certainly no EF dea, whether Faint or Strong, can Exift otherwife than in a Mind perceiving it.

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… Objections which may probably be made againft the Principles we have hitherto laid down, In doing of which, if I feem too Prolix to

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—” thofe of quick Apprehenfions, I defire

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I may be excufed, fincé all Men do | not equally apprehend things of this — Nature ; and I am willing to be under{tood by every one. Firft, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and fubftantial in Nature 1s banifh’d out of the World: And inftead thereof a ChimericalScheme of Ideas takes place. All things: that. Exift, Exift‘only in the Mind, that is, they are purely Notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon and ‘Stars ? What mutt we think of Houfes, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones ; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all = | So | _ ut

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 3

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the Fancy ? Toall which, and whatever elfe of the fame fort-may.be objected, I Anfwer, that by the Pririciples premisd, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we See, Feel, Hear, or any wife Conceiveor Un- derftand, remains as fecure as ever, and is as real as ever, There is a rerum na— tura, and thé Diftinétion between Realitiesand Chimeras retains its full force, - This is evident from Sed. XXIX, XXX, and XXXII, wheré we have fhewn what is meant by rea/ Things in oppofition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own framing ; but then they both equally Exift in the Mind, and in that Senfe are

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' Exiftence of any one thing that we cari

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7976 = Of the Principles Part I,

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ter or Corporeal Subftance. And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the reft of ‘Mankind, who, I dare fay, will never muifs it. "The Atheitt, indeed, will want the Colour of an empty Name to fupport his Impiety ; and the Philofophers may poflibly find, they have loft a great Handle for Trifling and Difputation. But that’s all the

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§ 36. If any Man thinks we jail from the Exiftence or Reality of things, he is very far from Underftanding what has been premis’d in the plaineft Terms I cou’d think of., Take here an Ab— {tract of what has been faid. There are Spiritual Subftances, Minds or Hu~ man Souls which will or excite Ideas _ in themfelves at pleafure : but thefe are

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faint, weak, and unfteady in refpect of othersthey perceive by Senfe, which be-

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ing imprefs’d upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, {peak themfelves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wife than Human Spirits. Thefe abil are faid to have more Re-

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… which is meant that thcy are more affecting, orderly and diftinét, and that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Senfe, the Sun that

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which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the Senfe here given of Reality, ’tis evident that every. Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general cach part of the Mundane Syftem, is as much a Real Being by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what

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… To thismy An{wer is, That if the word Subftance be taken in the vulgar Senfe, for a Combination of Senfible Qualities, fuch as Extenfion, Solidity, Weight, dc. This we cannot be accufed of taking away. But if ic be taken in a Phylofophic Senfe, for the fupport of Accidents or Quali-

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78 “of ie Principles Part is

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… it does fo, the word Idea not being ufed in common Difcourfe to fignifie the feveral Combinations of a le Qualities, which are called : and it is certain that any Ex-

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se on which varies from the familiar Ufe of Language will feem harth and

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the Truth of the Propofition, which in other Words is no more than this, vz, we are Fed and Cloathed with thofe Things which we perceive immediately: by our Senfes. The Hardnefs or Softnefs, the Colour, Tafte, Warmth, Fi - sure, 9. which combin’d together - conftitute the feveral forts of Victuals and Apparel, have been fhewn to Exift only 1 in, the Mind that perceives ther §

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Part I. of Haman Knowlege. 79

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Iam not for difputing about the Propriety, buc the Truth of the Expreffion.

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YG 39. If itbe demanded why I make — ufe of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Cuftom call them Things. I anfwer, I do it for

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Bo“ Of the Principles Part L

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… his Senfes, and never. fuffer any Arguments, how plaufible foever, to. prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it fo, aflert the Evidence of Senfe as high as you pleafe, we are willing to do the fame. That what I See, Iftar and Feel doth Exift, i. e. is perceived by me, I no more doubt than T do of my own Being. * But Ido not fee how the Teftimony of Senfe can be alleg’d,asa proof for the Exiftence of any Thing, which 1s not perceiv'd by Senfe.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. Si

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… It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for Inftance, and the Idea of — Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones felf Burnt, and actually being fo : If you fufpect it to be only the Idea of . Fire which you fee, do but put your _ ~ Hand into it, and ‘you'll be convinced , with awitnefs, This.and the like may be urged in oppofition to our Tenents. | To all which the Anfwer is evident from what hath been already faid, and I thall only add in this place, that if real Fite

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be very different from the Idea of Fire,

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fo alfo is the real Pain that it occafions, | very different from the Idea of the fame - Pain, and yet no Body will pretend that real "Pain either 1s, ot can poffibly be, in an unperceiving Thing ‘or without the Mind, any mote than its Idea,

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Part L. of Human Knowleve. 82

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are feen at the Diftance of iveral Miles,

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§ 43. But for the fuller clearing of

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… fome nearer, others farther off, feems to carry with it fome Oppofition to what hath been faid, of their Exifting no where without "the Mind. The Confideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to my E/- fay towards a new Theory of Vifion, which was publifh’d not long fince. ‘Wherein it 1s fhewn that Diffance or Outnefs is neither immediately of it felf perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing

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83 Of the Principles Part I.

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… by certain vifible Ideas and Senfations attending Vifion, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude ot Relation, either with Di© ftance, or Things placed at a Diftance, But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they came to fignify and Sug-

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geft them to us, after the fame manner ~ that Words of any Language Suggett

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from him. vid. Seé.. XLI. of the fore-

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§ 44. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely diftinét and - heterogeneous. The former are Marks atid Prognoftics of the latcer. That the proper Objects of Sight neither Exift without the Mind, nor are the Images” of External Things, was fhewn even in that Treatife, Thd throughout the °

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84. Of the Principles Part I. — fame, the contrary be fuppofed true of Tangible Objects : Not that to fuppofe _ that Vulgar Error, was neceflary for . eftablifhing the Notion therein laid down, but becaufe it was befide my | Purpofe to Examine and Refute it ina Difcourfe concerning Vifion, So thatin | {trict Truth the Ideasof Sight, when we apprehend by them Diftanceand Things placed at a Diftance, do not Suggeft or

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at a Diftance, but only admonih us - , what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at fuchand fuch diftances of Time, and in confequence of fuchor fuch Actions. It is, I fay, evident from ‘what has been faid in the foregoing — Parts of this Treatife, and in Sed, ,

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CXLVII andelfewhere of the Effay con_ cerning Vifion, that Vifible Ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what Tangible Ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in cafe we Excite this: or that Motion in our own Bodies. But

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Part I. of Hyman Knowlege. 85

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it follows, Things are every moment annihilated and created anew, The Objects of Senfe Exift only when they are Perceived : The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer than while there is fome Body by to perceive them. Upon fhucting my Eyes all the Furniture in the Room is reduc’d to nothing, and barely upon opening ’em it is again created. In anfwer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been faid i in Seé. IIL, IV, dc. and defire he wall confider whether he means any thing, by. the actual Exiftence of an Idea, diftinét from its being perceiv’'d. For my pare after the niceft Inquiry I cou’d make, I am not able to difcover that anything elfe is meant by thofe Words, And 1 once more intreat the Reader to oat his own Thoughts, and not fuffer him‘felf to be impofed on by Words. _ If he can conceive it poffible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to Exit with- out

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 86 out being perceived, then I give up the Caufe: But if he cannot, he willacknowlege it is unreafonable for him to ftand up in Defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an Abfurdity, the not affenting to thofe Propofitions which at Bottom have no meaning in them.

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~— § 46. Ie will not be amifs to obferve, how far the receiv’d Principles of Philofophy are themfelves chargeable with thofe pretended Abfurdities. It is-thought ftrangely Abfurd that upon - clofing my Eye-lids, all the Vifible Ob~ jects round me fhou’d be reduced to no‘thing ; and yet is not this what Philo| fophers commonly acknowlege, when ‘they agree on all Hands that Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are meer Senfations that Exift no longer

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-_ *, Scho of

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87 Of the Principles Part I.

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Sthoolmen, tho they acknowlege the Exiftence of Matter and that the whole - mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are neverthelefs of Opinion that it cannot fubfift without the Divine Confervation, which by them 1s expounded to bea continual Creation.

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— «§ 47. Farther, a little Thought will difcover to us, that thé we allow the Exiftence of Matter or Corporeal Subftance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the ‘principles which are now ge-

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‘Bodies of what kind foeyer do none of

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… dxc. that the Matter Philofophers contend for is an incomprehenfible Some-_ what which hath none of thofe particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Senfes are diftinguifhed one from another. But.to make this more plain, it muft be remarked that the Infinite Divifibility of Matter is now univerfally allow’d, at leaft by the moft — ‘d and confiderable. Philo-

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88 Of the Principles Part I. fophers, who on the receiv'd Principles | demonttrate it beyond all exception. Fience it follows, there is an infinite number of Parts in each Particle of Matter, which are’ not perceiv’d by Senfe. The reafon, therefore, that any particular Body feems to be of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of Parts to Senfe, is, not becaufe it contains no more, fince in it felf ic contains an infinite number of Parts, but becaufe the Senfe is not acute enough to difcern them. In proportion therefore as the Senfe is render’d more acute, it perecives a greater numof Parts in the Object i. e. the Object © dppeats greater, and its Figure varies, thofe Parts in its Extremities which were before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from thofe perceived by an obtufer Senfe. Ard at length, after various changes of Size and Shape, when the Senfe becomes infinitely acute, the Body fhall feem infinite. During all which there ts no alteration in the Body, but only in the Senfe. Each Body, therefore

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Part I. of Human Knowlege.. 89 therefore, confider’d in it felf is infinitely extended, and confequently void of all Shape or Figure. From. which it follows that tho we fhou’d grant the Exiftence of Matter to be never fo cer-

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them Infinite and Shapelefs, and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodics which compofe the vifible World, any one whereof does not Ex-

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| againft our Notions. For tho we hold indeed the Objects of Senfe to be mo: thing elfe but Ideas which cannot Exift

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sO Of the Principles. Part I. | clude they have no Exiftence except . only while they. are perceiv’d by us, fince there may be fome: other Spirit. - that perceives them thd we do not. . Wherever Bodies are faid to have no - Exiftence without the Mind, I wou’d . not be underftood to mean this or that — particular Mind, but all Minds what-foever.. It does not therefore follow | from the foregoing Principles, that Bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or Exift not at all during the ~ Intervals between our perception of them. Oo

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… figured ; fince Ex| tenfion isa Mode or Attribute which (to fpeak with the Schools) is predicated of the Subject in which it Exifts. I anfwer, Thofe qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceiv’d by it, that is not by way of Mode or Attribute but only by way of Idea, andit no more follows the Soul or Mind is extended = tee - caule

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| Part L of Hina Knowlege Gt

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' As to what Philofophers fay of Subject

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ed of 1 It, and in which they Exift. This

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from and fupporting them, but only an Explication of the meaning - of the word Die. |

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92. Of the Principles Part I. —Philofophy, and undermine thofe Mechanical Principles which have been applied with fo much fuccefs to account for the Phenomena. In fhort, whatever Advances. have been made, either

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the Study of Nature do all proceed on the Suppofition, that Corpereal Sub{tance or Matter doth really Exit. To this, I anfwer, that there 1s not any one Phenomenon explain’d on that Suppofition, which may not as well be :ex-

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plain’d without it, as might eafily be ~ maade appear by an induction of Parti.

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will pretend to explain. Ik is therefore evident, there can be no ufe of Matter in Natural Philofophy. Befides, they who attempt to account for Things, do it, not by Corporeal Subftance but, by Figure, Mation, @&c. which are in truth no more than meer Ideas, and therefore

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 93 ; cannot be the caufe of any thing, as hath been already fhewn wid. Sed. XXV.

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— § 61. Seventhly, at will wpon this be demanded whether .1t. does not feem abfurd, to take away Natural Caufes, and afcrrbe every thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits ? We muft no

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… to Think with the Learned, and Speak with the Valgar. They .. who to demoniftration are convinced of °

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the truth of the Copernican Syftem, do neverthelefs fay the Sun ‘Rifes, the Sun

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… very ridiculous. A little Reflexion on what 1s heréfaid will make it manifeft, that the common ufe of Language wou'd receive no manner of Alteration or Difturbance from the admiffion ‘of our Tenents, § 52.

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| 94 ~ Of the Principles Part I.

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§ g2. In the ordinary affairs of Life, any Phrafes may be retain’d, fo long as they Excite in us proper Sentiments, ~ or Difpofitions to act in fuch a manner as is neceflary for our well-being, how falfe foever they may be, if taken in a _ ftrict and Speculative Senfe. Nay this ' 1s unavoidable fince, Propriety being regulated by Cuftom, Language 1s fuited to the received Opinions which are not always the trueft. Hence it is impoffible even in the moft rigid, Philofophic Reafonings, fo far to alter the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we fpeak, as never to givea handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Inconfiftencies.. Bue a fair and ingenuous Reader will colle& the Senfe, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of a Difcourfe, making allowances for thofe unaccurate Modes ~ of Speech, which ufe has made inevita-

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¢ 53. As to the Opinion. that there. are no Corporeal Caufes, this has been yeretofore maintain’d by fome of the : ' 3 School-

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Schoolmen, as it is of late by others a-

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efficient Caufe of all. Things. Thefe

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Men faw, that amongft all the Objects of Senfe there was none, which had any

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Power or Activity included in it, and | _ that by confequence. this was likewife true, of whatever Bodies they fuppofed

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to Exift-without the Mind, like unto the immediate Objects of Senfe. But

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- then, that they fhou’d fuppofe an innumerable multitude of Created Beings, | which they acknowlege are not capable ©

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of producing any one effect in Nature, and which therefore are made to no

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manner of purpofe, fince God might | have done every thing as well without

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~ § 64. In the Eighth Place, the univerfal concurrent affent of Mankind may be thought by fome, an invincible Ar-

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_ gumentin behalf of Matter, or the Ex-

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 95 —

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94. - Of the Principles Part I. iftence.of External Things. Muft we

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~ fuppofe the whale World to be miftaken, and if fo, what caufe can be affign’d of fo wide-fpread and predominant an

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Error ? I anfwer, Firft, that upon a narrow inquiry, it wall not perhaps be found; fo many as is imagin’d do really

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believe the Exiftence of Matter, or

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it, is impoffible, and whether the fore© - _ going Expreflions are not of that fort, |

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J refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one Senfe, indeed,

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Caufe of their Senfations, which affects. them ‘every moment, and is fo nearly

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 97

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believe thofe Propofitions they have of- ten heard, tho at Bottom they have no meaning in them. : |

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… eranta Notion tobe never fo univerfally and ftedfaftly adhered to, yet this 1s but a weak Argument of its truth ,to whoever confiders what a vaft number of Prejus - dices and falfe Opinions. are every _ where embraced, with the utmoft te-

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are the far-greater) part of Mankind. There was a time when the Antipodes and Motion of the Earth, were look’d upon as monftrous Abfurdities, even by Men of Learning: And if it be conftder’d what a fmall proportion they bear to the reft of Mankind, we fhall find that at this Day, thofe Notions have gain'd. but a very inconfiderable footing in the World.

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§ 66. Buticis demanded, that we affign a caufe of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the World. To this I anfwer, That Men knowing

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98 Of the Principles Part I. they perceiv’d feveral Ideas, whereof they themfelves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within, nor depending on the operation of their Wills, this made ‘em maintain, thofe Ideas or Objects of Perception had an Exiftence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever dreaming that a Contradiction was involved in thofe Words. But Philofphers having plainly feen, that the immediate Objects of Perception do not Exift without the Mind, they in fome degree corrected the miftake of the Vulgar, -but at the fame time. run into another which feemsno lefs Abfurd, viz. that there are certain Objects really Exifting without the Mind, or having a fubfiftence di{tinct from being perceived, of which our Ideas are only Images or Refem‘blance, imprinted by thofe Objects on: the Mind. And this Notion of the Philofophers ows its Origine to the fame caufe with the former, namely their be_ Ing confcious that they were not the Authors of their own Senfations, which | they evidently knew were imprinted

Page 98

Part . of Human Knowlege. ‘ 9

Page 99

… recourfe to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, Firft, becaufe they were ‘not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in fuppofing things like unto our Ideas Exifting without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly, becaufe the fupreme Spirit which Excites thofe

Page 99

and limited to our view by any particular, finite Collection of fenfible Ideas, as Human Agents are by their Size, | Complexion, Limbs, Motions, dc. And Thirdly, becaufe his Operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the Courfe of Nature is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are ready to own the prefence of a Superiour Agent. But when we fee things go-on in the ordinary Courfe, they do not Excite } in us any Reflexion, O 2 - their

Page 99

100 Of the Principles Part I. their Order and Concatenation, tho it be an Argument of the greateft Wifdom, Power, and Goodnefs in their Creator, is yet fo conftant and familiar to us, that we do not think ’em the immediate effects of a Free Spirit: efpecially fince Inconftaney and Mutability in acting, tho it be an Imperfection, is look’d on as a mark of Freedom.

Page 100

… are mconfiftent with feveral found Truths in Philofophy and Mathematics. For Example, The Motion of the Earth is now univerfally admitted by Aftronomers, asa Truth grounded onthe cleareft and moft convincing Reafons. Bue on the foregoing Principles there can be no fuch thing. For Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it Exifts not, but the Motion of the Earth is not perceiv’'d by Senfe. I Anfwer, That Tenent, if rightly under{tood, will be found to: agree with the. Principles we have premifed : For the “ueftion, whether the Earth moves or

Page 100

Part L. of Human Knowlege. 101

Page 101

… and Diftance, both from the Earth and Sun, we fhou’d perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and. appearing in all refpects like ene of

Page 101

of Nature, which we have no reafon ta miftruft, is reafonably colle&ted from the Phenomena.

Page 101

§ 59. We may from the Experience we have had, of the Train and Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds, often make, } will not fay uncertain Conjectures, but, fure and well grounded Predictions, concerning the Ideas we fthall be affected with purfuant to a great Train of Actions, and be enabled to pafs a right Judgement of what wou'd have appear'd to us, in cafe we were placed in Circumftances, very different from

Page 101

1o2 Of ae Principles Part I.

Page 102

fifts the Knowlege of Nature, which may preferve its ufe and certainty very confiftently with what hath been faid. It will be eafy, to apply this to whatever Objections of the like fort may be drawn, from the Magnitude of the

Page 102

* § 60. In the eleventh Place, it will be demanded to what purpofe ferves that curious Organization of Plants, and the admirable Mechanifm in the

Page 102

Parts of Animals ; might not Vegeta—

Page 102

… and Blofloms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without, as with all that variety of Internal Parts fo ele_gantly contriv’d and put together, which being Ideas, have nothing Powerful or Operative i in them, nor have any neceffary connexion with the effeéts afcribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat, or act of his will, we muft think all that’s fine and artificial inthe Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be

Page 102

Part IL. of Human Knowlege. 103 - made in vain. ‘By this Doétrine, tho ' an Artift has made the Spring and ~ Wheels, and every Movement of a

Page 103

… done to no purpofe, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day. If fo, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the -Movements, and putting them together ? Why does not an empty Cafe ferve as well as another; and how comesit to pafs, that

Page 103

ing of a Watch, there is fome correfponding Diforder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be faid of all the Clock-work of Nature, great part whereof is fo — wonderfully Fine and Subtile, as {carce to be difcern’d by the beft Microfcope. In fhort it will be ask’d, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Caufe ier : O

Page 103

104. Of the Principles Part I.

Page 104

of an innumerable multitude of Bo| dies and Machines, fram’d with the moft | exquifite Art, whichin the common Phi: lofophy have very appofite Ufes aiened .: | them, and ferve to explain abundance | of Phenomena. .

Page 104

… which, I anfwer, Firf, That thé there were fome Difficulties | relating to the adminiftration of Providence, and the Ufes by it affign’d to | the feveral parts of Nature, which I | coud not folve by the foregoing Prin. ciples, yet this Objeétion cou’d be of | {mall weight againft the truth and certainty of thofe Things, which. may be’ | prov'd a Priori, with the utmoft Evidence and Rigor of Demontftration.

Page 104

… Difficulties ; for 1¢ may ftill be demanded, to what end God fhou'd take thofe roundabout Methods of effeéting things by Inftruments and Machines, which no. one can deny might have been effect| ed by the meer command of his ‘Will, — without all that apparatus: Nay, if wé ‘Mare

Page 104

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 105

Page 105

… we fhall find the Objection may be retorted with’ greater force, on thofe who hold the Exiftence of thofe Machines without the Mind ; for it has been made evident, - that Solidity, Bulk, Figure, Motion, isc. have no Adivity or Efficacy in them, fo as to be capable of producing any one effect in Nature, vid. Sed. XXV. whoever therefore fappofes them to Exift (allowing the Suppofition poffible) _ when they are not perceived, does it manifeftly to no purpofe, fince the on° ly ufe that is affign’d to them,. as_ they Exift unperceiv’d, is. that they ia thofe perceivable Effeéts which, truth, cannot be afcrib’d to ae hing but Spirit.

Page 105

¢ 62 But to come nigher tine Difficulty, it muft be obferv’d, that thd the Fabrication of all thofe Parts and Ors - gans be not abfolutely neceffary to the

Page 105

ceffary to the producing of things in a

Page 105

conftant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There arc certain ge» Pp.

Page 105

106 Of the Principles Part [. neral Laws, that run thro the whole Chain of Natural Effects, thefe are learn’d by the Obfervation and Study of Nature,.and are by Men applied as well to the framing artificial Things, for the Ufe and Ornament of Life,as to the explaining the variqus Phanomena, which Explication canfifts only in fhewing the Conformity, any particular Phanomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the fame thing, in difcovering the Uniformity, there isin the Production of natural Effects, as will be evident to whoever fhall. attend to the feveral Inftances, wherein Philo- fophers pretend to account for Appears ances. That there is.a great and confpicuous Ufe in thefe regular, conftant Methods of working, obferv’d by the Supreme Agent, has been fhewn in Sed. XXXI. and it is no lefs vifible, thata | ' parccular Size, Figure, Motion and Dif-pofition of Parts are neceflary, tho not abfolutely to the producing any Effect, yet co the producing it according to the Standing, Mechanical Laws of Nature. ‘Thus, for Inftance, It cannot be denied

Page 106

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 107

Page 107

denied that God, or the Intelligence that fuftains and rules the ordinary courfe of Things, might if He were minded to produce a Miracle, caufe all the Motions on the Dial-plate of a Watch, tho mo Body had ever made the Movements,

Page 107

and put them init: But yet if he will! act agreeably to the Rules of Mechanifm, by him for wife Ends eftablifh’d and mairitain’d in the Creation, it is né- ceflary that thofe Actions of the Watch-. maker; whereby lic makes the Move-

Page 107

cede the production of the aforefaid Motions, as alfo that any diforder in them be attended with the Perception of fome cortefponding Difotder, in thé Movements, which being once Corrected all is right again.

Page 107

<§ 63. It may, indeed, on fome. Oc cafions be neceffary, that the Author of Nature difplay his over-ruling Power, im producing fome Appearance out of the ordinary Series of Things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of — are proper to furprift and awe Pa ~ Men

Page 107

108 Of the Principles Part I. Men into an acknowledgment of the of the Divine Being : But then they are to be ufed but feldom, otherwife there

Page 108

— 4s a plain reafon, why. they fhou’d. fail - of that Effect. ‘Befides, God feems to _ choofe the convincing our Reafon of.

Page 108

his Attributes by the works of Nature; which difcover fo much Harmony. and Contrivance in ther Make, and are fuch plain Indications of Wifdom and -Beneficence in their Author, ‘rather than to aftonith us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and i cs Events.

Page 108

… how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion between them, like to that of Caufe and Effect : There are alfo feveral Combinations of them, made in

Page 108

a very Regular and Artificial Manner, which feem like fo many Inftruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as t were behind the Scenes, have a fecret | + Operation

Page 108

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 109

Page 109

Operation in producing thofe Appearances, which are.feen on the Theatre .of the World,being themfelves. difcernible only to the curious Eye of the Philofopher. But fince one Idea cannet be the Caufe of another, to what purpofe is that Connexion? And fince thofe In_

Page 109

ftruments, being barely inefficacious Perceptions in the Mind, are not fubfervi‘ent to the Production. of Natural -Effeéts; .ic is demanded why they are

Page 109

. . Works, behold fo great variety of Ideas,

Page 109

one may fo fpeak) of all that. Art and -

Page 109

§ 65. To. all which my Anfwer is, Firft, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of Caufe and Effect, but only of a Mark or Sign with

Page 109

I fee, is notthe Caufe of the Pain I

Page 109

110) 06 Of the Principles Part I. fuffer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that forewarns me of it. In like smanner the Noife that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion, or collifon of the ambient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Secondly, The reafon why Ideas are form’d into Machines, 2. e. artificial and regular Combinations, is the fame with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to fignific, a great - number of Effects and Actions, ’tis ne’ e¢flary they be vanioufly combin’d together: And to the ertd their Ufe be permanent and univerfal, thefé Combinations muft be made by Rawle, and with wife Contrivance. By this means | . abundance of Information is convey’d ‘unto us, concerning what we are to. expect from fuch and fuch Actions, and what Methods are proper to be taken, for the Exciting fuch and fuch Ideas : Which in effect, is all that I conceive to be diftinétly meant, when it is faid that by difcerning che Figure, Texture, and Mechanifm of the inward ‘Parts of Boches, whether Natural or Aruficial,

Page 110

Part L of Human Knowlege. 115

Page 111

Ufes and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the Thing.

Page 111

§ 66. Hence it 1s evident, that thofe Things, which under the Notion of a © Canfecosoperating or concurring tothe produétion of Effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great Abfurdities, may be very naturally explain’d, and have a proper and obvious Ufe affign’d ’em, whenthey are confider’d only as Marks, or Signs for our Information. And it is the fearching after, and endea— youring to underftand this Language Gf I may-fo call it) of the Author of Wature, that ought to be the Employ. ment of the Natural Philofopher; and not the pretending to explain ‘Things by .Corporeal Caufes, which.Dodtrine — {eems to. have too much eftranged the Minds of Men, from that aétive Principle, that fupreme and wife Spirit, ix whom we Live, Move, and have our Being.

Page 111

112 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 112

… Exifting without the Mind, fuch as Philofophers defcribe Matter : Yet if any Man fhall leave out of his I_dea of Matter, the pofitive Ideas of Exe tenfion, Figure, Solidity and Motion,’ — and fay ‘that he means only bythat word, an Inert, Senfelefs Subftance that Exifts without the Mind or unperceiv’d, which is the Occafion of our Ideas, or at the prefence whereof God is pleafed to excite Ideas in us: It doth not appear, but .that Matter taken in this Senfe may poffibly Exit. In Anfwer to which I fay, Firft, That it feems no lefs Abfurd to fuppofe ; a: Subftance without Accidents, than itis to fuppofe Accidents without a Subftance. But Se= condly, Thd we fhou’d grant this un+ known Subftance may poffibly Exift, yet where can it be fuppofed to be ? ‘That it Exifts not i ‘the Mind is agreed, and that it Exifts not in Place is no lefs certain ; fince all Place or Exsenfion’ Brsifts only i in the Mind as eo een

Page 112

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 113

Page 113

‘defcription that is here given us of Mat-

Page 113

… by. faying it is an Inert, Senfelefs, Unknown Subftance, which is a Definition © intirely made up of Negatives,excepting

Page 113

‘only the relative Notion of its ftanding

Page 113

be obferv’d that it Szpports nothing at — all ; and how nearly this comes to the defcription of a zon-entity, I defire may be canfider’d. But fay you it ts the

Page 113

anknown occafion, at the prefence of

Page 113

which is neither perceivable by Serife nor Reflexion, nor capable of producing any Idea nour Minds, nor is at_ all extended; nor hath any Form, nor Exifts in any place. The words to be

Page 113

114 Of -the ome Part L Meaning, and which I am not-able to comprehend.

Page 114

6S 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by Occafion: So far as I can gather from the common Ufe of Lan— guage, that Word fignifies, either the — ‘Agent which produces any Effect, or elfe fomething that 1s obferv’d to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary courfe of things.- But when it 1s

Page 114

it can be taken in neither of thofe Senfes. For Matter is faid to be Paffive and Inert, and fo cannot be an Agent or Efficient Caufe.. Ic is alfo unper_ceivable as being devoid of all Senfible Qualities, and fo cannot be the Occafi-

Page 114

on of our Perceptions in the latter Senfe: As when the burning my Finger,

Page 114

is faid to be the Occafion of the Pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling Matter an Occafion? _ This Term is either ufed in no Senfe ac. all, or elfe in fome very diftant from its receiv ‘d ‘Signification —

Page 114

Part I. of Human Knowlege. wis

Page 115

it is the Occafion of Exciting Ideas in our Minds. For, fay you, fince we ob-

Page 115

but reafonable to fuppofe, there are certain Conftant, and Regular Occafions of their being produced. That 1s_

Page 115

and diftiné parcels of Matter, corref-

Page 115

§ 71. In anfwer to this ] obferve, that, as ‘the Notion of Matter: is here

Page 115

116 = Of the Principles Part 1. cerning the Exiftence of a Thing diftinét from Spirit and Idea, from Perceiving and being Perceiv’d : But whe-

Page 116

_ ther there are not certain Ideas, of I

Page 116

know not what Sort, in the Mind of Gop, which are fo many Marks or

Page 116

… and regular Method: Much after the fame manner, as a Mufician is dire@&ted by the Notes of Mufic, to produce that ‘harmonious train and .compofition of Sound, which is calléd a Zune; tho they who Hear the Mufic do not Per. ceive the Notes, and may be intirely ignorant of them. Burt this Notion of Matter (which: after all is the only intelligible one that’ I can pick, from what is faid of unknown Occafions

Page 116

GY 972. If we follow the Light of Reafon, we fhall, from the conftant unii. 4 form

Page 116

Part L. of Human Knowlege. 3447 form Method of our Senfations, collect the Goodnefs and Wifdom of the Spirit who excites them in our Minds. But - this is all that-I can fee reafonably concluded from thence. To me, I fay, ’tis evident that the Being of a Spirit inf-

Page 117

dantly fufficient, to explain all the Appearances of Nature. But as for Inert,

Page 117

… Matter, nothing that I perceive has. any the leaft Connexion with it, or | leads to the Thoughts of i. And I wou'd fain fee any one Explain,aay the meanelt Phenomenon in Nature by it,

Page 117

- or fhew any manner of Reafon, tho in

Page 117

the loweft Rank of Probability, that he can have for its Exiftence; or even make any tolerable Senfe or Meaning of thae Suppofition. For as to. its being an Oc on we have,I think, evidendy thewn that with regard to us it is ng Occae fion : It remains therefore that it muft be, if at all, the Occafion to Goo of exciting Ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have juft now feen, _

Page 117

118 : Of the Principles | Part I. |

Page 118

… the Exiftenceof Material Sub ftance ; that fo having obferv’d the gradual Ceafing, and Expiration of thofe _ Motives or. Reafons, we may proporti-

Page 118

_ was thought that Colour, Figure, Mo- tion, and the reft of the Senfible Quadius or Accidents, did really Exift with-

Page 118

… they did Exift, fince they cou'd not be conceived to Exift by themfelves. After‘wards, in procefs of time, Men being » convinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reft of the Senfible, Secondary Qualitieshad no Exiftence without the Mind, they ftripped this Subfratum or material Subftance of thofe Qualities, leaving only the Primary Ones, Figure, Moti. on, &c. which they ftill conceived to _ Exift without the Mind, and confequently; to ftand in need of a material Sup-. —_ port,

Page 118

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 419°

Page 119

_ none, even of thefe, can poffibly Exift

Page 119

perccives them, it follows, that we have no longer any reafon, to fuppofe the be-. ing of Matter. Nay, that it is utterly ime poffible there fhou’d be any fuch thing, fo long as that Word is taken to denote,

Page 119

_an unthinking Subftratum of Qualities .or

Page 119

thought of only for the fake of fupporting Accidents; and the reafon intirely ceafing, one might expect the Mind | fhou’d naturally; and without any reluct-_

Page 119

~ ance at all, quit the belief of what.

Page 119

* ed and indefinite Notions of Being, Oc.

Page 119

£26 Of the Principles Part £

Page 120

tafton, 8c. thd without any fhew of |

Page 120

part, of what do we perceive amongft all the Ideas, Senfacions, Notions, which ate imprinted on our Minds, either by Senfe ox RKeflexiot, from: whence may be infer’ the Exiftence of an imert, thoughrlefs, unperceiv’d Occafion? and 6x the other hand‘on the part of an AL fufficient Spirit, what_can there be that ’ thou’d make us believe, or even fufped, It is direfled by an inere Occafion’ to excné Ideas m our Minds?

Page 120

-.§ ae, Teas a very exttaordinary In{tance of the force of Prejudice, ‘and much to be-lamented, chat the Mind of Mar retains fo great a Fondnefs, againft alli tlie evidence of Reafon, for a ftupid,

Page 120

fition whereof re wou'd,as it were fkreer iv felf, from: the Providence of God,and' remove it farther off from the Affairs 6f the World.. But tho we do the utmof we cat, to fecure the belief of Matter; tho: when Reafon forfakes us,

Page 120

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 121

Page 121

on the bare poffibility of the Thing, and | thd we Indulge our felves in -the full Scope, of an Imagination not regulated by Reafon, to make out that poor Poffibility, yet the Up-fhot of all is, that — there certain znknown Ideas in the Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is all chat I conceive to be meant by Occafion with.

Page 121

§ 76, Whether cherefore there are fuch Ideas.in the Mind of Gop, and whether they may be called by thename — Mater I fhan’t difpuce. Buc.if you ftick

Page 121

. ftance, or Support of Extenfion, Moti-

Page 121

122 Of rhe Principles Part L |

Page 122

of Extenfion, and the other Qualities | or Accidents. which we Perceive ; yet. . there may, perhaps, be fome Inert, Un|

Page 122

perceiving Subftance, or Subjtratum of

Page 122

of their Exiftence, than a Blind-man |

Page 122

made to See does.of the Exiftence of Light and Colours. I anfwer, Firft, if

Page 122

only the unknown Support-of unknown | Qualities, it’s no matter whether there .

Page 122

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 123: to Figure, Motion, Colour, 9. Qualicies,.as hath been fhewn, .are nothing elfe but Senfations:or Ideas, which Exift only in a Mind perceiving them; and this istrue not only of the Ideas we are ac-quainted with at prefenc, but likewife of all poffible Ideas :whatfoever.

Page 123

§ 79. But you will infift, what if I have no reafon to believe the Exiftence of Matter, what if I cannot affign any ufe to it, or explain any thing by it, or

Page 123

fron of Ideas ; tho, indeed, to go about

Page 123

to unfold the meaning,or adhere to any particular. Explication of thofe Words, © may be attended with great Difficulues. I anfwer, when Words are ufed wichout a Meaning, you may put them together as you pleafe, without danger of running into a Contradiction. You may fay, for Example, that twice Twa is c< qual to Seven, fo long as you declare —

Page 123

you da nat take the Words of that ProR pofitioa

Page 123

p24 Of the Principles Part I. pofition in their ufual Acception, but for Marks of you know not what. And by the fame reafon you may fay, there is an inert, thoughtlefs Subftance without Accidents, which is the occafion af our Ideas. And we hall underftand juft _ as much by one Propofition, as the @- ther. | :

Page 124

~— § 80. In the laft place, you will fay, What if we give up the Caufe of marerial Subftance, and ftand to it, that Matter is an unknown Somewhat, nelther Subftance nor Accident, Spirit nor Idea, Inert, Thoughtlefs, Indivifible, Ime moveable, Unextended, Exifting in no © Place? For, fay you, Whatever may be urged againft Subflance or Occafion, of any other pofitive or relative Notion ef Matter hath no place at all, fo long as this xegative Definition gf Matter is adhered to. I anfwer you may, if fo it thall feem good, ufe the word Matter in the fame Senfe, that other Men ufe Nothing, and fo make thofe Terms conver_ tible in your Stile. For after all, this 3 -what appears to me to he the Refule

Page 124

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 125 of that Difinition, the Parts. whereof when I confider with Attention, either

Page 125

of Effect or Impreffion made on my

Page 125

§ 81. Upon this, you "I = rom in the forefaid Definition, is included, what _ doth fufficiently diftinguith i it from nothing, the pofitive, abftra& Idea of Guide

Page 125

that thofe who pretend to the Faculty of framing Abftract, General Ideas, do talk as if they had fuch an Idea, which is, fay they, the moft abftract and ge-

Page 125

—~neral Notion Of all, that 1s, to me, the °

Page 125

moft | Incomprehenfible of all Others. That there are a great variety of Spirits

Page 125

of different Orders and Capacities, whofe

Page 125

are far exceeding thofe the Author of my Being has beftowed on me, I fee no.

Page 125

reafon to deny. And for me, to pretend to determine, by my own few, {tine ted, narrow Inlets of an i

Page 125

126 Of the Principles — Part F. Ideas the inexhauftible Power of the Supreme Spirit may Imprintupon’em, were certainly the utmoft Folly and Prefumpuon. Since there may be, for

Page 126

_ of Ideas or Senfations, as different from

Page 126

… as Colours are from Sounds. — But how ready foever I may be, to acknowlege the Scantinefs of my Comprehenfion, with regard to the endlefs variety of "Spirits and Ideas, that may

Page 126

tend toa Notion of Entity or Exiftence,

Page 126

| fibly be made on the part of Religion.

Page 126

§ 82.- — there are who think, that tho the Arguments for the real. Exitt"-ence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reafon, be allow’ d not. to amount to

Page 126

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 127 |

Page 127

… Ideas ; there being in Holy Writ innumerable Facts related, which evidently fuppofe the reality of Timber, and Stone, Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and Human Bodies, ¢%c. To which I Anfwer, ‘that no fort of Writings, whatever Sacred or Profane, which ufe thofe and the

Page 127

or fo as-to have a meaning in ‘em, are in danger of having their Truth call’d in queftion by our Doctrine. That all thofe Things do really Exift, that there are Bodies, even Corporeal Subftances, when

Page 127

XXXIH, XXXVI, &c. And I do not think, that ether what Philofophers call Matter, or the Exiftence of Objects with-

Page 127

128 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 128

… whether there be, or be -not-External Things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper Ufe of Words, is the marking our Conceptions, or Things only as they are Known and Perceiv’d by us; whence it plainly follows, that it the Tenents we have laid down, there is nothing inconfiftent with the tight Ufe and Significancy of Language and that Difcourfe of what kind focver, fo far as it is Intelligible, remains Undifturb'’d. . But all this fees fo very — manifeft, from what hath been largely fee forch in the Premifés, that it is need— Iefs to infift any farther on it,

Page 128

§ 84. But it will be ure’d, that. Miracles do, at leaft, lofe much of their Strefs and Import, by our Principles, What muft we think 6f Mofes’s Rod, Was it not really turn’d into a Serpent, > or was there only a Change of Ideas in

Page 128

the Minds of the Spectators? And can

Page 128

Part I. of Human Kuowlege. —ye2g of the Gucfts, fo as to create in them theAppearance or Idea only of Wine > ‘The fame may be faid of all other Miracles: Which, in confequence of the

Page 129

on only as fo many Cheats, or Illufions of Fancy. To this I Reply, that the Rod was changed into a real Serpent, and the Water into real Wine.

Page 129

But this Bufinefs of Rees and Imaginary

Page 129

that it were'an Affrone to the Reader’s . Underftanding, to refume the Explica- tion of it in this place. J thall only ob-

Page 129

and Drink Wine, and find the eftects of it, with me there.cou’d he no doubt

Page 129

of it’s Reality. So that, at Boxtom, the Scruple concerning teal Miracles has no

Page 129

130 Of the Principles Part I.

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… Light, and gave them all the Force and Weight I cou’d,we proceed in| the next place to take a view of our Tenents in their Confequences. Some of thefe appear at firft Sight, as chat feveral Difficult and obfcure Queftions, on which abundance of Speculation has been thrown away, are intirely banifh’d from Philofophy. Whether Corporeal Subftance can think : Whether Matter _ be infinitely Divifible - And how it O‘perates on Spirit ; thefe and the like In‘quiries have given infinite Amufement to Philofophers, in all Ages. But depending on the Exiftence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other Advantages there are, as well with regard to Religion as the Sciences, which it is eafy for any one to deduce, from what has been premifed. But this will appear more plainly inthe Sequel. =. ss § 86. From

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 13%

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lege many naturally be reduced to two Heads, that of Ideas, and that of Spirits. Of each of thefe I fhall treat in Order, .And firft as to Ideas or Une thinking Things, our Knowlege of thefe - has been very much obfcur’d, and confounded, and we have been led into

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two-fold Exiftence of the Objeéts of Senfe, the one Intelligible, or in the Mind, the other Real and without the Mind: Whereby Unthinking Things are thought, to have a natural Subfiftence of their own, diftinct from being perceiv’'d by Spirits. This which, if I miftake not, hath been fhewn to be a moft groundlefs and abfurd Notion, 1s the very Root of Scepticif{m ; for fo long as Men thought that Real Things fubfifted without the Mind, and that their Knowlege was only fo far forth Reel as it was conformable to real Things, it follows, they cow’d not be certain, tha¢

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132‘ Of the Principles Part T.~ how can it be known, that the Things | -

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… then are we involved all in.Scepticifm. We fee only the Appearances, and not the réal Qualities of Things. What may be che Excenfion, Figure, or Motion of any Thing ‘really - and abfolucely, orin at felf, its impoffible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our Senfés, Things remaiming the fame,-our Ideas vaty, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, reprefent the true Quality really Exifting in the Thing, it is out of our Reach to-determince. So that, for ought we know, all we See, Hear, and Feel, may be = . - *Phane

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dent, or demonftrative Knowlege, of

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 133. |

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the Arguments urged by Sceptics in all Ages, depend on the fappofition of External Objects. But this is too obvious to need bemg infifted on.

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their Senfes, and doubt of the Exiftence © of Heaven :and Earth, of every thing they See or Feel, even of their own Bodies, And after all:cher labouring and

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_ ftruggle of Thought, they are forced to |

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134. Of the Principles Part T, the Exiftence of fenfible Things. But all this Doubtfulnefs, which fo Bewilders and Confounds the Mind, and makes Philofophy ridiculous in the Eyes of the World, vanifhes if we annex a “meaning to our Words, and not amufe our felycs with the terms ‘Abfolute, External, Exifi, &c. fignitying we know - not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thofe things, which I actually perceive by Senfe: It being a manifeft Contradiction, that any fenfible Object fhou’d be immediately perceiv'dby Sight or Touch, and, at the fame time, - have no Exiftence in Nature, fince the very Exiftence of an unthinking Being, confifts in being perceiv "A. |

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§ 89. Nothing feems of. more Impor; tance, towards Erecting a firth Sy{tem of found and real Knowlege, which may be Proof againft the Affaults of _ Scepticifm, than to lay the beginning i in a diftinét Explication, of what is meant by Thing, Reality, Exiftence : For in vain fhall we izle concerning the real —

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Part L of Human Knowlege. 135.

Page 135

Exiftence of Things, or pretend, to any

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: not fix’d the meaning of thofe Words. ; Thing or Being is the moft general Name

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of all, ic comprehends under it two Kinds intirely diftinét and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the Name, viz. Spirits and Ideas. The former are Adlive, Indivifible, Incorrup-’ tible Subftances: The latter are Inert, Fleeting, Perifbable Paffions; or Dependent

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… but we deny they can fubfiftt without the Minds which perceive them, or that they are Refemblances of any Archetypes Exifting without the Mind: Since the very Being of a'Senfation or Idea confifts in being percei-

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136 Of the Principles Part I. not generated from within, by the Mind it felf,but imprintéd by a Spirit diftingt from that which perceives them. Senfible Objects May likewife be faid to be without the Mind, in another fenfe, namely when they Exift in fome other Mind. Thus when I fhut my Eyes, the Things Ifaw may (ull Exift, but ic mutt be in another Mind. : .

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¢ 91. It were a muftake to think, that what is here faid derogates in the - leaft, from the Reality of Things. i 4s acknowleg’d on the receiv’d Prince ples, that Extenfion, Motion, and ina -— "Word, all fenfible Qualities have need of a Support, as not being able to fub— fift by themfelves. But the Objects per. ceiv’'d by Senfe, are allow'’d to be nothing but Combinations of thofe Qua lities, and confequently cannot fubfift by themfelves. Thus far st is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the Things perceiv'd by Senfe, an Exiftence independent af a Subftance, or Support “vherein they may Exift, we detract nohing from the recery’d Opinion of their

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 137 Regtity, and are guilty of -no Innoyatie on in chat refpect. All the Difference is, that according to us the Unthinking Beings perceiy'd by Senfe, have no Ex,

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… ing Beings, or diftinét from being perr ceiy'd by any Mind what{gcyer, eyen the Eternal Mind of the Creazor, syherein they {uppofe only Ideasef she Corpoxe

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of Scepsicifn.fo bkewile wpon fc ‘fame - foundation have been rats‘ all

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| the Inas pions'Schames of Aelia and PECIABIOR. , Jay

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138 Of the Principles Part I. Nay fo great -a difficulty. has. it..been thought, to conceive Matter: produced ~ out of Nothing, thatthe moft Celebrat‘ed among the Ancient -Philofophers, - e-

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ven of thefe who maintain’d the. Being ofa Gop, have thought Matterto. be Uncreated: andCoeternal with him.

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Confideration on the Abfurdities of e_ very wretched Sect of Atheifts.

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of

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Part l. of Hen a 139

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of Things, ‘and inftead thereof make a Self-exiftent, Stupid, Unthinking Subftance the. Root.and Origine of all Beings. - That they fhou’d hearken to thofé who deny a Providence, or Infpection of. a Superior Mind over the Affairs of the ‘World, attributing . the whole Series of Events either to Blind Chance, or

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Fatal Neceffity arifing from the Impulfe of-one Body on.another. All this 1s. ve-

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ry natural. And: on the other hand, when Men of better Principles obferve

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_the Enemies of Religion lay fo great a Strefs-on Unthinkin “Matter » ; and allof |

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priv’d of their grand. Support, and dri-

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… Fortrefs, without -which -your. Epicureans, Hobbifts, and the ~ like, have. not.even the Shadow of a -.Pretence, but become the moft — -and eafy. Triumph 4 in the World.

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6 94. The Exiftence of Matter, or

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Bodies ‘unperceiv’d, ‘ has not only been i main. Support of reste and Fata| es

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tho of v the re Patek |. fits, but on the Principle does Idolatry - li ewite in all its various Formns,dépend: Did. Meh but cohfider that the Sun, Mooh, and Stars aiid evety other Object of the Senfes, arconly fo many Seine fations ih their Mirds, which havé ne _ other Exiftence but Barely being Pees ceiv'd : Doubrlefs they wow’d never fall dowil, and worlhip their own Ideas. But tathicr wddrets their Horttage t vhat ETeenat [nvistste Mino whith prdducts and fuftams ‘all ‘Things. =

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é. The (hive abhi. Britciple by sit i it felf with the Artichs of aht Fait his octaficn’d ho tial Dericel tics to Chriftiahs. For: Examphk, aboot the Re{urrettion, how indny Seraples aid ‘Obj jeCtiotis. have beet’ phifed By Boctyians nd Wehers ! > Put add hot the aot plaufible ‘of ‘thein depend ‘on the fuppofition,. that a Body 4s ‘Getibmnimated tite fame, With tegird nt t ‘the Fotra or that which is perceiv'd by Senfe, but the Material Subftarnce, whtch ‘remains the

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Part I. of Human Knowleye. aye

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… means by: that Word, vez, :that which is immediately Sten and Felt, which is only a Combination. of fenfibie Qualities; of Ideas + And then the rot unanfwerable ‘Objedtions come to

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tical and Imapious Nenoas, fuch an mt eredible number of Ditpunes and puating Queftions, which have been Thorns im che fides of Divares, as well as Phi-

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Work for Mankind ; thac of the Aree lms we have produced. fit st, ate

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-of the ‘Objects of Porteption, another great Source of Errors and Difficulties,

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ayo 2 Of the Principles”: Part’ L

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with: tegard to: Ideal Knowlege, ‘is the - Doctrine of Abftratt Ideas, {uch as it hath been fee forth in the Introduction, The plaineft things in the World, ‘thofe . Mte are moftintimately acquainted with, and perfectly. know, when they are confider'd-.in. an Abftrace way, appear ftrangely difficult and incomprehenfir ble. Time, Place, and Motion, taken | in paiticular, or concrete, are what e: ‘very. Body.:knows; but: having paffed thro’: the. Hands of a ‘Metaphyfician, — they become. too. Abftract. and. Fine, to de apprehended’ by .Men of ordinaty -Serife.. ‘Bid your Servant meet: you at fach a -Jime, infuch a Place,and he fhall -never ftay to deliberate.on the mean. ang of chofe: Words: In conceiving.that particular ‘Time and. Place,, or the Mo‘tren iby which-he is to get thither, he finds not the leat Difficulty. But if Time besaken; exclufive of all thofe particular Aétions and Ideas that -diverfifie the Day, meerly for the Continuation of Exiftence, or Duration in Abftract, then at will perhaps mates even a PhilofaPas to ‘comprehend 1 | | —§ a For ;

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“¢ 98. “ my own part, whentyer I attempt to frame a fimple Idea of Time, — abftracted from the fucceflion of. Ideas in my Mind, ‘which flows’ uniformly, and is’ participated by all Beings, Iam loftand embranigled jm inextricablé Difficulties. I have no Notion of: it:at.all,

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vilible, -and {peak of it in fucha manner, as leads me to harbour-odd Thoughts

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of my Exiftence: Since that Doétrine ays one under an abfolute:neceffity, of -

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of his Life : Both which feem equally abfard. Time therefore being nothing, abftracted from the Succeflon of Ideas

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ration of any Finite: Spirit mutt be. eftimated; by the Number of Ideasor:Actions fucceeding each.other, in that fame Spirit or Mind. | Hence itis aplain Confequence that, the Soul always thinks: And in truth whoever {hall go. about to

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144 Of the Principles’, Part. [. Exiflence of a Spirit from its Cogitation will, i believe, find 1 it no: caly. Task. |

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… for example, may be abfiracked foom ail other fenfible Qualiues; and Secondly, that the Enuicy of Excenfion, taay ‘be abftraced from its being Perr cayid. But whocver fhall reflec, aod take care to underftand what he (ays, avill, wf muftake not, ackaowlege chat - all fenfible Quahioies are alike Sen[atiozs, and alike ReaJ,that whore che Extenfion 4s, there Js the ‘Colour LOO, Z..e. In his Mind, and that chem Apchotypes, can exift oaly - in fome other Mind.. And _ che iaiided of Senle .are man ut

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Part T of Human Knowlege. 145 ~ but thofe Senfations combin’d, blended or (if one may fofpeak) concreted toge-

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ther : None of all which can be fuppos’d to Exift unperceiv’d. And that, confequently, the Wall is as truly White, as itis Extended, and in the fame Senfe. _

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Abftract Idea of 'Happinefs, prefcinded from alt particular Pleafure, or of Goodnefs, from every thing thatisGood, this — is what few can pretend. to. So like| wife, a Man may be Juft and Virtuous, — without having precife Ideas of Fuftice and Virtue.The opinion that thofe and the like Words, ftand for General Notions abftracted from all particularPerfons and: Actions,feems to have render’d Morality very difficult, and the Study thereof of {mall ufe to Mankind. And, in effect, one may make a-great progrefs inSchool- Ethics, without ever being the wifer or better Man for it, or knowing how to behave himfelf in the affairs ‘of Life, more to the Advantage of himfelf, =

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his Neighbours, thanhe did befote. This ~ Hint may fuffice, to let any one fee, che — Do€trine of Abjtrattion, has rot a little | contributed, towards {porting the moft ufeful Parts of Knowlege.

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§ 101. The two great Provinces of Speculative Sciehee, convetfant about Ideas receiv’d fiom Senfe, are Narural Philofophy and Mathematits. withregard to cach of thefe I thall make fome ‘Ob fervations. And firft] thall fay fotnewhat of Natural Philofophy. On this Subject yt is, that the Sveprics triumiph: All that ftock of Arguments they produce to.depreciate our Faculties, and make _ Mankind appear Ignorant and Low, are - drawn principally from this Head, hamely, that we are under an Inyinei ‘ble Blindnefs, as to the -Zrze and Real Nature of Things. This they exaggerate; and love to enlarge of. We are mift- yably Banter’d, fay they, by our Senfes, and amus’d only with the Ourfide and Shew of Things. Fhe real Effence, the unternal Qualities, and Conftitucion of every.the micanctt it Objet, is hidfrom —

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? art I. of Human Knovwlege. 147

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which it is beyond the Power of Human Underftanding, tq Fathom or Come pychend. But it is evident from what has been fhewn, that all chis Complaint is groundlefs, and that we are influenced by Falfe Principles, to that degree as to muiftruft aur Senfes, and think we

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‘know nothing, of thofe things which

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§ 192.-Qne great Inducement, to eur pronouncing our felyes Ignorant of the Nature of Things, is, the current Opinion that eyery thing includes within it felf, the Gaufe of ts Properties: Or that there is in cach Objeé&t, an inward Ef fence, which is the Source whence its difcernible Qualities ow, and whereon

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account for Appearances by Occult Qualities, bur of late they are moftly refolved into Mechanical Caufes. viz. the Fir © gure, Motion, Weight, ¢c. of infenfible Particles : Whereas, in truth, there is no other Agent or Efficient Caufethan Ue Spirit,

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148 Of the Principles Part I. Spirit, it being evident, that Motion, as well as all other Ideas, 1s perfectly Inert. vid. Sel. XXV. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of Colours, Sounds, dc. by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, muft needs be labour in vain. And accordingly, we fee the Attempts of that Kind, are not at all fatisfa@tory. Which may be faid, in

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~ general,.of thofe Inftances, wherein one

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Idea or Quality is affign’d for the Caufe of another. I need not fay, how many Hypothefes and Speculations are left out, ~ and how much the ftudy of Nature 1s Abridged by this Doctrine.

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… Enlighten’d by being told this is done by Attraction ? Is it that, that Word fignifies the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, inftead of their being impell’d or protruded towards cach | other ?

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 149 other? But nothing is determin’d - of the Manner or Action, and it may as truly (for ought we know) be termed

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the Parts of Steel we fee cohere firmly together, and this alfo is accounted for by Attraction; but in this, as in the other Inftances, I do not perceive, that any thing is fignified befides the Effect it felf ; for as to the manner of the Action whereby it is produced, or the Caufe which produces it, thefe are not fo much as aim’d at. ee ee

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… together, we may obferve.fome likenefs and conformity betweenthem. For Example, in the Falling of a Stone ‘to the Ground, Inthe Rifing of the Seatowards

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doc. there is fomething alike, namely.an Union or Mutual, Approach of Bodies.. So that any onc of thefe,or the like Phenomena,, may not feem Strange, or Sur| prifing, to a Man woh has.nicely obferv’d and compar’d the Effects of. Na-

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— «§50 Of the Principles Part j, ture, For that only is thought fo which is uncamamon, Or a thing by it felf, and eut af the qrdinary Courfe of aur Obs fexyation. ‘That Bodies thau’d tend gor wards the Center of the Earth; 1s nor thoughe fixange, hecaufe ’tis whac we perceive every moment of our Lives, Bus that they fhou’d have a like Gravis tation towards the Center of the Moon, may feem odd and unaccountable to _ paeft Men, becaufe it’s difcern’d only

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in the Tides. Bus a Philofopher, whofe Thoughts take in a larger compals of Nature, having obferv’d a certain fimihicude of Appearances,as well inthe Heayens as the Earth, that argue innumeyable Bodies to have a mutual Tendency towasds each other, which he denotes by the general Nasne -Attrafiox, what-. ever can be neduced to that he chinks _ jotly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides, by the Attraction of the Terragusaus Glabe towards the Moon, which to. him does not appear odd or anomalous, but anly a particular Exam ‘le of a general Rule ox Law of Nae

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 128 —§ 105. If, therefore, we confider the

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to thar Knowkege of the Phenomena,we

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fhall find it conhfts, moc itt an exaétet Knowlege of thé efficient Canfe thar produces them, for that can be no os ther than the Wil of a Spirit, but only in a greater Largenefs of Gorriprehety - fon, whereby Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements art difeover’d in the Works of Naturé, and the particular Effects explain’d, :. e. reduced eo gené> ral Rules, vid. Sef. LXEL which Rules grounded dn the Analogy,and Unifonne nefs ob{ctv'd 1a the Production of Na+ tural Effects, are moft agreeable, and fought after by tle Mind, for thac they extend our Profpect beyord what is pre fent, ahd mear to us, anid enable us to make very probable Conjettares, touche | ing Thihgs that may have happen’d at very steat diftances uf Time and Place; as well as to predi& Things to comme ; which fore of Endeavour towards Orne | nifcience, is much affected by the Mind.

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152 Of the Principles Part]

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… in fuch Things, for we are apt to Jay too :great a Strefs on Analogies, and to the prejudice of Truth, humour that _ Eagernefs of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowlege into general Theoremes. For Example, In the bufinefs of.Gravitation,or mutual Attraction, becaufe it appears in many Intances, fome are ftraightway for pronouncing it Uziverfal ;. and that to Ate tral, and be Attratted by, every other Body isan Effential Quality, inherent in all Bodies whatfoever. Whereas, its evident the Fix’d Stars have no fuch Tendency - towards. cach other ;. and fo far is that Gravitation, from being Effential to Bodies, that, in fome Inftances a. quite contrary Principle feems to fhew it felf: Asin the Perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elafticity of the Air. - There is nothing Neceflary or Effential in the Cafe, but it depends intirely on the Will of the Governing Spirit, who caufes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards eachother, according.to vari-

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Part L. of Human Knowleve. 153 ous Laws; whilft he keeps others at a fix’d Diftance ; and to fome he gives a quite contrary Tendency to fly afune der, juft, as he fees convenient.

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… Caufe, diftinét from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly, Confidering the whole Creation 18 the Workmanhhip of a Wife end Good Agent, it fhou’d feem to bécomié Philofophers, to employ their Thoughts © (contrary to what fome hold) about the Final Caufes of Things-: For be-

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Entertainment to the Murtd, it might be of great Advantage, in that 1t not |

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only difcovers to us the Attributes of

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the Creator, but may alfo direct us in feveral Inftances to the proper Ufes and Applications of Things; and } mutt eonfefs, I fee no reafon, why os Out the various Ends, to which Natura Things are adapted, and for which they

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154 Of thePrinciples Part I. were originally, with unfpeakable Wifdom, contriv’d, fhou’d not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philofopher. Thirdly, from what has been premis’d no reafon can be drawn, why. the Hiftory of .Nature fhou’d not ftill be ftudied, and Obfervations and Experiments made, which, that they are of ufe to Mankind, and enable us to draw any general Conclufions, i is not the Refult of any immutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themfelves, but only of Gops Goodnefs and Kindnefs to Men,in the Adminiftration of the World. wid. Se. XXX and XXXI. Fourthly, By a diligent Obfervation of the Phenome_ na within our View, we may difcover the general Laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other Phenomena, Ido not fay Demonftrate ; for all Deduétions of that kind, depend on a Suppofition that the Author of Nature always opetates uniformly, and in a conftant obfervance of thofe Rules, we take for Principles: Which We cannot evident-

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 155

Page 155

of Nature, may rot unfitly be Stiled the — Language of its Author, whereby he difcovers his Attributes to our View, and

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ence and Felicity of Life. And to me, thofe Men who frame General -Rules from the Phenomena,and afterwards de| rive the Phenomena. from thofe Rules, feem to be Grammarians, and their Art - the Grammar of Nature. Two ways there are of Learning a Language, ei-

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may be well read in the Language of

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of Nature, without underftanding the | Grammar of it, or being able. to fay, | by what Rule a: Thing is fo or fo. And as “tis very poffible co Write _Improperly, thro’ too ftri&t an Obfervance of General Grammar-rules: So in Arguing from General Laws of Nature, “tis not impoffible we may ftretch the Analogy ae far,and by that means run into Mi—

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136 Of the Principles Part I.

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… Ufe, rather than lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on the Language; fo in perufing the Vo-~ Jume of Nature, methinks it is beneath the Dignity of the Mind, to affect an Exactnefs, in reducing each particular Phenomenon, to general Rules, or fhew - how it follows from them. .We thon’d propofe to pur felvesnobler Views,namely to recreate and exalt the Mind, with a profpect of the Beauty, Order, Extent, and Variety of Natural Things : Hence, by proper Inferences, roenlarge our Nations of the Grandeur, Wifdom, and Be-

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neficence of the Creator: And laftly, to make the feveral Parts of the Creati on, fo far as.in us lies, fubfervicat to the Ends they weredefign’d for, Goons Glory, and the Suftentation and Comfort of aur Selves and Fellow-Creatures,

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we o. The beft Grammar of the kind ‘e are {peaking of, will be eafily ac| ‘know-

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 157 knowleg’d to be a Treatife of Mecha nics, demonftrated and applied to Nae ture, by a Philofopher of a Neighbours ing Nation whom all the World - Ad~ mire. I fhall not take upon me to make Remarks, on: the Performance of that Extraordinary Perfon : Only fome Things he has advanced, fo directly opfite co the Doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we fhou’d be wanting, in the regard due tothe Authority of fo great a Man, did we not take fome notice of them. In the Entrance of that juftly admired Treatife, Time, Space and Motion, are diftinguifhed into Abfolute and Relgtiue, True and Apparent, Mathematical and Vulgar: Which Diftin¢tion, as ic is ac large explain’d by the Author,daes fuppofe thofe Quantities to haye an Exiftence withaue the Mind: And that they are ordinarily conceivd with relation to fenfible Things, to which neverthelefs, in their own Natyre,they bearno Relationat all,

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158 Of the Principles Part J, for the Duration or Perfeverance of the Exiftence of Things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what has been already faid, on that Subjecd. For the reft, this Celebrated Author holds there is an Abfolute Space, which, being unperceivable to Senfe, remains-in it felf fimilar and: immoveable: And Relative Space to be the meafure thereof, which being moveable, and defin’d by its Situation in refpect of Senfible Bodies, is vulgarly taken for Immoveable Space. . Place he Defines, tobe that Part ofSpace which is occupied by any Body. And according as the Space is Abfolute or — Relative, fo alfo is the Place. Abfolute

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Motioz is faid to be the Tranflation of a Body, from Abfolute Place to Abfolute Place, as Relative Motion is, from one Relative Place to another. Now becaufe _ the Parts of Abfolute Space, do not fall under our Senfes, inftead of them we are obliged to ufe their Senfible Meafures : And fo define both Place and Motion with refpect to Bodies, which we regard asimmoveable. | But it is faid, in Philofophical Matters we muft Abftra@:

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. q 56

Page 159

. none of thofe Bodies, which feem tobe

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… Motion, all Parts which ' preferve the fame Pofition with refpect " to the Whole, partake of the Motions of + the Whole. Secondly, The Place being " moved, that which is placed therein is ‘. alfo mov'd:: So that a Body moving in - a place which is in Motion, doth parti-

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(166 Of the Principles | Part if tion is always changed, by Force im: | preffed on the Body moved. Fifthly, In Circular Motion barely Relative, there is no Getitrifugal Force, which neverthes

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te in that which is True or ‘Abfolute, dy proportional to the nog of Motion: -

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… So that toconceive Motion, there mutt beat leaft cons ceived two Bodies, whereof the Di {tance of pofition in regard to cach othet is varied... Hence if thére was one only Body in being, it cou'd not poffibly bé mov’d. This to me feems very evident, in that the Idea I have of Mo+

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- Part Ll. of Human Knovlege. 161

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caufing the change, in the Diftance or Situation of the Bodies, is‘ imprefled. For however fome may define Relative Motion, fo as to term that Body mov'd, which changes its Diftance from fome other Body, whether the Force caufing

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… told, Relative Motion is that which is perceiy’d by Senfe, and regarded in the ordinary Affairs of Life, it follows that every Man of common Senfe knows what‘it 1s, as well ag the beft Philofopher: Now I ask any one, whether in his Senfe of Motion, as he walks along the Streets, the Stones he _ paffes over may be faid to move, be— caufe they. change Diftance with ‘his Feet? To me it appears, that tho — Motion includes a Relation: of one thing to another, yet it 1s not nec effary, that each term of the Relat10n be denominated from it. As a Man may think of fomewhat which does not think, fo a Body may be moyed to, or from, another Body which which is not, therefore, it felf in Moti-

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162 Of the » Principles Part I.

Page 162

may be faid to be Quiefcent, with rela_ tion to the fides of the Veffel, and -yet | move, with relation to the Land: Or he may move Eaftward in refpect of | the one, and Weftward in refpect of | the other. Inthe common Affairs of | Life, Men.never go beyond the Earth, | to define the place of any Body : ‘And |

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. what 1s quiefcent in refpect of that, is

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accounted abfolutely to be fo. But Philofophers, who have a greater Extent of Thought, and jufter Notions of the Syftem of Things, difcover even the _ Earth it felf to be moved. In order therefore to fix their Notions, they feem to conceive the Corporeal ‘World as _ -Finite, and the utmoft, unmoved’ Walls or Shell thereof to be the Place, whereby they eftimate True Motions. If we found our own Conceptions, I believe we may find all the Abfolute Motion

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Part I. of a Knowlege. 163

Page 163

we can frame. an Idea of, to be at Bottom no other than Relative Motion thus defined.. For as I have already faid, abfoluce Motion exclufive of all external Relation is incomprehenfible:

Page 163

And to. this kind of Relative Motion,

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Caufes, and Effeéts afcribed to Abfolute: Motion will, if I miftake not, be found to agree. As to what is faid of the Centifugal Force, that it does not at all be-

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164. Of the Principles Part I. preffedonit. If either of thefe be wanting, Ido not think that agreeably to the Senfe of Mankind, or the Propriety of Language, a Body can be faid to be in Motion. I grant, indeed, that it is pof-fible for us to think a Body, which we fee changeits Diftance from fome other, ‘to be moved, tho’ it have no force im-preffed on it, (in which Senfetheremay — be apparent Motion, ) but then it is, becaufe the Force caufing the change of D{tance, 1s imagin’d by us to beimprefs’d onthat Body thought to move. Which, indeed, fhews we are capable of miftaking a thing to be in Motion which is not, but doesnot prove that, inthe common acceptation of Motion, a Body is moved meerly becaufe it changes Di{tance from another; fince as foon as we are undeceiv’d, and find that the | moving Force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So on the other hand, when one - only Body (the Parts whereof preferve a given Pofitron between themfelves) . is imagin'd co Exift; fome there are who think that it can be moved 7

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 165

Page 165

‘of ways, tho” without any change of

Page 165

tion of other Bodies, wou'd produce a ©

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Motion of any certain Quantity and Determination. But that an a@tual Moti-

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on (diftiné&: from the impreffed Force, or aa: productive of Change of Place in cafe there were Bodies prefent whereby to define it} can Exift in fuch a fingle Body, I muft confefs I am not able to comprehend. |

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GY 116. From what has been aa It follows,that the Philofophic Confideration of Motion, does not imply the be-

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- ing of an Abfolute Space, diftinct from

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the like of all other Objects of Senfe. ,

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_ynto the Matter, we fhall find we can— not eyen frame an Idea of Pure Space,

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166 Of the Principles Part I. exclufive of all Body. ThisI muft con-

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_ moft Abftract Idea. When I excite a Motion in fome part of my Body, if it be Free or without Reéfiftance,I fay there is Space : But if'I find a Refiftance, then J fay there is Body : and in proportionas the Refiftanceto Motionisleffer or greater, I fay the Space is more or lefs Pure, So that when I {peak of pure or empty Space,. it is not to be fuppofed, that the Word Space ftands for an Idea diftin& from, or conceivable without Body and Motion. Tho’ indeed, we are apt tothink, every Noun Subftantive ftands for a diftinét Idea, that may be feparated from all others: Which has occafion’d infinite Miftakes. When therefore

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… Pure Space : Thereby nothing elfe is meant, but only that Iconceive it poffible, for the Limbs of my Body to be movd on all fides, without * the leaft Refiftance: But if that too were Annihilated, then there cou’d be no Motion, and conf¢quently no Space,

Page 166

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 167

Page 167

Some, perhaps, may think the Senfe of

Page 167

of Pure Space; butitisplain from what we have elfewhere fhewn, that the Ideas of Space and Diftance are not obtain’d.

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-~ the Learned concerning the nature of

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ral, who have imploy’d their Thoughts . on that Subjeé, imagine themfelves reduced. viz, of thinking either chat Real Spaceis Gop, or. elfe that there is fomething befide Gop which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, Indivifible, Immutable, dc. Both which may juftly be thought pernicious and abfurd Notions. Ic is certain that not a few Divines, as well as Philofophers of great Note,have, from the Difficulty they found in conceiving, either Limits of eae” | | -

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168 «(OF the Principles Part I. of Space, concluded it muft be Divine, And fome of late, have fee themfelves articularly to thew, the Incommuntcable Attributes of Gop agree toit. Which Doctrine, how unworthy foever it may feem of the Divine Nature, yet, I mutt confefs, Ido not See how we can get clear of it, fo long as we adhere to the receiv d Opinions, |

Page 168

§ 118. Hitherto of Natural Philofophy : We come now to make fome In-quiry concerning that other great Branch of Speculative Knowlege, viz. Mathe gpatics. Thefe, how Celebrated foever they may be, for their clearnefs and certainty of Demonftration, which ishardly any where ‘elfe to be found, cannot neverthelefs be fuppos’d altogether free from Mittakes, if fobethat in their Principles there lurks fome fecret Error, which is common to the Profeffors of thofe Sciences with the reft of Mankind. Mathematicians, tho’ they deduce their Theorems from a great Height of Evidence, yet their firft Principles are limited by the confideration of ai F |

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Part L of Human Knowlege. 169.

Page 169

… particular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does confequently participate of the Errors involved in them. That the Principles laid down by Mathematicians are true, and their way of Deduction from thofe Prin- ciples clear and inconte¢ftable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may be

Page 169

certain Erroneous Maxims of greater

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Extent than the Objeét of Mathematics, and, for that reafon, not exprefly mention i'd, tho’ tacitly fuppofed throughoue the whole progrefs of that Science ; and that the ill effects of thofe fecret, unexamin’d Errors are diffufed thrdé all the Branches thereof. To be plain, we fulpeéctthe Mathematicians are no lefs deeply concern’d than other Men,in the Errors arifing from the Doétrine ‘of Abftract,

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3 General Ideas, and the Exiftence of Ob-

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to have for sts Object, Abftract Ideas of - LZ

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170 = Of the Principles Part I. Number. Of which to underftand the Properties and mutual Habitudes, is fuppofed no mean part of Speculative Knowlege. The Opinion of the pure and intellectual Nature of Numbers in Abftraét, has made ’em in eftcem with thofe Philofophers, who feem to have affected an uncommon Finenefs and - Elevation of Thought.It hath fet a Price ’ on the moft trifling Numerical Speculations, which in practice are of no ufe, but fetve only for Amufement. And hath heretofore fo far infected the Minds of fome, that they have dreamt of mighty Myfteries involved in Numbers, and attempted the Explication of Natural Things by them. But if we narrowly inquireinto ourown Thoughts, and confider what has been premifed, we may perhaps entertainalow Opinion of thofe high Flights and Abftractions, and look on all -Inquiries about Numbers, only as fo many difficiles nuge, fo far as they are not fubfervient to practife, and pro-

Page 170

mote the benefit of Life. |

Page 170

Part I. of a ended, I7I before confider’d wid. Sef. XII. from |

Page 171

trodudion, it plainly follows, there is not any fuch Idea. But Number being defin’daCollefion of Unites, we may conclude that, if there be no fuch thing as

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Ideas of Number in Abftraét denoted by the Numeral Names and Figures,

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- Science of Numbers 3 is f{ubordinate to

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of meer penne

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-fome, who, deluded by the fpecious _ Shew ‘of Difcovering Abftracted Verities, . wate their time in Arithmetical Theo|

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172 Of the Principles Part.I.. fully confider, and expofe the Vanity of that Pretence ; And this will plainly ap- pear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in its Infancy, and obferving what it was that originally put Menon the Study of that Science, and to what Scope they direéted it. Itis natural to think thacat firft, Men, for cafe of Memory and help of -Computation, madeufe of Counters, or in writing of Single Stroaks, Points or the like, each whereof was made to fignifiean Unite #. e. fomeone thing of what-. ever Kind they had occafion to reckon. Afterwards, they found out the more compendious ways, of makingoneCha-_ racter ftand in place of feveral Stroaks, - or Points. And laftly, the Notation of the Arabians or Indians came into.ufe, wherein by the repetition of a few Characters or Figures, and varying the Sig-. nification of each Figure according to the the place it obtains, all Numbers may be moft aptly. exprefs’d : Which feems to have been done in Imitation of | _ Language, fothatan exact Analogy is obferv’d betwixt the Notation by Ficures, and Names, the nine fimple Eioo gures

Page 172

Part-I. of Human Knowlege. 173

Page 173

ons of the fimple and local Value of Figures, were contrived Methods of finding from the given Figures or Marks of

Page 173

… is eafy to ~ read them into Words; and fo the Number becomes perfe@ly known. For then the Number of any particular Things is faid to be known, when we

Page 173

… to the ftanding Analogy belong to them.’ For thefe Signs being known, we can by the Operations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of any Part of theparticular Sums © fignified by them; and thus computing in Signs, (becaufe of the connexion eftablith’d betwixe them and the diftinct multitudes of Things, whereof one ts

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… their own fake, but becaufe they dired us how to a¢t with relation to Things, and difpofe ‘rightly of them. Now 2grecably to what we have before ob-

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_ ferv’d, of words in general (vid. Sed.

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. ers, while they do not fuggeft Ideas of

Page 174

3174. Of the Principles Part I. | rightly to fum Up, Divide, and Propore |

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. Part L of Human Knowlege. : 175

Page 175

for their own fake wou'd be juft as wife, and to as good purpofe, as if a Man negleating the true Ufe of original Intentionand fubferviency of Language, fhou’d

Page 175

to {peak of Axtenfion, which is the Ob-

Page 175

ja of Geometry. The Infizite Divifie |

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ility of Aixite Extenfion tho’ it.is not» exprefly laid down, either as an Axiom or Theoreme in the Elements of that _ Science, yet, 1s throughout the fame every. where fuppos’d, and thought to | have fo infeparable and effential a Connexion, with the Principlesand Demon_ itrations in Geometry, that Mathemati-

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the leaft Queftion of it. And.as this No« uionisthe Source from whence do fpring, all thofe Amufing Geometrical a

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176 Of the Principles Part i doxes, which have fuch a direé& Repugnancy to the plain, common Senfe of Mankind, and are admitted with fo much Reluctance, into a Mind not yet debauched by Learning : Soisit the principal occafion of all that nice and ex‘tream Subtlty, which renders the Study of Mathematics fo very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear, that no Finite Extenfion contains innumerable Parts, or is infinitely Divifible, it follows that we hall at once clear the Science of Geometry, froma | great number of Difficulties and Con- tradictions which have ever been efteemed a Reproach to Human Reafon, and withal. make the Attainment thereof, a bufinefs of much lefs Time and Pains, then it hitherto has been.

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§ 124. Every particular, Finite Ex~ tenfion, which may poffibly be the Obje@ of our Thought, is an Idea Exifting: only inthe Mind, and confequently each Part thereof muft be perceiv’d. If, therefore,I cannot perceiveinnumerable Parts, in any Finite Extenfion that.I confider, | ._ % a,

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 177

Page 177

tenfions I have in View, are no other — than my own Ideas, and it is no Iefs plain, that I cannot ‘refolve any one of . my Ideas, into an infinite Number ' of

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… fomething diftinct from a Finite Ideas I declare do not know what that is, and fo ¢annot affirm of

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deny any thing of ie.. But if ehe terms |

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to fay, a Finiee Quantity of Extenfiorr |

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confifts of Parts infinite-in Number, is fo manifeft and glaring a) Contradicti-

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fhou’d: ever gany the affent of any reay

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178 «Of the Principles Part I. to it by gentle and flow. Degrees, as a Pagan Convert to the belief of Zranfubflantiation. Ancient and rooted Prejudices do often pafs into Principles: And thofe Propofitions which once obtain the force and credit of a Principle, are not only themfelves, but likewife whatevers deducible from them, thought privileg’d from all Examination. And there's no Abfurdity fo grofs, which, by this means, the Mind of Man may not be prepared to fwallow. ‘4

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prepoffeft with the Doétrine of Abitract, general Ideas; may be eafily per{waded,that (whatever be thought of the Ideas of Senfe,)° Extenfion in Abfraé is infinitely Divifible. And any one, who thinks the Obyeéts of Senfe Exift without the Mind, will not ftick to affirm, a Line but an Inch long may contain innumerable Parts, really Exifting, thé too fmall.to be difcern’d. Thefe - Er- rors are grafted, as well in the Minds of Geometricians, as of other Men, and ‘have a like influence on their Reafo-

Page 178

Partl. of Human Knowlege. 179:

Page 179

nings ; and it were no difficult thing, to fhew how the Arguments from Géometry made ufe of to fuppore the infinite divifibility of Extenfion, are -bottom’d on them. But this, if ic be thought necef| fary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner. At prefent we fhall only obferve in general, whence it is the Mathema- ticians are all fo fond and tenacious of that Doctrine. | _

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… Linesand Figures _ included in the Diagram, are fuppofed to f{tand for innumerable Others of difterent Sizes, or, in other Words, the Geometer confiders them abftracting from

Page 179

i180 Of the Principles Part I. but sooks on that as a thing indifferent to the Demontftration : Hence it follows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an Inch long, muft be {poken of, as tho’ it contain’d ten-thoufand Parts, fince it is regarded, not in ic felf, but as it is ~univerfal, and it is univerfal. only in its Signification, whereby it reprefents innumerable Lines greater than it felf, jn which may be diftinguith’d ten-thoufand Parts or more, tho’ there may not in

Page 180

§ 127. Becaufe there isno number of Parts fo great, but its poflible there may —beaLinecontajning more, theInch-line is {aid to contain Parts more than-any aflignable Number; which is true, not of the Inch taken abfolutely, bue only for the things fignified by it, Bur Men

Page 180

Part 1. of Human Knowlege. 181 | contains in it felf Parts innumerable, There is no fuch ching as che ten-thoue fandth Pare of an Inch; but there is of a Mile or Diameter of the Earth, which may be fignified by that Ioch. When. therefore, I Delineate a Trrangle on Paper,

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ten-thoufandth Part of that Lime, confider'd in it felf, is nothing ac all, and

Page 181

any Error or Inconveniency; yet thefe -

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dius muft he taken of 10000 Patts or more, | a

Page 181

§ 128. — on lias been faid the yeafon is plain why, to the end any Theorem became univerfal in its Ufe, its neceflary we fpeak of the:Lines de(cribcd on Paper, as tha’ they contain’d an

Page 181

182. Of the Principles Part I. which really they do not. In doing of

Page 182

ly, we fhall, perhaps; difcover that we cannot conceive an Inch it felf asconfitting of,or being divifible into,a thoufand Parts, but only fome other Line which 4s far greater than.an Inch, and reprefented by.it. , And that when we fay a Line is infinitely Divifible, We mean (if we mean any thing) a Line which is izfinitely Great, What we have here obferv'd feems to be the chief Caufe, why, to fuppofe the infinite divifibility of Finite Extenfion, has been thought necelfaty 1 in | Geometry.

Page 182

Part L of Human Knowlege. 183

Page 183

Repugnant cou’d have a neceflary con-- nexion with Truth, or flow from it, But whoever confiders the weaknefs of

Page 183

of the Mind, which had rather acquiefce in an indolent Scepticifm, than be at the

Page 183

amination of thofe Principles it has ever embraced for true. . A

Page 183

§ 130. Of late the Speculations about Infinites have run fo high, and grown to fuch ftrange Notions, as have occafion’d no {mall Scruples and Difputes,

Page 183

among the Geometers of the prefenc

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Age. Some there are of great Note, who not content with holding, that Finice Lines may be divided into an In-

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finite number of Parts, do yet farther.

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maintain, that each of thofe Infinitefimals is it felf fubdivifible,into an infinicy of other Parts, or Infinitefimals of a fecond Order,and fo on ad seer be I fay, afferc, there are Infinitefimals of

Page 183

infinitefimals of Infinicefimals, dc. with-

Page 183

barely contain an infinte nunvber of -

Page 184

Parts, buc an Infiaity of an Infinity of an Lofinity ad infinitun of Parts.Others there

Page 184

be who hold.,. all orders of Infiniteftmals

Page 184

image there is any pofirive Quantity or Part of Extenfion, which, tho’ multiplyed Infinitely, can never equal the - {malleft given Extenfion. And yet on the other hand, it feems no lefs Abfurd, to think the Square,Cube, or other Pow:

Page 184

pying all of the fubfequent Orders, are

Page 184

fon. to conclude, they are doth in the wrong, and thae. there is.in effect no fach -thitig asParts infimecly Small, of

Page 184

‘an-infinite number of Parts contain d it any Finite Quamity? Buc you'll fay, thar

Page 184

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 185 deftroy'd : And thofe Great Men who, have raifed that Science to fo aftonifhing

Page 185

Geometry, and promotes the benefit of

Page 185

Properties inveftigated, without fuppofang Finite Excenfion to be infinitely Di‘wifible, may be the proper Bufinefs of

Page 185

another ‘place. For tlie reft, tho’ it fhou’d follow that fome of the more intricate. and fubtile Parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared of, without any prejudice to Truth; yet I do not fee, what Damage will be thence derived to Mankind. On the contrary,

Page 185

Men of the greateft Abilities and mott

Page 185

186 | of the Principle Dect I.

Page 186

and imploy them in the ftudy of fuch Things, as lie nearer the concerns of Life, or have a more direct Influence on the Mannets. ,

Page 186

… The» orems undoubtedly true, are difcover’d by methods in which Infinitefimals are made ufe of, which cou’d never have been, if their Exiftence included a con-

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-a thorough Examination it will not be found, that in any Inftance it is.neceffary to make ufe of or conceive Infinitefimal Parts of finite Lines,or even Quantities lefs than the Minimum Senfibile : Nay it will be evident ‘this: is never done, it being impoffible. And whatever Mathematicians may thinkof Flzxions or the Differential Calculus and the like, a little Reflexion will thew them, that in working by thofe Methods, they : do not conceive or imagine Lines. or ‘Surfaces lefs than what are perceivable to Senfe. They may, indeed, call thofe litle and almoft Infenfible Quantities Infinitefimals or ne mals of Infinitefi~ mals,

Page 186

Part I. of Human cite 187

Page 187

mals, if they pleafe: But at Bottom this 1s all, they being in ‘truth Finite, nor does the Solution of Problemes require the fuppofing any other. But this will be more clearly made out here-

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Rife, from thofe falfe Principles which were impugned in the foregoing Parts: of this Treatife. And the Oppofites of thofe erroneous Tenents, at the fame time, appear to be moft fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable Confequences highly advantagi« ous, to true Philofophy as well as to Religion. Particularly, Matter or the Abfolute Exiftence of Corporeal Objects,have been thewn to be that wherein the moft

Page 187

‘ avow'd and pernicious Enemies of all

Page 187

; ftinguifhing the real Exiftence of uns

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188 Of the Principles Part I. ceiv'd, and allowing them a Subfiftence of their own out of the Minds of Spirits, no one thing is explained in _ Nature, but, on the contrary, a great many inexplicable Difficulties arife: If the Suppofition of Matter 1s barely. precarious, as not being grounded on fo much as one fingle Reafon : If its Confequences cannot endure the light of . Examination and free Inquiry, but fkreen themfelves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites being Incomprehenfible : If. withal the Removal of. this Matter be not attended wih the -Teaft evil Confequence, if it be not even — miffed in the World, but every thing: as well, nay much eafier conceivd. without it : If i in fine, both Sceptics and. Atheifis are for ever filenced upon fuppofing only Spirits arid Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is perfectly agrecable both to Reafon and Religion : Methinks we may expect it fhowd be admitted and firmly embraced, tho’ it were pro-posd only as an Hypothefis, is, and the Exiftence of Matter had been allow’d poflible, which yet q think, we have

Page 188

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 189

Page 189

§ 134. True x¢ 3s, that in confequence of the foregomg Principles, feveral Difputes and Speculations, which are efteem’d no mean Parts of Learning, are rejected as ufelefs, and in effeét converfant about nothing at all, But how greata Prejudice foever againft our Notions, this may give to thofe who have already been deeply Engag’d, and made large Advances in Studies of that Nature : Yet by Others, we hope it will not be thought any juft ground of Difhke, to the Principles and Tenents” herem laid down, that they abridge the labour of Study, and make Human Sciences far more Clear, Compendious, and Attainable than they were before.

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§ 135. Having difpatch’d what we intended to fay concerning the knowlege of Ideas, the Method we propos’d Jeads us, in the next place, to treat of Sptrits : With regard to which, perhaps, Human Knowlege is not fo de«

Page 189

190 Of | the Principles Part I.

Page 190

ing thought Ignorant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of #. But furely ic ought not to belook’d on as a defect in a Human Underftanding, that it does not perceive the Idea of Spirit, if it is manifeftly impoffible there fhou’d be any fuch Idea. And this if I miftake not, has been demonftrated in Sef XXVII-to which I hhall

Page 190

Part I. of Human Krowlege. 191

Page 191

ons or Ideas of Senfe. But, I belicve,

Page 191

by the terms Soul and Subftance, is only fome particular fort of Idea or Sen{ation. - We may -therefore infer, that, -

Page 191

more reafonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furnifh us with an Idea of Spuirit,~or Active, Thinking Subftance, than it wou’d be if we fhou’d blame them for not being

Page 191

§ 137. From the opinion that Spirits are. to be known after’ the manner of an Idea or Senfation, have rifen many ~ abfurd and heterodox .Tenents, and much Scepticifm about the Nature of the Soul. °’Tis even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a |

Page 191

they had an Idea of it. That an Idea which is Inactive, and the Exiftence whereof confifts in being Perceiv’d, fhou'd be the Image or Likenefs of an

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192 «(OF the Principles Part I. Agent fubfifting by it felf,feems to need no other Refutation, than barely actending <0 what 1s meant by thot Words. But, perhaps, you'll fay, that tho’ an Idea cannot refemble a Spirit, in its Thinking, Acting, or Subfifting by 1c felf, yer 1c may in fome other re{pects: And it 1s not neceffary, that an Idea or Image be in all refpects like the Original. a

Page 192

… it is impoflible it fhou’d re« prefent ic in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Willing, Thinks ing, and Perceiving Ideas, and there remains nothing elfe wherein the Idea can be hike a Spirs. For by the Word Spi‘vit we mean only that which Thinks, Wills, and Perceives, this, and this alone, conftitutes the Signification of that Term. [f, therefore, it 1s impoffible that any degree of thofe Powers, thou'd be rcprefented in an Idea or No~ | tion, ‘tis evident there can be no Idea —or Nouonof a Spirit. © )

Page 192

Part L of Hunian Knowlege. 193,

Page 193

… I was nothing, or that I was an Idea or Notion, nothing coud be more..evidently Abfurd chan either of thefe Propofitions, You'll perhaps, infift, that this.is only Quarrelling at.a Word, and that fince the im-

Page 193

_ mediate fignifications of .other Names,

Page 193

… name Spirit or Soul may not partake in the.fame Appellation. I anfwer, all the Unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that a are intirely Paffive, and their Ex-

Page 193

194 Of the Principles Part L. iftence confifts only in being perceiv’d :

Page 194

6 140. In a large Senfe, indeed, we may be faid to have an Idea of Spirit, that is, we underftand the meaning of theWord otherwife we cou’d not affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits, by means of our own, which we fuppofe to be Refemblances of them. So we know other. _ Spirits by means of our own Soul, which, in that Senfe, 1s the Image or Idea of them, it having a like refpect to other Spirits, thac Bluenefs or Heat by me perceiv'd has to thofe Ideas perceiy'd by another. . |

Page 194

Part I. of Human Lonial 195

Page 195

¢§ 14. The awed Immortality of

Page 195

the Soul is a neceflary Confequence of

Page 195

the foregoing Doctrine, But before We attempt to prove this, “tis fit that we explain the meaning of that Tenent. It mutt not be fuppofed, that they who

Page 195

- affere the natural Immortality of the

Page 195

Soul are of opinion,that, 1¢ is abfolutely incapable of Annihilation, even by the

Page 195

infinite power of the Creator, who — firft gave it Being. But only that it is

Page 195

not liable to be broken, or diffolv’d, by the ordinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of

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- Syftem of animal Spirits, make it Per-

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… more eafily diffipated than fuch a Being, which it 1s naturally impoffible fhou’d furvive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it 1s: inclos’d. And this Notion has been. greedily embraced, and cherifh’d by the worft Part of Mankind, as the mott effe€tual Antidote againtt all Impreffions af Vertue and Religion. - But it has

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196 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 196

- been made evident, that Bodies, of what

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frame. of Texture foever, are barely

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… Active, Sitnple, Uncompourided Sub{tance : Such a being, therefore, is Indiffoluble by the force of Nature, that. is to fay, the Soul of Man is naturally Immortal, _* |

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… that otir Souls are not to be known in the fame manner as. fenfelefs, inactive Objects, or by way of Idea. Spirits and Ideas are things fo wholly different, that when we fay, they Exift, they are Known, or the like,. '-{¢ Words mutt not be thought to.

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Part I.. of Human Knowlege. 197 fignifie agg common to both NaThere is nothing alike or. common in them : And to:expect; that by any multiplication. or. enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, feems as Abfurd as if we fhou’dhope to fee a Sound. This is inculcated becaufe — I imagine it may be of Moment, towardsclearing feveral important Quefti-

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rous Errors concerning the Nature of the Souk = —

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— § 143..It will not be amifs to add, that the Doétritic of Abfraé Ideas has had no {mall thare, in rendering thofe Sciences Intricate.and obfcure, which are particularly converfant about Spiritual Things. Men have imagin’d they coud frame abftraéé Notions, of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, and con’ fider them prefcinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it felf, as from their

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a great number of dark and ambiguous Terms, prefum’d to ftand for abftrat -. eS — -. Notions,

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198 Of the Principles Part I. Notions, have been introduced into Metaphyfics and Morality, and from thefe have grown Infinite Diftractions and Difputes amongft the Learned.

Page 198

… towards engaging Men in Controverfies and Miftakes, with regard to the Nature.and Operations of the Mind, than the being ufed to fpeak of thofe things,in Terms borrow’'d from fenfible Ideas. For Example, The Will 1s termed the Motioz of the Soul: This -infufes a Belief, that che Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impell’d and determind by the Objects of Senfe, as neceffarily as thatis by the Stroak of-a Racket. Hence arife endlefs Scruples and Errors of dangerous Confequence in Morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and. Truth appear Plain, Uniform, and Confiftent, cou’d but Philofophers be prevail’d on, to depart from fome recely d prejudices and modes of Speech, and retiring into themfelves attentively confider their-own meaning. But the Difficulties arifing on this Head, demand

Page 198

Part tL of Human Sia 199

Page 199

with the Defign of this Treatifc. | 6 145. From Giué has been faid, "us.

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plain, that we cannot know the Exiftence of other Spirits, otherwife than by

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their Operations, or the Ideas by them excited in us. I perceive feveral Motions,’ Changes, and Combinations of I-.

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have of other Spirits is not immediate,

Page 199

as is the.Knowlege of my Ideas, but depending on the Interyention of Ideas, by me. refer’d to Agents or Spirits die ftin& from my iclf, as lenis OL COncomitant Signs. |

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vident to every one, that thofe things which are call’d the works of Nature, i. e. the far greater part of the Ideas or Senfations perceived by us, are not pro-

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200 Of the Principles Part I

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duced. by, or dependent ion, the Wilis of Men... There is therefore fome other Spirit that caufes them, fince it is repug-

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felves. See Seat. XXIX. But if we attentively confider the conftant Regularity, ‘Order, and Cancatenation of Nacural Things, the furprifing Magnificence, Beauty and Perfection.of the Jar-

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ger, and the Exqurfice Contrivance of

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the fmaller Parts of the-Creation, together with the exact Harmony and Correfpondence of sthe whole, but, above all, the never enough admir’d Laws of Pam and Pleafure, and the In-

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and Pafhians of ‘Antmals,I fayaf-we confider all thafe things, and atthe fame . time attend to. the meaning :and import of the Attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wafe, “Good and Perfeét, we

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Part [.. of Hunias on 201 diately as any other Mind or ' Spiric whatfoever, diftinct from our «felves.

Page 201

~ We may even affert, that the. Exiftence of Gop is far more evidently perceiv'd than the Exiftence of Men; becaufe the ~

Page 201

Effects of Nature are infinitely more nu-_ merous and confiderable, than thofe af-_ cribed to Human Agents. There is not any one Mark that denotes a Man, or Effect produced by him, which does not more ftrongly evince ‘the Being of | that Spirit, who is the Author of Nature. For it is evidenc that-in affecting other | Perfons, the will of Man has no other Object, than barely the Motion of the Limbs of his Body, but that fuch a Motion fhou’d be attended by, or excite,

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-any Idea in the Mind of another, de-

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pends wholly on the Will of the CreaTor, He alone it is who, zpholding all things by the word of his Power, maintains thac Intercourfe between Spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the Exiftence of each other. And yet’ this pure and clear Light which enlightens every: one, is it felf invifible to the

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-greateft part of Mankind.

Page 201

202 Of the Principles Part L

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§ 148 Ic fees to be a general Pretence of the Unthinking Herd,that they cannot fee Gov. Coud we but fee him, fay they, as we fee a Man, we fhou d believe that he is, and believing -obcy his. Commands. But alas we need only epen our Eyes to fee the Sovereign Lord of all Things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our Fellow-Creatures. Not that Iimagine, we fee Gop (as fome will have it) by a direct and immediate View, or fee Corporeal Things, not by themfelves but, by feeing that which reprefents them in the Effence. of Gop, — which Dectrine is, I muft confefs, to “me Iacomprehenfible. But I fhall explain my Meaning. A Human Spirit or Perfon is not perceiv’'d by Senfe, as not being an Idea; when therefore we ~ fee the Colour, Size, Figure, and Motions of a Man, we perceive only certain Senfations or Tdeas excited in our own ‘Minds: And thefe, being exhibited to our view in fandry, diftinét Colle@ions

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Part I. of Human ‘tethn 203

Page 203

of Finite, and Created Spirits like our felves. Hence ’tis plain, we do not {ce a Man, if by Maz is meaat that which Lives, Moves, Perceives, and Thinks as we do: But only fucha certain Collection of Ideas, as directs us to think there is a diftinét Principle of Thought and

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fame manner we fee Gop; all the difference is, that, whereas fome one finite and narrow affemblage of Ideas de-

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therfoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places, perceive manifeft Tokens of the Divinity: Every thing we See, Hear, Fecl or any wife perceive by Senfe, being a Sign or Ef-

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fect of the Power of Gop: as is our

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Perception of thofe very Motions, which are produced by Men, -

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§ 149. "Tis therefore sas that nos thing can be more evident to any ome that’s capable of the leaft Reflexion, than the Exiftence of Gon, or a Spirit who is intimately prefent to our Minds,

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204. Of the Principles Part I.

Page 204

producing in them all that variety of Ideas or Senfations, which continually affect us,on whom we have an abfolute and intire Dependence, in fhort iz whom. we Live, and Move, and have our Being.

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That the Difcovery of this great Truth . which lies fo near and obvious to’ the » Mind, fhou’d be attain’d to by the Rea-. fon of fo very few, is a fad. inftance of the Stupidity and Inattention of Men,

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who, thd they are Surrounded with fuch clear manifeftations of the Deity, are yet fo little affe@ted by them, that _ they feem, as it were, blinded with excefs of Light, |

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§ 150. But you'll fay has a no fhare in the Production of Natural Things, and muft they be all afcrib’d tothe immediate and fole Operation of Gop? I anfwer, if: by Nature is meant only the vifible Series of Effects, or Senfations imprinted on our Minds, according to certain fixt and general Laws : Then ‘tis plain, that Nature taken in this Senfe cannot produce any ching at all. But by Nature is meant

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— Part 1. of Human Knowlege. 205

Page 205

fome Being diftinét from Gop, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and things perceiv'd by Senfe, I muft confefs, that

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to it. Nature, in this Acceptation, is a vain Chimeba introduced by thofe Heathens, who had not juft Notions of the | Omniprefence and infinite Perfection

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of Gop. But it is more unaccounta-

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… belief in the Holy Scriptures, which conftantly afcribe thofe Effects to the immediate Hand of | Gop, that Heathen Philofophers are. wont to impute to Nature. The Lorv, he caufeth the Uapours to afcend; he mak= —

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forth the Wind out of his Treafures. Jerem. © Chap. to. v. 13. He turneth the fhadow of Death into the Morning, and maketh. the Day dark with Night. Atmos Chap. 5. v8. He vifiteth the Earth, and maketh it foft with Showers : He bleffeth the Springing thereof, and crowneth the. Tear with © his Goodnefs; fo thatthe Paftures are:cloath—

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206 Of the Principles Part I, over with Corn. See Pfal. 65. But notwithftanding that this is the con{tant Language of Scripture; yet we have I know not what Averfion from believing, tha. Gop concerns himfelf fo nearly in our Affairs. Fain wou’d we fuppofe him. at a great diftance off, and fubftieute . fome blind, unthinking Deputy in his ftead, tho (if we may believe Saint Paa/) be be not far from every one of us,

Page 206

… I doubt not, be objected, that the flow, gradual and roundabout Methods obferv’d in the Production of Natural Things, do not feem to have for their Caufe the imrhediate Hand of an Almighty Agent. 'Befides, Monfters, untimely Births, Fruits blafted in the Blofflom, Rains falling in defert Places, Mauferies incident to Human Life, and the like, are fo many arguments that the hole frame of Nature, is not immediately actuated and fuperitended by a Spiric of infinite Widom and Goodnefs. But the Anfwer to this Objection is ina good meafure plain from Se. LXII, it being

Page 206

Part 1. of Sis Knowlege. 207

Page 207

vifible, that the aforefaid Methods of Nature are abfolutely neceffary, in ore | der to working by the moft fimple and

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confiftent Manner; which argues both — the Wifdom and Goodnefs of Gop. For, .

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it doth hence follow, chat the Finger of Gop is not fo confpicuous to the refolv’d and carelefs Sinner, which gives . him an oppertunity to harden in his Impiety, and growripetor Vengeance. vid.

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crivance of this mighty Machine of Nature, that whilft ics Motions and various Phenomena ftrike on our Senfes, — the Hand which aétuates the whole is

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it felf unperceivable to Men of Fleth and Blood. Verily (faith the Prophet) thou art a Gop that. hidefi thy felf. Ifaiah

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Chap. 4s. ver. 15. But thé the Lord con~ ceal himfelf from the Eyes of the Sen_ ~ fual and Lazy, who will not be at the

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leaft expence of Thought; yet to an | unbiaffed and arcentive Mind, nothing can be more plainly legible, than the ©

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antimate Prefence of an Ad/-wife Spirit,

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208 Of the Principles Part J, the whole Syftem of Beings. . Second-

Page 208

… ace cording to. general and {tated Laws, is fo neceflary for our Guidance in the ‘afe fairs of Life, and. letting.us into the Secret of Nature, that without it, all Reach and Compafs of Thought, all ~ Human Sagacity and Defign cou’d ferve to no manner.of Purpofe : It were - even. impoffible, there fhou’d be any . fuch Faculties or Powers in the Mind,vid. Set. XXXI. Which one Confideration abundantly out-ballances whatever particular Inconveniences may thence arife.

Page 208

~ § rg2. But we fhou’d further confider, that the-very Blemifhes and Defects of Nature are not without their Ufe, in that they make an agreeable fort of Variety, and augment the Beauty of the -reft of the Creation, as Shades in a Pi“ture ferve to fet off the brighter and more enlighten’d Parts. We wou'd ~ likewife do well to examine, whether our taxing the Wafte of Seeds and Embryo’s,..and. accidental Deftruction of

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Part I. of Human Knowlege.. 209 Plants and Animals, before they come to full Maturity, as an’ Imprudence in. the Author of Nature, be not the effect |

Page 209

of, Prejudice, contracted by our Fami--

Page 209

= nagement of thofe “Things, which’ he

Page 209

explicably fine Machine of an Animal:

Page 209

~ every thing, by a meer Fiat or act of

Page 209

.f{plendid Profufion of ‘Natural Things

Page 209

fhou’d not be interpreted, Weaknefs or Prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather be look’d on as an Argument of the Riches of his Power.

Page 209

§ 153. As for the mixture of Pain

Page 209

p10 - Of the Principles Part I. purfuant to the General Laws of Nature, and the Actions of Finite, Imperfect Spirits ; This, in the State we are in at prefent, is indifpenfibly neceflary to —

Page 210

our Well-being. Butour Profpects are _ too narrow: We take, for Inftance, the Idca of fome one particular Pain into. our Thoughts, and account it Evil; whereas if we enlarge our View, fo as to comprehend the various Ends, Con_ nexions, and Dependencies of things, on what Occafions and in what Proportions, we are affected with Pain and Pleafure, the Nature of Human Freedom, and the Defign with which we are put into the World ; we-thall be forced to acknowlege that thofe particular Things, which confider’d in themfelves appear to be Evil, have the Nature of Good, when confider’das link’d with the whole . Syftem of Beings.

Page 210

.. § 154. From what has been faid it will be manifeft to any Confidering Perfon, that it’s meerly for want of attention and comprchenfivencts of —

Page 210

that there are any Favourers of Atheifn or the Manichdan Herefie to. be found.

Page 211

Little. and unreflecting Souls may, indeed,: Burlefque the Works: of Providence, the Beauty and Order whereof they have not Capacity, or will not be

Page 211

who are Matters of any juftnefs and ex-

Page 211

— tent of Thought and are withal ufed

Page 211

to reflect, can never fufficiently admire the Divine Traces of Wifdom and Goodnefs, that fhine throughout the Occonomy of Nature. But what Truth is there which glares fo ftrongly onthe Mind, that by an averfion of Thought, a wilful fhutting of the Eyes, we may not cfcape feeing it, at leaft with a full and dire&t view ? Is it therefore © to be wonder’d at, if the generality

Page 211

of Men, who are ever intent on Bufi| nefs or Pleafure, and little ufed to fix or open the Eye of their Mind, fhou’d not have all that Conviction ‘and Evidence of the Being of Gop, which might be expected in Reafonable

Page 211

212 of ae Prinipls ‘Part I.

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they fhou’d be unconvinced ‘of;. fuch an evident and momentous Truth, And yet it 1s to be fedr’d that tog mamy of Parts and Leifure, who live

Page 212

thro a fupine and ‘dreadful Negligence funk into a fort of Demy-Atheifm.

Page 212

there is. For what elfe can it be but fome lurking Infidelity, fome fecret mifgivings of Mind, with regard to the Exiftence and Attributes: of Gop, which permits Sinners to grow and harden in Impiety? Since itis downright impoflible, that a Soul pierced

Page 212

and. enlighten’d with a thorough Senfe | of the Omniprefence, Holinefs, and

Page 212

Juttice of that Almighty Spirit, fhou’d perfift in a remorflefs Violation of

Page 212

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 213

Page 213

attain Conviction. without .all Scru. ple, that the Fyes of the. Legp are in

Page 213

immediate Dependence on Him. A clear View of which great Truths cannot chufe but fill our Hearts, with an awful Circumfpection and . holy Fear, which is the ftrongeft Incentive to Vertue, andthe beft Guard ‘a-

Page 213

— § 156. For afterall, what deferves — the firft place in our Studies, is the Confideration of Gov, ‘and our Dz-

Page 213

the main drift and defign of my La-. bours, fo fhall I efteem them altoge-

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er 4 of the & Principles Part tC

Page n223

Readers with a pious Senfe of the Prefence of Gon! And having théwn the Falfenefs or. Vanity of thofe barren Speculations, which make’ the chief Employment of Learned Men, the better difpofe them to reverence and embrace . the Salutary Truths of the Gosps, _ which to Know and to Praétife, is the hugnelt Perfection of Human Nature.

Page n223

Page — (2/223)

Wherein the chief Caufes of Error — Dif.

Page n2

ficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of § Scepticifm, Atheifm, and en are inquird into. |

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| By ion Berkeley, M. A. Fellow of| |. ?

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EARL OF | PEMBROKE, &e.

Page n4

—— of the Moft Noble Order of sae Gaataa,

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5 One of ne tad of Her M AFESTYS Moft Honourable

Page n4

Choice of Your Lordfhip for his Patron, will not be thought

Page n5

_ have induced metomake You this prefent of my poos Endéavours, were Inot Encourag’d

Page n5

… fi. to fhew towards out Society, gave me Hopes; You'd not be unwilling to countenance the Studies of one of its Members. Thefe Confiderations -determin’dmetolay this Trea:

Page n6

… ‘Ambitious to have it known, that I am with the trueft and. | —-moft profound Refpeé,on ac-count: of: that Learning‘ and > Vertue which the World fo juftly Admires i in 1 Your Lord. Ahip, oe My Lord; = i - Your Lordfips Ay os Me oft Humble 7 And moft Devoted

Page n6

thofe who are tainted with Sceptici{m, of

Page n7

manta Demonfiration of the Exiftence and bomateriality of Gov; of the Natural In pyiortality of the Souk. Whether it be fo orno,

Page n7

I am content the Reader fhou’d impartially Examine.’ Since Ido not think, my felf any farther concern'd for the Succefs of what

Page n7

at leaft, read the whole through with that degree of Attention and Thought which. the fubjett Matter fhall feem to deferve. For - asthere are fome Paffages that,taken by themeS folges

Page n7

… ing Reader, I flatter my felf, it. wilk be througheut Clear and Obviows. As for the Characters of Novelty and Singularity, which fome of the following Notians may. feem to bear, "tis, E hope, needlefs to make any Apology on that account. He mut furely be either very weak, or ery. bite tle acquainted with the Sciences, who. foal reject a Truth, that is capable of Demonftration, for no other Reafon bur becaufe it’s newly keown and contrary to the Prejudices of Mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premife, in order to prevent, if pofible, the _bafly Cenfures of a fort of Men, who'are too’

Page n8

_ Which two laft are the proper Acceptations of 4bfraGion.

Page n9

.R-WHILOSOPHY being no| y thing elfe but the ftudy of | f Wildom and Truth, it may | with reafon be expected, that thofe who have {pent moft Time and Pains - in it fhou’d enjoy a greater’ calm and ferenity of Mund, a greater clearnefs : and evidence of Knowlege, and be lefs difturb’d with Doubts and Difhculties than other Men. Yet fo it 1s, we fee the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Senfe, and are govern’d by the Dictates of Nature, for the maft part eafy and undifturb’ d. ‘To them nothing that’s familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. - They com-

Page n10

plain not of any want of Evidence in

Page n10

their. Senfes,, and are out of all danger — of becofning Sceptics.. Butno fooner do we depart from Senfe and Inftinct to follow the Light of 4 Superior Prin-

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9 Introduttion. ciple, to reafon, meditate and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thoufand Scruples {pring up in our Minds, — concerning thofe Things which before we feem’d fully to comprehend. Preju-

Page n11

dices and Errors of Senfe do from all. .

Page n11

~ G2..The caufe of this is thought to _ be the Obfcurity. of things, or the na| tural Weaknefs and Imperfection of our Underftandings. It is faid the Faculties we have-are few, and thofe defign'd by Nature for the Support and -Pleafure of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Effence and Conftitution of Things. Befides, the Mind of | | | - Man

Page n11

Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity,. it’s not to be wonder'd at, if 1¢ run intoAbfurdities and ‘Contradictions, out of which it is impoffible it thou ‘d ever extricate it felf, ic being of the nature

Page 3

of Infinite not to be comprehended by ~

Page 3

$ 3 . But, perhaps, we may be too sent to our felves in placing the Faule originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong, ufe we make of theny. It is a hard thing to {uppofe,

Page 3

cconfiftent. We fhou’d believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a ftrong

Page 3

had placed quite out of their reach.

Page 3

_ ed, indulgent Methods of Providence,

Page 3

rightly made ufe of, will not fail to fa-

Page 4

—tusfie them. ‘Upon the whole, I am inclin’d to think that the far greater Part, — if not all, of thofe Difficulties which have hitherto amus’d Phitofophers, and block’d up the way:to Knowlege, are. inturely owing to our felves. That we

Page 4

- furdities and Contradictions into the fe_ veral Sects of Philofophy ; infomuch that the Wifeft Men have thonght our Ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arife from the natural dulnefs and limitation of our Faculties. And furely it is a Work well deferving our Pains, to make .a trict inquiry concerning the firft Principles of Human Knowlege, to Sift and . examirfe them on all fides, efpecially. fince there may be fome Grounds to fufpect that thofe Lets and Difficulties, which lacie and empbarrals the Mind in

Page 4

confider what a number of very great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the like Defigns: Yee I am not without fome Hopes, upon the Confideration that the largeft Views are not - always the Cleareft, and that he who is

Page 5

€ 6. Inorder to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the eafier conceiving © what follows, I thought it proper to premife fomewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abufe of Language. But the unraveling: this Matter leads me in fome gestae ta. anticipate |

Page 5

6 Introduétion. anticipate my Defign, by taking notice of what feems to have had a chief pare in rendering: Speculation intricate and perplexid, and to have occafion’d innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almoft all parts of Knowlege.: And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a powex of framing Abfraédt Ideas or Noti‘ons of Things. He who is not a per— fect Stranger to the Writings and Difputes of Philofophers, muft needs ac-. knowlege that no {mall pare of them

Page 6

are {pent about abftract Ideas. Thefe are, ina more efpecial manner, thought to be the Object of thofe Sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphyfics, and of all that which pafles under the Notion of the moft abftracted and fublime Learning, in all which one fhall {carce find any Queftion handled in fuch ___a manner, as does not fuppofe their Ex“iftence inthe Mind, and that 3 it is well

Page 6

§ 7. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never i exift each vs them apart by |

Page 6

Parts, and viewing each by 1 felf, exclufive of the ref{t, does frame the ab{tract Ideas of Extenfion, Colour & Mo~ tion. Not that it is poffible for Colour or Motion to exiftwithout Extenfion, but only that the Mind can frame to it. felf by Abffraction the Idea of Colour exclufive of Extenfion, and of Motion —

Page 7

7 exclufive of both Colour and Extenfion.

Page 7

… apart or fingles out by it felf that which is common, making thereof a moft ab| ‘ ftraét Idea of Extenfion ;which is neither“ Line, Surface nor Solid, nor has any 7 Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea in - -tirely prefcinded from all thefe. So like-. wife the Mind by leaving outof the particular Colours perceiv’d by Senfe, that which diftinguifhes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common toall,makesan Idea of Colour in abftraét which is neither | Red, nor Bltic, nor White, ¢c. And in like manner by confidering Motion abftrattedly not only from the Body moved, butlikewife from the Figure 1¢ defcribes, andall .particular Directions and Velocities, the abftract Idea of Motion isframed; which equally correfponds to: all particular Motions whatfoever that may be perceiv’d by Senfe,

Page 8

~. § 9. And as the Mind fais to it | fel abttradt Ideas of Qualities or Modes, fo does it, by the fame precifion or

Page 8

— Introduétion. mental Separation, attain abftract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include feveral coexiftent Qualities. For example, the Mind having obferv’d that Peter, Fames and fFohn, &c. refemble each other, 1n certain common Agree| ments of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of Peter, ames, &c. that -which is peculiar to each, retaining only: what 1s common to all; and fo makes an abftract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abftracting intirely from and cutting off all thofe - Circumftances and Differences, which — might determine it to any particular Exiftence.. And after this manner it 1s faid we come by the abftraét Idea of Man or, if you pleafe, Humanity or Humane Nature. wherein ‘tis true, there’s included Colour, becaufe there is no Man but has fome Colour, but ” then it can be neither White,nor Black, nor any particular Colour; becaufe there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewife there is included Stature, but then ’tis neither Tall » | | C Stature

Page 9

Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but fomething abftracted from all thefe; and fo of thereft. Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in fome Parts, but not all,of the complex Idea of Maz,

Page 10

ving Creatures, frames the Idea of Axi-

Page 10

particular Men,but alfo all Birds, Beafts, Fifhes and Infects. The conftituent Parts of the abftract Idea of Animal are

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… or Figure,there ‘being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, dc. nor yet Naked : Hair, Feathers, Scales, and ’ Nakednefs being the diftinguifhing Properties of. particular Animals, and for that reafon left out of the Abfiradt ‘Idea. Upon the fame account. the

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wonderful Faculty of Abftraéting their

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indeed a Faculty of imagining, or re-

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prefenting to my felf the Ideas of thofe |

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particular things I have perceiv’d and of varioufly compounding and divid-

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Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joyn’d to the Body of a Horfe. I can. confider the Hand, the Eye, the Nofe each by it felf abftracted or feparated from the reft of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it muft have fome particular Shape and Colour. Likewife the Idea of Man that — I frame to my felf, mutt be either of

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Streight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a. Low, or a Middle-fized. Man. I can not by any effort of Thought conceive - the abftract Idea above defcribed. And it is equally impoffi ble for me to form

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the abftraét Idea of Motiondiftint from © the Body moving, and which 1s neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear ; and the like may be faid of all other abftract general Ideas whatfoever. And there’s Grounds to think moft Men

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_ my Cafe. The generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to abfiraét Notions. It’s faid they are difficult and not to be attain’d without Pains and Study ; we may . therefore reafonably conclude that, if fuch there be, they are confin’d only to the ‘Learned.

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G11. I proceed to examine what can be alleg’d in defence of the Doétrine of Abftraction, and try if I can difcover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Ofinion, fo remote from common Senfe as that feems _ tobe. There hasbeena late excellent and defervedly Efteem’d Philofopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Coun. ’ tenance by feeming to think the having en — Ideas 1s what puts the

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Introduétion. = 13 wideft difference in point of Underftanding betwixt Man and Beaft. “ The ha/_ Ving of general Ideas (faith be) is that — “ which puts a perfect diftinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Ex“ cellency which the Faculties of Brutes

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“is evident, we obferve no Foot-f{teps “in them of making ufe of general . , Dgns for univerfal Ideas; from which ‘ we have reafon to imagine that they have not the Faculty of ab/tracting ‘or making general Ideas, fince they “have no ufe of Words or any other. “general Signs. And a little after.

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“ Therefore, I think, we may fuppofe “that ’tis in this that the Species of © Brutes are difcriminated from Men, “ and “tis that proper difference wherein “ they are wholly feparated, and which at laft widens :to fo.wide a Diftance. For if they have any Ideas at all; and are not bare Machines (as fome. wou 'dhave em) we cannot deny “em | to have fome Reafon. It feems as evident to me that they do fome of * “em in certain Inflances Reafon as that they

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* cicular Ideas, juft as they receive them “ fom their Senfes. They are the beft * of ’em tied up within thofe narrow “ Bounds, and have not (as I think) * the Faculty to enlarge ’em by any

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“kind of Abftrattion. Effay on Hum.

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that the Faculties of Brutes can by no - means attain to Abfraction. But then

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if this be made the diftinguifhing property of that fort of Animals, I fear a great many of thofe that pafs for Men muft be -reckon’d into their number. The reafon that ishere affign’d why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have

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ferve in-’em no ufe of Words or any other general Signs;- which is built on _ this Suppofition, viz. that the making ufe of Words, implys the having geneyal Ideas. From which i it follows, that

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ftract or Generalize their Ideas. That this: is the Senfe and Arguing of the

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… the Signsof generalIdeas. Effay “ on Hum. Underft. B.3. C.3. $6. To this © I cannot affent being of opinion that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abftract general.

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Idea but, of feveral particular Ideas,

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any one of which it indifferently fuggef{ts to the Mind. For Example, When — it is faid the change of Motion is propor

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fitions are to be qnderitood of Motion ©

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… in general,and neverthelefs it will not follow that they fuggeft to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body movd, or any determinate Direction, Velocitie, doc. or that I muft con-. ceive an abftraét general Idea of Extenfion, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, d¢. *Tis only implied that whatever Motion I con-

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… or Oblique, _ or inwhatever Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every. particular Extention, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or chat Magnitude or Figure, doc.

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of general Ideas, it is always fuppofed that they are formed by Abftraction, after the manner fet forth in Sed. VIII and IX. Now if we will annex a meaning ~ to our Words, and fpeak only of what we can conceive, I believe we fhall ac_ knowledge, that ar Idea, which confider’d ‘in it felf is particular, becomes general, by being made to reprefent or ftand for all other particular Ideas of

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is demonttrating the Method, of cut-

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ting a_-Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for inftance, a Black Line of an

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Lines whatfoever ; fo that what is demonttrated of it, isdemonttrated of all Lines or, nother Words, of a Line in

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the Sign of an abftract or general Line,

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but of all particular right Lines that may poffibly exift, fo the latter mutt

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| 61 13. To give the il a ” . clearer Vicw of the Nature of abftract Ideas, and the Ufes they are thought neceffary to, I thall add one miore Paf{age out of ‘the Effay on Human Under| flanding, which is as follows. “ Ab* " eafy to Children or the yet unexercif-

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“ly reflect upon them, we fhall find “that general Ideas are Fictions and “ Contrivances of the Mind, that carry “ Difficuley with them, and do not fo ", eafily offer thenifelves, as We are apt

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/_ the general Idea of a Triangle (which © ‘is yet none of the moft abftraét com-.

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“ be neither Oblique nor Rectangle,neither autlacetal, Equicrural, nor Sca“enon, but all and none of thefe at “ once. In effect itis fomething imperte 2 * fect

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Introduétion. 19 . __ fect that cannot exift, an Idea where“in fome Parts of feveral different and " « inconf fient Ideas are put eogether : * Tis true the Mind in this imperfect “ State has need of fuch Ideas, and makes _all the haftetothem it can for the con“ veniency of Communication and En“largement of Knowledge, to both : |, Which it 1s naturally very much in“-clin’d. But yee one has reafon to fu- ", fpect fuch Ideas.are Marks of our Im“ perfection. At leaft this is enough to ‘thew that the moft abftract and ge-’ , neral Ideas are not thofe that the Mind ‘is firft and moft eafily acquainted with, nor fuch as its earlieft Know* lege 1s converfant about. B. 4. C. 7, § 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind fuch an Idea of a

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to pretend to difpute him out of it, nor . woud I go about it. All I defire is, ‘that the Reader wou’d fully and and cet tainly inform himfelf whether he has fuch an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for any one to perform, What more eafy than for anyone | D2 <<. ta

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… has, or can attain to have, an Idea that fhall corre{pond with the defcription that is here given of the General Idea of a Triangle, which 1s, either Oblique nor Retlangle, Fquilateral, Equicrural nor Scalenon, but | all and none 7 thefe at once ? a.

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~~ § 14. Much is here faid of the Diffs |

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… Pains and Skill requifite to the forming them. And it is on all] ~ Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind,to Eman-

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~ - har to all forts of Men. But we are told

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… helps for Difcourfe. It cannot be when.they are grown up, for then it feems they are net confcious of any — fuch Pains-taking; ic remains therefore to be the bufinefs of their Childhood. ‘And furely, the great and multiply’dLa| bour of framing abftract Notions will — be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is 1c nota hard thing to imagine that a couple -of Children can’t Prate | cogether,of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the reft of their little Trinkets, till they have firft Tack'd together numberlefs Inconfiftencies, and fo framed _in their Minds eb/fract general Ideds, and

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annexed them to every common Name > they make ufe of? |

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§ 15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Azlargement of Knowlege than for Communication. It 1s I know a Point much infifted on, that all Knowlege and Demonftration are a‘bout unverfal Nouons, to which I — |

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… fo far as I can comprehend, not confifting in the abfolute, pofitive Nature or Conception of any thing, but

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of a Triangle; which ought not to be underftood as if I cou’d frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon, dc. But only

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whether of this or that fort 1t matters

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§ 16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Propofition to be crue of all particular Triangles, except we have firft feen it demonftrat-

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ed of the abftract Idea of a Triangle

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… in all refpeéts is not the fame with it. For Example, Having demonftrated that the three Angles of an Ifo{celes, Rectangular Triangle are equal to

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… Demonftration for every particular Triangle, which 1s impoffible, or once for all demontftrate it of the 2b flra&t Idea of a Triangle, in which all the - Particulars do indifterently partake, and by which they are all equally ——

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Demonftration be, for inftance, that of

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an Hafceles, Reétangular Triangle whofe Sides are of a determinate Length, I may neverthelefs be certain it extends. | to alk other Reétilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bignefs foever. And that,- . becaufe neither the right Angle, nor the equality, nor determinate Length of the — - Sides are at all concern’d in the Demonftration. Tis true, the Diagram I have in - view includes all thefe Particulars, but then there’ s not the leaft mention made of em in the Proof of the Propofition. Ic is-not faid the three Angles are equal: totwaright Ones,becaufe oneofthemis a right Angle, or becaufe the Sides comprehending it are of the fame Length. Which fufficiently fhews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all thatthe Demonftration have held good. And| for this reafon it is, that I conclude that - to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonttrated of a | particular Right-angled, Equicrural

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——— -Lntroduétion. - os Triangle; and not becaufe I demon_ ftrated the Propofition of the abftract

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- Idea of a Triangle.

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§ 17. It were an endlefs,as well as an ufelefs Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, thofe great Mafters of abftraction, thré all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Difpute, which their Doctrine of abftract Natures and Notions feems to haveled’em into. What Bickerings and Controverfies,and whata learns ed Duft have been raifed about thofe | Matters,and what mighty Advantage has been from thence deriv’d. to Mankind — are things at this Day tooclearly known toneed being infifttedon. Andithadbeen © well if the ill effects of that Doctrine were confin’d to thofe only who make the moft avow’d Profeffion of 1t. When | Men confider the great Pains, Induftry and Parts, that have for fo many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that —

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Part of them remain full of Darknefs. and Uncertainty, and Difputes, that | E are

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Underftandings of Men, and that taking altogether, avery {mall Portionof them does fupply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwafe than by being an innocent Diverfion and Amufement. I fay, the Confideration of all this is apt to throw. them into a Defpondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But

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_ this may perhaps ceafe, upon a view of the falfe Principles that have obtain’d in the World, amongft all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended Sway over the Thoughts

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of Speculative Men, than that we have _

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§ 18. I come now to confider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that feems to me to be Language. And furely nothing of lefs extent than Reafon it felf-cou’d have been the Source

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of an Opinion fo univerfally receiv’d. | - The .

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Tntroduétion. 27: The truth of this appears as from other Reafons, fo alfo from the plain Confeffion of the ableft Patrons of abftract Ideas, who acknowlege that they are | made in order to naming, from which | it is a clear Confequence that if there had been no fuch thing as Speech or Univerfal Signs, there never had been any ‘thought of Abftraction. See B. 3, C. 6. § 39. and elfewhere of the -Effay on Human Underftanding. But let us examine the manner wherein Words — have contributed to the Origine of that Miftake. Firft then, *Tis thought that. . every Name has, or ought to have, one only precife and fettled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are eertain abftratt, determinate Ideas that conftitute the true and only immediate ~ Signification of each general Name, And that it is by the mediation of thefe abftract Ideas, that a general Name comes to fignifie any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no fuchthing as one precife and definite Signification pence to any general Name, they all | fignifying indifferently a great ner — F2 of

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28 § — Introduttion. of particular Ideas. All which does evidently follow from what has been already faid, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this, YT doubt not, it will be objeéted that every Name that has a Definition is. is thereby reftrain’d to one certain Sig— ; nification. e. g. a Triangle is defin’'d to”; be a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines; by which that Name 3s himuted to denote one certain Idea and _ no other. To which I anfwer, that in the Definition it is not faidwhether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or ~ White, doc, nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal ot Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclin’d to _ each other, in all which there may be great varicty, and. confequently there is no one. fettled Idea which limits the _ Signification of the word Triangle, ’Tis one thing for to keep a Name conftantly co the fame Definition, and another to make it ftand every where for the - fame Idea, the one is neceflary, the other ufelefs and impracticable.

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G1 19. But to give a farther hsstdend how Words came to produce the Doétrine of abftract Ideas, it muft be ob| fery’d that it’s a receiv ‘d Opinion, that | Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every fignificant Name ftands for an I— dea. This being fo, and it being withe | all certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether Infignificant, do not always mark out particular cons ceivable Ideas, it is ftraightway concladed thag they ftand for abftract Notions. - That there are many Names in ufe amongft Speculative Men, which do not always fuggeft to others determinate, particular Ideas, or in truth any thing at all, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will difcover, that it is not neceffary (eveninthe tricteft Reafonings) fignificant Names which ftand for Ideas fhou’d, every time they are ‘usd, excite in the Underftanding the Ideas they are made to ftand for : ‘In Reading and Difcourfing Names being _ for the mott part ufed as Letters are in

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§ 20. Befides, the communicating of ¥deas marked by Words 1s not the chief and only end of Language,as iscommonly fuppos’d. There. are other Ends, as the raifing of fome Paffion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in fome particular Difpofition - to which the former is in manv Cafes barely fubfervient, and fometimes intirely omitted, when thefe can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen inthe familiar ufe of Language. Iintreat the Reader _to reflect with himfelf, and fee if it does not oft happen either in’ Hearing or Reading a Difcourfe, that the Pafftons ‘ of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admuiration, _ Difdain, we. arife immediately in his Mind upon the perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming bes

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… but, if I miftake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with thofe Paffions, which at firft were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promife of a Good thing, tho we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threaten’d with * Danger fufficient to excite a Dread, thd we think not of any particular Evil like-

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felves an Idea-of Danger in Abftract? | If any one fhall join ever fo little Refie€tion of his own to what has been faid, I believe ic will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often

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_ufed in the propriety of Language with_ out the Speakers defigning them. for marks of Ideas in his own, which he woud have -’em raife in the Mind. of the Hearer. Even proper Names them-

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… Introduétion. — felves do not feem always fpoken, with a defign to bring into our view the Ideas of thofe Individuals that are fup pofed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells mé | . Ariftotle hath faid it, all I conceive. he | means by it, is to difpofe metoem= - brace his Opinion with the Deference ~ and Submiffion which Cuftom has annex’d to that Name. And this effect is-oft fo inftantly produced in the Minds of thofe who are accuftom’d to refign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philofopher, as it is impoffible any Idea either of his Perfon, Writings, or Re=: | putation fhou’d go before. So clofe and - immediate a Connexion may Cuftomr — eftablith, betwixt the very word Ariffotle and the Motions of Affent and Reverence in the Minds of fome Mert. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why fhou’d I infift on thofe things, which every one’s Experi= - ence, will, I. doubt not, plentifully. fuggeft unto him? =

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§ 21. We have, I think, fhewn the Impoffibility of abftratt Ideas. We have. confider’d what has been faid for them by their ableft Patrons; and endeavor'd - to fhew they are of no Ufe for thofe Ends, to which they are thought neceffary. And laftly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow,

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_ which appears evidently to be Language. _ Jt cannot be deny’d that. Words are of . excellent Ufe, in that by their means all _ ‘that Stock of Knowlege which has _ been purchas'd by the joint Labours of

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| may be drawn into the view and made the poffleffion of one fingle Perfon. But moft parts of Knowlege have been fo - ftrangely perplcx’d and darken’d by the abufe of Words; and general ways of Speech wherein they are deliver’d, that it may almoft be made a Queftion whe-_ ther Language, has contributed more | to the hindrance or advancement of the. Sciences, Since therefore Words are fo © apt to impofe on the Underftanding, I : 7 ‘a am

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"am refolv’d in my Inquiries to make as lictle ufe of them as poffibly Ican.What-

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- to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, fo far as I am able, thofe Names which long and conftant Ufe hath fo ftrialy united with them ; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages. -

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§ 22. Firft, I thall be fure to get clear of all Controverfies purely Verbal; the — f{pringing up of which weeds in al~ moft all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and

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to be a fure way to extricate my felf, out of that fine and fubtile Net of ad-

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perplex’d and entangled thg Minds of _

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Men, and that with this peculiar Circumftance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by fo much the deeper was he like to be enfnar’d, and fatter held there-

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Introduétion. 25 in. Thirdly, fo long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divefted of Words, I do not fee how I can eafily be miftaken. The ObjectsI confider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv’d in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not poffible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike,that are not truly fo. To difcern the Agreements or Difagreements there are between my Ideas, to fee what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what’ not, there is nothing more requifite, chan an attentive Perception of what. paffes in my own Underftanding. | 7

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§ 23. But the attainment of all thefe Advantages does prefuppofe an intire deliverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promife my felf ; fo difficult a thing it 1s to diffolve anUnion fo early begun,and confirm’d by fo long a Habit asthat betwixt Words and "Ideas. Which Difficulty feems tohave been very much inereas'd by the Do-~

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Ctrine of Ab/traétion. For fo long as Men

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me the principal Caufe, why thofe Men - who have fo emphatically recommended to others, the laying afide all ufe of Words in their Meditations, and Con-

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fail’d to perform it themfelves. Of late many have been very fenfible of the abfurd Opinions and infignificant Difputes, which grow out of the abufe of Words. And in order to remedy thefe Evils they advife well, that we attend to the Ideas fignified, and draw off. our Attention, from the Words which fignifie them, But how good foever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they cou’d not have a due regard to it themfclves, fo long as they thought the

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only immediate ufe of Words was to .

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fignification of every general mane was a determinate, abjtratt Idea.

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… to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always ftand for Ideas, will fpare himfelf. the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had, It were, therefore, to be with'd that every one woud ufe his utmoft Endeavors, to obtain a clear view of , the Ideas he'd confider, feparating from ~ thern all that drefs and incumbrance of Words which fo much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention, In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into © the Encrails of the Earth, in vain do we confult the Writings of Learned

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Men, and trace the dark Foot-fteps of Antiquity, we need only draw the Cur-

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tain of Words;"to behold the faireft -

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Tree of Knowlege, whofe Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

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- § 2. Unlefs we oii care to clear the firft Principles-of Knowlege, from the embarras and delufion of Words, we may make infinite Reafonings upon them tono purpofe; we may draw Confequences from Confequences, and be never the Wifer. The farther we go we fhall only lofe our felves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled —in Difficulties and Miftakes. Whoever , therefore defigns to Read the following Sheets, I do Intreat him that, he wou'd make my Words the Occafion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the fame Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in Writing them. By this means, it will be eafy for him _ to difcever the Truth or Falfity of what

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T fay. He will be out of all danger.

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of

Page 38

Introduttion. — 29 of being deceiv’d by my Words, and Ido'not fee how he can be led into

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an Error by confidering his own Naked, undifguifed Ideas,

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Gx. T is evident to any oric wis ; BZ takes a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowlege, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the - Senfes, or elfe fuch as are perceiv’d by attending tothe Paflioris arid Operations of the Mind, or laftly Ideas formed by help: of Memory and Imagination; either compounding, dividing, or barely reprefencing thofe originally per ceiv’d in the aforefaid ways: By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their feveral Degrees and Variations: By Tough J perceive Hard

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42 Of the Principles Part I.

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and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and | R cfiftance, isc, and of all thefe more and lefs cither as to Quantity or Deevec. Simclling furnifhes me with O; do: s; the Palate with Taftes,and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind ‘in all their variety of Tone and Compofition.

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And as ‘feveral of thefe are obferv’d to - |

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… to go together, are accounted onediftinct Thing, fignified by the name Apple. Other Collections of Ideas conftitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book and the like fenfible Things; which as they are pleafing or. difagreeable excite the Paffions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, de.

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6 2. But befides all that endlefs variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowlege, thereislikewife fomething which knows or perceives them, and exercifes divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering, dc. about them. This per| ceiving,

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Part I. of Human Knowlese. 43 — ceiving,active Being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or my Self By which Words

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I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intyely diftin@ from chem, wherein they Exift, or, which 1s ‘the ; fame thing, whereby they are Perceiv’d,

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_. for the Exiftence of an Idea confifts in being Perceiv'd.

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… Exift otherwife than ina Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowlege may be. obtain'd of this, by any one that fhall attend to © what is meant by the Term Fxift when apply'd to fenfible Things. The Table | I Write on, I fay, Exifts, z..e. I See and Feel it, and if I were out of my Study I fhow’ d fay it Exifted, meaning there| by that if I was in my Study I might

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AA, Of the Principles Part I. perceive it, or that fome other Spirig actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, i. e. it was Smelt; There wasa Sound, 2. e. it was Heard ; a Colour or Figure and it was perceiy ‘d by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can una | derftand by thefe and the like Expreffi.

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ons. For as to what is faid of the Abe,

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folute Exiftence of unthinking Things — without any. rclationto their being per|

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ceiv'd, that is to. me perfectly Unintel-. ligible. Their Efe is Percipi, nor is it poffible they thou’d have any Exiftence, out of the Minds. or. thinking yhngs | which = them.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 45 it to involve a manifeft Contradiction. For what are the foremention’d Objects but the things we perceive by Senfe, and. what, I pray you, do we perceive befides our own Ideas or Senfations, and is it nor plainly repugnant that any one of thefe or any. Combination of them fhou’d Exift unperceivid 2

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… we throughly examine this Tenent, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Dodétnne of bz fraét Ideas. For can there be a nicer “Strain of Abftraction then to diftinguith | the Exiftence of fenfible Objects from their being PRerceiv’d, fo as'to conceive them Exifting Unperceiv ‘d? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extenfion and _ Figures, ina word the Things we See. and Feel what are they but fo many _ Senfations,Notions,Ideas ‘or Impreffions on the Senfe, and is it poffible to fepas ‘rate, even in thought, any of thefe from Perception : ? For-my part I might as cafily dividea Thing from it Self. I may, indeed, divide in my Thoughts or cone. ceive apart from edch other thofe Things -

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46 | Of the Principles ‘Part L

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ere perhaps, I never perceiv’d by | | Senfe fo divided. Thus I imagine the - Trunk of a Human Body without the - Limbs, or conceive the Smell of.a Rofe | without thinking on the Rofe it felf. So — far I will not deny I can Abftract, if - that may properly be called Abftrattion, which extends only to the conceiving feparately fuch Objedts, as it is poffible may really exift or be actually perceived afunder. But my conceiving or — imagining Power doés not extend be- yond the poffibility of real Exiftence or — Perception. Hence as it is impoffible, for me to See or Feel any Thing with| — out an actual Senfation of that Thing, | — fois it impoffible for me to conceive in | _ my Thoughts any fenfible Thing or Object diftine from the Senfation or Pers ception of it. In truth the Objeé&t and | the Senfation are the fame thing, and — cannot therefore bs. =. from | ant other, |

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' take this Important one.to be, viz. that ' all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all thofe Bodies

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which compofe the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subfiftence

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quently fo long as they are not actually Perceiv'd by Me, or do not: Exift in my: Mind or that of any other Creat-

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~ aftence at all, or elfe fubfift in the Mind: of fome Eternal Spirit : It being per-

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- the Abfurdity of Abftraction, to attri-

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~ bute to any fingle part of them an Ex. itence independent of “4” Spirit. To _ make this appear with all the Light - and Evidence of an Axiom, it feems

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fufficient if I can but awaken the Reflexion of the Reader, that he may take

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- -an impartial View of his own Meaning, -

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and turn his Thou hts upon the Subject it felf, free and difengaged from all | Embarras of Words and Prepoffeffion

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in favour of received Miftakes.

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48° of the Principles ‘Part i |

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… not any other Subftance | than Spirit or that which perceives. But for the fuller Derhonftration of this - Point, let it be confider’d, the fenfible Qualities are Colour, Figure, Mo| _ tion, Smell, Tafte, dc. i. e. the Ideas — -perceiv'd by Senfe.. Now for an Idea _

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¢ there can be no unthinking Subftance . 8 or Subjiratunt of thofe Ideas.

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t Part I. of Human Knowlege. 49 our Thoughts, we fhall find it impoffible for us to conceive a Likenefs except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether thofe fuppos’d Originals or External Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures. or Reprefentations, be themfelves Perceivable or no? If they are, then they are Ideas and we have gaind our Point; but if you fay they. are not, -I appeal to any one whether it be Senfe, to affert a Colour islike fome-: thing which 1s invifible; Hard or Soft, * like fomething which 1s Intangible, and

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fo of the reft. to. - § 9. Some there are who make a ditinction betwixt Primary and Secondary Qualities : By the former, they mean Extenfion, Figure, Motion, Reft, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number : By the latter they denote all other Senfible Qualitics as Colours, Sounds, ’ aftes, dc. the Ideas we have of thefe ' they acknowlege not to be the Refemblances, of any thing exifting without | the Mind or unperceiv’d, but they will have our Ideas of ——— Qualities _ - of. : to

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300 (Of the Principles. Part-Le to bePacterns or Images of things which exift without the Mind, in an unthink|

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… their Archetypes can Exift in an unperceiving Subftance. Hence it is‘plain, that thé very Notion of what is called Matter or Corporeal Subftance, involves a Contradiction in it. Infomuch that I fhou’d-not think it neceflary to.

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» dity. But becaufe the Tenent of the Exiftence of Matter feems to have taken fo deep a Root in the Minds of Philofonhers, and draws after it fo many ill Confequences, 1 chufe rather to be thought Prolix and Tedious, than omit ‘any thing thac might conduce to the ‘ull Difcovery and Extirpation of that Prejudice. . | ~§iu1o. They |

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 51

Page 51

Motion, and the reft of the Primary or Original Qualities do Exift without the Mind, in unthinking Subftances, do at. the fame timeacknowlege that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, ¢vc. do not, which

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‘Motion,.c. of the: minute Particles of ~ \Matter.This they take for an undoubted

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… are infepa_ vably united with the other fenfible Qualities, and not, evenin Thought, capable . of being Abftracted from them, it plainly follows that they Exift only in the Mind.. Buc I defire any one to reflect and try, -

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-wwhether he can by any Abftraction of -'Thought, conceive the Extenfion and ‘Motion ofa Body, without all other ‘fenfible Qualities. For my own part, I : fee evidently that it is not in my power © . t0 frame an Idea of a Body. Extended -and Moying, _ muft withal give it

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52 Of the Principles Part l. . fome Colour or other fenfible Quality which 1s acknowleg’d to Exift-only -in the Mind. In fhort, Extenfion, Figure,

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… Exift ne where without the Mind, being intirely rela— tive. and changing asthe Frame or: Pofition of the Organs of Senfe varies. The Extenfion therefore which Exifts without the Mind, is neither Great nor Small, che Motion, neither Swift nor Slow, that j 1S, they are ’ nothing at all. But fay you they are Extenfion in General, and .Motion in General : Thus. we fee how much the Tenent of extended, moveable Subftances Exifting without the Mind depends | on: that ftrange Doctrine of Abftradt E . deas. And here 1 can’t but remark, how nearly the Vague and indetermi-

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nate D-fcription of Matter ‘or Gorpo2al anne which the Modern Phi-. lofophers

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7 Part’ I. 1 of Hunan Knawlege

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fo much cidicul’d Notion of Materia Prima, to be met with in -Ariffotde and his Followers. Without Extenfion Solidi-

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it has been fhewn that Estenfion Exits not in an unthinking Subftance,. he fans mutt alfo be true of Salidiny, |

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S$ 12. That Number 3 is intircly: . cea of the Mind, even tho the o-

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out, will be evident to whoever confiders, that the fame thing bears.a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind viewsit with different refpects, Thus, the fame Extenfion is One or Three or Thirty Six, :according as the Mind confiders it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is fo vifibly relative, and dependent on Mens Underftanding, that ic is ftrange to think how any one fhou’d give it an abfolute Exiftence without the Mind. We fay one Book, one Page, one Line,

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54 ~~ Of the Principles Part I: fome contain feveral of the others.And in each Inftance ’tis plain, the Unite relates | to fome particular Combinationof Ideas

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… Underftanding fince if is faid to accompany’ all.other Ideas, and to be perceiv’d by all the ways of Senfation and -Reflexion. To fay no more it is an abfraét Idea. °

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-likewife prov’d of all other fenfible Qua— lities whatfoever. Thus, for Inftance,. jt is faid chat Heat and Cold, are Affections only of the Mind, and not 7

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Part 1. of Human Knowlese. 55 all Patterns of real Beings, exifting: in the Corporeal Subftances which excite .- them, for that the fame Body which appears Cold to one Hand, feems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extenfion, are not Patterns or Refemblances of Qualities exifting in Matter, becaufe to the fame Eycat different Stations,or Eyes of--a different Texture at the fame Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing feteled and determinate without the Mind ? again, “Tis prov’d that Sweetnefs is not-really in: the Sapid Thing, becaufe the thing remaining unalter’d the Sweetnefs is changed into Butter,as in cafe of a Fever orotherwife vitiated PalateIs | it not as reafonable to fay,that Motionis not without the Mind, fince if the Succeffion of Ideas in the Mind: become Swifter, the Motion, it is acknowledg’d, fhall appear Slower without any external Alteration. ~ . = - §- 35. In fhort, let any one confider thofe Arguments, which are thought : | = manifeftly

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86 Of the Principles Part I.

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find they may with equal force, be brought. to prove the fame thing of Extenfion, Figure, and Motion. Tho it mutt be confefs'd this method of Arguing does not fomuch prove that there

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Colour of the Objeé&t. But the Arguments foregoing plainly thew it to be

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Isa mode ot accident of Matter, and. that Matter is the Subftratam chat fup- ports it. Now I defire that you wou’d

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 57 cannot explain ic. I anfwer, tho you | have no pofitive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you muft at Icaft have a Relative Idea of Matter; thd you know not what it is, yet you muft be fuppofed to know whd&e Relation it — bears to Accidents, and what 1s meant by-its fupporting them. ’Tis evident ~ Support cannot here be taken in its ufual-or literal Senfe, as when we fay that Pillars fuppore a Building ; in what Senfe therefore muft it be taken ? For my part I am not able to difcover any Senfe at all that can be applicable to it.

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… ; we fhall find them acknowlege, they have no other meaning annexed to thofe Sounds, but the Idea of Being in

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tion of its fupporting Accidents. The gencral Idea of Being appeareth to mie the moft abftra& and incomprchenfible of all other, and as for its fupporting — Accidents, this, aswe have*juft now ob-

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58. Of the Principles Part I.

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ferv’d, cannot beunderftood in thecommon Senfe of thofe Words, it mutt therefore be taken in fome other Senfe,

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difcuffing this Material Subftratum or Support of Figure and Motion, @c. —

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… folid, Figur’d moveable Subftances may Exift without the Mind, correfponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it poffible for us to kn@w this? Either we muft know it by Senfe or by Reafon. As for our Senfes, by them

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we have the Knowlege only of ourSen|

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Part I. of Human Knowlese. 59 what you will : But they do not inform us that things Exift without the Mind, or unperceivd, like to thofe which are perceivd. This the Materialifts themfelves acknowlege. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowlege at all of External Things, it muft be by Reafon, inferring their Exiftence from what is immediately perceiv’d by Senfe. But I do not fee what reafon can induce us to believe the Exiftence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, fince the very Patrons of Matter themfelves do not pretend, there is any neceflary Connexion betwixt them

Page 59

… thd there were no Bodies Exifting without refembling them. | Hence it is evident the Suppofition of External Bodies is not neceflary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced fometimes, and might poffibly be produced always in

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60 Of the Principles Part I.

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yet perhaps it may be thought eafier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by fuppofing External Bodies in their likenefs rather than otherwife, and fo it might be at leaft probable there are fuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be faid, for tho we give the Materialifts their External Bodies, they by their one confeffion are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are. produced : Since they own themfelves. unable to comprehend in what manner. Body can aét upon Spirit, or how 1t 1s poflible icfhou’d imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it 1s evident the Production of Ideas or Senfations in our Minds,

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_ Part 1. of Human Kiowlege. 61

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ry precarious Opinion; {ince it Js to fuppofe, without any reafon at all, thac God has Created innumerable Beings that are intirely ufelefs, and ferve to no manner of purpofe. a

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with the fame train of Senfations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in the fame order and with hike vividnefs in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reafon to believe the Exiftence of Corporeal Subftances, reprefented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can poffibly have for beheving the fame thing ? Of this there can be no Queftion, which one Confideration were enough to make any reafonable Perfon,fufpect the ftrength of whatever

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62 Of the Principles Part I. Arguments he may think himfelf to have,

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for the Exiftence of Bodies without the Mind. - |

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§ 2x. Where it neceflary to add any farther Proof againft the Exiftence of Matter, after what‘has been faid,I cou’d inftance fevcral of thofe Errours and Difficulties (not to mention Impieties) which have fprung from that Tenent. ~ Jt has occafion’d numberlefs Controverfies and Difputes in Philofophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I fhall not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well becaufe I chink, Arguments a2 Pofteriori are unneceflary for confirming what has been, if I miftake not, fufficiently demonttrated @ Priori, as becaufe I thall hereafter find occafion to fpeak fomewhat of them.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 63 in a Line or Two, to any one that’s capable of the leaft Reflexion ? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, and fo trying whether you can conceive it poffible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour to Exift without the Mind, or Unperceiv’d. This eafy Try-

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… than in a Mind perceiving it, I fhall readily give up the Caufe : And as for all that compages of External Bodies you contend for, I fhall grant you its Exiftence, tho you cannot ¢ither give me any Reafon why you believe it Exifts, or aflign any — ufe to it when it is fuppofed to Exift. I fay, the bare poffibility of your Opinions being truce, fhall pafs for an Argument that it 1s fo.

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64. Of the Principles Part 1

Page 64

… Mind certain Ideas which you call Books and Trees, and at the fame time omitting to frame the Idea of any one that may perceive them ? But do not you your felf Perceive or Think

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of them all the while > This, therefore ©

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is nothing to the purpofe : It only fhews - you have the power of Imagining or Forming Ideas in your Mind; but it does not fhew that you can conceive it poffible, the Objects of your Thought ~ mayExift without cheMind; to make out this, itis neceflary that you conceaivethem Exifting unconceivd‘or unthought of, which is a manifeft Repugnancy. When we do our utmoft to concerve the Exiftence of External Bodies, we are all the while only Contemplating our own Ideas. ‘But the Mind taking no ie , an?

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Part L of Mies Knowlege. 65

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of it felf, is deluded to think it canand

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-doesconceive Bodies Exifting unthought of or without the Mind; thdat the fame time they are apprchended by or Exift init felf. A little Attention will difcover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here faid, and make it un— neceffary to infift on any other Proofs a-

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gaintt ‘the Exiftence of —— sie {tance. . |

Page 65

… to know whether it be poffible for us to underftand what is meant, by the abfolute Exiftence of fenfible Objetis in them ~

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all. And to convince others of this,I

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know no readier or fairer way, than to - intreat they wou'dcalmly attend to their _ own Thoughts: And jf by this Attention, the Emptinels or Repugnancy of ©

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66 Of the Principles Sia IL.

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… for their Conviction. “Tis on this therefore that I infift; wz. that the abfolute Exiftence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradition. This 1s what I repeat and inculcate, and earneftly recommend to _ the attentive Thoughts of the Reader.

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… we perceive by whatfoever Namies they may be diftinguih’d, are vifibly Inactive, there 1s nothing of Power, or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Objeé& of

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Thought cannot Produce,or make any Alteration in another. To be fatisfied of

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_. the Truth of this, there 1s nothing elfe re-

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-quifite but abare Obfervation of our Ide-

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as. For fince they and every part of them ' -Exift only in the Mind, it follows that there 1s nothing in them but what 1s

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his Ideas, whether of Senfe or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Pow© er or Activity, there 1 Is, therefore, no

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Part I. of Human Knowlege, 67 fuch thing contained in them. Ai little Attention will. difcover to us that thé very Being of an Idea implies Paflivenefs and Inertnefs in it, infomuch that. — it is impoflible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ftrictly fpeaking, to be the Caufe of any thing ; Neither can it be . the Refemblance or Pattern‘of any active Being, as is evident from Seéf. VIII. Whence it plainly follows that - Extenfion, Figure and Motion, cannot — be the Caufe of our Senfations. To fay, therefore, that thefe are the effects of Powers refulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, Size, We. of Corpufcles muft certainly be falfe.

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§ 26. We perceive a continual Succeffion of Ideas, fome are anew Excited, others are Changéd or totally Difappear. There is therefore {ome Caufe of thefe Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this — Caufe cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It muft therefore be _ a Subftance, but it has been fhewn that

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68 Of the Principles PartlL there is no Corporeal or Material Sub{tance : It remains therefore that the Caufe of Ideas is an Incorporeal, active

Page 68

there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, be-

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they cannot reprefent unto us, by way of Image or Likenefs, that which Acts. - _ A little Attention will make it plain to

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fhall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is abfolutely — impoffible. Such isthe Nature of Spi— rit or that which Acts, that it cannot

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- be of it {elf Perceived,. but only by the

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fhall doubt of the Truth of what 1s here : delivered, let him but refle& and try if | he can frame the Idea of any Power or :

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 69

Page 69

. of two Principal [Powers, mark’d by . the Names Will and Underflanding, die

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a third Idea of Subftance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of |

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its {upporting or being the Subject. of the aforefaid Powers, which 1s fignified

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… And by the fame Power it 1s obliterated, and makes way for another. This make . ing and unmaking of Ideas doth very. properly denOminate the Mind —

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4 0 . of the Pr inciples Par t J,

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Experience: But when we talk of un-

Page 70

thinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas ex-

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— clufive of Volition; we only arnufe our felves with Words.

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… And fo likewife as to the Hearing and other Senfes, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is _therefote fome other Will or je aia chat produces them.

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§ 30. The‘Ideas of Senfe are more ftrong, lively and diftinét-than thofe of the Imagination, they have likewifea | Steddinefs, Order and Coherence, and are not excited at Random,.as thofe | which are the effects of . Human Wills,

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 71 © often are, but ina regular Train or

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Series, the admirable Connexion whereof fufficiently teftifies the Wifdom and

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. Benevolence of its Author. Now the

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of Nature: And thefe we learn by Ex-

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fuch Ideas are attended with fuch and fuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courfe of ie tee | |

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31. This ; gives us a fort of Forefight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefice of Life. And without this we fhou’d be eternally at a lofs, we cou’d not know how to ac any thing that might procure us the leaft Pleafure, or remove thé leaft Pain of Senfe. That Food Nourifhes, Sleep Refrefhes, and Fire Warms us ; that to Sow in the Sced-time is the ‘way to Reap in the Harveft, and, in general, that to obtain fuch or fuch Ends, fuch or fuch Means are conducive, all this we know, not by difcovering any ne-

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“¢ «Of the Principles Part I. — ceflary Connexion between our Ideas, © but only by the Obfervation of the fet— tled Laws of Nature, without which © we fhou’d be all in Uncertainty and | Confufion, and a grown Man no more | know how to manage himfelf in the Af_ fairs of Life, than an Infant juft Born. |

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… And yet this confiftent, uni — form Working which fo evidently dif — playsthe Goodnecfsand Wifdom of that — Governing Spirit whofe Will conftitutes — the Laws of Nature, is fo far from lead— ing our Thoughtsto Him, that it rather ' fends’em a wandering afterfecondCau| - fes. For when we perceive certain I. deas of Senfe conftantly follow’d by o- ther Ideas, and we know this is not of - eur own doing, we forthwith attribute —

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felyes, and make one the Caufe of ano| ther, than which nothing can be more | Abfurd and Unintelligible. .Thus, for _

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| Part L. | of Human Knowlege. 73.

Page 73

clude the Sun to be the caufe of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Mo-.

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tion and Collifion of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to. think the latter the effect of the former.

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§ 33. The Ideas imprinted on the Senfes by the Author of Nature are c¢alled real things, and thofe excited in the Imagination being lefs Regular, Vivid and Conftant, are more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and reprefent. But then our Senfations, be they never fo Vivid and Di{tinct, are nevertheléfs Ideas, i. e. they _Exift in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Senfe are allow’d to. have more reality in them, i.e. to be more Strong, Orderly and Coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; bute this is no Argument that they Exift without the Mind.’ They are alfo lefs dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Subftance which ‘perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of a-

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14. Of the Principles Part I. nother and more Powerful Spirit : yet ftill they are Ideas, and certainly no EF dea, whether Faint or Strong, can Exift otherwife than in a Mind perceiving it.

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… Objections which may probably be made againft the Principles we have hitherto laid down, In doing of which, if I feem too Prolix to

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—” thofe of quick Apprehenfions, I defire

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I may be excufed, fincé all Men do | not equally apprehend things of this — Nature ; and I am willing to be under{tood by every one. Firft, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and fubftantial in Nature 1s banifh’d out of the World: And inftead thereof a ChimericalScheme of Ideas takes place. All things: that. Exift, Exift‘only in the Mind, that is, they are purely Notional. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon and ‘Stars ? What mutt we think of Houfes, Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones ; nay, even of our own Bodies? Are all = | So | _ ut

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 3

Page 75

the Fancy ? Toall which, and whatever elfe of the fame fort-may.be objected, I Anfwer, that by the Pririciples premisd, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we See, Feel, Hear, or any wife Conceiveor Un- derftand, remains as fecure as ever, and is as real as ever, There is a rerum na— tura, and thé Diftinétion between Realitiesand Chimeras retains its full force, - This is evident from Sed. XXIX, XXX, and XXXII, wheré we have fhewn what is meant by rea/ Things in oppofition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own framing ; but then they both equally Exift in the Mind, and in that Senfe are

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' Exiftence of any one thing that we cari

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7976 = Of the Principles Part I,

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ter or Corporeal Subftance. And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the reft of ‘Mankind, who, I dare fay, will never muifs it. "The Atheitt, indeed, will want the Colour of an empty Name to fupport his Impiety ; and the Philofophers may poflibly find, they have loft a great Handle for Trifling and Difputation. But that’s all the

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§ 36. If any Man thinks we jail from the Exiftence or Reality of things, he is very far from Underftanding what has been premis’d in the plaineft Terms I cou’d think of., Take here an Ab— {tract of what has been faid. There are Spiritual Subftances, Minds or Hu~ man Souls which will or excite Ideas _ in themfelves at pleafure : but thefe are

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faint, weak, and unfteady in refpect of othersthey perceive by Senfe, which be-

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ing imprefs’d upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, {peak themfelves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wife than Human Spirits. Thefe abil are faid to have more Re-

Page 76

… which is meant that thcy are more affecting, orderly and diftinét, and that they are not Fictions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Senfe, the Sun that

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which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the Senfe here given of Reality, ’tis evident that every. Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general cach part of the Mundane Syftem, is as much a Real Being by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what

Page 77

… To thismy An{wer is, That if the word Subftance be taken in the vulgar Senfe, for a Combination of Senfible Qualities, fuch as Extenfion, Solidity, Weight, dc. This we cannot be accufed of taking away. But if ic be taken in a Phylofophic Senfe, for the fupport of Accidents or Quali-

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78 “of ie Principles Part is

Page 78

… it does fo, the word Idea not being ufed in common Difcourfe to fignifie the feveral Combinations of a le Qualities, which are called : and it is certain that any Ex-

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se on which varies from the familiar Ufe of Language will feem harth and

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the Truth of the Propofition, which in other Words is no more than this, vz, we are Fed and Cloathed with thofe Things which we perceive immediately: by our Senfes. The Hardnefs or Softnefs, the Colour, Tafte, Warmth, Fi - sure, 9. which combin’d together - conftitute the feveral forts of Victuals and Apparel, have been fhewn to Exift only 1 in, the Mind that perceives ther §

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Part I. of Haman Knowlege. 79

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Iam not for difputing about the Propriety, buc the Truth of the Expreffion.

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YG 39. If itbe demanded why I make — ufe of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Cuftom call them Things. I anfwer, I do it for

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Bo“ Of the Principles Part L

Page 80

… his Senfes, and never. fuffer any Arguments, how plaufible foever, to. prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it fo, aflert the Evidence of Senfe as high as you pleafe, we are willing to do the fame. That what I See, Iftar and Feel doth Exift, i. e. is perceived by me, I no more doubt than T do of my own Being. * But Ido not fee how the Teftimony of Senfe can be alleg’d,asa proof for the Exiftence of any Thing, which 1s not perceiv'd by Senfe.

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. Si

Page 81

… It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, for Inftance, and the Idea of — Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones felf Burnt, and actually being fo : If you fufpect it to be only the Idea of . Fire which you fee, do but put your _ ~ Hand into it, and ‘you'll be convinced , with awitnefs, This.and the like may be urged in oppofition to our Tenents. | To all which the Anfwer is evident from what hath been already faid, and I thall only add in this place, that if real Fite

Page 81

be very different from the Idea of Fire,

Page 81

fo alfo is the real Pain that it occafions, | very different from the Idea of the fame - Pain, and yet no Body will pretend that real "Pain either 1s, ot can poffibly be, in an unperceiving Thing ‘or without the Mind, any mote than its Idea,

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Part L. of Human Knowleve. 82

Page 82

are feen at the Diftance of iveral Miles,

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§ 43. But for the fuller clearing of

Page 82

… fome nearer, others farther off, feems to carry with it fome Oppofition to what hath been faid, of their Exifting no where without "the Mind. The Confideration of this Difficulty it was, that gave birth to my E/- fay towards a new Theory of Vifion, which was publifh’d not long fince. ‘Wherein it 1s fhewn that Diffance or Outnefs is neither immediately of it felf perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing

Page 82

83 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 83

… by certain vifible Ideas and Senfations attending Vifion, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude ot Relation, either with Di© ftance, or Things placed at a Diftance, But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they came to fignify and Sug-

Page 83

geft them to us, after the fame manner ~ that Words of any Language Suggett

Page 83

from him. vid. Seé.. XLI. of the fore-

Page 83

§ 44. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely diftinét and - heterogeneous. The former are Marks atid Prognoftics of the latcer. That the proper Objects of Sight neither Exift without the Mind, nor are the Images” of External Things, was fhewn even in that Treatife, Thd throughout the °

Page 83

84. Of the Principles Part I. — fame, the contrary be fuppofed true of Tangible Objects : Not that to fuppofe _ that Vulgar Error, was neceflary for . eftablifhing the Notion therein laid down, but becaufe it was befide my | Purpofe to Examine and Refute it ina Difcourfe concerning Vifion, So thatin | {trict Truth the Ideasof Sight, when we apprehend by them Diftanceand Things placed at a Diftance, do not Suggeft or

Page 84

at a Diftance, but only admonih us - , what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at fuchand fuch diftances of Time, and in confequence of fuchor fuch Actions. It is, I fay, evident from ‘what has been faid in the foregoing — Parts of this Treatife, and in Sed, ,

Page 84

CXLVII andelfewhere of the Effay con_ cerning Vifion, that Vifible Ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what Tangible Ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in cafe we Excite this: or that Motion in our own Bodies. But

Page 84

Part I. of Hyman Knowlege. 85

Page 85

it follows, Things are every moment annihilated and created anew, The Objects of Senfe Exift only when they are Perceived : The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer than while there is fome Body by to perceive them. Upon fhucting my Eyes all the Furniture in the Room is reduc’d to nothing, and barely upon opening ’em it is again created. In anfwer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been faid i in Seé. IIL, IV, dc. and defire he wall confider whether he means any thing, by. the actual Exiftence of an Idea, diftinét from its being perceiv’'d. For my pare after the niceft Inquiry I cou’d make, I am not able to difcover that anything elfe is meant by thofe Words, And 1 once more intreat the Reader to oat his own Thoughts, and not fuffer him‘felf to be impofed on by Words. _ If he can conceive it poffible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to Exit with- out

Page 85

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 86 out being perceived, then I give up the Caufe: But if he cannot, he willacknowlege it is unreafonable for him to ftand up in Defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an Abfurdity, the not affenting to thofe Propofitions which at Bottom have no meaning in them.

Page 86

~— § 46. Ie will not be amifs to obferve, how far the receiv’d Principles of Philofophy are themfelves chargeable with thofe pretended Abfurdities. It is-thought ftrangely Abfurd that upon - clofing my Eye-lids, all the Vifible Ob~ jects round me fhou’d be reduced to no‘thing ; and yet is not this what Philo| fophers commonly acknowlege, when ‘they agree on all Hands that Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are meer Senfations that Exift no longer

Page 86

-_ *, Scho of

Page 86

87 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 87

Sthoolmen, tho they acknowlege the Exiftence of Matter and that the whole - mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are neverthelefs of Opinion that it cannot fubfift without the Divine Confervation, which by them 1s expounded to bea continual Creation.

Page 87

— «§ 47. Farther, a little Thought will difcover to us, that thé we allow the Exiftence of Matter or Corporeal Subftance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the ‘principles which are now ge-

Page 87

‘Bodies of what kind foeyer do none of

Page 87

… dxc. that the Matter Philofophers contend for is an incomprehenfible Some-_ what which hath none of thofe particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Senfes are diftinguifhed one from another. But.to make this more plain, it muft be remarked that the Infinite Divifibility of Matter is now univerfally allow’d, at leaft by the moft — ‘d and confiderable. Philo-

Page 87

88 Of the Principles Part I. fophers, who on the receiv'd Principles | demonttrate it beyond all exception. Fience it follows, there is an infinite number of Parts in each Particle of Matter, which are’ not perceiv’d by Senfe. The reafon, therefore, that any particular Body feems to be of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of Parts to Senfe, is, not becaufe it contains no more, fince in it felf ic contains an infinite number of Parts, but becaufe the Senfe is not acute enough to difcern them. In proportion therefore as the Senfe is render’d more acute, it perecives a greater numof Parts in the Object i. e. the Object © dppeats greater, and its Figure varies, thofe Parts in its Extremities which were before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from thofe perceived by an obtufer Senfe. Ard at length, after various changes of Size and Shape, when the Senfe becomes infinitely acute, the Body fhall feem infinite. During all which there ts no alteration in the Body, but only in the Senfe. Each Body, therefore

Page 88

Part I. of Human Knowlege.. 89 therefore, confider’d in it felf is infinitely extended, and confequently void of all Shape or Figure. From. which it follows that tho we fhou’d grant the Exiftence of Matter to be never fo cer-

Page 89

them Infinite and Shapelefs, and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodics which compofe the vifible World, any one whereof does not Ex-

Page 89

| againft our Notions. For tho we hold indeed the Objects of Senfe to be mo: thing elfe but Ideas which cannot Exift

Page 89

sO Of the Principles. Part I. | clude they have no Exiftence except . only while they. are perceiv’d by us, fince there may be fome: other Spirit. - that perceives them thd we do not. . Wherever Bodies are faid to have no - Exiftence without the Mind, I wou’d . not be underftood to mean this or that — particular Mind, but all Minds what-foever.. It does not therefore follow | from the foregoing Principles, that Bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or Exift not at all during the ~ Intervals between our perception of them. Oo

Page 90

… figured ; fince Ex| tenfion isa Mode or Attribute which (to fpeak with the Schools) is predicated of the Subject in which it Exifts. I anfwer, Thofe qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceiv’d by it, that is not by way of Mode or Attribute but only by way of Idea, andit no more follows the Soul or Mind is extended = tee - caule

Page 90

| Part L of Hina Knowlege Gt

Page 91

' As to what Philofophers fay of Subject

Page 91

ed of 1 It, and in which they Exift. This

Page 91

from and fupporting them, but only an Explication of the meaning - of the word Die. |

Page 91

92. Of the Principles Part I. —Philofophy, and undermine thofe Mechanical Principles which have been applied with fo much fuccefs to account for the Phenomena. In fhort, whatever Advances. have been made, either

Page 92

the Study of Nature do all proceed on the Suppofition, that Corpereal Sub{tance or Matter doth really Exit. To this, I anfwer, that there 1s not any one Phenomenon explain’d on that Suppofition, which may not as well be :ex-

Page 92

plain’d without it, as might eafily be ~ maade appear by an induction of Parti.

Page 92

will pretend to explain. Ik is therefore evident, there can be no ufe of Matter in Natural Philofophy. Befides, they who attempt to account for Things, do it, not by Corporeal Subftance but, by Figure, Mation, @&c. which are in truth no more than meer Ideas, and therefore

Page 92

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 93 ; cannot be the caufe of any thing, as hath been already fhewn wid. Sed. XXV.

Page 93

— § 61. Seventhly, at will wpon this be demanded whether .1t. does not feem abfurd, to take away Natural Caufes, and afcrrbe every thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits ? We muft no

Page 93

… to Think with the Learned, and Speak with the Valgar. They .. who to demoniftration are convinced of °

Page 93

the truth of the Copernican Syftem, do neverthelefs fay the Sun ‘Rifes, the Sun

Page 93

… very ridiculous. A little Reflexion on what 1s heréfaid will make it manifeft, that the common ufe of Language wou'd receive no manner of Alteration or Difturbance from the admiffion ‘of our Tenents, § 52.

Page 93

| 94 ~ Of the Principles Part I.

Page 94

§ g2. In the ordinary affairs of Life, any Phrafes may be retain’d, fo long as they Excite in us proper Sentiments, ~ or Difpofitions to act in fuch a manner as is neceflary for our well-being, how falfe foever they may be, if taken in a _ ftrict and Speculative Senfe. Nay this ' 1s unavoidable fince, Propriety being regulated by Cuftom, Language 1s fuited to the received Opinions which are not always the trueft. Hence it is impoffible even in the moft rigid, Philofophic Reafonings, fo far to alter the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we fpeak, as never to givea handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Inconfiftencies.. Bue a fair and ingenuous Reader will colle& the Senfe, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of a Difcourfe, making allowances for thofe unaccurate Modes ~ of Speech, which ufe has made inevita-

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¢ 53. As to the Opinion. that there. are no Corporeal Caufes, this has been yeretofore maintain’d by fome of the : ' 3 School-

Page 94

Schoolmen, as it is of late by others a-

Page 95

efficient Caufe of all. Things. Thefe

Page 95

Men faw, that amongft all the Objects of Senfe there was none, which had any

Page 95

Power or Activity included in it, and | _ that by confequence. this was likewife true, of whatever Bodies they fuppofed

Page 95

to Exift-without the Mind, like unto the immediate Objects of Senfe. But

Page 95

- then, that they fhou’d fuppofe an innumerable multitude of Created Beings, | which they acknowlege are not capable ©

Page 95

of producing any one effect in Nature, and which therefore are made to no

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manner of purpofe, fince God might | have done every thing as well without

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~ § 64. In the Eighth Place, the univerfal concurrent affent of Mankind may be thought by fome, an invincible Ar-

Page 95

_ gumentin behalf of Matter, or the Ex-

Page 95

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 95 —

Page 95

94. - Of the Principles Part I. iftence.of External Things. Muft we

Page 96

~ fuppofe the whale World to be miftaken, and if fo, what caufe can be affign’d of fo wide-fpread and predominant an

Page 96

Error ? I anfwer, Firft, that upon a narrow inquiry, it wall not perhaps be found; fo many as is imagin’d do really

Page 96

believe the Exiftence of Matter, or

Page 96

it, is impoffible, and whether the fore© - _ going Expreflions are not of that fort, |

Page 96

J refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one Senfe, indeed,

Page 96

Caufe of their Senfations, which affects. them ‘every moment, and is fo nearly

Page 96

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 97

Page 97

believe thofe Propofitions they have of- ten heard, tho at Bottom they have no meaning in them. : |

Page 97

… eranta Notion tobe never fo univerfally and ftedfaftly adhered to, yet this 1s but a weak Argument of its truth ,to whoever confiders what a vaft number of Prejus - dices and falfe Opinions. are every _ where embraced, with the utmoft te-

Page 97

are the far-greater) part of Mankind. There was a time when the Antipodes and Motion of the Earth, were look’d upon as monftrous Abfurdities, even by Men of Learning: And if it be conftder’d what a fmall proportion they bear to the reft of Mankind, we fhall find that at this Day, thofe Notions have gain'd. but a very inconfiderable footing in the World.

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§ 66. Buticis demanded, that we affign a caufe of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the World. To this I anfwer, That Men knowing

Page 97

98 Of the Principles Part I. they perceiv’d feveral Ideas, whereof they themfelves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within, nor depending on the operation of their Wills, this made ‘em maintain, thofe Ideas or Objects of Perception had an Exiftence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever dreaming that a Contradiction was involved in thofe Words. But Philofphers having plainly feen, that the immediate Objects of Perception do not Exift without the Mind, they in fome degree corrected the miftake of the Vulgar, -but at the fame time. run into another which feemsno lefs Abfurd, viz. that there are certain Objects really Exifting without the Mind, or having a fubfiftence di{tinct from being perceived, of which our Ideas are only Images or Refem‘blance, imprinted by thofe Objects on: the Mind. And this Notion of the Philofophers ows its Origine to the fame caufe with the former, namely their be_ Ing confcious that they were not the Authors of their own Senfations, which | they evidently knew were imprinted

Page 98

Part . of Human Knowlege. ‘ 9

Page 99

… recourfe to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, Firft, becaufe they were ‘not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in fuppofing things like unto our Ideas Exifting without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly, becaufe the fupreme Spirit which Excites thofe

Page 99

and limited to our view by any particular, finite Collection of fenfible Ideas, as Human Agents are by their Size, | Complexion, Limbs, Motions, dc. And Thirdly, becaufe his Operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the Courfe of Nature is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are ready to own the prefence of a Superiour Agent. But when we fee things go-on in the ordinary Courfe, they do not Excite } in us any Reflexion, O 2 - their

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100 Of the Principles Part I. their Order and Concatenation, tho it be an Argument of the greateft Wifdom, Power, and Goodnefs in their Creator, is yet fo conftant and familiar to us, that we do not think ’em the immediate effects of a Free Spirit: efpecially fince Inconftaney and Mutability in acting, tho it be an Imperfection, is look’d on as a mark of Freedom.

Page 100

… are mconfiftent with feveral found Truths in Philofophy and Mathematics. For Example, The Motion of the Earth is now univerfally admitted by Aftronomers, asa Truth grounded onthe cleareft and moft convincing Reafons. Bue on the foregoing Principles there can be no fuch thing. For Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it Exifts not, but the Motion of the Earth is not perceiv’'d by Senfe. I Anfwer, That Tenent, if rightly under{tood, will be found to: agree with the. Principles we have premifed : For the “ueftion, whether the Earth moves or

Page 100

Part L. of Human Knowlege. 101

Page 101

… and Diftance, both from the Earth and Sun, we fhou’d perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and. appearing in all refpects like ene of

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of Nature, which we have no reafon ta miftruft, is reafonably colle&ted from the Phenomena.

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§ 59. We may from the Experience we have had, of the Train and Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds, often make, } will not fay uncertain Conjectures, but, fure and well grounded Predictions, concerning the Ideas we fthall be affected with purfuant to a great Train of Actions, and be enabled to pafs a right Judgement of what wou'd have appear'd to us, in cafe we were placed in Circumftances, very different from

Page 101

1o2 Of ae Principles Part I.

Page 102

fifts the Knowlege of Nature, which may preferve its ufe and certainty very confiftently with what hath been faid. It will be eafy, to apply this to whatever Objections of the like fort may be drawn, from the Magnitude of the

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* § 60. In the eleventh Place, it will be demanded to what purpofe ferves that curious Organization of Plants, and the admirable Mechanifm in the

Page 102

Parts of Animals ; might not Vegeta—

Page 102

… and Blofloms, and Animals perform all their Motions, as well without, as with all that variety of Internal Parts fo ele_gantly contriv’d and put together, which being Ideas, have nothing Powerful or Operative i in them, nor have any neceffary connexion with the effeéts afcribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat, or act of his will, we muft think all that’s fine and artificial inthe Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be

Page 102

Part IL. of Human Knowlege. 103 - made in vain. ‘By this Doétrine, tho ' an Artift has made the Spring and ~ Wheels, and every Movement of a

Page 103

… done to no purpofe, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day. If fo, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the -Movements, and putting them together ? Why does not an empty Cafe ferve as well as another; and how comesit to pafs, that

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ing of a Watch, there is fome correfponding Diforder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again? The like may be faid of all the Clock-work of Nature, great part whereof is fo — wonderfully Fine and Subtile, as {carce to be difcern’d by the beft Microfcope. In fhort it will be ask’d, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Caufe ier : O

Page 103

104. Of the Principles Part I.

Page 104

of an innumerable multitude of Bo| dies and Machines, fram’d with the moft | exquifite Art, whichin the common Phi: lofophy have very appofite Ufes aiened .: | them, and ferve to explain abundance | of Phenomena. .

Page 104

… which, I anfwer, Firf, That thé there were fome Difficulties | relating to the adminiftration of Providence, and the Ufes by it affign’d to | the feveral parts of Nature, which I | coud not folve by the foregoing Prin. ciples, yet this Objeétion cou’d be of | {mall weight againft the truth and certainty of thofe Things, which. may be’ | prov'd a Priori, with the utmoft Evidence and Rigor of Demontftration.

Page 104

… Difficulties ; for 1¢ may ftill be demanded, to what end God fhou'd take thofe roundabout Methods of effeéting things by Inftruments and Machines, which no. one can deny might have been effect| ed by the meer command of his ‘Will, — without all that apparatus: Nay, if wé ‘Mare

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 105

Page 105

… we fhall find the Objection may be retorted with’ greater force, on thofe who hold the Exiftence of thofe Machines without the Mind ; for it has been made evident, - that Solidity, Bulk, Figure, Motion, isc. have no Adivity or Efficacy in them, fo as to be capable of producing any one effect in Nature, vid. Sed. XXV. whoever therefore fappofes them to Exift (allowing the Suppofition poffible) _ when they are not perceived, does it manifeftly to no purpofe, fince the on° ly ufe that is affign’d to them,. as_ they Exift unperceiv’d, is. that they ia thofe perceivable Effeéts which, truth, cannot be afcrib’d to ae hing but Spirit.

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¢ 62 But to come nigher tine Difficulty, it muft be obferv’d, that thd the Fabrication of all thofe Parts and Ors - gans be not abfolutely neceffary to the

Page 105

ceffary to the producing of things in a

Page 105

conftant, regular way, according to the Laws of Nature. There arc certain ge» Pp.

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106 Of the Principles Part [. neral Laws, that run thro the whole Chain of Natural Effects, thefe are learn’d by the Obfervation and Study of Nature,.and are by Men applied as well to the framing artificial Things, for the Ufe and Ornament of Life,as to the explaining the variqus Phanomena, which Explication canfifts only in fhewing the Conformity, any particular Phanomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the fame thing, in difcovering the Uniformity, there isin the Production of natural Effects, as will be evident to whoever fhall. attend to the feveral Inftances, wherein Philo- fophers pretend to account for Appears ances. That there is.a great and confpicuous Ufe in thefe regular, conftant Methods of working, obferv’d by the Supreme Agent, has been fhewn in Sed. XXXI. and it is no lefs vifible, thata | ' parccular Size, Figure, Motion and Dif-pofition of Parts are neceflary, tho not abfolutely to the producing any Effect, yet co the producing it according to the Standing, Mechanical Laws of Nature. ‘Thus, for Inftance, It cannot be denied

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 107

Page 107

denied that God, or the Intelligence that fuftains and rules the ordinary courfe of Things, might if He were minded to produce a Miracle, caufe all the Motions on the Dial-plate of a Watch, tho mo Body had ever made the Movements,

Page 107

and put them init: But yet if he will! act agreeably to the Rules of Mechanifm, by him for wife Ends eftablifh’d and mairitain’d in the Creation, it is né- ceflary that thofe Actions of the Watch-. maker; whereby lic makes the Move-

Page 107

cede the production of the aforefaid Motions, as alfo that any diforder in them be attended with the Perception of fome cortefponding Difotder, in thé Movements, which being once Corrected all is right again.

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<§ 63. It may, indeed, on fome. Oc cafions be neceffary, that the Author of Nature difplay his over-ruling Power, im producing fome Appearance out of the ordinary Series of Things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of — are proper to furprift and awe Pa ~ Men

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108 Of the Principles Part I. Men into an acknowledgment of the of the Divine Being : But then they are to be ufed but feldom, otherwife there

Page 108

— 4s a plain reafon, why. they fhou’d. fail - of that Effect. ‘Befides, God feems to _ choofe the convincing our Reafon of.

Page 108

his Attributes by the works of Nature; which difcover fo much Harmony. and Contrivance in ther Make, and are fuch plain Indications of Wifdom and -Beneficence in their Author, ‘rather than to aftonith us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and i cs Events.

Page 108

… how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion between them, like to that of Caufe and Effect : There are alfo feveral Combinations of them, made in

Page 108

a very Regular and Artificial Manner, which feem like fo many Inftruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as t were behind the Scenes, have a fecret | + Operation

Page 108

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 109

Page 109

Operation in producing thofe Appearances, which are.feen on the Theatre .of the World,being themfelves. difcernible only to the curious Eye of the Philofopher. But fince one Idea cannet be the Caufe of another, to what purpofe is that Connexion? And fince thofe In_

Page 109

ftruments, being barely inefficacious Perceptions in the Mind, are not fubfervi‘ent to the Production. of Natural -Effeéts; .ic is demanded why they are

Page 109

. . Works, behold fo great variety of Ideas,

Page 109

one may fo fpeak) of all that. Art and -

Page 109

§ 65. To. all which my Anfwer is, Firft, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of Caufe and Effect, but only of a Mark or Sign with

Page 109

I fee, is notthe Caufe of the Pain I

Page 109

110) 06 Of the Principles Part I. fuffer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that forewarns me of it. In like smanner the Noife that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion, or collifon of the ambient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Secondly, The reafon why Ideas are form’d into Machines, 2. e. artificial and regular Combinations, is the fame with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to fignific, a great - number of Effects and Actions, ’tis ne’ e¢flary they be vanioufly combin’d together: And to the ertd their Ufe be permanent and univerfal, thefé Combinations muft be made by Rawle, and with wife Contrivance. By this means | . abundance of Information is convey’d ‘unto us, concerning what we are to. expect from fuch and fuch Actions, and what Methods are proper to be taken, for the Exciting fuch and fuch Ideas : Which in effect, is all that I conceive to be diftinétly meant, when it is faid that by difcerning che Figure, Texture, and Mechanifm of the inward ‘Parts of Boches, whether Natural or Aruficial,

Page 110

Part L of Human Knowlege. 115

Page 111

Ufes and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the Thing.

Page 111

§ 66. Hence it 1s evident, that thofe Things, which under the Notion of a © Canfecosoperating or concurring tothe produétion of Effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great Abfurdities, may be very naturally explain’d, and have a proper and obvious Ufe affign’d ’em, whenthey are confider’d only as Marks, or Signs for our Information. And it is the fearching after, and endea— youring to underftand this Language Gf I may-fo call it) of the Author of Wature, that ought to be the Employ. ment of the Natural Philofopher; and not the pretending to explain ‘Things by .Corporeal Caufes, which.Dodtrine — {eems to. have too much eftranged the Minds of Men, from that aétive Principle, that fupreme and wife Spirit, ix whom we Live, Move, and have our Being.

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112 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 112

… Exifting without the Mind, fuch as Philofophers defcribe Matter : Yet if any Man fhall leave out of his I_dea of Matter, the pofitive Ideas of Exe tenfion, Figure, Solidity and Motion,’ — and fay ‘that he means only bythat word, an Inert, Senfelefs Subftance that Exifts without the Mind or unperceiv’d, which is the Occafion of our Ideas, or at the prefence whereof God is pleafed to excite Ideas in us: It doth not appear, but .that Matter taken in this Senfe may poffibly Exit. In Anfwer to which I fay, Firft, That it feems no lefs Abfurd to fuppofe ; a: Subftance without Accidents, than itis to fuppofe Accidents without a Subftance. But Se= condly, Thd we fhou’d grant this un+ known Subftance may poffibly Exift, yet where can it be fuppofed to be ? ‘That it Exifts not i ‘the Mind is agreed, and that it Exifts not in Place is no lefs certain ; fince all Place or Exsenfion’ Brsifts only i in the Mind as eo een

Page 112

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 113

Page 113

‘defcription that is here given us of Mat-

Page 113

… by. faying it is an Inert, Senfelefs, Unknown Subftance, which is a Definition © intirely made up of Negatives,excepting

Page 113

‘only the relative Notion of its ftanding

Page 113

be obferv’d that it Szpports nothing at — all ; and how nearly this comes to the defcription of a zon-entity, I defire may be canfider’d. But fay you it ts the

Page 113

anknown occafion, at the prefence of

Page 113

which is neither perceivable by Serife nor Reflexion, nor capable of producing any Idea nour Minds, nor is at_ all extended; nor hath any Form, nor Exifts in any place. The words to be

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114 Of -the ome Part L Meaning, and which I am not-able to comprehend.

Page 114

6S 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by Occafion: So far as I can gather from the common Ufe of Lan— guage, that Word fignifies, either the — ‘Agent which produces any Effect, or elfe fomething that 1s obferv’d to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary courfe of things.- But when it 1s

Page 114

it can be taken in neither of thofe Senfes. For Matter is faid to be Paffive and Inert, and fo cannot be an Agent or Efficient Caufe.. Ic is alfo unper_ceivable as being devoid of all Senfible Qualities, and fo cannot be the Occafi-

Page 114

on of our Perceptions in the latter Senfe: As when the burning my Finger,

Page 114

is faid to be the Occafion of the Pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling Matter an Occafion? _ This Term is either ufed in no Senfe ac. all, or elfe in fome very diftant from its receiv ‘d ‘Signification —

Page 114

Part I. of Human Knowlege. wis

Page 115

it is the Occafion of Exciting Ideas in our Minds. For, fay you, fince we ob-

Page 115

but reafonable to fuppofe, there are certain Conftant, and Regular Occafions of their being produced. That 1s_

Page 115

and diftiné parcels of Matter, corref-

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§ 71. In anfwer to this ] obferve, that, as ‘the Notion of Matter: is here

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116 = Of the Principles Part 1. cerning the Exiftence of a Thing diftinét from Spirit and Idea, from Perceiving and being Perceiv’d : But whe-

Page 116

_ ther there are not certain Ideas, of I

Page 116

know not what Sort, in the Mind of Gop, which are fo many Marks or

Page 116

… and regular Method: Much after the fame manner, as a Mufician is dire@&ted by the Notes of Mufic, to produce that ‘harmonious train and .compofition of Sound, which is calléd a Zune; tho they who Hear the Mufic do not Per. ceive the Notes, and may be intirely ignorant of them. Burt this Notion of Matter (which: after all is the only intelligible one that’ I can pick, from what is faid of unknown Occafions

Page 116

GY 972. If we follow the Light of Reafon, we fhall, from the conftant unii. 4 form

Page 116

Part L. of Human Knowlege. 3447 form Method of our Senfations, collect the Goodnefs and Wifdom of the Spirit who excites them in our Minds. But - this is all that-I can fee reafonably concluded from thence. To me, I fay, ’tis evident that the Being of a Spirit inf-

Page 117

dantly fufficient, to explain all the Appearances of Nature. But as for Inert,

Page 117

… Matter, nothing that I perceive has. any the leaft Connexion with it, or | leads to the Thoughts of i. And I wou'd fain fee any one Explain,aay the meanelt Phenomenon in Nature by it,

Page 117

- or fhew any manner of Reafon, tho in

Page 117

the loweft Rank of Probability, that he can have for its Exiftence; or even make any tolerable Senfe or Meaning of thae Suppofition. For as to. its being an Oc on we have,I think, evidendy thewn that with regard to us it is ng Occae fion : It remains therefore that it muft be, if at all, the Occafion to Goo of exciting Ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have juft now feen, _

Page 117

118 : Of the Principles | Part I. |

Page 118

… the Exiftenceof Material Sub ftance ; that fo having obferv’d the gradual Ceafing, and Expiration of thofe _ Motives or. Reafons, we may proporti-

Page 118

_ was thought that Colour, Figure, Mo- tion, and the reft of the Senfible Quadius or Accidents, did really Exift with-

Page 118

… they did Exift, fince they cou'd not be conceived to Exift by themfelves. After‘wards, in procefs of time, Men being » convinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reft of the Senfible, Secondary Qualitieshad no Exiftence without the Mind, they ftripped this Subfratum or material Subftance of thofe Qualities, leaving only the Primary Ones, Figure, Moti. on, &c. which they ftill conceived to _ Exift without the Mind, and confequently; to ftand in need of a material Sup-. —_ port,

Page 118

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 419°

Page 119

_ none, even of thefe, can poffibly Exift

Page 119

perccives them, it follows, that we have no longer any reafon, to fuppofe the be-. ing of Matter. Nay, that it is utterly ime poffible there fhou’d be any fuch thing, fo long as that Word is taken to denote,

Page 119

_an unthinking Subftratum of Qualities .or

Page 119

thought of only for the fake of fupporting Accidents; and the reafon intirely ceafing, one might expect the Mind | fhou’d naturally; and without any reluct-_

Page 119

~ ance at all, quit the belief of what.

Page 119

* ed and indefinite Notions of Being, Oc.

Page 119

£26 Of the Principles Part £

Page 120

tafton, 8c. thd without any fhew of |

Page 120

part, of what do we perceive amongft all the Ideas, Senfacions, Notions, which ate imprinted on our Minds, either by Senfe ox RKeflexiot, from: whence may be infer’ the Exiftence of an imert, thoughrlefs, unperceiv’d Occafion? and 6x the other hand‘on the part of an AL fufficient Spirit, what_can there be that ’ thou’d make us believe, or even fufped, It is direfled by an inere Occafion’ to excné Ideas m our Minds?

Page 120

-.§ ae, Teas a very exttaordinary In{tance of the force of Prejudice, ‘and much to be-lamented, chat the Mind of Mar retains fo great a Fondnefs, againft alli tlie evidence of Reafon, for a ftupid,

Page 120

fition whereof re wou'd,as it were fkreer iv felf, from: the Providence of God,and' remove it farther off from the Affairs 6f the World.. But tho we do the utmof we cat, to fecure the belief of Matter; tho: when Reafon forfakes us,

Page 120

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 121

Page 121

on the bare poffibility of the Thing, and | thd we Indulge our felves in -the full Scope, of an Imagination not regulated by Reafon, to make out that poor Poffibility, yet the Up-fhot of all is, that — there certain znknown Ideas in the Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is all chat I conceive to be meant by Occafion with.

Page 121

§ 76, Whether cherefore there are fuch Ideas.in the Mind of Gop, and whether they may be called by thename — Mater I fhan’t difpuce. Buc.if you ftick

Page 121

. ftance, or Support of Extenfion, Moti-

Page 121

122 Of rhe Principles Part L |

Page 122

of Extenfion, and the other Qualities | or Accidents. which we Perceive ; yet. . there may, perhaps, be fome Inert, Un|

Page 122

perceiving Subftance, or Subjtratum of

Page 122

of their Exiftence, than a Blind-man |

Page 122

made to See does.of the Exiftence of Light and Colours. I anfwer, Firft, if

Page 122

only the unknown Support-of unknown | Qualities, it’s no matter whether there .

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 123: to Figure, Motion, Colour, 9. Qualicies,.as hath been fhewn, .are nothing elfe but Senfations:or Ideas, which Exift only in a Mind perceiving them; and this istrue not only of the Ideas we are ac-quainted with at prefenc, but likewife of all poffible Ideas :whatfoever.

Page 123

§ 79. But you will infift, what if I have no reafon to believe the Exiftence of Matter, what if I cannot affign any ufe to it, or explain any thing by it, or

Page 123

fron of Ideas ; tho, indeed, to go about

Page 123

to unfold the meaning,or adhere to any particular. Explication of thofe Words, © may be attended with great Difficulues. I anfwer, when Words are ufed wichout a Meaning, you may put them together as you pleafe, without danger of running into a Contradiction. You may fay, for Example, that twice Twa is c< qual to Seven, fo long as you declare —

Page 123

you da nat take the Words of that ProR pofitioa

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p24 Of the Principles Part I. pofition in their ufual Acception, but for Marks of you know not what. And by the fame reafon you may fay, there is an inert, thoughtlefs Subftance without Accidents, which is the occafion af our Ideas. And we hall underftand juft _ as much by one Propofition, as the @- ther. | :

Page 124

~— § 80. In the laft place, you will fay, What if we give up the Caufe of marerial Subftance, and ftand to it, that Matter is an unknown Somewhat, nelther Subftance nor Accident, Spirit nor Idea, Inert, Thoughtlefs, Indivifible, Ime moveable, Unextended, Exifting in no © Place? For, fay you, Whatever may be urged againft Subflance or Occafion, of any other pofitive or relative Notion ef Matter hath no place at all, fo long as this xegative Definition gf Matter is adhered to. I anfwer you may, if fo it thall feem good, ufe the word Matter in the fame Senfe, that other Men ufe Nothing, and fo make thofe Terms conver_ tible in your Stile. For after all, this 3 -what appears to me to he the Refule

Page 124

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 125 of that Difinition, the Parts. whereof when I confider with Attention, either

Page 125

of Effect or Impreffion made on my

Page 125

§ 81. Upon this, you "I = rom in the forefaid Definition, is included, what _ doth fufficiently diftinguith i it from nothing, the pofitive, abftra& Idea of Guide

Page 125

that thofe who pretend to the Faculty of framing Abftract, General Ideas, do talk as if they had fuch an Idea, which is, fay they, the moft abftract and ge-

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—~neral Notion Of all, that 1s, to me, the °

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moft | Incomprehenfible of all Others. That there are a great variety of Spirits

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of different Orders and Capacities, whofe

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are far exceeding thofe the Author of my Being has beftowed on me, I fee no.

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reafon to deny. And for me, to pretend to determine, by my own few, {tine ted, narrow Inlets of an i

Page 125

126 Of the Principles — Part F. Ideas the inexhauftible Power of the Supreme Spirit may Imprintupon’em, were certainly the utmoft Folly and Prefumpuon. Since there may be, for

Page 126

_ of Ideas or Senfations, as different from

Page 126

… as Colours are from Sounds. — But how ready foever I may be, to acknowlege the Scantinefs of my Comprehenfion, with regard to the endlefs variety of "Spirits and Ideas, that may

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tend toa Notion of Entity or Exiftence,

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| fibly be made on the part of Religion.

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§ 82.- — there are who think, that tho the Arguments for the real. Exitt"-ence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reafon, be allow’ d not. to amount to

Page 126

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 127 |

Page 127

… Ideas ; there being in Holy Writ innumerable Facts related, which evidently fuppofe the reality of Timber, and Stone, Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and Human Bodies, ¢%c. To which I Anfwer, ‘that no fort of Writings, whatever Sacred or Profane, which ufe thofe and the

Page 127

or fo as-to have a meaning in ‘em, are in danger of having their Truth call’d in queftion by our Doctrine. That all thofe Things do really Exift, that there are Bodies, even Corporeal Subftances, when

Page 127

XXXIH, XXXVI, &c. And I do not think, that ether what Philofophers call Matter, or the Exiftence of Objects with-

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128 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 128

… whether there be, or be -not-External Things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper Ufe of Words, is the marking our Conceptions, or Things only as they are Known and Perceiv’d by us; whence it plainly follows, that it the Tenents we have laid down, there is nothing inconfiftent with the tight Ufe and Significancy of Language and that Difcourfe of what kind focver, fo far as it is Intelligible, remains Undifturb'’d. . But all this fees fo very — manifeft, from what hath been largely fee forch in the Premifés, that it is need— Iefs to infift any farther on it,

Page 128

§ 84. But it will be ure’d, that. Miracles do, at leaft, lofe much of their Strefs and Import, by our Principles, What muft we think 6f Mofes’s Rod, Was it not really turn’d into a Serpent, > or was there only a Change of Ideas in

Page 128

the Minds of the Spectators? And can

Page 128

Part I. of Human Kuowlege. —ye2g of the Gucfts, fo as to create in them theAppearance or Idea only of Wine > ‘The fame may be faid of all other Miracles: Which, in confequence of the

Page 129

on only as fo many Cheats, or Illufions of Fancy. To this I Reply, that the Rod was changed into a real Serpent, and the Water into real Wine.

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But this Bufinefs of Rees and Imaginary

Page 129

that it were'an Affrone to the Reader’s . Underftanding, to refume the Explica- tion of it in this place. J thall only ob-

Page 129

and Drink Wine, and find the eftects of it, with me there.cou’d he no doubt

Page 129

of it’s Reality. So that, at Boxtom, the Scruple concerning teal Miracles has no

Page 129

130 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 130

… Light, and gave them all the Force and Weight I cou’d,we proceed in| the next place to take a view of our Tenents in their Confequences. Some of thefe appear at firft Sight, as chat feveral Difficult and obfcure Queftions, on which abundance of Speculation has been thrown away, are intirely banifh’d from Philofophy. Whether Corporeal Subftance can think : Whether Matter _ be infinitely Divifible - And how it O‘perates on Spirit ; thefe and the like In‘quiries have given infinite Amufement to Philofophers, in all Ages. But depending on the Exiftence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other Advantages there are, as well with regard to Religion as the Sciences, which it is eafy for any one to deduce, from what has been premifed. But this will appear more plainly inthe Sequel. =. ss § 86. From

Page 130

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 13%

Page 131

lege many naturally be reduced to two Heads, that of Ideas, and that of Spirits. Of each of thefe I fhall treat in Order, .And firft as to Ideas or Une thinking Things, our Knowlege of thefe - has been very much obfcur’d, and confounded, and we have been led into

Page 131

two-fold Exiftence of the Objeéts of Senfe, the one Intelligible, or in the Mind, the other Real and without the Mind: Whereby Unthinking Things are thought, to have a natural Subfiftence of their own, diftinct from being perceiv’'d by Spirits. This which, if I miftake not, hath been fhewn to be a moft groundlefs and abfurd Notion, 1s the very Root of Scepticif{m ; for fo long as Men thought that Real Things fubfifted without the Mind, and that their Knowlege was only fo far forth Reel as it was conformable to real Things, it follows, they cow’d not be certain, tha¢

Page 131

132‘ Of the Principles Part T.~ how can it be known, that the Things | -

Page 132

… then are we involved all in.Scepticifm. We fee only the Appearances, and not the réal Qualities of Things. What may be che Excenfion, Figure, or Motion of any Thing ‘really - and abfolucely, orin at felf, its impoffible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our Senfés, Things remaiming the fame,-our Ideas vaty, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, reprefent the true Quality really Exifting in the Thing, it is out of our Reach to-determince. So that, for ought we know, all we See, Hear, and Feel, may be = . - *Phane

Page 132

dent, or demonftrative Knowlege, of

Page 133

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 133. |

Page 133

the Arguments urged by Sceptics in all Ages, depend on the fappofition of External Objects. But this is too obvious to need bemg infifted on.

Page 133

their Senfes, and doubt of the Exiftence © of Heaven :and Earth, of every thing they See or Feel, even of their own Bodies, And after all:cher labouring and

Page 133

_ ftruggle of Thought, they are forced to |

Page 133

134. Of the Principles Part T, the Exiftence of fenfible Things. But all this Doubtfulnefs, which fo Bewilders and Confounds the Mind, and makes Philofophy ridiculous in the Eyes of the World, vanifhes if we annex a “meaning to our Words, and not amufe our felycs with the terms ‘Abfolute, External, Exifi, &c. fignitying we know - not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thofe things, which I actually perceive by Senfe: It being a manifeft Contradiction, that any fenfible Object fhou’d be immediately perceiv'dby Sight or Touch, and, at the fame time, - have no Exiftence in Nature, fince the very Exiftence of an unthinking Being, confifts in being perceiv "A. |

Page 134

§ 89. Nothing feems of. more Impor; tance, towards Erecting a firth Sy{tem of found and real Knowlege, which may be Proof againft the Affaults of _ Scepticifm, than to lay the beginning i in a diftinét Explication, of what is meant by Thing, Reality, Exiftence : For in vain fhall we izle concerning the real —

Page 134

Part L of Human Knowlege. 135.

Page 135

Exiftence of Things, or pretend, to any

Page 135

: not fix’d the meaning of thofe Words. ; Thing or Being is the moft general Name

Page 135

of all, ic comprehends under it two Kinds intirely diftinét and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the Name, viz. Spirits and Ideas. The former are Adlive, Indivifible, Incorrup-’ tible Subftances: The latter are Inert, Fleeting, Perifbable Paffions; or Dependent

Page 135

… but we deny they can fubfiftt without the Minds which perceive them, or that they are Refemblances of any Archetypes Exifting without the Mind: Since the very Being of a'Senfation or Idea confifts in being percei-

Page 135

136 Of the Principles Part I. not generated from within, by the Mind it felf,but imprintéd by a Spirit diftingt from that which perceives them. Senfible Objects May likewife be faid to be without the Mind, in another fenfe, namely when they Exift in fome other Mind. Thus when I fhut my Eyes, the Things Ifaw may (ull Exift, but ic mutt be in another Mind. : .

Page 136

¢ 91. It were a muftake to think, that what is here faid derogates in the - leaft, from the Reality of Things. i 4s acknowleg’d on the receiv’d Prince ples, that Extenfion, Motion, and ina -— "Word, all fenfible Qualities have need of a Support, as not being able to fub— fift by themfelves. But the Objects per. ceiv’'d by Senfe, are allow'’d to be nothing but Combinations of thofe Qua lities, and confequently cannot fubfift by themfelves. Thus far st is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the Things perceiv'd by Senfe, an Exiftence independent af a Subftance, or Support “vherein they may Exift, we detract nohing from the recery’d Opinion of their

Page 136

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 137 Regtity, and are guilty of -no Innoyatie on in chat refpect. All the Difference is, that according to us the Unthinking Beings perceiy'd by Senfe, have no Ex,

Page 137

… ing Beings, or diftinét from being perr ceiy'd by any Mind what{gcyer, eyen the Eternal Mind of the Creazor, syherein they {uppofe only Ideasef she Corpoxe

Page 137

of Scepsicifn.fo bkewile wpon fc ‘fame - foundation have been rats‘ all

Page 137

| the Inas pions'Schames of Aelia and PECIABIOR. , Jay

Page 137

138 Of the Principles Part I. Nay fo great -a difficulty. has. it..been thought, to conceive Matter: produced ~ out of Nothing, thatthe moft Celebrat‘ed among the Ancient -Philofophers, - e-

Page 138

ven of thefe who maintain’d the. Being ofa Gop, have thought Matterto. be Uncreated: andCoeternal with him.

Page 138

Confideration on the Abfurdities of e_ very wretched Sect of Atheifts.

Page 138

of

Page 138

Part l. of Hen a 139

Page 139

of Things, ‘and inftead thereof make a Self-exiftent, Stupid, Unthinking Subftance the. Root.and Origine of all Beings. - That they fhou’d hearken to thofé who deny a Providence, or Infpection of. a Superior Mind over the Affairs of the ‘World, attributing . the whole Series of Events either to Blind Chance, or

Page 139

Fatal Neceffity arifing from the Impulfe of-one Body on.another. All this 1s. ve-

Page 139

ry natural. And: on the other hand, when Men of better Principles obferve

Page 139

_the Enemies of Religion lay fo great a Strefs-on Unthinkin “Matter » ; and allof |

Page 139

priv’d of their grand. Support, and dri-

Page 139

… Fortrefs, without -which -your. Epicureans, Hobbifts, and the ~ like, have. not.even the Shadow of a -.Pretence, but become the moft — -and eafy. Triumph 4 in the World.

Page 139

6 94. The Exiftence of Matter, or

Page 139

Bodies ‘unperceiv’d, ‘ has not only been i main. Support of reste and Fata| es

Page 139

tho of v the re Patek |. fits, but on the Principle does Idolatry - li ewite in all its various Formns,dépend: Did. Meh but cohfider that the Sun, Mooh, and Stars aiid evety other Object of the Senfes, arconly fo many Seine fations ih their Mirds, which havé ne _ other Exiftence but Barely being Pees ceiv'd : Doubrlefs they wow’d never fall dowil, and worlhip their own Ideas. But tathicr wddrets their Horttage t vhat ETeenat [nvistste Mino whith prdducts and fuftams ‘all ‘Things. =

Page 140

é. The (hive abhi. Britciple by sit i it felf with the Artichs of aht Fait his octaficn’d ho tial Dericel tics to Chriftiahs. For: Examphk, aboot the Re{urrettion, how indny Seraples aid ‘Obj jeCtiotis. have beet’ phifed By Boctyians nd Wehers ! > Put add hot the aot plaufible ‘of ‘thein depend ‘on the fuppofition,. that a Body 4s ‘Getibmnimated tite fame, With tegird nt t ‘the Fotra or that which is perceiv'd by Senfe, but the Material Subftarnce, whtch ‘remains the

Page 140

Part I. of Human Knowleye. aye

Page 141

… means by: that Word, vez, :that which is immediately Sten and Felt, which is only a Combination. of fenfibie Qualities; of Ideas + And then the rot unanfwerable ‘Objedtions come to

Page 141

tical and Imapious Nenoas, fuch an mt eredible number of Ditpunes and puating Queftions, which have been Thorns im che fides of Divares, as well as Phi-

Page 141

Work for Mankind ; thac of the Aree lms we have produced. fit st, ate

Page 141

-of the ‘Objects of Porteption, another great Source of Errors and Difficulties,

Page 141

ayo 2 Of the Principles”: Part’ L

Page 142

with: tegard to: Ideal Knowlege, ‘is the - Doctrine of Abftratt Ideas, {uch as it hath been fee forth in the Introduction, The plaineft things in the World, ‘thofe . Mte are moftintimately acquainted with, and perfectly. know, when they are confider'd-.in. an Abftrace way, appear ftrangely difficult and incomprehenfir ble. Time, Place, and Motion, taken | in paiticular, or concrete, are what e: ‘very. Body.:knows; but: having paffed thro’: the. Hands of a ‘Metaphyfician, — they become. too. Abftract. and. Fine, to de apprehended’ by .Men of ordinaty -Serife.. ‘Bid your Servant meet: you at fach a -Jime, infuch a Place,and he fhall -never ftay to deliberate.on the mean. ang of chofe: Words: In conceiving.that particular ‘Time and. Place,, or the Mo‘tren iby which-he is to get thither, he finds not the leat Difficulty. But if Time besaken; exclufive of all thofe particular Aétions and Ideas that -diverfifie the Day, meerly for the Continuation of Exiftence, or Duration in Abftract, then at will perhaps mates even a PhilofaPas to ‘comprehend 1 | | —§ a For ;

Page 142

“¢ 98. “ my own part, whentyer I attempt to frame a fimple Idea of Time, — abftracted from the fucceflion of. Ideas in my Mind, ‘which flows’ uniformly, and is’ participated by all Beings, Iam loftand embranigled jm inextricablé Difficulties. I have no Notion of: it:at.all,

Page 143

vilible, -and {peak of it in fucha manner, as leads me to harbour-odd Thoughts

Page 143

of my Exiftence: Since that Doétrine ays one under an abfolute:neceffity, of -

Page 143

of his Life : Both which feem equally abfard. Time therefore being nothing, abftracted from the Succeflon of Ideas

Page 143

ration of any Finite: Spirit mutt be. eftimated; by the Number of Ideasor:Actions fucceeding each.other, in that fame Spirit or Mind. | Hence itis aplain Confequence that, the Soul always thinks: And in truth whoever {hall go. about to

Page 143

144 Of the Principles’, Part. [. Exiflence of a Spirit from its Cogitation will, i believe, find 1 it no: caly. Task. |

Page 144

… for example, may be abfiracked foom ail other fenfible Qualiues; and Secondly, that the Enuicy of Excenfion, taay ‘be abftraced from its being Perr cayid. But whocver fhall reflec, aod take care to underftand what he (ays, avill, wf muftake not, ackaowlege chat - all fenfible Quahioies are alike Sen[atiozs, and alike ReaJ,that whore che Extenfion 4s, there Js the ‘Colour LOO, Z..e. In his Mind, and that chem Apchotypes, can exift oaly - in fome other Mind.. And _ che iaiided of Senle .are man ut

Page 144

Part T of Human Knowlege. 145 ~ but thofe Senfations combin’d, blended or (if one may fofpeak) concreted toge-

Page 145

ther : None of all which can be fuppos’d to Exift unperceiv’d. And that, confequently, the Wall is as truly White, as itis Extended, and in the fame Senfe. _

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Abftract Idea of 'Happinefs, prefcinded from alt particular Pleafure, or of Goodnefs, from every thing thatisGood, this — is what few can pretend. to. So like| wife, a Man may be Juft and Virtuous, — without having precife Ideas of Fuftice and Virtue.The opinion that thofe and the like Words, ftand for General Notions abftracted from all particularPerfons and: Actions,feems to have render’d Morality very difficult, and the Study thereof of {mall ufe to Mankind. And, in effect, one may make a-great progrefs inSchool- Ethics, without ever being the wifer or better Man for it, or knowing how to behave himfelf in the affairs ‘of Life, more to the Advantage of himfelf, =

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his Neighbours, thanhe did befote. This ~ Hint may fuffice, to let any one fee, che — Do€trine of Abjtrattion, has rot a little | contributed, towards {porting the moft ufeful Parts of Knowlege.

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§ 101. The two great Provinces of Speculative Sciehee, convetfant about Ideas receiv’d fiom Senfe, are Narural Philofophy and Mathematits. withregard to cach of thefe I thall make fome ‘Ob fervations. And firft] thall fay fotnewhat of Natural Philofophy. On this Subject yt is, that the Sveprics triumiph: All that ftock of Arguments they produce to.depreciate our Faculties, and make _ Mankind appear Ignorant and Low, are - drawn principally from this Head, hamely, that we are under an Inyinei ‘ble Blindnefs, as to the -Zrze and Real Nature of Things. This they exaggerate; and love to enlarge of. We are mift- yably Banter’d, fay they, by our Senfes, and amus’d only with the Ourfide and Shew of Things. Fhe real Effence, the unternal Qualities, and Conftitucion of every.the micanctt it Objet, is hidfrom —

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? art I. of Human Knovwlege. 147

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which it is beyond the Power of Human Underftanding, tq Fathom or Come pychend. But it is evident from what has been fhewn, that all chis Complaint is groundlefs, and that we are influenced by Falfe Principles, to that degree as to muiftruft aur Senfes, and think we

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‘know nothing, of thofe things which

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§ 192.-Qne great Inducement, to eur pronouncing our felyes Ignorant of the Nature of Things, is, the current Opinion that eyery thing includes within it felf, the Gaufe of ts Properties: Or that there is in cach Objeé&t, an inward Ef fence, which is the Source whence its difcernible Qualities ow, and whereon

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account for Appearances by Occult Qualities, bur of late they are moftly refolved into Mechanical Caufes. viz. the Fir © gure, Motion, Weight, ¢c. of infenfible Particles : Whereas, in truth, there is no other Agent or Efficient Caufethan Ue Spirit,

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148 Of the Principles Part I. Spirit, it being evident, that Motion, as well as all other Ideas, 1s perfectly Inert. vid. Sel. XXV. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of Colours, Sounds, dc. by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, muft needs be labour in vain. And accordingly, we fee the Attempts of that Kind, are not at all fatisfa@tory. Which may be faid, in

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~ general,.of thofe Inftances, wherein one

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Idea or Quality is affign’d for the Caufe of another. I need not fay, how many Hypothefes and Speculations are left out, ~ and how much the ftudy of Nature 1s Abridged by this Doctrine.

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… Enlighten’d by being told this is done by Attraction ? Is it that, that Word fignifies the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, inftead of their being impell’d or protruded towards cach | other ?

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 149 other? But nothing is determin’d - of the Manner or Action, and it may as truly (for ought we know) be termed

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the Parts of Steel we fee cohere firmly together, and this alfo is accounted for by Attraction; but in this, as in the other Inftances, I do not perceive, that any thing is fignified befides the Effect it felf ; for as to the manner of the Action whereby it is produced, or the Caufe which produces it, thefe are not fo much as aim’d at. ee ee

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… together, we may obferve.fome likenefs and conformity betweenthem. For Example, in the Falling of a Stone ‘to the Ground, Inthe Rifing of the Seatowards

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doc. there is fomething alike, namely.an Union or Mutual, Approach of Bodies.. So that any onc of thefe,or the like Phenomena,, may not feem Strange, or Sur| prifing, to a Man woh has.nicely obferv’d and compar’d the Effects of. Na-

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— «§50 Of the Principles Part j, ture, For that only is thought fo which is uncamamon, Or a thing by it felf, and eut af the qrdinary Courfe of aur Obs fexyation. ‘That Bodies thau’d tend gor wards the Center of the Earth; 1s nor thoughe fixange, hecaufe ’tis whac we perceive every moment of our Lives, Bus that they fhou’d have a like Gravis tation towards the Center of the Moon, may feem odd and unaccountable to _ paeft Men, becaufe it’s difcern’d only

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in the Tides. Bus a Philofopher, whofe Thoughts take in a larger compals of Nature, having obferv’d a certain fimihicude of Appearances,as well inthe Heayens as the Earth, that argue innumeyable Bodies to have a mutual Tendency towasds each other, which he denotes by the general Nasne -Attrafiox, what-. ever can be neduced to that he chinks _ jotly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides, by the Attraction of the Terragusaus Glabe towards the Moon, which to. him does not appear odd or anomalous, but anly a particular Exam ‘le of a general Rule ox Law of Nae

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 128 —§ 105. If, therefore, we confider the

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to thar Knowkege of the Phenomena,we

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fhall find it conhfts, moc itt an exaétet Knowlege of thé efficient Canfe thar produces them, for that can be no os ther than the Wil of a Spirit, but only in a greater Largenefs of Gorriprehety - fon, whereby Analogies, Harmonies, and Agreements art difeover’d in the Works of Naturé, and the particular Effects explain’d, :. e. reduced eo gené> ral Rules, vid. Sef. LXEL which Rules grounded dn the Analogy,and Unifonne nefs ob{ctv'd 1a the Production of Na+ tural Effects, are moft agreeable, and fought after by tle Mind, for thac they extend our Profpect beyord what is pre fent, ahd mear to us, anid enable us to make very probable Conjettares, touche | ing Thihgs that may have happen’d at very steat diftances uf Time and Place; as well as to predi& Things to comme ; which fore of Endeavour towards Orne | nifcience, is much affected by the Mind.

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152 Of the Principles Part]

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… in fuch Things, for we are apt to Jay too :great a Strefs on Analogies, and to the prejudice of Truth, humour that _ Eagernefs of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowlege into general Theoremes. For Example, In the bufinefs of.Gravitation,or mutual Attraction, becaufe it appears in many Intances, fome are ftraightway for pronouncing it Uziverfal ;. and that to Ate tral, and be Attratted by, every other Body isan Effential Quality, inherent in all Bodies whatfoever. Whereas, its evident the Fix’d Stars have no fuch Tendency - towards. cach other ;. and fo far is that Gravitation, from being Effential to Bodies, that, in fome Inftances a. quite contrary Principle feems to fhew it felf: Asin the Perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elafticity of the Air. - There is nothing Neceflary or Effential in the Cafe, but it depends intirely on the Will of the Governing Spirit, who caufes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards eachother, according.to vari-

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Part L. of Human Knowleve. 153 ous Laws; whilft he keeps others at a fix’d Diftance ; and to fome he gives a quite contrary Tendency to fly afune der, juft, as he fees convenient.

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… Caufe, diftinét from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly, Confidering the whole Creation 18 the Workmanhhip of a Wife end Good Agent, it fhou’d feem to bécomié Philofophers, to employ their Thoughts © (contrary to what fome hold) about the Final Caufes of Things-: For be-

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Entertainment to the Murtd, it might be of great Advantage, in that 1t not |

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only difcovers to us the Attributes of

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the Creator, but may alfo direct us in feveral Inftances to the proper Ufes and Applications of Things; and } mutt eonfefs, I fee no reafon, why os Out the various Ends, to which Natura Things are adapted, and for which they

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154 Of thePrinciples Part I. were originally, with unfpeakable Wifdom, contriv’d, fhou’d not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philofopher. Thirdly, from what has been premis’d no reafon can be drawn, why. the Hiftory of .Nature fhou’d not ftill be ftudied, and Obfervations and Experiments made, which, that they are of ufe to Mankind, and enable us to draw any general Conclufions, i is not the Refult of any immutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themfelves, but only of Gops Goodnefs and Kindnefs to Men,in the Adminiftration of the World. wid. Se. XXX and XXXI. Fourthly, By a diligent Obfervation of the Phenome_ na within our View, we may difcover the general Laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other Phenomena, Ido not fay Demonftrate ; for all Deduétions of that kind, depend on a Suppofition that the Author of Nature always opetates uniformly, and in a conftant obfervance of thofe Rules, we take for Principles: Which We cannot evident-

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 155

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of Nature, may rot unfitly be Stiled the — Language of its Author, whereby he difcovers his Attributes to our View, and

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ence and Felicity of Life. And to me, thofe Men who frame General -Rules from the Phenomena,and afterwards de| rive the Phenomena. from thofe Rules, feem to be Grammarians, and their Art - the Grammar of Nature. Two ways there are of Learning a Language, ei-

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may be well read in the Language of

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of Nature, without underftanding the | Grammar of it, or being able. to fay, | by what Rule a: Thing is fo or fo. And as “tis very poffible co Write _Improperly, thro’ too ftri&t an Obfervance of General Grammar-rules: So in Arguing from General Laws of Nature, “tis not impoffible we may ftretch the Analogy ae far,and by that means run into Mi—

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136 Of the Principles Part I.

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… Ufe, rather than lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on the Language; fo in perufing the Vo-~ Jume of Nature, methinks it is beneath the Dignity of the Mind, to affect an Exactnefs, in reducing each particular Phenomenon, to general Rules, or fhew - how it follows from them. .We thon’d propofe to pur felvesnobler Views,namely to recreate and exalt the Mind, with a profpect of the Beauty, Order, Extent, and Variety of Natural Things : Hence, by proper Inferences, roenlarge our Nations of the Grandeur, Wifdom, and Be-

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neficence of the Creator: And laftly, to make the feveral Parts of the Creati on, fo far as.in us lies, fubfervicat to the Ends they weredefign’d for, Goons Glory, and the Suftentation and Comfort of aur Selves and Fellow-Creatures,

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we o. The beft Grammar of the kind ‘e are {peaking of, will be eafily ac| ‘know-

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 157 knowleg’d to be a Treatife of Mecha nics, demonftrated and applied to Nae ture, by a Philofopher of a Neighbours ing Nation whom all the World - Ad~ mire. I fhall not take upon me to make Remarks, on: the Performance of that Extraordinary Perfon : Only fome Things he has advanced, fo directly opfite co the Doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we fhou’d be wanting, in the regard due tothe Authority of fo great a Man, did we not take fome notice of them. In the Entrance of that juftly admired Treatife, Time, Space and Motion, are diftinguifhed into Abfolute and Relgtiue, True and Apparent, Mathematical and Vulgar: Which Diftin¢tion, as ic is ac large explain’d by the Author,daes fuppofe thofe Quantities to haye an Exiftence withaue the Mind: And that they are ordinarily conceivd with relation to fenfible Things, to which neverthelefs, in their own Natyre,they bearno Relationat all,

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158 Of the Principles Part J, for the Duration or Perfeverance of the Exiftence of Things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what has been already faid, on that Subjecd. For the reft, this Celebrated Author holds there is an Abfolute Space, which, being unperceivable to Senfe, remains-in it felf fimilar and: immoveable: And Relative Space to be the meafure thereof, which being moveable, and defin’d by its Situation in refpect of Senfible Bodies, is vulgarly taken for Immoveable Space. . Place he Defines, tobe that Part ofSpace which is occupied by any Body. And according as the Space is Abfolute or — Relative, fo alfo is the Place. Abfolute

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Motioz is faid to be the Tranflation of a Body, from Abfolute Place to Abfolute Place, as Relative Motion is, from one Relative Place to another. Now becaufe _ the Parts of Abfolute Space, do not fall under our Senfes, inftead of them we are obliged to ufe their Senfible Meafures : And fo define both Place and Motion with refpect to Bodies, which we regard asimmoveable. | But it is faid, in Philofophical Matters we muft Abftra@:

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. q 56

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. none of thofe Bodies, which feem tobe

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… Motion, all Parts which ' preferve the fame Pofition with refpect " to the Whole, partake of the Motions of + the Whole. Secondly, The Place being " moved, that which is placed therein is ‘. alfo mov'd:: So that a Body moving in - a place which is in Motion, doth parti-

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(166 Of the Principles | Part if tion is always changed, by Force im: | preffed on the Body moved. Fifthly, In Circular Motion barely Relative, there is no Getitrifugal Force, which neverthes

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te in that which is True or ‘Abfolute, dy proportional to the nog of Motion: -

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… So that toconceive Motion, there mutt beat leaft cons ceived two Bodies, whereof the Di {tance of pofition in regard to cach othet is varied... Hence if thére was one only Body in being, it cou'd not poffibly bé mov’d. This to me feems very evident, in that the Idea I have of Mo+

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- Part Ll. of Human Knovlege. 161

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caufing the change, in the Diftance or Situation of the Bodies, is‘ imprefled. For however fome may define Relative Motion, fo as to term that Body mov'd, which changes its Diftance from fome other Body, whether the Force caufing

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… told, Relative Motion is that which is perceiy’d by Senfe, and regarded in the ordinary Affairs of Life, it follows that every Man of common Senfe knows what‘it 1s, as well ag the beft Philofopher: Now I ask any one, whether in his Senfe of Motion, as he walks along the Streets, the Stones he _ paffes over may be faid to move, be— caufe they. change Diftance with ‘his Feet? To me it appears, that tho — Motion includes a Relation: of one thing to another, yet it 1s not nec effary, that each term of the Relat10n be denominated from it. As a Man may think of fomewhat which does not think, fo a Body may be moyed to, or from, another Body which which is not, therefore, it felf in Moti-

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162 Of the » Principles Part I.

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may be faid to be Quiefcent, with rela_ tion to the fides of the Veffel, and -yet | move, with relation to the Land: Or he may move Eaftward in refpect of | the one, and Weftward in refpect of | the other. Inthe common Affairs of | Life, Men.never go beyond the Earth, | to define the place of any Body : ‘And |

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. what 1s quiefcent in refpect of that, is

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accounted abfolutely to be fo. But Philofophers, who have a greater Extent of Thought, and jufter Notions of the Syftem of Things, difcover even the _ Earth it felf to be moved. In order therefore to fix their Notions, they feem to conceive the Corporeal ‘World as _ -Finite, and the utmoft, unmoved’ Walls or Shell thereof to be the Place, whereby they eftimate True Motions. If we found our own Conceptions, I believe we may find all the Abfolute Motion

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Part I. of a Knowlege. 163

Page 163

we can frame. an Idea of, to be at Bottom no other than Relative Motion thus defined.. For as I have already faid, abfoluce Motion exclufive of all external Relation is incomprehenfible:

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And to. this kind of Relative Motion,

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Caufes, and Effeéts afcribed to Abfolute: Motion will, if I miftake not, be found to agree. As to what is faid of the Centifugal Force, that it does not at all be-

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164. Of the Principles Part I. preffedonit. If either of thefe be wanting, Ido not think that agreeably to the Senfe of Mankind, or the Propriety of Language, a Body can be faid to be in Motion. I grant, indeed, that it is pof-fible for us to think a Body, which we fee changeits Diftance from fome other, ‘to be moved, tho’ it have no force im-preffed on it, (in which Senfetheremay — be apparent Motion, ) but then it is, becaufe the Force caufing the change of D{tance, 1s imagin’d by us to beimprefs’d onthat Body thought to move. Which, indeed, fhews we are capable of miftaking a thing to be in Motion which is not, but doesnot prove that, inthe common acceptation of Motion, a Body is moved meerly becaufe it changes Di{tance from another; fince as foon as we are undeceiv’d, and find that the | moving Force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So on the other hand, when one - only Body (the Parts whereof preferve a given Pofitron between themfelves) . is imagin'd co Exift; fome there are who think that it can be moved 7

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 165

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‘of ways, tho” without any change of

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tion of other Bodies, wou'd produce a ©

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Motion of any certain Quantity and Determination. But that an a@tual Moti-

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on (diftiné&: from the impreffed Force, or aa: productive of Change of Place in cafe there were Bodies prefent whereby to define it} can Exift in fuch a fingle Body, I muft confefs I am not able to comprehend. |

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GY 116. From what has been aa It follows,that the Philofophic Confideration of Motion, does not imply the be-

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- ing of an Abfolute Space, diftinct from

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the like of all other Objects of Senfe. ,

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_ynto the Matter, we fhall find we can— not eyen frame an Idea of Pure Space,

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166 Of the Principles Part I. exclufive of all Body. ThisI muft con-

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_ moft Abftract Idea. When I excite a Motion in fome part of my Body, if it be Free or without Reéfiftance,I fay there is Space : But if'I find a Refiftance, then J fay there is Body : and in proportionas the Refiftanceto Motionisleffer or greater, I fay the Space is more or lefs Pure, So that when I {peak of pure or empty Space,. it is not to be fuppofed, that the Word Space ftands for an Idea diftin& from, or conceivable without Body and Motion. Tho’ indeed, we are apt tothink, every Noun Subftantive ftands for a diftinét Idea, that may be feparated from all others: Which has occafion’d infinite Miftakes. When therefore

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… Pure Space : Thereby nothing elfe is meant, but only that Iconceive it poffible, for the Limbs of my Body to be movd on all fides, without * the leaft Refiftance: But if that too were Annihilated, then there cou’d be no Motion, and conf¢quently no Space,

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 167

Page 167

Some, perhaps, may think the Senfe of

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of Pure Space; butitisplain from what we have elfewhere fhewn, that the Ideas of Space and Diftance are not obtain’d.

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-~ the Learned concerning the nature of

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ral, who have imploy’d their Thoughts . on that Subjeé, imagine themfelves reduced. viz, of thinking either chat Real Spaceis Gop, or. elfe that there is fomething befide Gop which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, Indivifible, Immutable, dc. Both which may juftly be thought pernicious and abfurd Notions. Ic is certain that not a few Divines, as well as Philofophers of great Note,have, from the Difficulty they found in conceiving, either Limits of eae” | | -

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168 «(OF the Principles Part I. of Space, concluded it muft be Divine, And fome of late, have fee themfelves articularly to thew, the Incommuntcable Attributes of Gop agree toit. Which Doctrine, how unworthy foever it may feem of the Divine Nature, yet, I mutt confefs, Ido not See how we can get clear of it, fo long as we adhere to the receiv d Opinions, |

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§ 118. Hitherto of Natural Philofophy : We come now to make fome In-quiry concerning that other great Branch of Speculative Knowlege, viz. Mathe gpatics. Thefe, how Celebrated foever they may be, for their clearnefs and certainty of Demonftration, which ishardly any where ‘elfe to be found, cannot neverthelefs be fuppos’d altogether free from Mittakes, if fobethat in their Principles there lurks fome fecret Error, which is common to the Profeffors of thofe Sciences with the reft of Mankind. Mathematicians, tho’ they deduce their Theorems from a great Height of Evidence, yet their firft Principles are limited by the confideration of ai F |

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Part L of Human Knowlege. 169.

Page 169

… particular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does confequently participate of the Errors involved in them. That the Principles laid down by Mathematicians are true, and their way of Deduction from thofe Prin- ciples clear and inconte¢ftable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may be

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certain Erroneous Maxims of greater

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Extent than the Objeét of Mathematics, and, for that reafon, not exprefly mention i'd, tho’ tacitly fuppofed throughoue the whole progrefs of that Science ; and that the ill effects of thofe fecret, unexamin’d Errors are diffufed thrdé all the Branches thereof. To be plain, we fulpeéctthe Mathematicians are no lefs deeply concern’d than other Men,in the Errors arifing from the Doétrine ‘of Abftract,

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3 General Ideas, and the Exiftence of Ob-

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to have for sts Object, Abftract Ideas of - LZ

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170 = Of the Principles Part I. Number. Of which to underftand the Properties and mutual Habitudes, is fuppofed no mean part of Speculative Knowlege. The Opinion of the pure and intellectual Nature of Numbers in Abftraét, has made ’em in eftcem with thofe Philofophers, who feem to have affected an uncommon Finenefs and - Elevation of Thought.It hath fet a Price ’ on the moft trifling Numerical Speculations, which in practice are of no ufe, but fetve only for Amufement. And hath heretofore fo far infected the Minds of fome, that they have dreamt of mighty Myfteries involved in Numbers, and attempted the Explication of Natural Things by them. But if we narrowly inquireinto ourown Thoughts, and confider what has been premifed, we may perhaps entertainalow Opinion of thofe high Flights and Abftractions, and look on all -Inquiries about Numbers, only as fo many difficiles nuge, fo far as they are not fubfervient to practife, and pro-

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mote the benefit of Life. |

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Part I. of a ended, I7I before confider’d wid. Sef. XII. from |

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trodudion, it plainly follows, there is not any fuch Idea. But Number being defin’daCollefion of Unites, we may conclude that, if there be no fuch thing as

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Ideas of Number in Abftraét denoted by the Numeral Names and Figures,

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- Science of Numbers 3 is f{ubordinate to

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of meer penne

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-fome, who, deluded by the fpecious _ Shew ‘of Difcovering Abftracted Verities, . wate their time in Arithmetical Theo|

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172 Of the Principles Part.I.. fully confider, and expofe the Vanity of that Pretence ; And this will plainly ap- pear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in its Infancy, and obferving what it was that originally put Menon the Study of that Science, and to what Scope they direéted it. Itis natural to think thacat firft, Men, for cafe of Memory and help of -Computation, madeufe of Counters, or in writing of Single Stroaks, Points or the like, each whereof was made to fignifiean Unite #. e. fomeone thing of what-. ever Kind they had occafion to reckon. Afterwards, they found out the more compendious ways, of makingoneCha-_ racter ftand in place of feveral Stroaks, - or Points. And laftly, the Notation of the Arabians or Indians came into.ufe, wherein by the repetition of a few Characters or Figures, and varying the Sig-. nification of each Figure according to the the place it obtains, all Numbers may be moft aptly. exprefs’d : Which feems to have been done in Imitation of | _ Language, fothatan exact Analogy is obferv’d betwixt the Notation by Ficures, and Names, the nine fimple Eioo gures

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Part-I. of Human Knowlege. 173

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ons of the fimple and local Value of Figures, were contrived Methods of finding from the given Figures or Marks of

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… is eafy to ~ read them into Words; and fo the Number becomes perfe@ly known. For then the Number of any particular Things is faid to be known, when we

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… to the ftanding Analogy belong to them.’ For thefe Signs being known, we can by the Operations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of any Part of theparticular Sums © fignified by them; and thus computing in Signs, (becaufe of the connexion eftablith’d betwixe them and the diftinct multitudes of Things, whereof one ts

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… their own fake, but becaufe they dired us how to a¢t with relation to Things, and difpofe ‘rightly of them. Now 2grecably to what we have before ob-

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_ ferv’d, of words in general (vid. Sed.

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. ers, while they do not fuggeft Ideas of

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3174. Of the Principles Part I. | rightly to fum Up, Divide, and Propore |

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. Part L of Human Knowlege. : 175

Page 175

for their own fake wou'd be juft as wife, and to as good purpofe, as if a Man negleating the true Ufe of original Intentionand fubferviency of Language, fhou’d

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to {peak of Axtenfion, which is the Ob-

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ja of Geometry. The Infizite Divifie |

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ility of Aixite Extenfion tho’ it.is not» exprefly laid down, either as an Axiom or Theoreme in the Elements of that _ Science, yet, 1s throughout the fame every. where fuppos’d, and thought to | have fo infeparable and effential a Connexion, with the Principlesand Demon_ itrations in Geometry, that Mathemati-

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the leaft Queftion of it. And.as this No« uionisthe Source from whence do fpring, all thofe Amufing Geometrical a

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176 Of the Principles Part i doxes, which have fuch a direé& Repugnancy to the plain, common Senfe of Mankind, and are admitted with fo much Reluctance, into a Mind not yet debauched by Learning : Soisit the principal occafion of all that nice and ex‘tream Subtlty, which renders the Study of Mathematics fo very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear, that no Finite Extenfion contains innumerable Parts, or is infinitely Divifible, it follows that we hall at once clear the Science of Geometry, froma | great number of Difficulties and Con- tradictions which have ever been efteemed a Reproach to Human Reafon, and withal. make the Attainment thereof, a bufinefs of much lefs Time and Pains, then it hitherto has been.

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§ 124. Every particular, Finite Ex~ tenfion, which may poffibly be the Obje@ of our Thought, is an Idea Exifting: only inthe Mind, and confequently each Part thereof muft be perceiv’d. If, therefore,I cannot perceiveinnumerable Parts, in any Finite Extenfion that.I confider, | ._ % a,

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Part I. of Human Knowlege. 177

Page 177

tenfions I have in View, are no other — than my own Ideas, and it is no Iefs plain, that I cannot ‘refolve any one of . my Ideas, into an infinite Number ' of

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… fomething diftinct from a Finite Ideas I declare do not know what that is, and fo ¢annot affirm of

Page 177

deny any thing of ie.. But if ehe terms |

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to fay, a Finiee Quantity of Extenfiorr |

Page 177

confifts of Parts infinite-in Number, is fo manifeft and glaring a) Contradicti-

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fhou’d: ever gany the affent of any reay

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178 «Of the Principles Part I. to it by gentle and flow. Degrees, as a Pagan Convert to the belief of Zranfubflantiation. Ancient and rooted Prejudices do often pafs into Principles: And thofe Propofitions which once obtain the force and credit of a Principle, are not only themfelves, but likewife whatevers deducible from them, thought privileg’d from all Examination. And there's no Abfurdity fo grofs, which, by this means, the Mind of Man may not be prepared to fwallow. ‘4

Page 178

prepoffeft with the Doétrine of Abitract, general Ideas; may be eafily per{waded,that (whatever be thought of the Ideas of Senfe,)° Extenfion in Abfraé is infinitely Divifible. And any one, who thinks the Obyeéts of Senfe Exift without the Mind, will not ftick to affirm, a Line but an Inch long may contain innumerable Parts, really Exifting, thé too fmall.to be difcern’d. Thefe - Er- rors are grafted, as well in the Minds of Geometricians, as of other Men, and ‘have a like influence on their Reafo-

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Partl. of Human Knowlege. 179:

Page 179

nings ; and it were no difficult thing, to fhew how the Arguments from Géometry made ufe of to fuppore the infinite divifibility of Extenfion, are -bottom’d on them. But this, if ic be thought necef| fary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner. At prefent we fhall only obferve in general, whence it is the Mathema- ticians are all fo fond and tenacious of that Doctrine. | _

Page 179

… Linesand Figures _ included in the Diagram, are fuppofed to f{tand for innumerable Others of difterent Sizes, or, in other Words, the Geometer confiders them abftracting from

Page 179

i180 Of the Principles Part I. but sooks on that as a thing indifferent to the Demontftration : Hence it follows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an Inch long, muft be {poken of, as tho’ it contain’d ten-thoufand Parts, fince it is regarded, not in ic felf, but as it is ~univerfal, and it is univerfal. only in its Signification, whereby it reprefents innumerable Lines greater than it felf, jn which may be diftinguith’d ten-thoufand Parts or more, tho’ there may not in

Page 180

§ 127. Becaufe there isno number of Parts fo great, but its poflible there may —beaLinecontajning more, theInch-line is {aid to contain Parts more than-any aflignable Number; which is true, not of the Inch taken abfolutely, bue only for the things fignified by it, Bur Men

Page 180

Part 1. of Human Knowlege. 181 | contains in it felf Parts innumerable, There is no fuch ching as che ten-thoue fandth Pare of an Inch; but there is of a Mile or Diameter of the Earth, which may be fignified by that Ioch. When. therefore, I Delineate a Trrangle on Paper,

Page 181

ten-thoufandth Part of that Lime, confider'd in it felf, is nothing ac all, and

Page 181

any Error or Inconveniency; yet thefe -

Page 181

dius muft he taken of 10000 Patts or more, | a

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§ 128. — on lias been faid the yeafon is plain why, to the end any Theorem became univerfal in its Ufe, its neceflary we fpeak of the:Lines de(cribcd on Paper, as tha’ they contain’d an

Page 181

182. Of the Principles Part I. which really they do not. In doing of

Page 182

ly, we fhall, perhaps; difcover that we cannot conceive an Inch it felf asconfitting of,or being divifible into,a thoufand Parts, but only fome other Line which 4s far greater than.an Inch, and reprefented by.it. , And that when we fay a Line is infinitely Divifible, We mean (if we mean any thing) a Line which is izfinitely Great, What we have here obferv'd feems to be the chief Caufe, why, to fuppofe the infinite divifibility of Finite Extenfion, has been thought necelfaty 1 in | Geometry.

Page 182

Part L of Human Knowlege. 183

Page 183

Repugnant cou’d have a neceflary con-- nexion with Truth, or flow from it, But whoever confiders the weaknefs of

Page 183

of the Mind, which had rather acquiefce in an indolent Scepticifm, than be at the

Page 183

amination of thofe Principles it has ever embraced for true. . A

Page 183

§ 130. Of late the Speculations about Infinites have run fo high, and grown to fuch ftrange Notions, as have occafion’d no {mall Scruples and Difputes,

Page 183

among the Geometers of the prefenc

Page 183

Age. Some there are of great Note, who not content with holding, that Finice Lines may be divided into an In-

Page 183

finite number of Parts, do yet farther.

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maintain, that each of thofe Infinitefimals is it felf fubdivifible,into an infinicy of other Parts, or Infinitefimals of a fecond Order,and fo on ad seer be I fay, afferc, there are Infinitefimals of

Page 183

infinitefimals of Infinicefimals, dc. with-

Page 183

barely contain an infinte nunvber of -

Page 184

Parts, buc an Infiaity of an Infinity of an Lofinity ad infinitun of Parts.Others there

Page 184

be who hold.,. all orders of Infiniteftmals

Page 184

image there is any pofirive Quantity or Part of Extenfion, which, tho’ multiplyed Infinitely, can never equal the - {malleft given Extenfion. And yet on the other hand, it feems no lefs Abfurd, to think the Square,Cube, or other Pow:

Page 184

pying all of the fubfequent Orders, are

Page 184

fon. to conclude, they are doth in the wrong, and thae. there is.in effect no fach -thitig asParts infimecly Small, of

Page 184

‘an-infinite number of Parts contain d it any Finite Quamity? Buc you'll fay, thar

Page 184

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 185 deftroy'd : And thofe Great Men who, have raifed that Science to fo aftonifhing

Page 185

Geometry, and promotes the benefit of

Page 185

Properties inveftigated, without fuppofang Finite Excenfion to be infinitely Di‘wifible, may be the proper Bufinefs of

Page 185

another ‘place. For tlie reft, tho’ it fhou’d follow that fome of the more intricate. and fubtile Parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared of, without any prejudice to Truth; yet I do not fee, what Damage will be thence derived to Mankind. On the contrary,

Page 185

Men of the greateft Abilities and mott

Page 185

186 | of the Principle Dect I.

Page 186

and imploy them in the ftudy of fuch Things, as lie nearer the concerns of Life, or have a more direct Influence on the Mannets. ,

Page 186

… The» orems undoubtedly true, are difcover’d by methods in which Infinitefimals are made ufe of, which cou’d never have been, if their Exiftence included a con-

Page 186

-a thorough Examination it will not be found, that in any Inftance it is.neceffary to make ufe of or conceive Infinitefimal Parts of finite Lines,or even Quantities lefs than the Minimum Senfibile : Nay it will be evident ‘this: is never done, it being impoffible. And whatever Mathematicians may thinkof Flzxions or the Differential Calculus and the like, a little Reflexion will thew them, that in working by thofe Methods, they : do not conceive or imagine Lines. or ‘Surfaces lefs than what are perceivable to Senfe. They may, indeed, call thofe litle and almoft Infenfible Quantities Infinitefimals or ne mals of Infinitefi~ mals,

Page 186

Part I. of Human cite 187

Page 187

mals, if they pleafe: But at Bottom this 1s all, they being in ‘truth Finite, nor does the Solution of Problemes require the fuppofing any other. But this will be more clearly made out here-

Page 187

Rife, from thofe falfe Principles which were impugned in the foregoing Parts: of this Treatife. And the Oppofites of thofe erroneous Tenents, at the fame time, appear to be moft fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable Confequences highly advantagi« ous, to true Philofophy as well as to Religion. Particularly, Matter or the Abfolute Exiftence of Corporeal Objects,have been thewn to be that wherein the moft

Page 187

‘ avow'd and pernicious Enemies of all

Page 187

; ftinguifhing the real Exiftence of uns

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188 Of the Principles Part I. ceiv'd, and allowing them a Subfiftence of their own out of the Minds of Spirits, no one thing is explained in _ Nature, but, on the contrary, a great many inexplicable Difficulties arife: If the Suppofition of Matter 1s barely. precarious, as not being grounded on fo much as one fingle Reafon : If its Confequences cannot endure the light of . Examination and free Inquiry, but fkreen themfelves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites being Incomprehenfible : If. withal the Removal of. this Matter be not attended wih the -Teaft evil Confequence, if it be not even — miffed in the World, but every thing: as well, nay much eafier conceivd. without it : If i in fine, both Sceptics and. Atheifis are for ever filenced upon fuppofing only Spirits arid Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is perfectly agrecable both to Reafon and Religion : Methinks we may expect it fhowd be admitted and firmly embraced, tho’ it were pro-posd only as an Hypothefis, is, and the Exiftence of Matter had been allow’d poflible, which yet q think, we have

Page 188

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 189

Page 189

§ 134. True x¢ 3s, that in confequence of the foregomg Principles, feveral Difputes and Speculations, which are efteem’d no mean Parts of Learning, are rejected as ufelefs, and in effeét converfant about nothing at all, But how greata Prejudice foever againft our Notions, this may give to thofe who have already been deeply Engag’d, and made large Advances in Studies of that Nature : Yet by Others, we hope it will not be thought any juft ground of Difhke, to the Principles and Tenents” herem laid down, that they abridge the labour of Study, and make Human Sciences far more Clear, Compendious, and Attainable than they were before.

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§ 135. Having difpatch’d what we intended to fay concerning the knowlege of Ideas, the Method we propos’d Jeads us, in the next place, to treat of Sptrits : With regard to which, perhaps, Human Knowlege is not fo de«

Page 189

190 Of | the Principles Part I.

Page 190

ing thought Ignorant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of #. But furely ic ought not to belook’d on as a defect in a Human Underftanding, that it does not perceive the Idea of Spirit, if it is manifeftly impoffible there fhou’d be any fuch Idea. And this if I miftake not, has been demonftrated in Sef XXVII-to which I hhall

Page 190

Part I. of Human Krowlege. 191

Page 191

ons or Ideas of Senfe. But, I belicve,

Page 191

by the terms Soul and Subftance, is only fome particular fort of Idea or Sen{ation. - We may -therefore infer, that, -

Page 191

more reafonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furnifh us with an Idea of Spuirit,~or Active, Thinking Subftance, than it wou’d be if we fhou’d blame them for not being

Page 191

§ 137. From the opinion that Spirits are. to be known after’ the manner of an Idea or Senfation, have rifen many ~ abfurd and heterodox .Tenents, and much Scepticifm about the Nature of the Soul. °’Tis even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a |

Page 191

they had an Idea of it. That an Idea which is Inactive, and the Exiftence whereof confifts in being Perceiv’d, fhou'd be the Image or Likenefs of an

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192 «(OF the Principles Part I. Agent fubfifting by it felf,feems to need no other Refutation, than barely actending <0 what 1s meant by thot Words. But, perhaps, you'll fay, that tho’ an Idea cannot refemble a Spirit, in its Thinking, Acting, or Subfifting by 1c felf, yer 1c may in fome other re{pects: And it 1s not neceffary, that an Idea or Image be in all refpects like the Original. a

Page 192

… it is impoflible it fhou’d re« prefent ic in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Willing, Thinks ing, and Perceiving Ideas, and there remains nothing elfe wherein the Idea can be hike a Spirs. For by the Word Spi‘vit we mean only that which Thinks, Wills, and Perceives, this, and this alone, conftitutes the Signification of that Term. [f, therefore, it 1s impoffible that any degree of thofe Powers, thou'd be rcprefented in an Idea or No~ | tion, ‘tis evident there can be no Idea —or Nouonof a Spirit. © )

Page 192

Part L of Hunian Knowlege. 193,

Page 193

… I was nothing, or that I was an Idea or Notion, nothing coud be more..evidently Abfurd chan either of thefe Propofitions, You'll perhaps, infift, that this.is only Quarrelling at.a Word, and that fince the im-

Page 193

_ mediate fignifications of .other Names,

Page 193

… name Spirit or Soul may not partake in the.fame Appellation. I anfwer, all the Unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that a are intirely Paffive, and their Ex-

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194 Of the Principles Part L. iftence confifts only in being perceiv’d :

Page 194

6 140. In a large Senfe, indeed, we may be faid to have an Idea of Spirit, that is, we underftand the meaning of theWord otherwife we cou’d not affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits, by means of our own, which we fuppofe to be Refemblances of them. So we know other. _ Spirits by means of our own Soul, which, in that Senfe, 1s the Image or Idea of them, it having a like refpect to other Spirits, thac Bluenefs or Heat by me perceiv'd has to thofe Ideas perceiy'd by another. . |

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Part I. of Human Lonial 195

Page 195

¢§ 14. The awed Immortality of

Page 195

the Soul is a neceflary Confequence of

Page 195

the foregoing Doctrine, But before We attempt to prove this, “tis fit that we explain the meaning of that Tenent. It mutt not be fuppofed, that they who

Page 195

- affere the natural Immortality of the

Page 195

Soul are of opinion,that, 1¢ is abfolutely incapable of Annihilation, even by the

Page 195

infinite power of the Creator, who — firft gave it Being. But only that it is

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not liable to be broken, or diffolv’d, by the ordinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of

Page 195

- Syftem of animal Spirits, make it Per-

Page 195

… more eafily diffipated than fuch a Being, which it 1s naturally impoffible fhou’d furvive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it 1s: inclos’d. And this Notion has been. greedily embraced, and cherifh’d by the worft Part of Mankind, as the mott effe€tual Antidote againtt all Impreffions af Vertue and Religion. - But it has

Page 195

196 Of the Principles Part I.

Page 196

- been made evident, that Bodies, of what

Page 196

frame. of Texture foever, are barely

Page 196

… Active, Sitnple, Uncompourided Sub{tance : Such a being, therefore, is Indiffoluble by the force of Nature, that. is to fay, the Soul of Man is naturally Immortal, _* |

Page 196

… that otir Souls are not to be known in the fame manner as. fenfelefs, inactive Objects, or by way of Idea. Spirits and Ideas are things fo wholly different, that when we fay, they Exift, they are Known, or the like,. '-{¢ Words mutt not be thought to.

Page 196

Part I.. of Human Knowlege. 197 fignifie agg common to both NaThere is nothing alike or. common in them : And to:expect; that by any multiplication. or. enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, feems as Abfurd as if we fhou’dhope to fee a Sound. This is inculcated becaufe — I imagine it may be of Moment, towardsclearing feveral important Quefti-

Page 197

rous Errors concerning the Nature of the Souk = —

Page 197

— § 143..It will not be amifs to add, that the Doétritic of Abfraé Ideas has had no {mall thare, in rendering thofe Sciences Intricate.and obfcure, which are particularly converfant about Spiritual Things. Men have imagin’d they coud frame abftraéé Notions, of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, and con’ fider them prefcinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it felf, as from their

Page 197

a great number of dark and ambiguous Terms, prefum’d to ftand for abftrat -. eS — -. Notions,

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198 Of the Principles Part I. Notions, have been introduced into Metaphyfics and Morality, and from thefe have grown Infinite Diftractions and Difputes amongft the Learned.

Page 198

… towards engaging Men in Controverfies and Miftakes, with regard to the Nature.and Operations of the Mind, than the being ufed to fpeak of thofe things,in Terms borrow’'d from fenfible Ideas. For Example, The Will 1s termed the Motioz of the Soul: This -infufes a Belief, that che Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impell’d and determind by the Objects of Senfe, as neceffarily as thatis by the Stroak of-a Racket. Hence arife endlefs Scruples and Errors of dangerous Confequence in Morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and. Truth appear Plain, Uniform, and Confiftent, cou’d but Philofophers be prevail’d on, to depart from fome recely d prejudices and modes of Speech, and retiring into themfelves attentively confider their-own meaning. But the Difficulties arifing on this Head, demand

Page 198

Part tL of Human Sia 199

Page 199

with the Defign of this Treatifc. | 6 145. From Giué has been faid, "us.

Page 199

plain, that we cannot know the Exiftence of other Spirits, otherwife than by

Page 199

their Operations, or the Ideas by them excited in us. I perceive feveral Motions,’ Changes, and Combinations of I-.

Page 199

have of other Spirits is not immediate,

Page 199

as is the.Knowlege of my Ideas, but depending on the Interyention of Ideas, by me. refer’d to Agents or Spirits die ftin& from my iclf, as lenis OL COncomitant Signs. |

Page 199

vident to every one, that thofe things which are call’d the works of Nature, i. e. the far greater part of the Ideas or Senfations perceived by us, are not pro-

Page 199

200 Of the Principles Part I

Page 200

duced. by, or dependent ion, the Wilis of Men... There is therefore fome other Spirit that caufes them, fince it is repug-

Page 200

felves. See Seat. XXIX. But if we attentively confider the conftant Regularity, ‘Order, and Cancatenation of Nacural Things, the furprifing Magnificence, Beauty and Perfection.of the Jar-

Page 200

ger, and the Exqurfice Contrivance of

Page 200

the fmaller Parts of the-Creation, together with the exact Harmony and Correfpondence of sthe whole, but, above all, the never enough admir’d Laws of Pam and Pleafure, and the In-

Page 200

and Pafhians of ‘Antmals,I fayaf-we confider all thafe things, and atthe fame . time attend to. the meaning :and import of the Attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wafe, “Good and Perfeét, we

Page 200

Part [.. of Hunias on 201 diately as any other Mind or ' Spiric whatfoever, diftinct from our «felves.

Page 201

~ We may even affert, that the. Exiftence of Gop is far more evidently perceiv'd than the Exiftence of Men; becaufe the ~

Page 201

Effects of Nature are infinitely more nu-_ merous and confiderable, than thofe af-_ cribed to Human Agents. There is not any one Mark that denotes a Man, or Effect produced by him, which does not more ftrongly evince ‘the Being of | that Spirit, who is the Author of Nature. For it is evidenc that-in affecting other | Perfons, the will of Man has no other Object, than barely the Motion of the Limbs of his Body, but that fuch a Motion fhou’d be attended by, or excite,

Page 201

-any Idea in the Mind of another, de-

Page 201

pends wholly on the Will of the CreaTor, He alone it is who, zpholding all things by the word of his Power, maintains thac Intercourfe between Spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the Exiftence of each other. And yet’ this pure and clear Light which enlightens every: one, is it felf invifible to the

Page 201

-greateft part of Mankind.

Page 201

202 Of the Principles Part L

Page 202

§ 148 Ic fees to be a general Pretence of the Unthinking Herd,that they cannot fee Gov. Coud we but fee him, fay they, as we fee a Man, we fhou d believe that he is, and believing -obcy his. Commands. But alas we need only epen our Eyes to fee the Sovereign Lord of all Things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our Fellow-Creatures. Not that Iimagine, we fee Gop (as fome will have it) by a direct and immediate View, or fee Corporeal Things, not by themfelves but, by feeing that which reprefents them in the Effence. of Gop, — which Dectrine is, I muft confefs, to “me Iacomprehenfible. But I fhall explain my Meaning. A Human Spirit or Perfon is not perceiv’'d by Senfe, as not being an Idea; when therefore we ~ fee the Colour, Size, Figure, and Motions of a Man, we perceive only certain Senfations or Tdeas excited in our own ‘Minds: And thefe, being exhibited to our view in fandry, diftinét Colle@ions

Page 202

Part I. of Human ‘tethn 203

Page 203

of Finite, and Created Spirits like our felves. Hence ’tis plain, we do not {ce a Man, if by Maz is meaat that which Lives, Moves, Perceives, and Thinks as we do: But only fucha certain Collection of Ideas, as directs us to think there is a diftinét Principle of Thought and

Page 203

fame manner we fee Gop; all the difference is, that, whereas fome one finite and narrow affemblage of Ideas de-

Page 203

therfoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places, perceive manifeft Tokens of the Divinity: Every thing we See, Hear, Fecl or any wife perceive by Senfe, being a Sign or Ef-

Page 203

fect of the Power of Gop: as is our

Page 203

Perception of thofe very Motions, which are produced by Men, -

Page 203

§ 149. "Tis therefore sas that nos thing can be more evident to any ome that’s capable of the leaft Reflexion, than the Exiftence of Gon, or a Spirit who is intimately prefent to our Minds,

Page 203

204. Of the Principles Part I.

Page 204

producing in them all that variety of Ideas or Senfations, which continually affect us,on whom we have an abfolute and intire Dependence, in fhort iz whom. we Live, and Move, and have our Being.

Page 204

That the Difcovery of this great Truth . which lies fo near and obvious to’ the » Mind, fhou’d be attain’d to by the Rea-. fon of fo very few, is a fad. inftance of the Stupidity and Inattention of Men,

Page 204

who, thd they are Surrounded with fuch clear manifeftations of the Deity, are yet fo little affe@ted by them, that _ they feem, as it were, blinded with excefs of Light, |

Page 204

§ 150. But you'll fay has a no fhare in the Production of Natural Things, and muft they be all afcrib’d tothe immediate and fole Operation of Gop? I anfwer, if: by Nature is meant only the vifible Series of Effects, or Senfations imprinted on our Minds, according to certain fixt and general Laws : Then ‘tis plain, that Nature taken in this Senfe cannot produce any ching at all. But by Nature is meant

Page 204

— Part 1. of Human Knowlege. 205

Page 205

fome Being diftinét from Gop, as well as from the Laws of Nature, and things perceiv'd by Senfe, I muft confefs, that

Page 205

to it. Nature, in this Acceptation, is a vain Chimeba introduced by thofe Heathens, who had not juft Notions of the | Omniprefence and infinite Perfection

Page 205

of Gop. But it is more unaccounta-

Page 205

… belief in the Holy Scriptures, which conftantly afcribe thofe Effects to the immediate Hand of | Gop, that Heathen Philofophers are. wont to impute to Nature. The Lorv, he caufeth the Uapours to afcend; he mak= —

Page 205

forth the Wind out of his Treafures. Jerem. © Chap. to. v. 13. He turneth the fhadow of Death into the Morning, and maketh. the Day dark with Night. Atmos Chap. 5. v8. He vifiteth the Earth, and maketh it foft with Showers : He bleffeth the Springing thereof, and crowneth the. Tear with © his Goodnefs; fo thatthe Paftures are:cloath—

Page 205

206 Of the Principles Part I, over with Corn. See Pfal. 65. But notwithftanding that this is the con{tant Language of Scripture; yet we have I know not what Averfion from believing, tha. Gop concerns himfelf fo nearly in our Affairs. Fain wou’d we fuppofe him. at a great diftance off, and fubftieute . fome blind, unthinking Deputy in his ftead, tho (if we may believe Saint Paa/) be be not far from every one of us,

Page 206

… I doubt not, be objected, that the flow, gradual and roundabout Methods obferv’d in the Production of Natural Things, do not feem to have for their Caufe the imrhediate Hand of an Almighty Agent. 'Befides, Monfters, untimely Births, Fruits blafted in the Blofflom, Rains falling in defert Places, Mauferies incident to Human Life, and the like, are fo many arguments that the hole frame of Nature, is not immediately actuated and fuperitended by a Spiric of infinite Widom and Goodnefs. But the Anfwer to this Objection is ina good meafure plain from Se. LXII, it being

Page 206

Part 1. of Sis Knowlege. 207

Page 207

vifible, that the aforefaid Methods of Nature are abfolutely neceffary, in ore | der to working by the moft fimple and

Page 207

confiftent Manner; which argues both — the Wifdom and Goodnefs of Gop. For, .

Page 207

it doth hence follow, chat the Finger of Gop is not fo confpicuous to the refolv’d and carelefs Sinner, which gives . him an oppertunity to harden in his Impiety, and growripetor Vengeance. vid.

Page 207

crivance of this mighty Machine of Nature, that whilft ics Motions and various Phenomena ftrike on our Senfes, — the Hand which aétuates the whole is

Page 207

it felf unperceivable to Men of Fleth and Blood. Verily (faith the Prophet) thou art a Gop that. hidefi thy felf. Ifaiah

Page 207

Chap. 4s. ver. 15. But thé the Lord con~ ceal himfelf from the Eyes of the Sen_ ~ fual and Lazy, who will not be at the

Page 207

leaft expence of Thought; yet to an | unbiaffed and arcentive Mind, nothing can be more plainly legible, than the ©

Page 207

antimate Prefence of an Ad/-wife Spirit,

Page 207

208 Of the Principles Part J, the whole Syftem of Beings. . Second-

Page 208

… ace cording to. general and {tated Laws, is fo neceflary for our Guidance in the ‘afe fairs of Life, and. letting.us into the Secret of Nature, that without it, all Reach and Compafs of Thought, all ~ Human Sagacity and Defign cou’d ferve to no manner.of Purpofe : It were - even. impoffible, there fhou’d be any . fuch Faculties or Powers in the Mind,vid. Set. XXXI. Which one Confideration abundantly out-ballances whatever particular Inconveniences may thence arife.

Page 208

~ § rg2. But we fhou’d further confider, that the-very Blemifhes and Defects of Nature are not without their Ufe, in that they make an agreeable fort of Variety, and augment the Beauty of the -reft of the Creation, as Shades in a Pi“ture ferve to fet off the brighter and more enlighten’d Parts. We wou'd ~ likewife do well to examine, whether our taxing the Wafte of Seeds and Embryo’s,..and. accidental Deftruction of

Page 208

Part I. of Human Knowlege.. 209 Plants and Animals, before they come to full Maturity, as an’ Imprudence in. the Author of Nature, be not the effect |

Page 209

of, Prejudice, contracted by our Fami--

Page 209

= nagement of thofe “Things, which’ he

Page 209

explicably fine Machine of an Animal:

Page 209

~ every thing, by a meer Fiat or act of

Page 209

.f{plendid Profufion of ‘Natural Things

Page 209

fhou’d not be interpreted, Weaknefs or Prodigality in the Agent who produces them, but rather be look’d on as an Argument of the Riches of his Power.

Page 209

§ 153. As for the mixture of Pain

Page 209

p10 - Of the Principles Part I. purfuant to the General Laws of Nature, and the Actions of Finite, Imperfect Spirits ; This, in the State we are in at prefent, is indifpenfibly neceflary to —

Page 210

our Well-being. Butour Profpects are _ too narrow: We take, for Inftance, the Idca of fome one particular Pain into. our Thoughts, and account it Evil; whereas if we enlarge our View, fo as to comprehend the various Ends, Con_ nexions, and Dependencies of things, on what Occafions and in what Proportions, we are affected with Pain and Pleafure, the Nature of Human Freedom, and the Defign with which we are put into the World ; we-thall be forced to acknowlege that thofe particular Things, which confider’d in themfelves appear to be Evil, have the Nature of Good, when confider’das link’d with the whole . Syftem of Beings.

Page 210

.. § 154. From what has been faid it will be manifeft to any Confidering Perfon, that it’s meerly for want of attention and comprchenfivencts of —

Page 210

that there are any Favourers of Atheifn or the Manichdan Herefie to. be found.

Page 211

Little. and unreflecting Souls may, indeed,: Burlefque the Works: of Providence, the Beauty and Order whereof they have not Capacity, or will not be

Page 211

who are Matters of any juftnefs and ex-

Page 211

— tent of Thought and are withal ufed

Page 211

to reflect, can never fufficiently admire the Divine Traces of Wifdom and Goodnefs, that fhine throughout the Occonomy of Nature. But what Truth is there which glares fo ftrongly onthe Mind, that by an averfion of Thought, a wilful fhutting of the Eyes, we may not cfcape feeing it, at leaft with a full and dire&t view ? Is it therefore © to be wonder’d at, if the generality

Page 211

of Men, who are ever intent on Bufi| nefs or Pleafure, and little ufed to fix or open the Eye of their Mind, fhou’d not have all that Conviction ‘and Evidence of the Being of Gop, which might be expected in Reafonable

Page 211

212 of ae Prinipls ‘Part I.

Page 212

they fhou’d be unconvinced ‘of;. fuch an evident and momentous Truth, And yet it 1s to be fedr’d that tog mamy of Parts and Leifure, who live

Page 212

thro a fupine and ‘dreadful Negligence funk into a fort of Demy-Atheifm.

Page 212

there is. For what elfe can it be but fome lurking Infidelity, fome fecret mifgivings of Mind, with regard to the Exiftence and Attributes: of Gop, which permits Sinners to grow and harden in Impiety? Since itis downright impoflible, that a Soul pierced

Page 212

and. enlighten’d with a thorough Senfe | of the Omniprefence, Holinefs, and

Page 212

Juttice of that Almighty Spirit, fhou’d perfift in a remorflefs Violation of

Page 212

Part I. of Human Knowlege. 213

Page 213

attain Conviction. without .all Scru. ple, that the Fyes of the. Legp are in

Page 213

immediate Dependence on Him. A clear View of which great Truths cannot chufe but fill our Hearts, with an awful Circumfpection and . holy Fear, which is the ftrongeft Incentive to Vertue, andthe beft Guard ‘a-

Page 213

— § 156. For afterall, what deferves — the firft place in our Studies, is the Confideration of Gov, ‘and our Dz-

Page 213

the main drift and defign of my La-. bours, fo fhall I efteem them altoge-

Page 213

er 4 of the & Principles Part tC

Page n223

Readers with a pious Senfe of the Prefence of Gon! And having théwn the Falfenefs or. Vanity of thofe barren Speculations, which make’ the chief Employment of Learned Men, the better difpofe them to reverence and embrace . the Salutary Truths of the Gosps, _ which to Know and to Praétife, is the hugnelt Perfection of Human Nature.

Page n223

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Part I. Wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are Inquir’d into.

by: Berkeley, George, 1685-1753

Publication date: 1710
Usage: Public Domain Mark 1.0
Topics: Philosophy, Knowledge, Theory of, Idealism
Publisher: Dublin : Printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy [i.e., Jeremiah] Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner-Row
Collection: folkscanomy_philosophy; folkscanomy
Language: English
Item Size: 272.7M

George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Part I. Wherein the Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are Inquir’d into. (1st edition) (Dublin: Printed by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy [i.e., Jeremiah] Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner-Row, 1710; OCLC 3766934).

No other part was published.

Source: Google Books (https://books.google.com/books?id=cbVjAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover).

iii, [3], 214 p. 21 cm.

Addeddate: 2023-04-25 15:35:13
Collection_added: folkscanomy
additional_collections
Identifier: berkeleyhumanknowledge
Identifier-ark: ark:/13960/s2d46c5q7mz
Lccn: 10032116
Ocr: tesseract 5.3.0-3-g9920
Ocr_detected_lang: en
Ocr_detected_lang_conf: 1.0000
Ocr_detected_script: Latin
Ocr_detected_script_conf: 1.0000
Ocr_module_version: 0.0.21
Ocr_parameters: -l eng
Openlibrary: OL6525670M
Page_number_confidence: 94.17
Pages: 224
Ppi: 600
Scanner: Internet Archive HTML5 Uploader 1.7.0
Source: https://books.google.com/books?id=cbVjAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover
Worldcat (source edition): 3766934
Year: 1710

Full catalog record: MARCXML

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