The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796) [1 ed.] 083872020X, 9780838720202

Table of contents :
Contents
Abbreviations
Schelling Bibliography
Preface
Introduction
Biographical note on Schelling

1. On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy (1794)
Translator’s Notes

2. Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy (1795)
Translators Notes

3. Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795)
Prefatory Remark
First Letter
Third Letter
Fourth Letter
Fifth Letter
Sixth Letter
Seventh Letter
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Translator’s Notes

4. New Deduction of Natural Right(1796)
§1
§100

Appendix
A
B
C. References to Kant
D. Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843): Judgment and Being

Indexes
Subject Index

Citation preview

The Unconditional in Human Knowledge Four Early Essays ( 1794 - 1796 )

by F. W. J. Schelling Translation and Commentary by Fritz M arti

l.ewisburg Hue knell University Press London: Associated University l*resses

'• / %■

T h e Young Schelling A draw ing of 1808 or 1809 by Josef Klotz. Courtesy of the M ünchner Stadtmuseum

© 19 80 b y A ssociated U niversity Presses, Inc.

Associated University Presses, Inc. Cranbury, New Jersey 08512

Associated University Presses Magdalen House 136-148 Tooley Street London SE1 2TT, England

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Schelllng, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. The unconditional in human knowledge. Include* bibliographies and indexes. CONTENTS: 1. On the possibility of a form of all philosophy. —2. Of the I as principle of philosophy, or On the unconditional in human knowledge. —3. Philolophlcal letters on dogmatism and criticism.—4. New deduction of natural right. I. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 —Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Philosophy — Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Title. BI7B8.S17 1979 193 77-74407 ISBN 0-8S87-2020-X O ther books by Fritz M arti:

A Philosophical Glossary Rtligwti, Reason and Man Htligion and Philosophy On Btinn Human by Fritz Medicus (translator)

I'KINTKD IN 11 IK IINITKI) S T A IR S OK AMKKICA

To my students and colleagues of 1923 to 1973 and to my gracious hosts at the University of Notre Dame du Lac

Contents Abbreviations Schelling Bibliography Preface Acknowledgments Introduction Biographical Note on Schelling

9 11 13 15 17 29

F o u r E a r l y E ssa y s o f S c h e l l i n g

Translator’s Introduction 1 On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy Translator’s Notes

35

38 56

T ranslator’s Introduction 2 Of the I as Principle of Philosophy, or On the Unconditional in Hum an Knowledge Translator’s Notes

63 129

T ranslator’s Introduction 3 Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism Translator’s Notes

151 156 197

T ranslator’s Introduction 4 New Deduction of Natural Right Translator’s Notes

219 221 247

Appendix A: K ant’s Publications after 1780 Appendix B: Publications by Kant and Others Pertinent to Schelling’s Beginnings Appendix C: References to Kant Appendix D: Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843); Judgm ent and Being Indexes Subject Index Index of Names

253

7

59

255 • 257 261 263 264 270

Abbreviations

PuR Pro I PrR CrJ Beck

Kant

Bernard Cass. Diels

H erm ann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912) Johann G. Fichte, Science o f Knowledge, trans. Peter H eath and John Lachs (New York: Apple­ ton. Century-Crofts; Meredith Corporation, 1970) G.L. Plitt, ed., Aus Schelling Leben. In Briefen, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1869-70) Kant PuR, trans. Norm an Kemp Smith (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1965) John Wild, ed., Spinoza. Selections (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930) Fichte’s own occasional abbreviation of Wissen­ schaftslehre

Heath

Plitt Smith Wild WL

Poss. Of I Dug in NR

Critique o f Pure Reason Prolegomena Critique o f Practical Reason Critique o f Judgm ent Prol, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobb-Merrill, 1950) Foundations o f the M eta­ physics o f Morals, trans. L.W. Beck (Indiana­ polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959) PrR, trans. L.W . Beck (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1956) CrJ, trans. J.H . Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1961) Ernst Cassirer, ed., Kants Werke, 11 vols. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912-22)

Schelling

On the Possibility o f a Form o f A ll Philosophy O f the I as Principle o f Philosophy Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism New Deduction o f Natural Right 9

10

TH E U N CONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

O riginal Editions Used Flehte, Werke, 11 vols. (Leipzig: M ayer an d M üller, n .d .) Ilrg rl, Werke, 19 vols. (Leipzig: D uncker u n d H um blot, 1831-87) Sclirlling, W erke, 14 vols. (S tu ttg art and A ugsburg: J .G . C otta, 1856-

Schelling Bibliography

Brown, Robert F. Schelling’s Treatise on “The Deities o f Sam othrace.” A Translation and an Interpretation. American Academy of Religion, Studies in Religion. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977. Pp. 64-65. Jost, Johannes. F. W.J. von Schelling, Bibliographie der Schriften von ihm und über ihn. Bonn, 1927. M arquet, Jean-François. Liberté et existence. Etude sur la form ation de la philosophie de Schelling. Paris: Gallimard, 1973. Pp. 587-90. Sandkühler, Hans Jörg. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970, pp. 24-41. Schneeberger, Guido. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Eine Bibliographie. Bern, 1954. Tilliette, Xavier. Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir. Paris: Vrin, 1970. 2:507-14. Zeltner, Herm ann. Schelling-Forschung seit 1954. Darm stadt: Wissen­ schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975. Pp. 3-4, 109-15. To facilitate reference to specific pages of Schelling’s German text, the page number of each is inserted at the appropriate place in brackets throughout the translations of the four essays. This same original pagination is also used in the translator’s notes when Schelling’s essays are referred to. T he same bold ciphers appear at the inner top corner of each page.

Preface I translated Schelling’s Letters on Dogmatism, and Criticism in 1930, encouraged by Professor A rthur O. Lovejoy of The Johns Hopkins University, who even penciled some emendations on my first draft. In the thirties my friend James Gutmann used typescript copies in his seminar at Columbia University. His translation of O f H um an Freedom was printed at his expense. Then his pupil Frederick Bolman translated and commented The Ages o f the World as his doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, whose Press published it. But the mood of the age was not favorable to Schelling. A few years ago I put my old copies of the Letters in the hands of my students at Southern Illinios University at Edwardsville, and they confirmed my long-held opinion that the essay is a good introduction to post-Kantian speculation. They also pointed out many of the m ain diffi­ culties that might confront a reader who is neither at home in Kant nor familiar with Fichte. It is that reader whom I kept in m ind while rewriting the translation of the Letters and while translating the other three essays contained in this volume. My commentary notes are placed at the ends of the essays, so that the reader who does not need them can read Schelling without tutorial interruptions. The commentary is frankly tutorial because I still harbor the hope that professional philosophers in America will study more seriously the consequences of K ant’s revolution, especially as they are seen in Schelling, and that the dogmatic division between so-called idealism and realism will no longer confuse students. My wife, Gertrude Austin Marti, deserves the main credit if my trans­ lations are readable. My editor, Mrs. Mathilde E. Finch, contributed innumerable small but pertinent emendations. My own stubbornness is to be blamed if, in my endeavor to follow Schelling’s German closely, the translation will in spots takes liberties with English. South Bend, Indiana Fritz Marti All Saints’ Day, 1977

13

Acknowledgments I would like to thank the following publishers for permission to reprint m aterial under copyright: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., for quotations from Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, and Critique o f Practical Reason, translated by Lewis Beck. Copyright © 1950, 1959, 1956 respectively by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., for quotations from Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Judgm ent, translated and with Introduction by J. H. Bernard. Copyright © 1961 by Hafner Press. Metaphilosophy, for permission to reprint my translation of Schelling’s “On the Possibility of a Form for All Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy 6 , no. 1 (January 1975):l-24. Prentice-Hall, Inc., for quotations from Johann G. Fichte, Science o f Knowledge, edited and translated by Peter H eath and John Lachs. Copyright © 1970 by Appleton-Century-Crofts. Reprinted by Permis­ sion of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. St. M artin’s Press, Inc., and Macmillan & Co., Ltd., for quotations from Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, translated by Norm an Kemp Smith. Copyright © 1965 by St. M artin’s Press, Inc. Charles Scribner’s Sons, for quotations from Spinoza Selections, edited by John Wild. Copyright 1930 by Charles Scribner’s Sons.

15

Introduction

On Translation Poems are untranslatable. Depart from the original words and you lose their music. T h at music is like the color of a painting. Omit the color and you have a black-and-white textbook illustration. It may be didactically useful, yet it lacks the life of the painting. Poems must be heard, not read —heard inwardly, for the poet himself may be a poor speaker who kills the music when he reads his own poem aloud. A poem is alive because each word stands in the right place. Change the order, and the poem is gone. It is a pedagogic crime to ask pupils to say in prose what the poet m eant. The poem’s words alone can say it. Poems are untranslatable because their wording is final. Theirs is the finality of heaven, for there is no further place to go. Each poem offers its own celestial peace. This is why religious language is poetical. However, religious enunciations also have another kind of finality; they claim to be true. T ruth ought to be the concern of everyone and therefore must speak to everyone in his own language. Beauty is for men of taste. Only those attuned to the specific language used by the poet can appreciate it. Of course, the very perfection of each work of beauty invites all to partake of it, and all should learn each respective language. But the poet is not a missionary. He may be sorry if you cannot like his poem, but he will not call you sinful. In my opinion, original sin is lack of concern for the truth. The missionary will try to help you overcome what he calls your hardness of heart. Therefore he may find it necessary to bring his message closer to you by translating it into terms with which you are familiar. Still, homiletic work is casework, and the home base of religion is its poetic language and its liturgy. Compared with the universality of philosophy, the religions appear provincial. Philosophy is not a m atter of denominational schools, nor does it have one sacred language. Whatever is philosophically true ought to appeal to man as man. Therefore every philosophical formulation demands transla-

17

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TH E UN CONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

lion an d retranslation. T his is why philosophy has a genuine history. Rrligious words seem timeless. Philosophy dem ands perpetual aggiornam ento. It m ust be up-to-date. Its tru th s are reb o rn by translation. Language can be a b a rrie r which then calls for the spadework of tra n s­ lators. H alf a century of such lab o r has tau g h t m e th a t there is only one excuse for translations: they can save tim e. A nd they have only one value: (hey force us to read the original m ore searchingly. W hen the student has reached th a t point and m asters the language in question, then he is ready for (he genuine work of translating philosophy —the labor of philosophical historiography, the translation from thinker to thinker, the history of Uleaa. T h a t is the real translation, the discovery of the life of tru th . T h a t real translation exposes the basic honesty o f philosophy, its openness. In 1804, in his second lecture on The Basic Traits o f the Present Age, Fichte spoke thus of the a rt of philosophizing: “Every other art, like poetry, music, pain tin g , proceeds w ithout, at the same tim e, m aking explicit the rules of its procedure. It is the self-transparent art of philosophilln g which alone may not take a single step w ithout stating sim ultaneouily the reason why it takes it” (7:16). In the th ird lecture he says: “the very rule* of this a rt dem an d th a t the philosopher be absolutely honest and proceed openly. In retu rn he has the power of telling his hearers in advance what he will produce in them and, if they will but understand him , the power of producing it w ith certainty” (7:38).

H istorical B ackground K ant is not the first one who distinguished betw een w hat he called V$rstand (ratiocination and, in a narrow er sense, objective thinking) and V tm u n ft (reason and, less technically, sound sense). It is Vernunft, he la id , th at always seeks the unconditional, while Verstand is concerned with the conditional. K ant has the m erit of introducing two clearly defined trrim , and of resting their definition on functional use rath e r th an on custom ary psychological term inology. His is no m ere new sem antic fashion. A cadem ic fashions can be disposed o f easily. O ne way is to expose their questionable efficacy; the other is simply to wait until they get out of fashion. I prefer the latter; it saves energy and credits the fashion m akers with intelligence th at will discover their own shortcom ings. In 1802, in a review of the French publication entitled Philosophie de Kant by Charles Villers (Metz: Colignon, 1801), Schelling confessed his suspicions "that Kant's philosophy might be a provincialism or at least a G erm anism " (5: 185). Insofar as it might be th at, we should not need to use hi* two words, Verstand an d V ernunft, nor to spend our labor on

INTROD UCTION

19

finding English equivalents. B ut the distinction th a t these words express is as old as occidental philosophy itself. Parm enides, P lato an d Plotinus share th e distinction betw een I," which presupposes the theorem “I = I .” T h e third form , conditioned by the two suprem e ax ­

[1 0 9 ]

ON T H E POSSIBILITY OF A FORM OF ALL PHILOSOPHY

53

ioms, can therefore only com bine the form of assertion an d negation but can never be either one of the two.* 3. A ccording to m odality, the form which stands u n der the original form o f being unconditionally posited can only be the form of possibility, because only the form of possibility is unconditional, though in itself [it is] an absolute condition of all reality. Even the theorem 1 = 1, inasm uch as it is posited unconditionally, has only possibility.'9. T he form of m odality, w hich stands u n d er the original form of being conditionally posited, is the form of reality, because a conditional theorem is given by a conditioning one, an d the logicians of older an d m ore recent times never created a m ore erroneous theorem th an the one w hich claims th a t hypothetical theorem s relate [109] only to possibility. A com bination of both forms yields a reality determ iend by possibility, th a t is necessity. In this m anner all identical theorem s are necessary. Inasm uch as they are unconditional, they stand u n d er the form of possibility; inasm uch as they are conditioned by them selves,** they are u n d er th e form of reality. T h e theorem I = I as a categorical theorem is m erely possible, yet inasm uch as it is not condition­ ed by a superior theorem b u t ra th e r through itself, it becomes a necessary theorem . It is therefore obvious th a t identical theorem s express merely a p articu lar form which stands u n d er the general form of analytic theorem s. T hus it becomes clear th a t every identical theorem m ust be a categorical one, b u t not vice versa, an d for th a t reason the original form of all philosophy is not a form of identity subordinated to a higher form , b u t in ­ stead the form of being unconditionally posited, as such. For th a t very reason the theorem I = I is not the basis for identity b u t for the form of b e­ ing unconditionally posited as original form . For it is only owing to the la t­ ter th a t the form of identity exists in the theorem itself. T herefore, in the theorem one can recognize as original form only th a t form which is no longer conditioned by the theorem itself. T hus we have an explanation for our p arad o x th a t the theorem [I = I] can, as categorical theorem , stand

• T h e form of assertion is not identical with th e form of being unconditionally po sited , though it is d eterm in ed by it. For one can also im agine a negation being unconditionally posited (in th e th ird m odus). Yet exactly this possibility o f a n eg atio n ’s being unconditionally posited presupposes the form of negation as such, an d th a t in tu rn presupposes a form o f affirm atio n as such. T hese two form s can be com bined into a th ird one, so th a t th ro u g h the u nconditional positing o f a neg atio n arise those theorem s w hich logicians call infinite. • • T o be u n co n d itio n ally posited an d to be conditioned by itself are two d ifferen t things. A th eo rem ca n be u n co n ditionally posited w ithout having to be co nditioned by itself, b u t n ot the reverse. But the suprem e axiom of all science being th e axiom of u n conditioned form an d u n co n d itio n ed co n tent as such, an d thus being the axiom th ro u g h w hich it is a t all possi­ ble to posit an y th in g u nconditionally m ust not only be unconditional as such, b ut also be co n ditioned by itsllV. T h e fact th at the suprem e axiom is conditioned by itself belongs to its conten t; th at it is u nconditionally posited belongs to its exterior form , which is necessarily in ­ duced by its c o n te n t.

54

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOW LEDGE

[ 1 1 0 ,1 1 1 ]

u n der the form of mere possibility, an d only inasm uch as it does stand u n der it, can it becom e the principle of all content and all form o f a science. T here still rem ains th e question as to the origin of the three orders of quantity , quality, and m odality, according to which the respective deriva­ tive form s have been classified. [110] T h e answer is easy. T hey are given directly w ith the suprem e axiom , an d simply could have been developed from it as d atu m (als etwas Gegebenes). For if one knows at all w hat should be understood by a deduction of these orders, one realizes th a t it is im possi­ ble to deduce them from an already-existing concept. By absolute necessity they m ust be deduced as a fact from a principle which expresses a fact as su ch .’" Being determ ined in this m an n er, the originally given content of all knowledge (the I, the n ot-I, a n d the prod u ct of both) is at the same time the form o f all science, ju st as the content is possible only u n d er the condi­ tion of the form . Parallel w ith this deduction of the form of knowledge as such, one would find th e deduction of the form which, in the p articular parts of the original content, is determ ined by the original form . T his is quite n a tu ra l, since the same principle sim ultaneously determ ines both content an d form , and for th a t very reason determ ines both the m aterial and th e form al form (the one th a t originally pertains to the content, and the one u n d er which it is posited). Aenesidemus seems to have presented cogent evidence when he questioned R einhold’s deduction of the original form o f subject an d object. Besides, one could ask —as Aenesidemus did not —why R einhold had deduced only one kind of the forms o f subject and object which are subordinate to the original form , an d why he did not deduce the form of im agination (Vorstellung) at all.** It is precisely such a com plete deduction of the entire form of subject, object, and im age [ 1 1 1 ] th a t would have nullified alm ost all o f Aenesidem us’s objections. O nce it is proved th a t the form o f the subject as such is the form o f unconditionality and the form of the object is conditionality (being conditioned by the sub­ ject), then it follows autom atically th a t the subject in the th ird (in the im ­ agination) always stands [in relation] to the object as d eterm inant to the d eterm inable (as unity to m ultiplicity, reality to negation, possibility to reality). In short, all o th er theorem s of E lem entary Philosophy follow con­ clusively and m ore naturally th an in the Theory o f Im agination, from the one theorem for which there is no basis in R einhold’s deduction. But I am beginning to go beyond the limits of my topic. •T hin is valid also for R einhold’s d ed u ctio n of these form s w hich, incidentally, in a form al respect, is a m asterpiece of philosophical a rt. R einhold also h ad to presuppose th e form s of unity an d m ultiplicity, in o rd er to d educe them along w ith the others. " L e t it be laid in passing th a t every im age (V orstellung) as such is necessary according to m ixU lity, w hatever it» co n ten t. T h is is it» form d eterm in ed by the suprem e axiom s.

[1 1 2 ]

ON TH E POSSIBILITY OF A FORM OF ALL PHILOSOPHY

55

Postcript The whole investigation, of which the above is a sample, is necessarily dry and not very promising in the beginning, but is that not also the case with the beginning of any science, and is it not the superior sign of the science of all sciences to start out from a small nucleus whose rays are in­ finite in regard to num ber and scope? The topic at hand —the achievement of the ultim ate goal of all philosophical inquiry—is not too dearly purchas­ ed by the initial forfeit of all the charms of im agination (Einbildungskraft), considering the seriousness of this enterprise. W hether the present investigation has suffered from the form the author has given it, he himself is the last to judge. So be it. May those who deem this enterprise worthy of some attention, direct theirs only to the topic, and may they forget the author, who is glad to put these pages before the public unassumingly, and may they forget his m anner of presenting his case. May they not find fault with the terms he has used from time to time in speaking without hateful circumlocutions of that which the greatest philosophers of their era [112] have left for posterity. Words are mere sounds —alas, all too often a sounding brass and tinkling cymbal!20 W hat the author wishes is that no reader may be a stranger to the great feeling of necessity evoked by the hope of an ultimate unity of knowledge, of faith, and of will, which is the ultim ate heritage of mankind and which mankind will soon claim more loudly than ever. Philosophers have often complained that their science has [had] so little influence on the will of m an and on the fate of all mankind, but have they pondered what they are complaining about? They lament the lack of in­ fluence on the part of a science which, as such, has existed nowhere, and they complain that one makes no use of axioms held to be true by only one part of mankind, and even that part acknowledges them only under very different aspects. Who will follow a leader whom he does not yet dare to regard as the only true leader? Who will cure the ills of mankind with a remedy which, as such, is still suspect for many, and which is found among different people in so many different qualities? First seek in m an himself the criteria by which everybody must recognize the eternal truth before you call them in their divine form from heaven to earth! Then all the rest will be added unto you !21

Tübingen, September 9, 1794.

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T H E U N CONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

[p 1-8]

Translator’s Notes 1. G o ttlob E rnst Schulze (1761-1833), professor a t H elm stedt an d G öttingen. In 1792 he p u b lish ed anonym ously Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Pro-

fessor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, nebst einer Verteidigung des Skep­ tizismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik. 2. K arl L eo n h ard R einhold (1758-1823), from 1787-1794 professor a t Je n a, from 1794-1823 professor a t Kiel. In 1789 he p u b lish ed Neue Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens. H e called his d o ctrin e Elementarphilosophie. 3. Jo h a n n G ottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). In 1791, a t the advice of K an t, F ichte published his

Kritik aller Offenbarung (C ritique o f all R evelation), which the publisher p rin te d w ithout the a u th o r's nam e. T h e critics a ttrib u te d it to K ant, who thereu p o n nam ed the real a u th o r, an d F ich te’s resu ltin g fam e b ro u g h t him to the c h air at Je n a vacated by R einhold. In the spring of 1794, while still in Z ürich, and in o rd er to a ttra c t students at Je n a , F ichte published th e book S chelling m entions, Über den B egriff der Wissenschaftslehre, oder der sogenannten Philosophie (O n the C oncept o f the Science of Knowledge o r of the So-called Philosophy). 4. T h e a u th o r of the philosophically m ost im p o rta n t Recension des Aenesidemus was Fichte. His review ap p eared in 1794 in nos. 47-49 of the Jenaer Allgem eine Literaturzeitung. 5. Salom on M aim on (1754-1800), Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens (B erlin, 1794). 6. R e in h o ld ’s axiom rem ains co n d itio n al because he stops w ith a fa c t of consciousness, w ithout in q u irin g into th e unconditional form of a cogent connection betw een the subject u nd p red icate of any proposition. All m ere facts are conditional, as K ant has show n. (See also p. 100, n. 1. Poss.) Schelling’s question is: C an th ere be an un co n d itio n al m aterial axiom ? 7. Schelling’s arg u m en t against a p ro ced u re th a t tries to reach the un co n d itio n al by a sta rt from th e conditional seems to ru n as follows. If we sta rt from d ep en d en t axiom s, th en no m atIe r which one we pick fo r o u r sta rt, each m ust have th e form of a disjunctive proposition: A is eith er B o r C. A is eith er B d eterm in ed by itself, or else C by a h igher axiom . B ut since we are Hi HI looking for the latter, we can n o t yet say positively C. T h a t leaves us w ith the disjunctive ulternative B. But if B, th en the axiom of ou r sta rt would itself be the u ltim ate axiom we seek. Thun no axiom picked at ran d o m is fit to furnish the sta rt for such a regressive procedure. Therefore we m ust, as it were, beg th e question an d sta rt with th e unco n d itio n al itself, as Schelling’* sequel suggests. A nd the form of th e unconditional is no “e ith e r-o r.” It is the form n f self, which is not “eith er I am or I am not, ” b u t strictly “I am ." Kant had already pointed at it when he said: “T h e 7 think' m ust potentially accom pany all imttgen in my m in d ” (PuR 131; S m ith 152). Potentially, because I m ay n ot actually m ake clear lo myself th at I could not im agine anything at all w ithout the “act of spontaneity” which th e “ 1“ ia, Therefore K ants speaks of “original a p p e rc e p tio n .” A nd since th o u g h t is the awitirurHH of a cogent connection in som e m anifold, the title of his §1 6 is "O f the originally nynlhetic unity nf ap p ercep tio n ." (PuR 131 f.) A few pages later. K ant says: “ I am aw are of (he identity of my self, in resprct to the m anifold of images givrn to m r in an intuitive e x ­ perience, lo r I t all them all my im ages which, ihn», am ount to otiv im age" (/*w/f 1H5). This lead* Fichte to point out: "I) I h r I posit* the non I . i n lim ited by the I" (th r lim itation being

[p 8-11]

o n T H E POSSIBILITY OF A FORM OF ALL PHILOSOPHY

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th e cogency o f th e connection in the m an ifo ld of a n object), a n d “2) T h e I posits itself as lim ited by th e n o n I ” (1:1125 f.: cf. H e a th 122). T h e la tte r lim itatio n was fo rm u lated by K ant: ‘‘fo r th ro u g h the I as sim ple aw areness no th in g is yet given.” (PuR 135). 8. S chelling does n o t seem to be aw are o f th e im plication of his shift from I = I to A = A, th a t is, fro m a specific to a g eneral expression. T h e specific or absolute I is b o th form al an d m aterial form . T h e la tte r is lacking in A = A. T h e A of ab stract logic ca n be anything. T h e I is a lways “m a te rially” I. S chelling seems to be carried away by a m etalogical desire to find the g ro u n d for the cogency o f logical proofs. A year later, in 1795, in Dogm. (1:308) he him self points o u t th a t “as soon as we step into the dom ain o f proofs, we step in to th e d o m ain o f the c o n d itio n a l.” T h a t is, we step fo rth from the unconditionality of th e “absolute” I. T h e a b ­ solute I-form is ontological. O n th e sam e p age S chelling also says th a t “only a n ontological p ro o f can b e given of the existence o f G od. ... His existence an d his essence m ust be id e n tic a l.” Seven years later, in 1802, in th e dialogue Bruno (4:261), Schelling wrote: “w hat truly ex- / ists by itself is never th e finite b u t only the unity o f the finite with the n o n fin ite .” A nd, p resum ably b efo re 1828 (see 10:iii), in th e historicocritical in tro d u c tio n to the Philosophy o f Mytholgy (11:186), he dealt w ith th e freq u e n t question “how does consciousness com e to G od?” a n d he replies: “B ut consciousness does n ot come to [em phasis a d d ed ]God; its very first m ove...goes away from th e true G od. ... Consciousness has G od in itself (an sich), in the sense in w hich we say o f a m an th a t he has a virtue in him self, o r m ore often a vice, m eaning th a t he does not have it objectively as som ething he w ants, n o r even as som ething he know s.” In a sim ilar sense, A ugustine said th a t “w hatever can love, loves G od, know ingly o r u n w it­ tingly” (Soliloquies 1.1.). A m ong th e very last things Schelling w rote (see 11 :iii) we find th e statem en t: “T h e re is n o ^ p ro o f of th e existence of G od in general (ü b e rh a u p t), fo r there is no existence o f God in general. T h e existence o f G od is always im m ed iately specific.” (11:274). O f course Schelling is right in deriving “A is A” from am I ,” a n d he also knows th a t “ I am I ” can n o t b e derived from “A is A ” as dogm atists will try. 9. N ow adays m ath em atician s use th e sign > to m ean larger, e .g ., A > B , m ean in g A is larg er th a n B, w hich is one case of th eir being u n eq u al. T h e re a d e r m ay p refe r the m ore g en eral, now c u rre n t sign + for u n eq u al. 10. In 1794 F ichte h ad said: “T h e I posits negation in itself, insofar as it posits reality in the n o t-I; a n d it posits reality in itself insofar as it posits negation in the n o t-I. T h u s it posits itself a s determ ining itself, insofar as it occurs a t all as som ething determined', an d it posits itself as being d eterm in ed , inasm uch as it determines itself. T h u s o u r p roblem is solved” (1:130. cf. H eath 126). Seven years later, in 1801, F ichte said ab o u t this problem of the relation o f su b ­ je c t an d object: “Do not desire to ju m p beyond yourself a n d to grasp som ething different from w h at you are cap ab le o f grasping, d ifferen t from aw areness and thing, from th in g and awareness th ereo f o r, m ore p roperly speaking, different from eith er o f the two, b u t different from th a t absolutely subjectively objective an d objectively subjective entity w hich only an afterth o u g h t distinguishes as two. C om m on h u m a n u n d erstan d in g does n ot fin d an y th in g d if­ ferent: it always has awareness a n d th in g together, an d it always talks a b o u t th eir u n ion. T h e philosophical system of dualism alone finds it differently, by dividing the absolutely indivisi­ ble, an d by believing th a t it is thinking very sharply an d thoroughly ju st w hen it has ru n o ut of all th o u g h t” (Sonnenklarer Bericht, Werke 2:400. cf. n. 21 to D ogm ). In th e review of Aenesidem us, F ichte h a d w ritten: “T h e absolute subject, the I, is n ot given in em p irical in tu i­ tio n , b u t is posited by intellectual in tu itio n ; an d the absolute object, th e n o t-I, is posited in opposition to it. In the em pirical consciousness the two do n ot occur except by a rep re sen ­ tative im age (V orstellung] which refers to them . In em pirical consciousness they occur only m ediately, as w hat is rep resenting an d w hat is represented. O ne is never aw are o f the absolute subject (i.e ., w hat is rep resenting w ithout being represented) nor o f the absolute object (call­ ed a th in g -in its e lf, in d ependent of any representation) as anything given em pirically” (1:10.

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T h e tru e essence of th e “newest” K ant-F ichtean philosophy is th e identity of subject an d o b ­ ject (as H egel an d Schelling cam e to call it) a n d the consequent objection to dualism . 11. C h ristian A ugust Crusius (1715-1775), professor of philosophy an d theology in Leipzig. C ritic o f W olff. F u n d am en tal axiom : W h a t can n o t be th o u g h t is false; w hat can n o t be th o u g h t as false is tru e. T h re e principles: (1) principium contradictionis: n o th in g can a t once be a n d n o t be; (2) p rin cip iu m inseparabilium : w hatever entities can n o t be th o u g h t w ithout each o th er can n o t exist w ithout each other; (3) p rin cip iu m inconiungibilium : w hat can n o t be th o u g h t as jo in t o r as ju x taposed can n o t exist jointly or in ju x tap o sitio n . (W illy Moog; Die Philosophic der Neuzeit bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts. [Berlin, M ittler: 1924], p. 460). 12. A fter “th e axiom of co n trad ictio n ” Schelling p u t “(das U n b ed in g te).” T h is rem ark in parentheses seems to belong elsewhere (perhaps h a lf dozen lines earlier, after “the original form o f all know ledge”), since it is th e philosophical m eth o d th a t m ust reach th e u n c o n d i­ tio n al, while th e axiom o f co n trad ictio n alone falls short of it. IS. It is significant th a t Schelling sees in K ant the th in k er who tu rn e d away from the re m ­ n a n t o f form alism in Leibniz tow ard a philosophy founded on the reciprocal d eterm in atio n of form a n d co n ten t, w hich is th e m ark o f the I. 14. T h e m erely analytical form can n o t constitute objective reality, which requires a "tran sce n d en tal synthesis.” T ra n sc e n d e n ta l idealism is realism , in co n trast to any philosophy restricted to form al analysis. 15. S chelling m ay have in m in d the crucial passage at th e en d of section 2 of the in tro d u c ­ tion to CrJ: “T h e re must be a g ro u n d of unity of th a t supersensuous w hich is a t the base of n a tu re w ith the supersensuous w hich the concept o,f freedom contains practically. T h o u g h the co n cep t o f th a t unity n eith er theoretically nor practically attain s d efinite know ledge, and th erefo re has n o d o m ain of its ow n, still it m akes possible th e transition of the m an n e r of th in k in g acco rd in g to th e principles o f th e one [freedom ] to th a t according to the principles of the o th e r [n a tu re ]” (Cass. 5:244; cf. B e rn ard 12). 16. Schelling m eans the d eduction of the categories from th e tab le o f ju d g m en ts. H e him self holds th a t th e th ree form s of relatio n furnish a p ro p er ded u ctio n of th e o th er nine categories (Poss. 107). In th e System o f Transcendental Idealism [1800] 3: 517) he says th a t “the entire m echanism o f th e categories m ust be deduceable from th e relation o f tim e to th e p u re c o n ­ cepts on th e one h an d an d , on th e o th er, to p u re in tu itio n (A nschauung) or to sp a ce.” 17. T h is § 1 1 was n o t in th e first edition (1781), b ut was ad d ed in th e second (1787, pp. 109 13). O n pages 110-11 K ant says th e table of categories “contains th e form of a system of all elem ental concepts and therefo re gives a h in t of all jo in t tra its (alle M om ente) of an available speculative science” (cf. S m ith 110). H e em phasizes th a t in each g ro u p “the th ird category is not a m ere derivative b u t a genuine concept o f p u re u n d e rsta n d in g .” 18. PuR 95; Sm ith 105. 19. PuR 131,8 16; S m ith 152. See n. 7 above. 20. I C or. 13:1. 21. M att. 6:33.

Translator’s Introduction to O f the I as Principle o f Philosophy, or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge Schelling’s son, K. F. A. Schelling, who edited the Works, (1856-61), ap ­ pended to the essay O f the I a critique that Schelling had written in 1796 of a review of the essay. My translation of it also follows the essay itself, but it could equally well serve as Schelling’s own introduction to the essay. Another introductory statement by Schelling may be found in his letter to Hegel dated February 4, 1795, written while he was at work on the essay. He implies that Hegel can soon learn from the essay why Schelling called himself a Spinozist. Parts of this letter are translated in notes 25 and 55. The reader may also consult note 101. As I have mentioned earlier he would do well to keep at hand both Spinoza’s Ethics, which Schelling surely had before him, and Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason. T he title of this essay no longer speaks hypothetically about the mere possibility of a form of all philosophy but comes right out with the thesis that the I is the principle of philosophy. To be sure, this is not the em ­ pirical I which each one of us finds in his consciousness. If it were, that would mean the subjective idealism of Berkeley, where to be is to be perceived, and where mental contents would be inexplicable illusions unless certainty came with our ideas because they themselves came to us from the m ind of God, who is not a deceiver. But in that case the existence of that God would be a postulate, which begs the question. We cannot look for any unconditionality of truth in a sheerly transcendent and therefore entirely hidden God. And if that hidden God should deign to reveal himself to man, it would still be a conditional truth depending on the two conditions that the Devil had no hand in the revelation and that God felt like bestowing it. Now, even the empirical I has the unconditional form of being identical with itself, nor is this particular identity merely formal. For, if you express your awareness of your self in the sentence / am I and then rashly transpose 59

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th a t sentence into the form ula 1 = 1 , you have a m ere form al identity as in A = A. Everybody grants th a t, given an A, A can n ot be anything b u t A. Yet noth in g is really given in th e form ula I = I. It h a d b etter be w ritten x = x. W h at are we talking ab o u t when we talk in term s of such letters as A or x or even I? In m ath em atical tradition, x m eans any unspecified am oun t. A nd the letter I m ay m ean anything a t all, n o t excluding any it. T h e m istake of those who can n o t understan d K ant an d Fichte and Schelling is precisely their notion th a t the I probably m eans some mysterious it called a m in d or a soul or a spirit. Now, when these three writers use the word / , they take it strictly as a p ronoun which, even in ordinary speech, cannot m ean anything b u t th e speaker or w riter or read er him self who refers to him self when he says I. T h e p ronoun / m eans the act by which two events are established sim ultaneously, the awareness of myself, an d the distinction betw een my I an d any not-I. T h e self-awareness can be describ­ ed in words as the identity of thinking-form an d thought-content. K ant’s phrasing is clearer; he says “the subject is a t the same tim e its own object” ( PuR 429). A dopting Fichte’s words, Schelling says of the I, “it is because it thinks itself, an d it [can] think itself because it is. It produces itself by its own th in k in g —by absolute causality” (O f I, 167), O f course none of these words an d sentences can force you to grasp th a t you are an I. T he I is a free act. “I am because I am! —th a t [insight] grabs each one suddenly” (O f I, 168). A ugustine says it happens by th a t m ental “slap” by which the m ind understands the word yourself. (De trinitate 10, ix, 12: eo ictu quo intelligit quod dictum est te ipsam.) As an em pirical I, I find m yself not only as absolutely self-positing but also as the specific physical an d historical person I am . For w hen I realize th at I am I for myself alone, as Fichte puts it (1:98), I simultaneously distinguish my I from w hatever is not I, for instance, from my own m ental constitution with its historical setting an d from my body w ith its physical environm ent. T h e em pirical I is never w ithout some object, as K ant pointed out (PuR 276). Now, there is a distinction (not a separation) betw een the unconditional certainty th a t I am I, an d th e unconditional as such. T h e form er, being lubjective, is never w ithout an object. T herefore the em pirical person is conditioned by objects. A nd there is a conditioning bond between objects. No such conditioning can p ertain to the unconditional. Therefore the u n ­ conditional can be neither subject nor object. It is “no thing at all” (O f I, 177) and therefore fittingly nam ed “absolute I ,” whose essence is freedom . (T o absolve m eans to detach. Absolute m eans w ithout ties.) Schelling distinguishes it from the em pirical I. T h e la tter is subject: though it is unconditionally I, it is also conditioned as a specific person. Yet, if its form were not the form of unconditionality, there could be no I at all. T h e "absolute I" is the ground of possibility of every em pirical I.

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Schelling says that the absolute I cannot occur in consciousness (180) because of the condifenality inherent in all consciousness: no subject without an object. Yet the absolute I, 01 e could say, furnishes the form of unconditionality without which no consciousness would be possible. You may feel that this kind of argum entation endeavors to hold fast what is utterly elusive. And this is what Schelling seems to do when, in that February 4 letter to Hegel, he writes, “God is nothing but the absolute I” (Plitt 1:77). He does not mean that God is a person, for in the same letter he had already said that we can (and ought to) “reach farther [meaning ^/deeper] than the personal being” (ibid. 76). Why then use the word / to designate God and the unconditional? Because the I has the fo rm of selfpositing, that is, of absolute independence, absolute freedom. (See also n.v 25, the entirety of which could serve as a short introduction to the essay O f

L)

In 1811 Schelling wrote: “God in his highest Self is not revealed [once and for all], he is [continuously] revealing himself; he is not real, he becomes real, precisely in order to be manifest as the very freest being” (The Ages o f the World; 8:308; cf. Bolman 196-97). Around 1836 Schell­ ing said of God, “he is entirely outside of himself, free of himself, and is thus the being that sets everything else free” (see the entire passage quoted in n. 70). Freedom cannot be im parted by coercion, only by invitation. No “power” of God can make m an free, only “love.” Terms like power and love may help some readers who do not entirely lack a religious background. To be sure, they can help only a reader who, like Schelling, is beyond what Schelling calls “orthodox concepts of God.” On February 4, 1795, he wrote to Hegel: “Here is my answer to your question whether I believe that, with the moral proof, we cannot reach a person Being. ... My answer is: We reach farther than a personal being. For by now I have •J become a Spinozist” (Plitt 1:76). Kant warned against objectifying and more especially personifying God (PuR 611 n.), a warning that, unfortunately, is not heeded to this day. The main reason may be the dependence of “m odern” thinking and schooling on the objective sciences. Thus, when Nietzsche exorcised “the old God,” and when William James dam ned “the Absolute,” they were both thinking of objective entities, and they let their objectivistic thinking overrule that keen sense for the symbolic which they both possessed. The other reason for objectivism is the kind of ecclesiastic teaching which, for the sake of be­ ing “m odern,” ignores Kant and his warning and therefore neglects to tell the youiyj the deepest truths religion has voiced. God is not one of the gods. He is “not in a genus” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica l.Q S . Art 5), the genus gods. The gods come and go; their ex­ istence is not identical with their essence. But in God essence and existence

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are identical (ibid., A rt 4). G od has no essence a p a rt from his existence or presence. “I shall be who shall b e” (Exodus 3:14). A read er who has been tau g h t an d has really grasped these truths will find no insurm ountable d if­ ficulty in Schelling’s notion of the "absolute I .” O n page 200 O f I Schelling says the finite I strives to becom e identical with the absolute I. Religion teaches th a t m an should strive to live in God. A nd th e mystic strives to lose him self in God.

2

Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge (1795; second printing, 1809)

Say first, of God above, or Man below, W hat can we reason, but from what we know? Of Man, what see we but his station here, From which to reason, or to which refer? T hrough worlds unnum ber’d though the God be known, ‘Tis ours, to trace him only in our own. Pope: Essay on Man (Epigraph of the first edition)

[ 151]

Preface to the First Edition

Instead of all the pleas with which a writer can meet his readers and critics, there in only one plea here to the readers and critics of this essay; either not to read it at all or to read it in its entire contest, and either to refrain from judgm ent altogether or to judge the author by the whole work and not by separate passages taken out of context. There are readers who look at a book flFetingly, in order to grasp quickly something that they can throw at the author as a criticism, or to find a passage that has been rendered in­ comprehensible by being taken out of context. By such means they can (i.H

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prove to anyone who has not read the work that the author has written nonsense. Thus, for instance, readers of that kind could say that in this essay Spinoza is spoken of very often, not (to use Lessing’s expression) “as a dead dog,” and then —the logic of such people is all too well known —they could ijump to the conclusion that the author is trying to repeat Spinoza’s errors, even though they have been refuted long ago. For such readers (if that term may be applied to them) I want to say, on the one hand, that this essay is m eant to annul explicitly the very foundations of Spinoza’s system, which has not yet been refuted by any means, or more aptly, to topple it by means of its own principles; on the other hand I want to say that (in spite of all its errors) Spinoza’s system seems to me more worthy of high esteem, because of its bold consequences, than the popular coalition-systems of our intellectual world, which [152] through a patchwork of all possible systems 'Spell death to all true philosophy. At the same time I am ready to admit to such readers that these systems, which constantly hover between heaven and earth and are not brave erlouffh to penetrate to the core of all knowledge, are much more secure against the most dangerous errors than is the system of a great thinker whose speculations take great flights, and who risjts-everything, either to achieve complete truth in all its greatness, or no truth at all. And please let me remind you that whosoever is not brkve enough to follow the truth to its fullest height will never possess it even though he touch the hem of its garment, and that, in spite of tolerable errors, posterity will judge more justly the m an who.dargs to meet the truth freely, than it will those who are afraid of shipwreck on the rocks or sandbars and prefer to drop anchor permanently in some safe cove. I would like to remind the other kind of readers, those who prove by means of passages taken out of context that the author had written nonsense, that I do not care for the praise bestowed on writers whose every word, in and out of context, conveys the same meaning. In all modesty, I am conscious of the fact that all ideas in this writing are my own, and therefore I deem it a not immodest dem and that I be judged only by readers who think for themselves. Besides, the whole investigation deals with principles and hence can be tested only by principles. I have tried to drpict the results of critical philosophy in its regression to the last prin ­ ciples of all knowledge. The only question, then, which the reader of this essay has to answer is the following: W hether these principles are true or false, and (be they true or false) whether the results of critical philosophy are really based on them. W hat I hope for my essay is precisely such a test «if the principles here elaborated. I cannot expect this testing from any readers who are indifferent to all truth, nor from those who presume that no new investigation of principles can be possible after Kant 1153] and think that the highest principles of his philosophy have already been establithed by him YEvery other reader regardless of his system must be in-

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terested in the question of the highest principle of all knowledge because his own system, even if it is the system of skepticism, can be true only through its principles. One cannot do anything with people who have lost all interest in truth, for one could persuade them only with the truth' ) 6 n the other hand, I believe that I may say to those followers of Kant who presume that he himself has established the principles of all knowledge, that they have comprehended the letter but not the spirit of their teacher if they did not discover that the way of the Critique o f Pure Reason cannot possibly be the way of phi|osophy^as a science.1 'As a science), philosophy takes its start from the existence of original conceptions (ursprüngliche Vorstellungen) not made possible by experience but explainable only through superior principles. For instance, the necessity and universal validity, which Kant stated as their outstanding character, cannot be based on mere feeling for it (which necessarily would have to be the case if it were not determined by superior principles, principles that must be presupposed even by skep­ ticism, for skepticism cannot be overturned by a mere feeling of necessity). Furthermore, space and time, which are supposed to be only forms of in­ tuition, cannot possibly precede all synthesis and therefore must themselves depend on a higher form of synthesis.* Similarly, the derivative subordinate synthesis by means of categories (Verstandesbegriffe) cannot possibly be thought of without an original form and an original content, which must be the basis of every synthesis if it is to be a synthesis at all. This is all the more obvious, since Kant's deductions tell us at first glance [154] that they presuppose superior principles. Thus Kant names the only possi­ ble forms of sense perception, space and time, without having examined them according to a principle (as for instance the categories according to the principle of logical functions of judgment). The categories are set up according to the table of functions of judgm ent, but the latter are not set up according to any principle [see n.49]. If we look at this m atter more closely, we find that the synthesis contained in the judgm ent as well as the synthesis expressed in the categories is only a derivative synthesis; both can be understood only through a more basic synthesis shared by both —the synthesis of multiplicity in the unity of consciousness as such —and this syn­ thesis itself can be understood only through a superior absolute unity. Therefore the unity of consciousness is determinable not through the forms of judgments, but on the contrary, the judgments together with the categories are determ inable only through the principle of that unity [see n. 49]. By the same token, the many apparent contradictions in K ant’s writings pointed out by his opponents should have been admitted long ago for they cannot be corrected at all except under those higher principles *1 find (hat Beck1 expresses a sim ilar thought in the preface to the second p ari of his co m m en ­ tary on K ant. But I can n o t judge how close or how far the th oughts of this co m m en tato r, who iiAn so visibly en tered into K an t’s spirit, are related to m ine.

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which, in the Critique o f Pure Reason, its author only presupposed. Final­ ly, even if it could be said that K ant’s theoretical philosophy m aintained the most conclusive concatenation among all its parts, still his theoretical' philosophy is not connected with the practical by a common prinicple .3 His practical philosophy does not seem to be one-and-the-same structure with the theoretical; instead it seems to be a mere annex to his philosophy as a whole and, what is more, an annex wide open to attacks from the main building. Yet, inasmuch as the first principle of philosophy is also the last, since all philosophy, the theoretical in particular, starts from the final result of the practical in which all knowledge ends, the whole science must be possible, in its highest perfection and unity. I think the mere mention of all this will suffice to justify the need of an exposition of Kant’s philosophy based on superior principles. Indeed I believe that, [155] in the case of such an author, one must explain him ac­ cording to the principles which he must have presupposed, and only accor­ ding to themi^Even in the face of the original sense of his words, one must assert the still more original sense of his thoughts. This essay proposes to CStahlish the principles [on which Kant’s thoughts rest]) I could promise myself nothing more fortunate in this venture than to find examiners of the principles here established. I would be grateful for the most severe ex­ am ination, provided only that it merit the name of examination. My gratitude would be proportionate to the importance of the subject discuss­ ed. The estimable critic of my treatise On the Possibility o f a Form o f All Philosophy has made a rem ark in the Tiibinger Gelehrten Anzeigen (1795, 12th issue) concerning the principle I stated. He has questioned the main point of this whole investigation. I believe that my present essay will alleviate his doubts. To be sure, if what I stated were an objective principle then one would not be able to understand why it should not depend on a superior one. The distinguishing feature of my new principle lies in the fact that it ought not to be an objective principle. There my critic and I agree; an objective principle could not be an ultim ate one because it would have to be determined by an ulterior one. The only unresolved question between us is whether there is any principle which is not objective at all and which nevertheless furnishes the basis for all philosophy. To be sure, if we had to look at the ultim ate in our knowledge as if it were a mute pain­ ting outside of us (as Spinoza put it )5 then we would never know that we know. However, if that ultim ate itself is a condition of all knowledge, in­ deed a condition of its own being known, if it is the only immediacy in our knowledge, then we know precisely through it that we know; we have found the principle of which Spinoza could say that it is the light which il­ luminate« itself and the darkness.' 1156|f It dors not behoove philosophy to ingratiate itself by an anlii ipalory enumeration of its results and thus lo suborn the unbiased judg­

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ment regarding its principles, nor can it allow an evaluation of its p rin ­ ciples by the m aterial interests of everyday lifejYet, if a well-meaning m an should ask where these ostensibly new principles should lead, whether they should remain merely a tenet of some specific school or go on to benefit Jifg., one may well answer him, provided one does not thereby sway his judgm ent of the principles themselves. In this regard only, and only to ac­ commodate the reader who asks that question, may I be perm itted the following remark regarding the principles on which this treatise rests. _A philosophy which is based on the nature of m an himself could not aim at dead formulae, which would function as just so many prisons of m an’s mind, nor could it aim at being a philosophical artifice which, by deduc­ ing current concepts from apparently superior ones, would bury the living work of the hum an m ind in dead mental faculties. If I may say it in the words of Jacobi ^philosophy seeks to unveil and reveal^hat which is [Dasein ],6 so that the nature or spirit of philosophy cannot lie in any formula •or letter; its highest topic must be what is immediate in m an and presnet only to itself,7 and cannot be what is m ediated by concepts and laboriously recapitulated in concepts. The aim of philosophy is no mere reform of its discipline but a complete re^e&ai^oi its principles, that is, a revolution which one can view as the second possible revolution in its field. T he first took place when the recognition of objects was set up as the principle of all knowledge. Up to the second revolution every advance made was not a change of principles but a progression from one object to another. And though it is not an indifferent m atter for the schoolman as to what p ar­ ticular object is being served, [157] but is all the same for mankind, the progression of philosophy from one object to another cannot be the pro­ gression of the hum an m ind as such./'Therefore if one may expect any in­ fluence on hum an life itself from any kind of philosophy, one must expect ’ e new philosophy made possible by a complete reversal of It is a daring step of reason to liberate mankind to remove it from the terrors of the objective world, h u t this daring venture cannot fail, because m an grows in the measure in which he learns to know himself and his power. Give m an the awareness of what he is and he will soon learn to be what he ought to be. Give him the theoretical self-respect and the practical will soon follow. One would hope in vain for any great progress of mankind as a result of the mere goodwill of man, because in order to become better he would have had to be good already. For that very reasor^ the revolution in man must come from the awareness of his essence; he must be good theoreticafty in order to become so practically. The surest preparatory ex­ ercise for harmonious action within oneself is the knowledge that the very essence of man consists of unity and is due to it alone. Once a m an has realized that, he will also understand that the unity of volition and action

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must become as natural and necessary for him as the preservation of his ex­ istence. It is the very goal of man that the unity of volition and action should become as natm-al to him as the mechanism of his body and the uni­ ty of his consciousness j (In a languid age one cannot expect much progress from a philosophy which asserts as its highest principle that the essence of m an consists of freedom and only of freedom , that man is not a thing, not a chattel, and in his very nature no object at all/.O ur spiritless age trembles before every authentic force which stirs in man- Therefore the representatives of the age promptly tried to tone down the first great product of this philosophy. They could do so without too much difficulty, because its language still seems to indulge the mood of the time. Consequently they saw [in the Criti­ que o f Pure Reason] nothing but the old established obsequiousness [158] under the yoke of objective truth, and they tried at least to reduce its doc­ trine to the humiliating tenet that jh e limits of objective truth are not set by absolute freedom but are the mere consequence of the well-known weakness of man's m ind and are due to the limitation of his power of Perception. But it would be faintheartedness unworthy of philosophy not Ito follow the great new lead which philosophy is beginning to take; not to m ap a new course for the hum an mind, not to give strength to the tired, .courage and energy to the crushed and beaten minds, not to shake up th$ [slaves of objective truth by giving them an inkling of freedom, and not to teach m an, who is consistent only in his inconsistency, that he can save nimself only by the unity of his action j ind by strict observance of principles. / It is difficult not to be, enthusiastic about the great thought that, while all sciences, the empirical ones not excluded, rush more and more toward the point of perfect unity, m ankind itself will finally realize, as thereonsitutive law, the principle of unity which from the beginning was the regulating.basis of the history of mankind. As the rays of m an’s knowledge and the experiences of many centuries will finally converge in one focus of truth and will transform into reality the idea which has been in many great m en’s minds, the idea that the different sciences must become one in the end just so the different ways and by-ways which humans have followed till now will converge in one point wherein mankind will find itself again and, as one complete person, will obey rhelaw of freedom. No m atter how far in the future this point may be, no m atter how long it may be possible for some to indulge in a genteel laughter at the daring hopes for the pro­ gress of mankind, those for whom the hopes are not folly still have the great task of working jointly toward the completion of the sciences and thereby at least preparing [the way for| that great period of mankind. 1159) For all ideas must first be realized in the domain of knowledge before they find their realization in history, and mankind will never become one before i(N knowledge lias mat tired to unity.

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Nature has wisely provided for hum an eyes the device of dawn as a tran ­ sition to broad daylight. Small wonder then that wisps of fog remain in the lower regions while the m ountain peaks already shimmer in the radiance of the sun. But once the first blush of morning appears, the sun cannot fail. To bring about the beautiful day of knowledge is reserved to few—perhaps to one alone—but may it be granted to anyone who senses the coming of that day to take pleasure in it in advance. W hat I have said in this essay and am saying in this preface is, for m any,too much, as I know only too well; for myself it is too little. But all the greater is the subject, which concerns us all. W hether is was too daring to join in the discussion of such a topic, of that only the essay itself can render an account. No m atter what the verdict may be, any anticipatory answer would be futile. It is natural that any reader who likes to twist things and is victimized by misunderstandings can find fault enough.^But I on my part will not call every adverse criticism unjust, every correction ir­ relevant; I hope that I have m ade that clear through my modest plea for strict exam ination. W hat I wanted was truth, and I know it just as well as I know that more can be done in this m atter, which does not require mere fragmentary work. I hope that some happy time may be granted to me in which it will be possible to bring to realization the idea of writing a counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics.* Tübingen, M arch 29th, 1795. • N o t e OF THE EDITOR OF THE COMPLETE WORKS, (1 8 5 6 ) , K. F . A . SCHELLING:In Schelling’s preface to the first volume of his philosophical writings, 1809, he characterizes the essay “O f the I” with the following words. “It shows idealism in its freshest form, in a sense which it may have lost later. At least the I is still taken everywhere as an absolute, or strictly as identity of the subjective and the objective as such [see n . 8], and not as a subjective I.”

[160] 1. 2.

Synopsis

Deduction of a last ground of reality of our knowledge as such, § 1. Determination of it through the concept of the unconditioned. The unconditioned as such can be found a# neither in an absolute object, b. nor in an object conditioned by the subject, nor in a subject conditioned by the object, c. nor in the sphere of objects at all, § 2 , d. therefore only in the absolute I. Reality of the absolute I as such, § 3.

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D eduction of all possible a priori views of the unconditioned. a. Principle of perfect dogm atism , § 4. b. Principle o f im perfect dogm atism an d criticism , § 5. c. Principle of perfect criticism , § 6 . 4. D eduction of the original form [Urform] of the I, which is identity, and of the suprem e principle [Grundsatz], § 7. 5. D eduction o f the form o f its being posited by absolute freedom , in intellectual intuition, § 8 . 6. D eduction of the subordinate form s of the I. a. A ccording to quan tity —Unity, specifically absolute unity, in contrast aa. to m ultiplicity, bb. to em pirical unity, § 9. b . A ccording to quality aa. absolute reality as such in contrast a- to the ostensible reality o f things in themselves, or p. to an objective conception of all reality, § 1 0 . bb . as absolute reality also absolute nonfiniteness [Unendlichkeit] cc. as absolute reality also absolute indivisibility dd. as absolute reality also absolute im m utability, § 1 1 . c. A ccording to relation aa. absolute substantiality, in contrast to derivative, em pirical substantiality, § 1 2 . bb . absolute causality, specifically im m anent causality, § 13, in contrast [161] a. to th e causality of the m oral being [Wesen] and /}. of the ratio n al and sensuous being insofar as it strives for happiness. D eduction of the concepts of m orality an d happiness, § 14. d. A ccording to m odality —p u re absolute being [Sein] in contrast to em pirical being as such, and specifically in contrast aa. to em pirical eternity, bb. to m erely logical reality, cc. to dialectical reality, d d . to all em pirical determ ination of being, possibility, a c tu ­ ality, necessity (existence as such), ee. to the ostensible absolute being of things in themselves —(in passing: determ ination of th e concepts of idealism and realism), ff. to the existence of the em pirical world as such, § 15. 7. Deduction of the forms of all modes of being posited [Setzbarkeit] from their ground in the I.

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Form of thetical propositions as such. Determination of them through the subordinate forms. aa. According to q u an tity - unity. bb. According to quality — affirmation. cc. According to m odality—pure being [Sein], Specifically this determ ination separates the original concepts [Urbegriffe] of being [Sein], not-being [Nicht-Sein], and existence [Dasein] from the derivative concepts of possibility, actu­ ality, and necessity, and it considers the latter as such in re­ lation to the finite I, as follows: a. in regard to the moral I and, in that respect, aa- discussing the concept of practical possibility, actuality, and necessity, and PP. deducting from these concepts the concept of transcendental freedom, and discussing the prob­ lems based on it, p. in regard to the theoretical subject [and its interest in] purposiveness [Zweckverknüpfung] in the world .9

[ 162]

He who wants to know something, wants to know at the same time that what he knows is real. Knowledge without reality is not knowledge. W hat follows from that? Either our knowledge has no reality at all and must be an^eternal round of propositions, each dissolving in its opposite, a chaos in which no element can crystallize —or else th e re rqust-be an ultimate point of reality on which everything depends, from which all firmness and all form of our knowledge springs, a point which sunders the elements, and which circumscribes for each of them the circle of its continuous effect in the universe of knowledge. There must be something in which and through which everything that is reaches existence, everything that is being thought reaches reality, and thought itself reaches the form of unity and immutability. This something (as we can problematically call it for the time being) should be what com­ pletes all insights within the whole system of hum an knowledge, and it should reign —in the entire cosmos of our knowledge —as original ground (Urgrtfnd) of all reality .10 If there is any genuine knowledge at all, there must be knowledge which I do not reach by way of some other knowledge, but through which alone all other knowledge is knowledge. In order to reach this last statement I do not have to presuppose some special kind of knowledge. If we know anything at all, we must be sure of at least one item of knowledge which we

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cannot reach through some other [163] knowledge and which contains the real ground of all our knowledge. This ultim ate in hum an knowledge must therefore not search for its own real ground in something other. Not only is it itself independent of anything superior but, since our knowledge rises from any consequence to the reason thereof and in reverse descends from that reason to the conse­ quence, that which is the ultim ate and for us the principle of all knowledge cannot be known in turn through another principle. T hat is, the principle of its being and the principle of its being known* must coincide, m ust be one, since it can be thought only because it itself is, not because there is something else. Therefore it must be thought simply because it is, and it must be because it itself is being thought, not because something else is thought." Its assertion must be contained in its thought; it must create itself through its being thought .12 If we had to think something else in order to reach its thought, then that other entity would be superior to the ultimate, which is a contradiction. In order to reach the ultim ate I need nothing but the ultim ate itself. The absolute can be given only by the ab ­ solute. Now the investigation is becoming more definite. Originally I posited nothing but an ultim ate ground of any real knowledge. Now this criterion that it must be the last absolute ground of knowledge permits us at the same time to establish its existence (Sein). The last ground for all reality is something that is thinkable only through itself, that is, it is thinkable only through its being (Sein); it is thought only inasmuch as it is. In short,Mie principle o f being arid thinking is one and the same |see n .ll ] . The ques­ tion can now be expressed quite clearly and the investigation has a clue which can never fail.

§2 Knowledge which I can reach only through other knowledge is condi­ tional. The chain of our knowledge [164] goes from one conditional [piece of| knowledge to another. Either the whole has no stability, or one must be able to believe that this can go on ad infinitum, or else that there must be a some ultim ate point on which the whole depends. The latter, however, in regard to the principle of its being, must be the direct opposite of all that falls in the sphere of the conditional, that is, it must be not only uncondi­ tional but ahogethefjuncondilionable. All possible theories of the unconditional must be determinable a priori, once the only correct one has been found. As long as it has not been established, one must follow the empirical progress of philosophy. • |F o o I N(HK)F I iik hrs I KDr I ion | May this expression h r taken here in it» broadest sense, as long an (h r nom rthing wr arc looking lor in z.stin}. And this, though pure, is nevertheless valid only in the world o f appearances and is absolutely em pty outside o f it. O u r em pirical age seems to have entirely lost th at idea, yet it lives on in the systems o f Spinoza and D escartes, an d , as th e holiest idea o f antiquity ( t o o v ) , in the im ­ m ortal works o f Plato. Nevertheless, should our era ever again rise to th at idea, it m ight believe, in its conceited delusion, that never before had anything like it com e into m an ’s head. **T h is question is intentionally expressed this way. T h e author knows that Spinoza asserts only an im m anent causality o f the absolute o b je ct. Still, what follows here will show that he Asserted it only because for him it was unintelligible as to how the absolute could go out of itself; i.e .. because he could propose lhai question but was unable to answer it.

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solute in order to oppose something to ourselves that is radically different from us. T h e most intelligible is how we determine all, merely by the law o f identity; the most enigmatical is how we can determine anything beyond this law !35 As far as I can see, this unintelligibility is indissoluble, theoretically, for citicism as well as for dogmatism. T ru e enough, criticism can prove the necessity o f synthetic propositions for the realm of experience. But o f what avail is that in answering our question? I ask again, why is there a realm o f experience a t a l l ? Every reply I give to this already presupposes the existence o f a world o f experience. In order to be able to answer this question we should First o f all have to have left the realm o f experience; but if we had left that realm the very question would cease. Hence this question cannot be solved except in the way in which Alexander solved the [problem of] Gordian knot, that is, by doing away with the question. [311] Hence it is absolutely unanswerable, because it^arTbe answered only in such a way that it can never again be asked. But now it is already evident that such a dissolution o f the question can ' no longer be theoretical; it necessarily becomes practical. For in order to be able to answer it, I must leave the realm o f expenence’myself, that is, I must do away, for myself, with the bound o f the world o f experience; I must cease to be a finite being [endliches W esen ].36 Therefore that theoretical question necessarily becomes a practical postulate, and the problem o f all philosophy necessarily leads us to a claim which can be met only outside o f all experience [of any objects]. And thus the problem necessarily leads me beyond all bounds of know ledge [Schranken des Wissens; cf. n .l] into a region where I do not fin d firm ground, but must p ro d u c£ it m y se lfjn o rd e r to stand .firmly. .upoXL.it. T ru e enough, theoretical reason might try to leave the realm of knowledge and set out haphazardly for the discovery o f some other realm ; however, nothing would be attained by that, except reason’s losing itself in vain fancies through which it could not gain any real possessions. T o pro­ vide against such ventures, reason itself would have to create a new realm there where its know ledge ceases, that is, from a merely cognitive it would have to turn into a creative reason, from theoretical reason into practical. This necessity, however, to become practical is valid for reason as such, not only for a specific reason confined in the fetters o f a particular system. Dogmatism and criticism, starting from principles however different, must nonetheless meet in one point in Qne-and-the.--sam&-problem . Only at this meeting does the time come for their proper separation; only here can they realize tfrat the principle which they had so far presupposed, was nothing but{a prolepsis\ upon which the verdict is to be given only at this point. Now only is it manifest that all the propositions which they had put forth thus far were propositions asserted absolutely, that is, without

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ground. Now, as they enter a new realm , the realm ofcrea tiv eJS lZ ] reason [realisierender Vernunft], it will be revealed whether they are capable of giving reality to those propositions; now only is it to be decided whether they are able to m aintain their principles as well, in the scrimmage o f the contest, by the autonomy [Selbstm acht]of their freedom, as they did in the realm o f general peace (by absolute power which has no m erit*). Criticism could not follow the lead o f dogmatism nor, vice versa, lead it into the realm o f the absolute, because in that realm nothing was possible for either except absolute assertions —assertions o f which the opposite system would take no notice, assertions that would decide nothing for a conflicting system, p n ly now when both systems meet, can neither ignore the other any more, and just as before they were concerned with an undisturbed possession ronquprfd vyjt frou t resistance, so now they must concern themselves with a possessiorLgained by victory] lit would be vain to believe that the victory is decided by the mere choice o f principles which are to serve as a basis of one’s system, and that in order to save one system or the other, it matters only what principle one has set up at the outset. For what matters is not a trick by which one finds at the end what one had prepared initially and cleverly for such eventual discovery ^The theoretical assertions which we put forth absolutely will not coerce our freedom to decide this way or that (that would be blind dogmatism) but, as soon as we are in the contest, those very principles as set up in the beginning are no longer valid in and by themselves; tiQW only is it to, be decided, pr ^ tira lly Hy r^lr fraa^? rr. whether they are valid or not And it is nothing indeed but an inevitable circle if our thenrptiral speculation sets up beforehand what our freedom will m aintain afterwards in the icrimmage o f the contest. If we want to establish a system and, therefore .p rin c ip le s, we cannot do it except by an anticipation o f the practical decision. We should not establish those principles unless our freedom had already decided about them; at the beginning of our knowledge they are [313] nothing but proleptic assertions, or, as Jacob i ex­ presses it somewhere—wryly and awkwardly enough, as he says himself, yet not quite unphilosophically —they are original insuperable preju dices |Vorurteile]. ^ Consequently, no philosopher will imagine that he has done everything, by merely setting up the highest principles. For those principles have only a subjective value as a basis o f his system, that is, they are valid for him only inasmuch as he has anticipated his own practical decision. i

'' '

Seventh Letter I begin to approach the goal. T h e ethics o f dogmatism becomes more in* K . K. A. S< helling'« c o m m e m : C l a u s e o f 1 7 9 5 . d r o p p e d 18 09.

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telligible for us as soon as we know what the problem is which, like any other ethics, it has to solve. T h e m ain task o f all philosophy consists o f solving the problem o f the ex--> istence o f the world. All philosophers have worked at this solution, whatever different expression they have given to the problem. He who wants to conjure up the spirit o f philosophy must conjure it up here. W hen Lessing asked Jaco b i what he would consider the spirit o f Spinozism to be, Jacobi replied :37 it could be nothing else than the old a nihilo nihil f i t , which Spinoza contemplated according to concepts more abstract and pure [nach abgezogenern Begriffen] than those o f the philosophizing cabbalists or o f others before him. According to these purer concepts he found that the notion o f anything emerging within the nonfinite [Entstehen im Unendlichen] posits som ething fr o m nothing regardless o f any support which images and words seem to furnish. “Conse­ quently, he rejected every transition o f the nonfinite into the fin ite,” all transitory causes whatsoever, and for the em anating prinicple he substituted an im manent principle, an indwelling cause o f the world, eter­ nally im m utable in itself, a cause which would be one and the same as all its effects. I don’t believe that the spirit o f Spinozism could be better cir­ cumscribed. But I believe that the very transition from the nonfinite to the [314] finite is the problem o f all philosophy, not only o f one particular system. I even believe that Spinoza’s solution is the only possible solution, though the interpretation it must have in his system can belong to that system alone and another system will offer another interpretation for the solution. I hear you say: “This statement needs an interpretation itself.” I shall give it as well as I can. No system can realize the transition from the nonfinite to the fin ite.3" A mere play o f thoughts is always possible, but it is never o f much avail. No system can fill the gap between the nonfinite and the finite. This I presup­ pose; it is the result, not o f critical philosophy, but o f the Critique o f Pure R ea so n ,,39 which concerns dogmatism as well as criticism, and which must be equally evident for both. Reason [personified as feminine] sought to realize that transition from; the nonfinite to the finite in order to bring unity into her cognition. She wanted to find the middle term [das Mittelglied] between the nonfinite and the finite in order to. connect them both in the same unity of knowledge. W hile she cannot possibly find that middle term, yet she does not on that account surrender her highest aspiration, unity o f cognitions;_it is now her will no longer to need that middle term. Her effort to realize that transition consequently becomes the absolute demand —there shall bei no transition from the nonfinite to the finite. How different is this demand from the opposite there shall he such transition! T he latter is transcen-l

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dent; it wants to extend its sway to a realm in which it has no power (the realm of the nonfinite).* It is the demand o f blind dogm atism . T h e former demand, o a jh e contrary, is im m anent; it wills that I shall not adm it o f any |transition./ Thus dogmatism and criticism unite in the same postulate. Philosophy cannot make a transition from the nonfinite to the finite, but it can make one from the finite to the nonfinite. [315] It is precisely the refusal o f a transition from the nonfinite to the finite which, as an aspira­ tion [Streben], comes to be the connecting middle term o f the two in human cognition. In order that there may be no transition from the non­ finite to the finite, the finite itself must have, a tendency towards the non­ finite l a perpetual strivingfco lose itself in thfi nonfinite .40 Now only does light dawn for us with regard to Spinoza’s Ethics. It was not theoretical necessity alone, it was not merely a consequence o f ex nihilo nihil fit , that led him to his solution o f the problem, the solution that there is no transition from the nonfinite to the finite, no transitive, but only an indwelling cause o f the world. It was to the practical dictum heeded by all philosophy that he owed that solution, except that Spinoza interpreted the tfictum 'according to t o system. H eTiacTbegun with a nonfinite substance, an absolute object. “T here shall be no transition from the nonfinite to the finite” —behold, the de­ mand o f all philosophy. Spinoza interpreted it according to his principle, which let the finite differ from the nonfinite only because o f the limitations o f the finite. According to his principle everything in existence was merely a modification of the same infinite. Consequently there was no transition, no conflict, but only the demand that the finite strive to become identical with the infinite and to merge in the infinity of the absolute o b ject .41 Do you ask, my friend, how Spinoza could bear the contradiction o f such a demand? Truly, he felt that the commandment annihilate th y self could not be fulfilled as long as he had to value the subject as highly as it is valued in the system of freedom. But this was his very aim ; his self was n ot to be his property; itjv as to belong.taJnfinU je-realityT h e subject as such cannot annihilate itself for, in order to do so, it would have to survive its own annihilation. But Spinoza did not acknowledge any subject as such. On his part, he had done away with that concept o f a subject before he set up his postulate. If the subject has an independent causality o f its own insofar as it is ob ­ je c t, then there is a contradiction in the demand L ose you rself [3 1 6 [in th e absolute. But Spinoza had done away with just that independent causality of the ego by which it is ego [Ic h ]. In demanding that the subject lose itself in the absolute, he had demanded implicitly the identity o f subjective with absolute causality. He had decided, practically, that the finite world is *K , F S, Sd irllin g» iim im rn i: In th r firm rdiiion

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nothing but a m odification of the infinite, finite causality merely a m odification o f infinite causality. T h a t demand was to be fulfilled, not by the subject’s own causality, but by a foreign causality in the subject. In other words, the demand was this: A nnihilate yourself through absolute causality! Be absolutely passive toward absolute causality! Finite causality was to differ from absolute not by prinfciple but only by its limitations. T h e very causality governing in the infinite was to govern in every finite being. In the absolute this causality purported absolute nega­ tion o f every merely finite state [Endlichkeit]. Similarly, its significance in the finite was to negate finitude empirically, a negation to be produced progressively, in time. Furthermore, Spinoza could not but infer that a complete fulfillment o f the task o f this finite causality, attained at any time, would m ean identity with absolute causality, the finite having over­ come the limitations by which alone it differed from the absolute. Let us stop here, my friend, and admire the calmness with which Spinoza approached the completion o f his system. He may have found that calm only in the love o f the infinite. W ho would think any the worse o f his serene spirit for harboring such an image, under which he found bearable the thought at which his system stopped?

Eighth L etter I believe that I am touching on the very core o f all possible utopianism [Srhwä^ p re i^ when I speak o f the ethical principle o f dogmatism. T h e most sacred thoughts of antiquity and the phantoms o f human insanity [317] meet on this spot. “T h e return into the deity, into the fountainhead o f all existence, the unification with the absolute, the annihilation of selfhood” — is this not the principle o f all utopian [schwärmerischen] philosophy, except for the different interpretations given by different en ­ thusiasts who would expound it and shroud it in different images accor­ ding to their spirit and their intentions. T h e principle of the history o f all enthusiasm [Schwärmerei] is to be found here. You say: “I can understand how Spinoza could keep out o f sight the con­ tradiction involved in his ethical principle. However, granting that, how was it possible for the serene spirit o f Spinoza to bear that destructive and annihilating prii^icple itself? For his is a serenity which illumines with its mild light his whole life and all his writings.” I cannot reply except by say­ ing: “Read his writings in just this respect, and you will find the answer to your question yourself." A natural, an unavoidable dcccption had made that principle bearable for him and for all those nobler spirits who believed in it. For him, intellec-

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tual intuition o f the absolute is the highest attainm ent, the last grade of cognition to which a finite being can rise, the very life o f the spirit.’1' From where else could he have drawn the idea of intellectual intuition but from his own self-intuition [Selbstanschauung]? You need only to read him in order to be fully convinced o f th is.** [318] W e all have a secret and wondrous capacity o f withdrawing from temporal change into our innermost self, which we divest of every exterior accretion. There, in the form o f immutability, we intuit the eternal in us. This intuition is the innermost and in the strictest sense j ju r own ex= perience, upon which depends everything we know and believe o f a supersensuous world. It is this intuition which first convinces us that anything is, strictly speaking, while everything else merely appears, and is only inasmuch as we transfer the word being to it. This intuition is distinguished from every sensuous intutition by the fact that it is produced by freedom alone, and that it is foreign and unknown to any whose freedom, overcome by the invading power o f the objects, is almost insuffi­ cient for the production o f consciousness. Yet there is an approximation to this freedom o f self-intuition even for those who do not possess it; there are m ediate experiences in which the freedom can be divined. T h ere is a cer­ tain profoundness of mind [Tiefsinn] o f which one is not aware, and which one would try in vain to produce at will. Jaco b i has described it. And a complete aesthetics (this word taken in its old meaning) will show forth em ­ pirical acts which are explicable only as imitations of that intellectual act, and which would not be intelligible at all if we had not at some time —to speak with P lato —-seen their prototype in the intellectual world .43 “From experiences ,”44 from immediate experiences must all o f our knowledge start. This is a truth which has already been proclaimed by many philosophers who have fallen short o f full truth only for lack o f an explanation concerning the nature o f that intuition [Anschauung]. From experience, indeed; however, because every experience o f objects depends on the experience of further objects, at core our knowledge must start from * A ccording to Spinoza, all a d equ ate, i.e ., im m ediate cognitions are intuitions [Anschautingrn l o f divine attributes, and the m ain theorem on which his ethics rests, so far as it is an rtlllcii, is the proposition mens hu m an a h a b et a d a eq u a ta m cogn itionem a e te m a e et in finitae rw rn tiae Dei (Ethics, bk. 2 prop. 4 7 ). From this intuition o f God arises the intellectu al love o f ’ (in d , which Spinoza describes as an approach to the state o f the highest bliss. H e says (bk . 5, prop. S6): M entis erga Deum am or in te lle c tu a ls pars est infm iti am oris, quo Deus se ipsum ■m at. A nd; Sum m us m entis conatus sum m aque virtus est, res intelligere tertio genere, quod procrdit ab adaequ ata idea divinorum attributorum (ib id ., prop. 25). And also: Ex hoc tog nition is genere sum m a, quae dari potest, m entis acquiescentia oritur, (ib id ., prop. 27). Kurt her: C lare intelligim us, qua in re salus nostra, seu beatitud o seu libertas consistit, nem pe lit inn»iiim i et aeterno erga Deum am ore (ib id ., prop. 36 sch o l).es^not infer o ne's existence by .any syllogism — n ecju ep er sylfogismum deducit, sed tanquam

j

rem p er w notam sim plici m entis intuitu agnoscit. In D e T rin itate (1 0 . ix . 12; also see

I

n, !fl below) Augustine said o f the m ind: Non itaque velut absentem se q u aerat cernere, sed | praesentem se curet discernere. N ec se quasi non norit cognoscat, sed ab eo quod alterum f novit dinoscat. “Let it not then seek to discern itself as though absent, but take pains to [ tliicern itself as present. N or let it acq u ire knowledge o f itself as if it did not know itself, but lei it distinguish itself from th at which it knows to be som ething o th er” (An Augustijje Synthesis, arranged by Erich Przywara, S .J. [Leipzig: H egner, I934|, trans. C. C. M artindale, S, J . (New York: Sheed and W ard , 1945|. Now available as H arper T orch b ook T B 35, pp. 8 9. See those entire pages). In the first edition o f the C ritique o f P ure R eason (A 355; Sm ith j 11 7 ) Kant wrote: “what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is really a , tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence im m ediately.” O f course one y should not translate cogito as “I th in k” but as “I am aw are.”

J\

The natural m ind, that is, the m ind o f the child (and o f untutored people, or people who lave not tutored them srlves) is dogm atistic. It sees all reality as objective and thus, for nstance, takes God for "a great Som ebod y,” as Augustine says in the Confessions ( l.ix .1 4 ) : esse m agnum aliquem , (See also Medit us and M arcr!, n. 34 O f I.) None of us is ever entirely

.

[d 3 3 - 4 1 ] p h i l o s o p h i c a l

l e t t e r s o n d o g m a t is m a n d c r it ic is m

209

free o f th e n atu ral m ind for which gru n dlos can m ean abysm al. K an t says (PuR 641; cf. Sm ith 5 1 3 ): “U n con d itional necessity, which we so indispensably require as the last bearer o f all things, is for h um an reason the veritable abyss” (A bgrund). T h is leads m e to translate

gru n dlos as groundless. 34 .

In 18 0 5 , in his Aphorism 159 (7 : 174) Schelling said: “In reply to the question raised

by a ratio cin atio n th at is perplexed when it stands at the abyss o f infinity: Why is th ere not

nothing, why is th ere anything at a ll ? the valid answer is not Som ething but only the All or God. T h e All is th a t fo r which it is strictly im possible not to b e, ju st as it is strictly im possible for the N othing to be. T h e absolute contrast to the N othing (which is eternally im possible, eternally N othing) is the A ll.” C f. the begin n in g o f the Seventh L etter. 35.

See n. 21 above. A ristotle said in th e N icom ach ea n E thics (1 . vii. 20, R ackh am

tran s.): “N or again m ust we in all m atters alike dem and an exp lan ation o f the reason why things are what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fa ct th at they are so is satisfactorily established. T h is is the case with first p rin cip les.” And he goes on to say pithily (1 0 9 8 6 3 ): 6'

npw'cov xal apxi j. I translate this clum sily as: “F or the fa c t th at there is a first T H A T is

also a first p rin cip le.” For Fichte and Sch ellin g the first T H A T is the I. T h e n th e enigm a arises. See n. 38 below. 36.

PuR had shown that the world o f experience consists o f objects which are

categorically conditioned. U nconditioned, not fin ite, is the K an tian autonom y, which alone can brin g about any o bligation . In Poss. 97 Sch ellin g stressed the nonfiniteness o f the I, writing in Fichtean language: “T h e I is simply posited; its position is not determ ined by anything outside itself; it posits itself (through absolute causality). It is posited not because it has been posited b u t because it is what is doing the positin g.” (C f. D ogm . 3 2 0 .) T h e last phrase o f this letter speaks o f “his own p ractical decision .” In ecclesiastic language th at could be called an “act o f fa ith .” 37.

Sch ellin g quotes verbatim what here follows a fter the colon, but he om its the

quotation m ark. A pparently for em phasis he puts only the last sentence in quotation m arks: “C onsequently [Spinoza] rejected every transition o f the nonfinite into the fin ite .” However, he replaces the period by a m ere com m a in ord er to continue in his own words. He is quoting from Ja c o b i’s book o f 1785, U ber d ie L eh r e des Spinoza, in B riefen an H errn Moses M endelssohn, which Ja c o b i republished in 1789 with additions. (F riedrich H einrich Ja c o b i, W erke [Leipzig, 18 1 9 ; D arm stad t: W issenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968], 4 :5 6 .) 38. See nn. 21 and 35 above, and D ogm. 310: “this unintelligibility is indissoluble theoretically, for criticism as well as for do g m atism .” 39.

For instance PuR 33 4 , where K ant speaks o f “the secret o f the origin o f our sense

awareness” and says th at “its relation to an o b je ct, and th e transcend ental grund o f this unity undoubtedly lies too deeply hidden” (c f. Sm ith 2 8 7 ). A gain, o f the sense form s he says: “T h e nonsensuous cause o f these images [V orstellungen] is entirely unknown to us” (PuR 522; cf. Sm ith 4 4 1 ). It is significant th at Schelling gave his essay o f 1836, published posthumously, the title D arstellung des p h ilosophischen E m pirism us, Presentation o f Philosophical Em piricism (1 0 : 225 -2 8 6 ). 40 . PuR m ade it clear that all o bjects are conditional and therefore point beyond themselves. And, K ant says, , “the absolute totality of the series o f these conditions. . .is an idea which, though it can never be com pleted in em pirical use, yet serves as a rule how to proceed with regard to it, m eaning th at, in the regresses o f the exp lan ation o f given phenom ena, wc should proceed ii.v if the series itself |an sich| were infinite, i.e ., we are to proceed in inde/initum " ( PuR 713; cf. Sm ith 559). 41 .

U nfortunately, Schelling stick» to the habit of using the word infinite |unendlich|

without distinguishing between its two m eanings, as Hegel did twenty two years later. Let the reader

be guidrd

by

Hegel's disim iiin n

Uncndlithkeit| ol riidlcM r e g r e t

hr I wren

ih c

m ath etm atu al infinity

Nit htendlu he| wilh whirli philonophy in to m r n ir d (i.ogu

"b a d ” infinite

|dir schlechte

and the “truly“ n onfiniie |dafi in I'.niycloftf’dm o f thr

210

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

41-42]

Philosophical Sciences, W erke, 6: 184 ff .; 1817 ed. § 4 7 , p. 4 1 ). W ith th at guidance the reader can steer clea r o f the mystifying im plication th at “to becom e id entical with the infinite and to m erge [unterzugehen] with the infinity o f the absolute o b je ct” m eans to lose on e’s identity and to drown in a kind o f endless ocean . I had to retain th e word in finite in this sentence because Sch ellin g refers to Spinoza. B u t Spinoza had already distinguished what is absolu te infinitum from what is infinite only in suo g en ere. In his exp lanation o f def. 6 (“By God I understand Being absolutely infinite”) o f the first p art o f the Ethics he said, “o f whatever is infinite only in its own kind [in suo genere], we can deny infinite attributes; but to the essence o f th at which is absolutely infinite pertains w hatever expresses essence and involves no n egation ” (John W ild, ed ., Spinoza. Selections. [New Y ork: S crib n er’s, 1930], p. 9 5 ). In th e sam e part, prop. 14 says: “Besides God, no substance can be nor can be conceived” (ib id ., p. 197). And def. 3 declares: “By substance, I understand th at which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in oth er words, th a t, the conception o f which does not need the conception o f another thing from which it must be form ed” (ib id ., p. 9 4). O n February 4, 1795, Sch ellin g wrote to Hegel: “M eanw hile I have becom e a Spinozist! Do not be astonished. H ere is how: For Spinoza, the world (the ob ject as such in contrast to the subject) was All, for m e, the / is A ll” (P litt 1: 76; c f. n n. 25 and 55 to O f I. Fich te had tau ght him to see th at Spinoza’s definition o f substance as what is in itself and is perceived by itself (id quod in se est et p er se percip itu r) expresses the very form o f I, i.e ., the form o f unity and o f logical cogency w hich, so K an t had taught him , alone can bestow reality on phenom ena. T h erefo re Sch ellin g can tell H egel: “For us, there is no supersensuous world o th er than the world o f the absolute I. G od is nothing but the absolute I, the I insofar as it has an nih ilated everything theoretically and therefore, in

th eo retic a l philosophy |which, accordin g to K an t, deals only with o b jects], is itself equal to /.ero [since the 1 is no o b je ct at a ll). Personality com es about through the unity o f consciousness. B u t consciousness is not possible without an o b je ct. For God, however, th at is, for the absolute I, there is no o b je ct at ali, otherwise it would cease to be absolute. T h erefore there is no personal God. . . ” (P litt 1: 7 7). And this tallies with Spinoza’s id entification o f God with n atu re. O f course, th at id entification is perfect dogm atism insofar as God becom es an absolute It, although Spinoza’s definition o f substance would requ ire God as absolute I. Since ob jects are fin ite, an absolute o b je ct m ust appear to ratiocin ation in the form o f “bad in fin ity .” Every dogm atist, tied as he is to ratio cin atio n , will tell you th at God is so infinite that no intelligence [ Verstand| can com prehend H im . T h is is true, and rem ains true for every rationalistic theology. B u t genuine theology is philosophical. K an t, critically denying the possibility o f an objectivistic theology, had to reduce the godhead to ‘n othing but the idea o f an All o f reality [om nitudo realitatis|” , to a “transcendental ideal” ( PuR 604; C f. Sm ith 490). T h e C ritique at once confirm s th e agnostic assertion o f dogm atism and the nonfinite nupenicnsuous of criticism . T h e God o f dogm atism (and o f Spinoza) must be called infinite. But the “true God” is nonfinite and therefore distinguishable from the m erely “real G o d ,” as Schelling pointed out m uch later. “God in his truth can only be known, but a blind relationship is possible with God in his m ere reality” ( W erke 11: 190). 42.

Schelling slightly shortened his quotations. In Jo h n W ild ’s translation o f Spinoza: (2:

* 7 ): "T h e hum an mind possesses an adequate knowledge o f the eternal and infinite essence o f (»od ." 5: 36: "T h e intellectual love o f the m ind towards God is part o f the infinite love with which God loves h im self.” 5: 25: “T h e highest effort of the m ind and its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind o f knowledge. . .which proceeds from an adequate idea o f certain attributes o f God to an ad equ ate knowledge o f the essence o f th in gs." 5: 27: “From thin third kind o f knowledge arises the highest possible peace o f m in d .” (Instead o f p ea ce, Spino/a said acqu icscvn cv. T h a t

word precisely expresses the mood which Schelling

em phasizes. T h e word p e a c e does n o t.) 5: 36. schol,: "H en ce we clearly understand that our Nalvation, or blessedness, or liberty consists in a constant and eternal love towards G od .” !>;S0: "O u t m ind, in so far ax it knows itsrlf. . .under the form o f eternity, necessarily has a knowledge ol («od. and knows that it is in God and is contrived through H im ."

[d 43-46] PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS ON DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM 43 .

211

Schelling says “in der intellektualen W elt”, not intellektuellen. Perhaps I should m ore

freely tan slate: in the world o f ideas. Schelling m ust be thinking o f P la to ’s T heaetetu s 184 b -8 5 e, where the problem is how we can be aware at all o f anything and specifically o f a th in g o f sense. Auguste Diès ([P aris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles L e ttre s,” 1924], pp. 2 2 0 , 184b ) egregiously m istranslates

aisthesis as sensation. Plato points out th at each sensation has its specific organ, eye, ear, e tc., and th at the problem becom es insoluble if we assume th at (a sjo w ett translates) “in each o f us, as in a sort o f T ro ja n horse, there are perched a nu m b er o f unconnected senses” (184d ). Having rendered the word aisthesis (which really n am es the problem ) as “p ercep tio n ,” Jow ett now calls it “sen se.” B u t the senses are m any, and aw areness (the only possible English term ) is one. And the result o f P la to ’s discussion is, as he has T h ea etetu s put it (185d e): “the soul itself and by itself is what oversees” (or really sees) what is com m on in the d ifferent things which the specific senses brin g to our atten tion . In short, without awareness we have no sensation. And this aisthesis is not an organ but the act o f the soul. W ords like p ercep tion , sense, sensation m erely repeat the question; they do not answer it. Plato does. 44 .

Obvious reference to the first sentence o f the introd uction to PuR.

45.

In 1781, in the first edition o f the PuR (A 117), K an t spoke o f th e very “p rin ciple o f a

synthetic unity o f the m anifold in any possible awareness” (A nschauung). A nd in a long footnote he said: “All im ages [V orstellungen] have a necessary relation to a possible em pirical consciousness. For, if they had not, and if it were quite im possible to becom e aware o f them , this would m ean as m uch as: they would not exist at all. Y et all em pirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness (antecedent to any p articu lar experience) which is the awareness [Bewusstsein] o f m yself as the original apperception. It is indispensably necessary th at, in my knowledge, every awareness belongs to the one awareness o f m y se lf’ (cf. Sm ith 142). T h is tallies with P lato ’s on e awareness in the T heaetetu s (see n. 43 above). And when Plato says th a t the soul “itself and by its e lf’ (185d:auTrj ßi ' aurr$lalone can b rin g about any awareness, th a t tallies with F ich te’s rem inder th at th e awareness o f m yself as I is n ot an inert fa ct but exists only as spontaneous act. It is synthesis in the strictest sense in which K ant already used the word synthetic in the footnote o f 1781 ju st quoted. “T h e synthetic proposition th at every p articu lar em pirical awareness m ust have its unity in one single selfawareness [Selbstbewusstsein] is the absolutely first and synthetic p rinciple o f our thinking as such. O ne m ust not ignore th at the sheer im age I [die blosse V ostellung Ich ], in relation to all oth er im ages (whose collective unity the I m akes possible) is the transcendental consciousness [das transscend entale Bewusstsein]. T h is im age may b e (em pirically] clear or obsure. T h a t does not m atter. In fa ct its very presence [W irklichkeit] does not m atter. W h at m atters is th at the possibility o f a logical form o f all knowledge rests necessarily on the relation to this apperception in potency" (als einem V erm ögen) (Sm ith ob jectifies and says: as a faculty). K an t sum m arizes: “T h erefo re the transcend ental unity o f apperception refers to the pure synthesis o f im agination [E inbildungskraft] as an a p rio ri condition o f th e possibility o f every com position o f any m anifold in any knowledge. B u t what can take place a p rio ri is only the p rod u ctiv e synthesis o f im agin ation , for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions o f exp erien ce” (A 118; cf. Sm ith 142 f.). T h e la tter are what Schelling here calls objective causality. 46. In the review o f A enesidem us (1 7 9 2 ) Fichte wrote: “T h e I is what it is, and becau se it is, f o r the I ” (1 : 16). And in 1798 he wrote: “T h e I is anything at all only insofar as it posits itself as self (intuits and thinks itself), and it is nothing at all if not self posited” (4 : 2 9 ). In this way, the K an tian prim acy o f practical reason m anifests itself as the ground o f th eoretical reason, whose very problem s arise only for a »elf I hat is m ade intellectually responsible by autonom y. A m eaningful t>roblern in a lank grasped by a responsible self. In his l.ectu res on

th e Vocation o f th e S cholar delivered “before a considerable n u m b er" (6: 291) of students in his first sem ester at Jen a in the sunim ei of 17!M, Fichte spoke of our “sublim e task" and said: B y u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t g i e a t t a s k , 1 h a v e a l i e a d y g r a b b e d e t e r n i t y " ((>,

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

212 47.

[d 4 7 -5 5 ]

O n February 4 ,. 17 9 5 , Sch ellin g wrote to H egel: “O u r highest endeavor is the

an nih ilatio n o f our personality, the transition into th e absolute sphere o f being which, however, is not possible in eternity —h en ce only p ra ctica l approxim ation to the absolute, and therefore —im m ortality-” (P litt 1 :7 7 ). 48.

P uR says (1 3 1 ,

16): “T h e 7 think' must potentially accom pany all my notions” (cf.

Sm ith 152). 49 .

Law rence Sterne (1 7 1 3 -1 7 6 8 ).

50.

Baggesen belonged to th e K önigsberg group around K an t. “In his old age, K ant

found a wide circle o f adm irers and friends for whom he was the celeb rated head o f the rapidly increasing critical school. T h e most extravagant praise cam e from those for whom the new philosophy was a kind o f new religion, am ong them Baggesen who, for a tim e, looked at K an t as at a second M essiah” (W illy M oog, F riedrich U eberwegs Grundriss d er G eschichte der P hilosop h ie, pt. 3, in D ie P h ilosop h ie d e r N euzeit bis zum E n d e des X V III. Ja h rh u n d erts, 12th ed. [B erlin : E . S. M ittler, 1924], p. 508. 51 .

T h e not only descriptive b u t explanatory form ula for the I as “present to its e lf’ was

already used by A ugustine, who says o f anyone desirous o f know ing him self: “L et him not seek to ascertain what he is as if he were absent b u t take ca re to grasp h im self discerningly as present” (De trinitate 10. ix.

12: N on itaque velut absentem se q u aerat cern ere, sed

praesentem se curet discernere). T h e re is overwhelm ing evidence th at Augustine is as clear about th e self as Fich te. So is Plotinus. As for the earliest an cien t philosophers, Hegel says, “philosophizing properly speaking started with Parm enides” (L ectu res on th e History o f

P hilosophy, W erke 13: 296 f.). Hegel sees the m ain point in Parm enides’ sentence: “T h in kin g and that wherefore thought is, are the same” [Diels, fragm . 8, line 34] Cf. n. O F I. 100. 'tao'cov 6 1 lori'voeTv T6 x a l ofcv&xsv Sornvdrjua T h e w herefore o f thought is cogency, which is what “being” (ein ai) m eans, strictly speaking. H en ce the fragm en t quoted by Clem ent, Plotinus, Proclus, and Sim plicius: “T h e sam e is thinking and b ein g” (D iels, fragm . 5). K irk and Raven

( T h e P resocratic P hilosophers [C am brid ge: T h e University Press, 1962] p. 27 7 ) would seem to m ake Parm enides a skeptic, unbelievably translating their fragm en t 352: “W h at can be thought is only the thought th at it is.” I believe th at Hegel is right and Parm enides stands closer to Plotinus. A t all events, som e o f the ancients have not only f e l t but thought the I, as strictly not an o b je ct. 52.

T h e m uch older Sch ellin g will say: “consciousness does not c o m e to God; its very first

move is away from the true God. . . .consciousness, as soon as it moves at all, moves away from G od " (1 1 : 186). 53.

Seligkeit m eans beatitu d e, glü ckselig blessedly happy. In English good “h ap ” is luck.

Schelling plays with the word G lück w hich, like its English cogn ate, m ay m ean sheer luck, as in G lücksspiel, gam e o f luck. T h u s, one m ight say in English, happiness com es upon us by happenstance. In 1784, in his I d e a f o r a Universal H istory in a C osm opolitan Sense, K ant »aid: “M an, having worked his way up from greatest crudeness to greatest skill. . .and thus to happiness, should alone have the m e rit,” as if nature had planned not “his w ell-being but rath er his reasonable self-approv al,” not having intended “his com fort, but his being worthy o f i t .” (Cass. 4: 154, prop. 3). 54.

O n D ecem ber 24, 1794, the repeal o f price control m ade the assignats o f the French

R ep u b lic depreciate still m ore. In flatio n led to bread riots in Paris on April 1 (12 germ inal) 1795. O n Ju ly 21, 1795, Schelling wrote Hegel th at the treatise (Letters) was about to appear in N ieth am m ers philosophical jo u rn a l. 55.

K ant said: “All m oral value o f acts lies essentially in th is,'th at the m oral law alone has

determ ined the will” ( P rR , Cass. 5: 79; B eck 74). Aristotle said: “acts done in conform ity with the virtues are not done justly or tem perately if they themselves are o f a certain kind, but only if the agent deliberately choose the a ct, and choose it for its own sake” (R ackh am trans.,

Nnom: 141; d . Deck M l).

[d 6 6 -6 9 ] 66.

PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS ON DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM

215

In 1781 the first edition o f P uR put this succinctly: “T h e transcendental realist co n ­

ceives o f outward phenom ena as things in themselves which exist independently o f us and o f our sensibility. . . . It is precisely this transcend ental realist who then plays the em pirical idealist, finding all our impressions [V orstellungen] insufficient to establish the reality o f the objects o f sense” (A 3 69). “In contrast, the transcend ental idealist can be an em pirical realist and thus can be called a dualist, i.e ., he can adm it the existence o f m atter without going beyond sheer self-awareness and without assuming m ore than the certainty o f the impressions in m e” (A 37 0 ; c f. Sm ith 3 46). In the essay O f th e I, Schelling said: “ Transcendent realism is necessarily em pirical idealism , and vice versa.” (O f I 2 1 3 ). 67.

See O f I pp. 2 3 5 -3 6 .

W h en , in 1796 and 1797, Schelling wrote the Essays to E xplain th e Id ealism o f th e

W issenschaftslehre , he referred back to those sam e pages (2 3 5 -3 6 ) and added: “In ord er to ex- v plain free will as a fa ct o f com m on consciousness, we need the idea o f absolute freedom ;

without it we cann o t understand any freedom o f choice; with it alone we do not understand how there can still b e any choice at a ll in us, nor why the original law in us has not turned into necessity. H ere we must rem ind ourselves th a t arbitrary choice [W illkür] or the liberty to take our stand for or against the law belongs exclusively to the phenom enon [Erscheinung] and th at we m ay not in any way use the concept o f freedom in order to determ ine or define the supersensuous in us. Instead, what must be shown is that we cann ot b eco m e aw are at all o f the supersensuous in us, th at is, o f freedom [F reih eit], except through arbitrary choice [W illkür] w hich, th erefo re, though it does not p ertain to the supersensuous in us, yet necessarily p e r­ tains to our finiteness, that is, to the aw areness [Bewusstsein] o f the supersensuous. Ju st as it is > necessary th a t, for ourselves, we becom e fin ite, so it is necessary th at the absolute freedom in us a p p e a r as arbitrariness. T ho u gh it belongs m erely to our finiteness and is therefore m ere

p h en om en on [Erscheinung], arbitrariness is not on that accou nt m ere seem ingness [Schein]. It belongs to the necessary lim itations o f our n atu re, which we forever endeavor to overcom e, but without ever b ein g ab le to do away with them entirely. And thus, from this otherwise so dark spot o f p ractical philosophy, a new ray o f light falls back upon our th eoretical idealism , whose sign ificance only now becom es entirely clear. W e can now ascertain the transcendental place, as it were, whence the intellectu al in us passes into the em p irical” (1 :4 3 9 f.). 68.

T h e endlessness o f the challenge is already im plied in what K ant wrote 1786, in the

Fou n dations o f th e M etaphysics o f M orals: “T h e question is not whether this action or th at a c ­ tually occurs. R a th e r, reason as such and as independent o f all phenom ena com m ands what ought to o ccu r. Ineradicably the challenge o f reason dem ands actions o f which no exam ple m ay yet have been given in the world” (Cass. 4 :2 6 5 ; cf. B eck 24). Presum ably in 1780-81, in his L ectu res on Ethics, K ant had already said very concisely: “An objective rule states what ought to happen, even if it were never to happen in fa c t” (New Y ork: (Eine Vorlesung Kants

ü b er E th ik , ed. Paul M enzer [B erlin : Pan V erlag R o lf Heise, 1924], p. 2; cf. H arper T o rchbook T B 105 [New Y ork: H arper and Row, 1963], p. 2 .) 69.

T h e re is no English word for Schw ärm erei. T h e noun Schw arm m eans th e sam e as the

English sw arm , as in a swarm o f bees. T h e verb schw ärm en can m ean the sam e physical event as when we say the bees sw arm , either when they fly to and fro around the hive, or when a new colony swarms, following the young queen. Said o f butterflies, schw ärm en m eans th at they

flu tter around the flowers. Said o f a young m an, it means that his m ind flutters around his absent girl. A sim ilar flu ttering occurs in a m ind that begins to be attracted by G od. I f this religious love becom es steady, the lover can say with R ainer M aria R ilke th at his m ind “kreist um Gnu wie um einen alten T u r m .” (hat il hovers around God, as a falcon might circle around an old tower, almost without wingheat. But that would not be schw ärm en , which always retains (h r m eaning o f unstable roving. I hr du iion.iiy in right in telling us that the noun S chw ärm er also mranN hawk m oth oi sphinx, an innen which flics in a h rlter skelter, tum bling way. Kigmutively a

4

m eans

a

(itr< i At ker whit h jumps liithei and yon. In

/

216

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

[d 6 9 -7 4 ]

Sw itzerland we say o f a young m an in love “är hat en Schw arm " , h e has a Schw arm , and th at m asculine noun can m ean b o th his afflictio n and his really quite fem inine girl. W hen he is ready to propose m arriage he is beyond m ere S chw ärm erei. It seems obvious th at God cann ot really b e an ob ject o f m ere S chw ärm erei. B u t th at word can designate and therefore can be translated as enthusiasm , in th e original Greek sense o f being possessed by a god. T hu s possessed th e m ind is beside itself, in the literal G reek sense o f ecstasis. And it is th at state of irresponsibility which Schelling m eans h ere. Instead o f enthusiasm I could also translate

ecstasy. Sound religiosity is basically quiet. B u t th e unsound religionist lacks th at security and therefore becom es a fa n atic, in som e way a child o f the Devil. T h e dictionary is wrong when it translates S chw ärm erei as fa n a ticism . T h e la tter is a curdled form o f the form er. T h erefore Sch ellin g can speak o f the p otential terrors o f Schw ärm erei. 70.

In CrJ,

4 9 , K ant says: “T h e im agination is very powerful in creating , as it were, a se­

cond n atu re” (Cass. 5 :3 8 9 ; B ern ard 157). And in

57: n . l : “An aesth etic id ea cann ot becom e

knowledge [Erkenntnis] because it is a vision o f im agination [A nschauung der Eim bildungskraft] to which no co n cep t can ever b e ad equ ate” (Cass. 5 :4 1 8 c f. B ern ard 187). Sch ellin g’s footnote points in the d irection o f his System o f T ran scen den tal Idealism o f 1800. See n. 97 to O f I. 71. In 1805 Schelling started his A phorism no. 48 with th e sentence: “Reason does not have ihe idea o f God, it is th a t idea and nothing else” (7 :1 4 9 ). 72 . In the C ritical Fragm en ts o f 1805/6, Schelling says: “T h e existence o f God is an em ­ p irical tru th , nay it is the ground o f all exp erien ce” (7 :2 4 5 ). Sch ellin g adds: “H e who has grasped this and thoroughly understood it, has acquired a sense fo r N atu rphilosophie.” Cf.

N .R ., n .9. J J

73 .

T o think system atically at all is a responsible act. See n. 121 to O f I.

74.

As autonom ous, the responsible subject is opposed to the absolute o b je ct, at least im ­

plicitly if n ot in exp licit rebellion. T h e rebellion takes its cue from dogm atism ’s conception of God. Dogm atism considers God as absolute o b je ct. I f th e dogm atist reads th e words “God is sp irit” (John 4 :2 4 ) he thinks o f “a sp irit” and he turns spirit into an ob je ct by declarin g th at it is absolutely transcendent, essentially inscrutable, u nintelligible to the responsible rational bein g. T h e refo re, “in dogm atism my vocation is to an nih ilate all free causality in m e” (334). In our civilization this takes two form s, theological and scien tific. T h e dogm atistic theologian m ust deny m oral autonom y and must dem and uncond itional obedience to G od’s revealed laws, into whose m ean ing and validity m an has no right to inqu ire. T h e dogm atistic scientist must endeavor to exp lain every hum an awareness o f autonom y as an illusion caused by chem ical changes in the b rain . F o r this scientist, o f course, th e laws o f nature take the place o f God. By the sam e determ inistic logic, the dogm atistic theologian would dem and “that the subject cease to be su bject for the absolute o b je c t,” in plain language th at, for God, m an has no m ore dignity th an a rock. T o be sure, such a dem and could n ot be reconciled with the notion that God is our loving F a th er, a notion which could not explain any total lack o f hum an dignity. O n account o f such theological inconsistencies, m any dogm atistic m inds prefer quite dogm atic scientific exp lanations rn theological dogmas. T h e dogm a o f O riginal Sin tries to accou nt for the autonm ous su b ject’s bein g “som ething opposed to ” God. T h e old Sch ellin g gives a philosophical accou nt. Betw een 1828 and 1845 he wrote, “the very first m ovem ent o f consciousness is not a m ovem ent by which consciousness seeks God but a movement by which it deviates from God. T h e refo re, prior to all real m ove­ m ent o f consciousness, God inheres in it a p riori, essentially. T hose thinkers who let hum anity start from an explicit concept o f God will never be able to explain how any mythology can result from this concept. W h at is m ore, they do not seem to have considered th at, no m atter how they explain the origin o f the concep t, be it through m an’s own m ental activity or else by revelation, in either case they im plicitly claim an original atheism o f consciousness, an atheism to which they o bject in o th er respects” (12: 120 f.).

[d 7 4 -8 0 ]

PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS ON DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM

217

Young Sch ellin g’s Fichtean criticism m ust postulate “an infinite striving tow ard the realiza­ tion o f the absolute in m y self’ (D ogm . 335). Schelling is strictly in line with K ant when he in ­ sists on “a m ere p ra ctica l use o f th e idea fo r th e determ ination of the m oral b e in g .” However, he soon saw th e precariousness o f positing sheer “passivity in the o b je c t.” In line with the basic trend o f the C ritique o f Ju d g m en t, he began to look for the life th at is in nature. In F ich te’s System o f E thics o f 1798, in section 12 on a “viable ethics” (4 : 14 7 j), th ere are significant pages on a m orality th at considers case by case. H ere is a condensation. “Every possible purpose seeks to satisfy som e n atu ral urge. All real volition is em p irical. A p ure will is not a real will b u t a m ere id e a .” T o b e sure, it is not “the natural urge as such which produces a volition. / will; nature does n ot. Y et, m aterially, I cann ot will anything but w hat nature would will if it were cap ab le o f volition” (1 4 8 ). Still, I cann ot abolish my pure m oral in clin a ­ tion as a cause; it alone posits “m e as an I . ” T h is inclination “seeks com plete lib eration from n a tu re ,” but the desired “independence never takes p la c e .” T h erefore my m oral actions form “ a series by whose continu ation the I would becom e ind ep end en t.” T hu s “the fin al purpose o f the rational b ein g necessarily lies in infinity” (1 4 9 ). Som e people “speak o f infinity as if it were a thing in itse lf.” In th a t m ann er o f speech one could say, “there must b e a series” o f m oral acations “whose continu ation could be conceived as an approxim ation to absolute in ­ dependence. . . .A nd we must state the p rinciple o f ethics as follows: In ea ch case m a k e g o o d you r v ocation !” (1 5 0 ). However, “what precisely is my vocation? . . . At no tim e can we m ake good our total vocation. (It is the error o f the mystics th at they im agine what can n o t be a t­ tained at any tim e as a ttain ab le in tim e. T o be sure, the total annihilation o f th e individual and its fusion in the absolutely pure form o f reason, its fusion in God, is the ultim ate goal o f fin ite reason; but it is not possible in tim e.) T h e possibility o f m aking good on e’s vocation in

ea ch sp ecific case lies in nature itself and is given by it. T h e relation o f our natural urge to the principle enunciated is this: At every m om ent there is som ething in conform ity with our m oral vocation, and this som ething is at the sam e tim e dem anded by the n atu ral urge (p ro ­ vided it be natural and not an a rtifice produced by a spoiled fantasy). However, it does not follow th at everything the natural urge dem ands conform s to the m oral prin ciple” (151). 75.

In 1783, in th e p reface to Prol. K an t wrote: “I freely confess th at it was the rem inder

by David H um e th at, m any years ago, first interrupted my dogm atic slu m b er,” a condition he him self had lam pooned in 1766 in his D ream s o f a G hostseer E xplain ed by D ream s o f M etaphysics, presum ably after reading H um e (Cass. 4 : 8 Cf. Beck 8. Beck m istranslates as “my recollection o f David H u m e,” which in G erm an would be “m eine Erinnerung a n ,” not “die Erinnerung des,” as K an t w rites.) T h e alternative offered by dogm atism is m oral childhood, heteronom ous obedience. 76.

T ho se K an tian s who found in K a n t’s term inology a m eans for the resuscitation o f

m oral heteronom y and th eoretical dogm atism . 77.

At this point, Sch ellin g’s diatrib e against the K antians turns against K an t him self,

who taught that the existence o f God is a p ra ctica l postulate. “For the purely speculative use o f reason the highest Being rem ains a m ere id ea l, though free from error” ( PuR 669; cf. Sm ith , 5 31). “A free interest o f pure p ractical reason decides for the assumption o f a wise c rea to r . . . on the ground o f a m axim to assume som ething as true in b eh a lf o f m orals. T h e assumption is pure, p ractical, rational faith [V ern u n ftg lau b e].” PrR, Cass. 5: 158; cf. Beck 151). 78. Schelling spent his two years at the University o f Leipzig, 1796-98, largely in studying natural science. 79.

A p aragraph like this should m ake the reader pause when in a textbook he comes

across (he (a ir about the alleged pipe dream s o f so called G erm an idealism. 80.

In 1797, in the hirst Introduction to thv Wi.wrnu haftslvhrv , Fichte wrote: “One's

choice o f a philosophy depend* on the kind oi in,hi one is, ini a philosophical system is not dead furniture which one («in acquire or di*po*e of al will, hul i* anim ated by (he soul ol the m an who hold* it, A < lia ia (ic i ( annul ri*e to idealism il it i* Hat ( id liy nature ot hy iiuelle«

218

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

14 8 0 -8 1 ]

tual slavery, or is twisted by erudite luxury and by vanity” (1 :4 3 4 ). Jo h n Lach s translates som ew hat differently (H eath 16). 81. T h e jo y o f such a union o f free spirits had been experienced by the three friends and fellow students at T ü b ing en , Hegel, H ölderlin, and Schelling. As a final note I translate four lines o f the long poem Eleusis, which Hegel wrote for Hölderlin in August 1796. (See Gustav Em il M üller, H egel. D en kgeschichte eines L eb en d ig en , [B ern and M unich: 1959j, p. 72.) M uller's book is a treasure trove o f insights into the life and thoughts o f Hegel.

Our old agreement found still riper, firmer our old trust. No need of oath for our determination to live for the free truth alone, and never to make peace with feelings and opinions bound by custom, never, never. ... des alten Bundes Treue fester, reifer noch zu finden, des Bundes den kein Eid besiegelte, der freien W ahrheit nur zu leben, Frieden mit der Satzung, die Meinung und Empfindung regelt, nie nie einzugehn.

Translator’s Introduction to New Deduction o f Natural Right

In his book on L a filo so fia politica d i Schelling (B ari: Laterza, 1969, p. 114) Claudio Cesa states that the New D eduction o f N atural R ight was written right after the P hilosophical Letters on Dogmatism an d Criticism. On M arch 23, 1796, Schelling wrote to Niethammer in Jen a that he would stop in and perhaps bring along some aphorisms written while, as their private tutor, he was teaching natural right to the two young barons von Riedesel, who were going to study law at Leipzig. Schelling told N ietham ­ mer: “I would like to send [these aphorisms] if I had a clean copy. I would not like it if another published [his own writings on the topic] before me and if people then thought I had followed his steps” (Horst Fuhrmans, ed., F. W. J . Schelling. B riefe. [Bonn: Bouvier, 1962], 1: 67,77). Fuhrmans notes that this other author is surely Fichte who, as Schelling knew from Hölderlin, had lectured on natural right for the first time in the winter of 1795/96. Gabler in Jen a published the first part o f Fichte’s lectures at Easter 1796. (T h e lectures are now in Fichte’s works, 3: 1-385.) On May 8, 1796, Schelling sent Niethammer the rest of the manuscript. Nietham mer published that completed work in the belated April issue of his

P hilosophical Jou rn al. T h e essay looks like a study o f Rousseau’s distinction between the general will and the will o f all, with emphasis ont^he decisive function of the individual will. Schelling’s convincing logic flows freely, like lucid music, at least in the first half. No introductory explanations seem to be needed. An abridged outline o f some of the main points may suffice. T h e ind iv idu al will is restricted by th e g e n e r a l will only i n a s m u c h as the re s trictio n by the la t t e r m a k e s the f o r m e r a b s o lu te ( § 4 4 ) . T h e g e n e r a l will d e m a n d s ju s t i c e . All are to be fr r e . T h e fo rm o f ( h e indiv idual will is a u t o n o m o u s f r e e d o m . Bui that is im po ssib le without th e " m a t t e r " o f the g e n e r a l will, w hich if* the just f re e d o m o f all ( § 4 4 ) . 219

220

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

“O nly the m a tte r” o f the individual will “(th a t w hich is accom plished by it), n ot its form (th e freed om o f willing) depends on th e general will” ( § 4 9 ). W h a t, according to K a n t, ought to be accom plished is the establish ­ m en t o f the “realm o f G od ” on e a rth . B u t this p a x D ei is given only hom inibus bonae voluntatis (L u k e 2 :1 4 ). A nd it is precisely our duty to b r ­ ing ab ou t this peace through th e fr e e d o m o f ou r will, fo r it can n o t b e done in any oth er way. T h e re fo re “my will subm its to the g eneral will in order not to be su b ject to any o th er individual will” ( § 5 0 ) . T h e free “individuality o f will can n o t b e com m and ed at a ll” ( § 5 5 ,5 9 ). It is autonom ous. T h e re fo re it im plies th e possibility o f unlaw ful a ctio n . I

can do anything. B u t th e question o f right is w hat I may do. R ig h t is what corresponds “to the form o f will as such, or (w hich is th e sam e) to the form o f the general will” ( § 6 7 ). T h e re fo re , “the m a tter o f th e perm issible [ my right] is d eterm ined by th e form o f the perm issible [freed o m ], not vice ver­ sa” ( § 6 0 ) . Sin ce th e m a tter o f m y actio n is d eterm ined by its fo rm , autonom y, all m o ral beings who can will this m a tte r, the realm o f G od, m ust also will its fo rm , autonom y ( § 1 5 4 ). A m an can will his own freed om and disregard the freed om o f all, becau se I ca n n o t prescribe to h im what he wills. Sin ce n ot all potentially m o ral beings need to will the m a tte r o f my m o ral actio n , the ju stice fo r all ( § 154), those who will not m ay have beco m e u n able and irred eem able, as it would seem , or they m ay not yet be ab le, as is a very young ch ild . B u t their existen ce does n ot do away with "th e form o f my actio n ” ( § 1 5 4 ) . In short, “the form o f th e g eneral will is fr e e d o m , its con ten t m orality ” (§ 3 5 ). Sch ellin g ’s definition o f ethics is sig n ifican t. E th ics is “th a t p art o f m orality w hich dem ands a g eneral will [or the universality o f will] with regard to its m a tte r” ( § 5 2 ) . Since the essay was w ritten only h a lf a dozen years a fte r the definitive establishm ent o f the U n ited States o f A m erica, it is in terestin g to find fo r­ m u lations th at could have b een penned by a m an like Je ffe rso n , fo r in ­ stan ce § 32 and especially § 15 (see n . 12). How would the entire essay strike an A m erican student o f law?

[2 4 7 , 2 4 8 ]

4 New Deduction of Natural Right ( 1796 ) [247]

1.

D eduction o f the science o f right as such, an d o f its suprem e

principle.

§1 W hat I cannot bring into reality theoretically, I ought to make real practically. Now, the unconditional toward which reason moves 1 is beyond the reach o f theoretical reason, 2 for it can never become an object for me. As soon as I try to fix it as object, it falls back into the limits o f the conditional. W hatever is object for me can manifest itself only phenomenally. As soon as it is more than a phenomenon for me, my freedom is annihilated.3

§2 If I am to bring the unconditional into reality, it must cease to be an o b ­ je c t for m e. I must conceive the ultim ate, which is the ground o f everything that exists, the absolute being that manifests itself in every being as id en ­ tical with myself, with the ultim ate, im mutable in m e.4 §3

Be! in the highest sense o f the word; cease to be you rself as a phenomenon; endeavor to be a noumenon as suchl* This is the highest call 1' o f all practical philosophy. r

|248|

§4 If you arc a bring by yoiir*clf,|rin Wmcn an nich|, no contrary t

221

.

222

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE [2 4 9 ]

power can change your status, none ca n lim it your freed om . T h e re fo re , in o rd er to becom e a being by yourself, to be absolutely fr e e , endeavor to su b ­ je c t every heteronom ous pow er to your own autonom y, endeavor by freed om to extend your freed om to an absolute, illim ita b le power. §5 T h is com m and m en t is u n con d ition al, becau se it dem ands som ething u n con d ition al. T h e re fo re th e d em anded endeavor itself m ust b e uncondi­ tional, th at is, it must depend only on itself an d ca n n o t be d eterm ined by any foreign law.

§6 I f my endeavor is not to be d eterm ined by any foreign law, then, in reverse, everything opposed to my endeavor m ust sim ply be d eterm ined by

my endeavor. By p ro claim in g m yself as a free being, I p ro claim m yself as a being who determ ines everything resistant, bu t is not d eterm ined by anything. §7 I rule over the world o f o b jects; even in th a t world n oth in g reveals itself but my causality. I proclaim m yself as m aster o f n a tu re, and I dem and th at it be absolutely d eterm ined by the law o f my will. My freedom keeps every o b je ct in the bounds o f a phenom enon (E rsch ein u n g ) and thus prescribes to it laws it m ay n ot b rea k . A utonom y pertains only to the im ­ m u table self, everything th a t is not this s e lf—everything th a t ca n becom e object — is heteronom ous, and fo r m e phen om enon. T h e en tire world is my m oral property.''

§8 If I am to rule in the world o f phenom ena and govern n atu re in line with m oral laws, the causality m ust reveal* ,7 itself through a. physical causality. Now [249] fr e e d o m as such ca n announce itself only through original autonom y. T h erefo re this physical autonom y, althou gh it is heteronom ous with regard to the object, is autonom ous with regard to its p rinciple, th a t is, it is not within reach o f any n atu ral law .s T h u s it m ust un ite in itself both autonom y and heteronom y. §9 T h e nam e o f this cau sality is life. L ife is the autonom y in the p h enom enon;" it is the schem e (S ch e m a )10 o f freed om , ijiso far as it reveals ils rlf in natu re. T h is is why, o f necessity, I becom e a living being. * I hiii in ( h r p i o p e r ox p ie w ii o n m i d p r o p e r l y b e l o n g * h e i r ! K l s e w h r r e t h e a u t h o r will e x p l a i n its ItierinihH tit h I c o n t e n t . ll r . m n o l s e e m s li ,» n ^ e l o ,i r e . u le i w h o h*is u n t i e i M o o d |d2; I, n. 68 to Of I). And in 179f> h r strm srd that what we ought to m ake iiu t in out im agr of I h r ohjec t . "IuaMmu< h an the I posits this im age an a pio d tm o( it* own activity, it iircriM iilv opponrn ( that linage

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

[r 32-37]

som ething th at is not its own prod u ct; som ething no longer d eterm in ab le b u t fully d eterm in ­ ed, without the act o f the I, determ ined by itself. And th a t is th e real thing, after which th e I shapes its im age” (1 : 3 75). T h e im age is not th e thing, b u t n eith er is it a m ere fantasy or dream . T h u s the objectivity o f the thing is “absolutely determ in ed” by the free responsibility o f thinking objectively, guided by th e constitutive categories. T h is § 1 3 6 looks like an a p ­ proach to N aturphilosophie from th e side o f ethics. S3.

T his seems to be a misprint (photomechanically repeated in Schroter’s edition of

1927). T h e first sentence o f § 154 says categorically, “th e m a tter o f my action is always co n d i­ tioned by its fo rm .” T h a t is in line with § 8 0 a n d § 88. My co n jectu re is th at Schelling m eant to say, “then the form o f my action would b e conditioned by the m atter o f it; which is c o n ­ trad icto ry ." 34.

I f a defendent pleads tem porary insanity, the ju d iciary process stops. H e is no longer

treated as a responsible will. H e beom es th e o b je ct o f psychiatric treatm en t. A ccording to § 153 the general will can never will th a t any will be annulled. T h e plea o f insanity m ust be left to the now no longer insane defendent. No totalitarian governm ent has any right to declare h im insane. Such a declaration destorys all right ( § 1 6 2 ) and replaces the very idea o f a ju st state by sheer physcial predom inance. 35. In a key passage o f the C ritique o ffu d g m e n t , K an t w rote; “T h e concept o f freedom ought to actualize in the world o f sense the purpose proposed by its m oral laws” (Cass. 5; 244; B ern ard 12). 36.

Schelling uses expressions found in K a n t. For instance, in the introd uction to the P ro­

legom en a, K ant wrote: "Few writers are gifted with the subtlety and, at the sam e tim e, with the grace o f David Hum e, o r with th e depth, as well as th e eleg ance, o f Moses Mendelssohn. Y et I fla tter m yself that I m ight have m ade my own exposition popu lar had my ob je ct been m erely to sketch out a plan and leave its com pletion to others” (Cass. 4 :1 1 ; B eck 10). 37.

Schelling is thinking o f F ich te’s Foundation o f N atural R ight A cco rd in g to Principles

o f Wissenschaftslehre which cam e o ff the press o f Gabler in Je n a, Easter 1796. T h e year 1797 brought K ant’s Metaphysical Principles o f the Doctrine o f Right.

Appendix A Kant’s Publications after 1780 1781 1783 1784 1785

Kritik der reinen Vernunft Prolegomena zu einer jed en künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht Beantwortung der Frage: was ist Aufklärung? Rezension von Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit Über die Vulkane im M onde Von der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchem achdrucks Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrasse Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1. Auflage; 2. Auflage 1786)

1786

1787 1788 1789

Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren? Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2. Auflage) Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft (published only 1914 by Cassirer 5: 177-231)

1790 1791 1793

1794 1795 1796

Kritik der Urteilskraft Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft Über den Gemeinspruch: Das m ag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fü r die Praxis Etwas über den Einfluss des Mondes a u f die Witterung Das Ende aller Dinge Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie 253

154

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

1797 1798 1800

Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Traktats zum eivigen Frieden in der Philosophie Die Metaphysik der Sitten Der Streit der Fakultäten Anthropologie in pragm atischer Absicht abgefasst (1.Auflage) Anthropologie in pragm atishcer Absicht abgefasst (2.verbesserte Auflage)

Appendix B Publications by Kant and Others Pertinent to Schelling’s Beginnings * available in English

1785

K ant

1786

KANT K ant

Critique o f Pure R eason ( l s t e d . ) * Prolegom ena to Every Future M etaphysics W hich Can Claim to B e S cien ce* Id ea f o r a Universal History R egarding W orld Citizen­ ship Ideas f o r a Philosophy o f the History o f M ankind Review o f H erd er’s Ideas f o r a Philosophy o f the His­ tory o f M ankind Foundations o f the M etaphysics o f M orals* Presum able Beginning o f H um an History M etaphysical Principles o f N atural Science

1787

K ant

C ritiq u e o f P ure R eason (2 d e d .)*

H erd er

God. Som e Conversations,* trans. F . H . B u rk h ard t

1788

K ant

1789

R e in h o ld

1790

R e in h o ld

1791

K ant

1792

F ic h te

Critique o f P ractical R eason * On the Use o f T eleological Principles in Philosophy On the Vicissitudes o f K antian Philosophy up to Now Essay on a New Theory o f H um an Im agination Letters on K antian Philosophy (continued to 1 7 9 2 ) Critique o f Ju d g m en t * On the Failure o f A ll P hilosophical Endeavors in Theodicy Critique o f A ll R evelation (p u b lish e d an o n y m o u sly ;

1793

K an t

1781

K ant

1783

K ant

1784

K ant H erd er

K ant

(New Y ork: V eritas, 1940) K ant R e in h o ld K ant

m ade F ichte fam ous) F ic h te

Religion within the Limits o f Pure Reason R eclam ation o f the Freedom o f Thought hitherto Repressed by I Vinces 2fi!i

256

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

Contribution to Correct Current Ju dgm en ts abou t the French Revolution SCHELLING On Myths, H istorical L egends an d P hilosophem es o f Antiquity K ant T he E nd o f All Things F ic h te Review o f the Aenesidem us (o f 1 7 9 2 , by G . E . F ic h te

1794

Schulze, against R ein ho ld ) F ic h te FICHTE F ic h te SCHELLING

1795

K ant F ic h te SCHELLING SCHELLING

1796

K ant SCHELLING

F ic h te

Concept o f the W issenschaftslehre (B e g riff) Foundation o f W issenschaftslehre* (G ru n d la g e ) T he Calling o f the Scholar On the Possibility o f a Form o f A ll P hilosophy* A bout E ternal P eace Outline o f W issenschaftslehre (G ru n d riss) O f the I as Principle o f P hilosophy* P hilosophical Letters on D ogmatism an d Criticism * O f a New L ofty Tone in Philosophy New D eduction o f N atural R ight * Foundations o f N atural R ight (see r 37)

Appendix C References to Kant A student o f Kant and especially o f the Critique o f Pure R eason may want to use Schelling as a com m entator. Though half a century younger than K ant, Schelling was still a contemporary and wrote the first o f the four essays only seven years after the second edition o f the PuR and four years after the Crf. In the following list, the left-hand column gives the traditional pagina­ tion o f the second edition o f PuR (1787). An A indicates the first edition (1781). T h e other four columns give the numbers of the translator’s notes to the respective essays. T h e sign T I refers to the translator’s introductions.

( T I = Translator’s Introduction) Page Notes in in Poss PuR 23 AW 23 A66 A116-18 A354 A355 A356 A369 f. A373 A396 21 Bxxii XXX 19 xxxii 25 68 72 22 75 94 18 95 104 lOli

Of I

Dogi

22.4 101 33 100 66 108 76 3 1,27 119 3 78 4 22

22

104

258

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Poss.

O fl

109 ff. 110 128 131 132 133 134 1S5 138f 139 157 161 178 182 246 274 275 276 307 308 310 312 n. 321 f. 330 334 345 f. 352 367 382 f. 384 394 f. 403 f. 424 f. 425 429 449 476 498 f. 522 597 604 611 617 f. 633 638 6441 661 f. 664 f. 669 672

17

713

Dogm.

N .R . 19 32

7 ,19

37 78,121

48

111 101 7

4 4 101

TI 32 107 10 23 23 60

109 92 112 5 28

22 117 91 111 39 109 23 77 1 7 74 25 26 24

74 69 8 ,7 4 ,7 6 76 67

10,24

5

27 39 66 41 5,17 7

61 34 65

33 26 5,6 77 77

114

2

APPENDIX C 714 726 766 781 827 839 842 846 860-68 P rR Cass. vol. 5 33 35 36 38 49 53 f. 79 90 f. 114 115 130 132 136 157 158 171 CrJ Cass. vol. 5 184 221 f. 224 272 279 329 335 389 418 482 483 514 515 537

153

259 40 17

110 5 74 72 64 29

Poss.

Of I

23 23 37

Dogm.

N .I

4 9

24 80

4 55

118 14 26 26 154 24 24

17 121 74,119 17 65 77 72

15

22

3 3 3 3 3 70 70

9 9 34

120 120 6.9 68 5

260

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE P ro l Cass, vol. 4 8 11 84

Dogm. 75 35 17

F o u n d in g o f M etaphys o f M orals Cass. vol. 4 265 271

Dogm. 68 9

Id ea U n iv. H ist. Cass. vol. 4 154

53

L etters Cass. vol. 10 97 351 L ife Cass. vol. 11 307

TI 21

Of I 2 3

N .R .

9

Appendix D Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843): Judgment and Being

Translator’s note: Hölderlin takes the entirely legitimate liberty o f m ak­ ing explicit the meaning o f the two syllables o f the German word Urteil. T h e prefix ur, which never occurs as an independent word, means original. For instance, Urkunde, document, that is, the document without which we could have no inform ation (Kunde) at all on the thing documented. Or Ursache, that is, the entity or event without which the thing could not exist. T eil means part, and teilen means to deal, in the sense o f dividing. (T h e Germanic root o f the Germ an and the English verbs is the sam e.) Unlike Hölderlin, we cannot deal as easily with the English word ju d g m en t. But we do expect a fitting decision from a fair judge. T h e verb to d ecid e comes from the Latin root caed ere, to cut. D ecidere means to cut off. T h e judge must decide what is due to each litigant, what is his part by right. See Ardstotle’s N icom achean Ethics 1143a24. T h e following translation is based on pages 226-27 in the fourth volume o f Hölderlin’s Säm tliche W erke (Stuttgart W . Kohlham mer Verlag, 1962) edited by Friedrich Beissner. In his commentary on pages 391-92, Beissner says Hölderlin’s paper was “probably written at the beginning o f 1795, presumably on the in-page o f a book, one could imagine Fichte’s W issenschaftslehre.” Beissner’s whole comment is worth consulting, but again that goes beyond the purpose o f this book.

Judgment and Being In th e highest a n d strictest sense, ju d g m e n t is the o rig in a l division b e t ­ ween o b je c t a n d s u b je c t, w hich a re most i n tim a te ly un ited in th e intellec­ tual i n t u i t i o n . It is tha t division by which o b je c t and sub je ct first b e c o m e

261

262

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

possible. It is the original cu ttin g into parts (U r-te il) or dividing. T h e c o n ­ cep t o f division already im plies the concept o f in te rrela tio n o f o b je ct and su b je ct, and the necessary presupposition o f a whole o f which o b je ct and su b ject are the parts. “I am I ” is the m ost fittin g exam p le o f this con cep t o f original division, in the sense o f theoretical division by m eans o f w hich the I [as subject] find itself in opposition to itself [as o b je c t]. In the practical original division the I posits itself in opposition to a not-1. R eality (W irklich k eit) and possibility (M ög lichk eit) are distinguished like im m ed iate and m ed ia te awareness (Bew usstsein). W h e n I conceive o f an o b je ct as possible, I m erely rep eat the a n teced en t awareness o f it in w hich it was re al. F o r us th ere is no conceivable possibility th a t was not reality. Consequently the co n cep t o f possibility does n ot apply at all to o b ­ je c ts o f reason (V ern u n ft), becau se they do n ot o ccu r in consciousness (Bew usstsein) as [merely] w hat they ought to b e. W h a t applies to them is only the concept o f necessity. T h e concept o f possibility applies to ob jects o f ratio cin atio n (V erstan d ), th e con cep t o f reality to o b jects o f perception (W ah rn eh m u n g ) and im a g in a tio n (A nschauu ng). Being expresses the unity (V erbin d u n g ) o f su b ject and o b je c t. Only when su b ject and o b je ct are absolutely u n ited , n ot m erely relatively, that is, only when they are u nited in such a way th a t no division at all can be m ad e betw een them w ithout violating the essence (W esen ) o f what |presum ably] is to be divided — only in th a t case and in no other can there be any talk o f sim ple b ein g (Sein sch lech th in ), as is the case in in tellectu al in tu ition . However, this being m ust n ot be confou nded w ith identity. W h en I say “I am I , ” the su b ject (I ) and the o b je ct (I) are not united so th a t no division at all can be m ad e w ithout violating the essence o f what is to be divided. O n the con trary, the I is possible only owing to this division betw een I and I. How could I say “I ” w ithout self-aw areness? A nd how is this selfawareness possible? O nly by the act o f positing m yself in d istinction from m yself, though still recognizing m yself as this sam e self in this very division. B ut in what respect as the sam e? I can ask this question; I m ust ask it, for in an oth er respect it is [not the sam e but] opposed to itself. T h e re fo re the identity is not a unity o f o b je c t and su b ject th a t occurs absolutely (die »chlcchthin stattfän d e). T h e re fo re the identity is not the sam e as absolute b rin g .

Indexes It is customary to indicate passages in Schelling by referring to volume and page o f the fourteen volume edition o f his works edited by his son, K .F .A . Schelling, and published by J.G .C o tta , Stuttgart und Augsburg, 1856-61. T h e four translations in this book render parts of the first volume of the Cotta edition, where they cover the following pages: Poss, 85-112; O f I, 149-244; D ogm , 281-341, and N .R ., 245-280. T h e reader who consults this index will want to know at a glance whether a passage referred to is: ( 1 ) taken from the body o f one o f the four essays. (2) found in the translator’s documentary notes. (3) is merely in the translator’s introductions. (1) Simple page numbers refer to the essays themselves, in their original pagination indicated at the inside top o f each page as well as in brackets in the body o f the text. (2) Reference to the translator’s commentary is made by small case letters followed by the num ber o f the respective note: p signifies i ” d ” r ”

notes ” ” ”

to Poss, on this book’s pages 56- 58; ” O f I, ” ” ” ” 129-149; ” D ogm , ” ” ” ” 197-218; ” N .R ., ” ” ” ” 246-251.

(3) Ciphers in italics refer to pages o f the translator’s introductions, in the regular pagination o f this book.

I

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

264

Subject Index A = A , 21 8 , i 100

Being itself (W esen ),

Absolute, there is no A bsolute, d

17, d 56;

N .R .

§4, §5,

beyond reach o f objectivist, 2 4 3 -4 4 ; not

§ 4 5 , r 5, r 21 B elief, 333 n , d 27

caused from without, 23 5 ; egress from ,

Bliss (G lückseligkeit), 197 n, 240

294, 3 1 0 , d 17; absolute freed om , 235;

Block o f wood (K lotz), d 32

identity o f subject and o b je ct,

Boredom , 326

159 n,

308, i 74, i 76, d 56; in it no co n tro ­ versy, 329, no ought, 3 2 4 ; is no o b je c ­ tive entity,

d 17;

abs.

o b je ct,

Boxed (ein gesch achtelt), 243 Brahm in s, 326

2 8 7 -8 8 ;

power, 179, 181, 196; reality, 2 3 5 ; thesis, 297

C abbalists, 326 Cage (S ch ran ke), 307

A bstractions, 290, d 11

Categories, 2 2 , 105, 107, 153, 194, 199 n,

A b stract principles, 242

22 2 , 223 n , 296, p 16, p 17, i 105

Abyss, d 33, d 34 A ccom m odation, K ant's system of, 21 0 , 231 n , i 89 A ct, see Intellectu al intuition

Causality, 96, 195, 2 3 8 , 286, N .R . § 8 , d7 C h attle (S ach e), 157; (H au srat) d 32 Chinese sages, 326 C ircle, unavoidable, 97 C oercion, 233 n , N .R . § 1 4 7 , § 1 4 8 , § 1 4 9 ,

A esthetic intuition, d 4 Aesthetics, 28 5 , 3 1 8 , d 3, d 43

§150

Age, our, 339-40 A ggiornam ento, perpetual o f philosophy, 18

Com m on sense, d 11, d 21 Com pass, r 13

Aisthesis, d 43

Concepts, 181, 184

Alive and dead, 325 A m erican C onstitution,

Condescension, 210, i 89 N .R .

§15,

rl2 ;

R evolution, N .R . § 4 1 , r 19

Conditional, 2 3 , 163 C onditioned by itself, 109 n

A nalytical proposition, “I a m ,” 206

C onnotation o f all reality, 190

A narchy, 233 n

Consciousness, d 52

A n nih ilation, 5 25-26

C onstitution, 233 n

A nthropom orphism , 285, d 5

C ontent and form , 90

A ppearance, see Phenom enon

Cove, safe, 152

A priori, 176 n

Creative im agination, d 32, d 45

A rbitrariness (W illkür), 3 2 4 , d 67

C reatu re, fin ite, 238 n

A rguing (vernünfteln), 308

C ritical philosophy, 152, 204

A rt, 2 8 5 , i 97, d 4

C riticism , 170, 290, 328, 331, 335, d 68

A rtifices, philosophical (K unststücke), 2 3 8 n

C ritiqu e o f Pure R eason, 20, 21,

Aw ignat, 322, d 54

153,

Atheism , d 27

2 9 9 , 300, i 7, d 26

A ttributes, 192

154,

302,

302 n,

Awareness o f self, 324, d 58

Dawn, 159

Awkward to tell, d 32

Dead faculties, 2 38 n

Axiom (G rundsatz), 90, 91, 94, 96,

100,

101 n,

157, 294, 295, 2 9 7 , 298 n, 303,

Autonom y, 2 4 , d 9

109 n, 155

§6,

D eath, 320, 325 D eduction o f categories, 110-11 Deity (G otth eit), 333 n, 335 n

Back door, d 27

Delusion (W a h n ), 295

B r , S08, 335, 347

D em onstration, 184, 307

Beatitu d e (Seligkeit), 322

D ialectic, 206

Becom e yourarlf, 2 0 0 n

D ichotom y, i 47

B rin g (Sein), 209. 209 n

Divine, in art, 285

304, i 3,

265

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE §74

Divine will, d 9 D ocum ent, art organon and docum ent o f

E xisten ce (D asein), 210, 229 n ; G od’s exist­ en ce, 308 n

philosophy, i 97, d 4 D ogm atism , K an t says it proceeds w ithout critiq u e, d 1; posits a n o t-I as anteced ent o f any I, 170, 188; holds th at n o t-I is

Experien ce, all knowledge starts from im ­ m ediate e ., 318; why e. at all? 310; th eoretical question becom es a practical

the absolute, 2 1 3 ; must im agine things in

postulate,

themselves, 2 1 3 ; therefore even the em p ir­

2 9 7 ; Bathos of, d 21

ical I is incom prehensible, 23 6 , 2 3 9 ; co n ­ tradicts itself by positing an uncond itional

311;

term inates in a thesis,

Experien ced , is what is possible only through ob jects, 176 n

th in g (unbedingtes D ing), 171; denies the for it em pirical

F a ct o f consciousness, p 6; fact o f reason

idealism m akes sense, 231; its fascin ation,

(Faktu m der V ernu nft), d 4; all m ere facts

absolute 290,

I,

205,

300;

r 5;

can n o t

be

confuted

are cond itional, p 6

theoretically, 296, 339; its dem and o f a

Faculties, dead (tote V erm ögen), 238 n

transition from the n onfinite to the fin ite

Fa ith (G lau be), 112, 2 1 6 , d 1

is transcen d ent, 4 1 3 ; connects m orality

Fall o f M an (Sün den fall), 325, 326

with happiness, 3 2 8 ; in it my vocation is

Fan tastication

to an nih ilate all free causality in m e, while

3 2 6 , 327

criticism dem ands th at the absolute cease

(Schw ärm erei),

320,

321,

Fascin ation (R eiz), 290

to b e o b je ct fo r m e, 334; blind d. uses

Fin ite, the (das E ndliche), 203, 315

the absolute as constitutive principle o f

Finiteness (E nd lich keit), 180 n

knowledge, while sim ple d. only for our

Force (Zwang), 234 n; see coercion

vocation, 3 3 3 ; H um e rem ained a dog m a­

Form , form al and m aterial, 90 , 2 1 7 , 2 29 n;

tist, so did K an t insofar as he still needed

inner and extern al, 93 ; o f positing, 93;

a thing in itself, d 13

origin al, 105, 110; o f subject and o b ject,

D ualism , p 10 D uration,

th in kable only with regard to

ob jects, 202

111 Freedom (F reih eit) is the begin n in g and end o f all philosophy, 177, 2 0 5 ; is the essence

Duty (P flich t), N .R . § 6 6

o f the I, 179, 205; o f the absolute I, 2 3 5 ; em p irical, 234, N .R . § 1 5 , § 2 1 ,

Ecology, r 30

§ 2 7 , § 3 5 ; and necessity united in the

Ecstasy (Sch w ärm erei), 33 1 ; see Schw ärm ­ erei

absolute, 330, 331 n ; absolute f. in co m ­

Ego (Ic h ), n ot ca p ab le o f objective d eter­ m in atio n , 320 n

of, 109; o f m inds, 292

Egyptians, golden vessels of, 215 n

patib le with consciousness, 324; parad ox Fu rn iture, a philosophical system is no dead f. (to ter H au srat), d 32

E m p irical, is everything th at is in contrast to pure I, 176 n Em piricism , philosophical (1 8 3 6 ), d 39 Endeavor (S treben ), brings to pass our know­ ledge o f ourselves, 308 Enthusiast (Schw ärm er), 319, 332

G eneral, the (das A llgem eine), philosophy must start from the un cond itional, not from som ething general, 184 Genus, cann o t be som ething u ncond itional, 164

E p icureanism , 325, 329

G eom etry, 243

Esoteric philosophy, 341

God, no m ere abstraction, 185; conscious­

Essence, genuine (ursprüngliches W esen), 29 0 , d 10 Etern al, original form o f I is that o f pure etern al being, 203 Eternity, 2 0 0 , 20 2 . 2 0 3 , 319, 325, i 88. d 4 6 , d 60 Ethin». 200 n. N H § 1 1 , § 3 2 , § 1 3 , § 7 2 ,

ness moves away from , i 25, d 17; deus ex m ach in a, d 5; em pirical concept of, 308 n; existence of, 209, p8, d 72; fear of,

28 6;

only freedom ,

d 17; God

=

I. 168 n, 202, i 79; is nothing but the nhimlutc I, i 25; in I

= not I, 201; as

avenging judge, 341; for K ant, 202. d 77;

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

266

fo r K antians, 288 n; only L ord , i 70;

philosophy is n othing, i 25; is no longer

is n oth ing in itself, i 70; as o b je ct, 290,

pure absolute I when it occurs in co n ­ sciousness, 180; assertion o f absolute I

340 , d 17; is no o b ject, 2 0 2 , 288 n , i 25, 2 1 0 ; no personal God, i 25, d 4 1 ; only

is n ot transcen d ent but most im m an en t, 2 0 5 ; is not synonymous with the logical

absolute power, 201; p ractically a n n ih il­

su b ject in consciousness which is possible

ates n o t-I,

only owing to the unity o f the absolute

i 34 ; sees no phenom ena, only him self,

2 0 1 ; we are never outside

G od, d 17; is not Som ebody, d 9; for

I, 2 0 6 , 20 7 ; it is n eith er a m erely form al

Spinoza there is n oth ing w ithout God,

prin ciple, n or an idea, nor an o b je ct, but

i 58;

pure I determ ined by intellectu al intuition

theoretically

is a

n o t-I,

209

n;

weak reason desires an objectiv e God,

as absolute reality, 2 0 8 ; anyone who can

290

say the

Gods, blessed, 32 4 ; im m ortal, 32 3 ; cann ot

absolue

I exists (ist wirklich)

knows nothing about it, 209; it can n o t be reach ed by concepts o f du ration, 209 n;

prevail on fate, 337 n G reek gods still within n atu re, 337 n

never steps outside o f itself, 216, i 58,

G reek tragedy, 3 36-38

i 96;

Grounds o f relation and distinction, d 23

righ t, 233 n; no im perative, 233; in the

G round o f the unity o f the supersensible,

in it no synthesis, no duty and

absolute I th e p rincip ium

essendi and

cogno scendi coin cid e, 235 n; God is n o ­

i 3

th in g b u t th e absolute I, i 25 Happiness (G lückseligkeit), 197 n, 198, 322

The

em pirical

I,

owes its reality to its

H arm ony, 198 n , r 9

restriction by n o t-I, 180 n; it is by th in k­

H em o f the garm ent o f tru th , 152

ing som ething, 180 n ; does not exist through itself, 2 3 4 ; exists only with and

H eteronom y, 2 3 , d 9

through o b jects, b u t ob jects could never

H ilto rical probability, 308 n H um anity (M enschheit),

33 9 ,

34 1 ,

N .R .

produce an I, 236; is I owing to the sam e causality through which the absolute I is

§13, §15 n

I, 235 n , 236 I am I, differs from all other existential

T h e fin ite I, in it is unity o f consciousness,

propositions, 2 0 6 ; is the basis o f all posit­

i.e . personality, 2 0 0 ; there is an im per­ ative (Sollen) only for the finite I, 232 n;

ing, 218 T h e I (das Ich ) is posited because it is th at which posits, 96; I am because I am , 167; has reality through itself alone,

m ust a ct as i f right and duty existed for the absolute I, 235 n, i 114 T h e logical I, is nothing oth er th an the

177; is determ ined only in an intellectu al

form al p rinciple o f unity o f thinking, 208

intuition , 181; only by its freedom , 182;

T h e m oral I, strives to elevate reality to the

has no reality except by being posited

level o f pure bein g, 209 n

186; is at all only f o r

T h e n onfin ite I (das unendliche Ich ), co n ­

itself, i 7, i 23, fo r anything outside the

tains no synthesis, 180 n ; no m oral law,

unconditionally,

I the I is nothing, 177, 193; its essence

198; knows no o b je ct, no consciousness,

U freedom , 179; is no o b je ct a t all, 193,

no personality, 200; its causality is only

2 0 5 ; i j only owing to its identity, 217; It indivisible, 192; can never b eco m e an

absolute power (absolue M acht), 201; no

ob je ct nor an idea, 204; whoever can take

no purposes, 241

the I for a concept knows n othing o f the I, 184; turned into a dem onstrable co n ­

im perative (Sollen) for it, 232 n; knows Idealism , 23, 2 5 ,

191 n, 211, 214, i 16,

i 17, i 52

cept it is no longer u ncond itioned, 184;

Idealism and realism , these names should

th e form o f its intellectual intuition is

fall into disuse, dogm atism being the sys­

eternity,

202;

not it

was,

it will be,

tem o f objective realism (or subjective

but lim ply, is is, 202; Fichte's classroom

idealism ), criticism

way of presenting the I, i 33

jective realism (or objective idealism ), 302

T h e absolute I, in theoretical (o bjectivistic)

the system o f su b ­

n, 330, d 6 6; also 330 n

267

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Ideas, 159, d 17

M achin e, Deus ex m ach in a, d 5, d 14

Identity, 177, 178, 2 1 7 , 230

M ajority (die M eisten), 302 n

Id en tity o f subject and o b je ct, 159 n, p 10 Im age (B ild ), 2 2 8 n ; im age (V orstellung),

M echanism in n atu re, 241, r 9 (K an t)

110 n Im aginatio n (E inbildu ngskraft), 2 0 2 , 332,

M ob, 280 M odality, 229 n , 23 2 n M oral, actions, N .R . § 1 5 1 ; beings, N .R .

332 n , d 4 5 , d 6 9 , d 70 Im m ortality,

201,

2 0 9 n,

M ethod o f p ractical postulates, 303, 304

333

n,

i 72,

§19,

§21,

§22;

C ausality

N .R .

§16,

r 13; com m an dm en t (M oralg eb ot), 327 n,

i 74 Im perative (also see ought), 2 3 7 , 23 8 , 2 4 0 ,

N .R .

§16,

§17,

§18,

r

14;

a m oral

God, 2 84 -8 6 , d 2, d 3, d 6; m oral laws,

d 9 Individual, 233 n

19 8 -9 9 , i 80 ;

Individuation, 2 0 0 n , 2 4 0 (see m oral p ro g ­

N .R .

§7;

progress, 2 4 0 ; property,

resistance,

N .R

§11,

§12,

§ 1 3 , r 11; strife, 233 n

ress) In fin ite du ration , 200

M orality (M o ralität), 322, 328

Infinity, H egel: b ad infinity, d 41 In tellectu a l, 235 n , d 67

M ost people (die m eisten M enschen), 209

Intellectu ality, 235 n

M ystic, 3 19, 332, i 38

Intu itio n (A nschauung), i 4 0 , i 97

Mythology, d 74

M ysteries, 341

In tu itio n , In tellectu al, we awaken from it as from

a state o f death , 3 2 5 ; should I

m a in ta in it I would cease to live, 325;

N aturphilosophie, 28, 29, i 122, d 78, N .R . § 1 3 6 , r 32

is n ot w hat we possess, r 5; it alone determ ines the I, 181, i 4 0 ; incom p re­

Necessity, 330-31, 331 n N egability, 228

hensible if likened to sense intuition , 181;

N egation, absolute, 191 n ; o f ob jects, 237

can n o t occu r in consciousness,

181; is

N obody (n iem and ), 243, d 17

possible only inasm uch as it has no o b ject,

N on-finiteness, 202, d 41

182; ca n b e n eith er refuted nor ob jectified

N o t-I, conceivable only in contrast to I,

by consciousness, 182; is only nonsense for

187; original form o f m ultiplicity, 194;

those who have n ot yet elevated th e m ­

an unconditional n o t-I is a contrad iction ,

selves, 183; is self-attain ed insight (selb-

i.e . nothing, 203 n ; does not create it­

sterrungenes

self,

A nschauen),

216;

o f the

206;

to have reality it m ust be

world, 2 8 5 ; for K a n t, d 4 ; for Spinoza,

posited in the absolute I, 212; posited in

3 1 7 ; on it depends whatever we know o f

tim e, 2 28; if posited absolutely it is only

a supersensuous world, 31 8 ; takes place

absolute n egation , 239; a system o f abso­

when I cease to be an o b je ct for myself,

lute n o n-I can know no freedom , 239

3 1 9 ; is not th a t which we possess, r 5;

N othingness, 326; why not n oth ing ? d 34

produced by freedom alone, 318

N oum enon, 22, N .R . § 3 ; K an t's two senses o f noum enon, r 5

Intu itio n , Sensuous, 325 K an tian s, 2 8 5 , 2 8 6 , 2 8 7 , 288 n , 2 9 1 , 300, i 2 8 , i 33, d 5, d 14, d 76, d 77 K not, p ra ctica l T iib in g ia n reason cuts it, d 14

O bed ien ce, d 17 O b je ct, to reach one I m ust already have an o th er, 164; its existence n ot p art o f its reality, 165; d eterm in ab le as n o n -I, 170; know able, 202; posited in a specific tim e,

Languages, o riginal, 166, i 19, i 86

2 2 8 ; th e form o f identity does not d eter­

L an gu age and the supersensuous, 216

m ine any ob je ct as such, 2 3 0 ; all objects

Life, is the autonom y in the phenom enon,

N .R. § 9 ; value of, r 6 Light, 155, i 5, i 44 Logic, 229 n; r o n rr rtr , d 23; form al. 218 227, 2 29 n

are cond itional, d 40 ; absolute o b je ct o f Spinoza, 319 O b jective possibility, 228; ju d g m ent, 296; reality, 230; tru th , 19S; terror o f o b je c ­ tive world, 337

268

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

O b ligatio n (V erbind lich keit), d 17

Prayer, i 38

O n tological proof, 168 n, 3 0 8 n

Pre-established harm ony, 239, 240

O pposition betw een subject and o b je ct, 298,

Presence (D asein), 209 P rim acy o f p ractical reason, i 8

d 23 O rgan on , art organon and docum ent o f philosophy, i 97, d 4 O riginal bein g (das Urwesen), fo r K an t, d 4, d 5

P rinciple, an ob jectiv e pr. would be d eter­ m ined by an ulterior p r., 155 P rivate property, N .R . § 1 3 4 , § 1 3 7 § 1 4 0 , r 31

O rig inal, form (U rform , 2 1 6 , 2 1 7 ; lan g ­ uages (ursprüngliche Sp rach en ), 209, i 86 ; sin, d 74; source (U rq uelle), 195 O ught (Sollen ), 23, 2 4 , 199, 2 3 2 n , 233,

P robability, h istorical, 308 n Professors, 243 Profoundness o f m ind (T iefsin n ), 318 Progress in infinity, 2 0 0 , 241, i 74 Prolepsis, 311, 313

2 9 9 , d 23 O utside ourselves (ausser uns), d 17

Proofs, theirs is realm o f the conditioned, 31,

3 0 8 ; true critical spirit quells vain

P ain tin g, a m ute painting outside o f us, 155 Paralogism , 206, 208

passion

of

dem onstration

(die

eitle

P ath olog ical, K ant's use o f this word, 2 0

lute not proofs b ut analyses, 308; u n ­

D em onstriersucht), 307; in realm o f abso­

Pedagogy, i 3 3 , N .R . § 1 5 n , r 12

b ea ra b le talk o f proofs for the existence

Personality, 200 Phenom enon, 2 3 , 172, 173, N .R . § 1 , § 5 ,

o f God, 308 n ; Spinoza, 308 n

§7

Pure, 176 n , 195 Purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit), r 9

Philosophy, art its organon and docum ent, i 97 ;

its

conten t

inherently

connected

with its fo rm , 9 0 ; its conten t u n cond ition ­ al, 9 1 ; cage o f a system, 3 0 7 ; esoteric,

R atio cin atio n (V erstan d ), 2 3 , d 34 R ead ers, fo r whom Schelling did n o t w rite, 2 98 n

341; fin ite m ust lose itself in n o n-finite,

R ealism , 2 1 2 , 2 1 3 , 330, i 16, d 66

3 1 5 , d 4 0 ; freedom is its prin cip le, 177,

R ealization (realisieren ), 327 n

205, 2 4 2 , 243, 307 n ; goal o f its synthesis

R eason (V ern u n ft), does not have bu t is

il absolute thesis, 327; incom prehensible

th e idea o f God, d 71; for K an t, r 1;

■I long as ideas are idle specu lation, 2 4 3 ;

absolute reason total ind ifference o f sub­

its influen ce, 112; not th e m a rch o f m ere

jective

individuals,

reason, 31 1 ; weak reason, 286

293;

"new ” philosophy o f

and

objective,

d 56;

creative

K an t, 2 8 9 ; its m ain task solving problem

R eligion , for K an t, d 3

o f existence o f th e world, 31 3 ; problem

R epresen tation (V orstellung), 337

o f all ph. the impossible transition from

R esistance (W id erstand ), 325, 326, d 59

th e n onfin ite to th e fin ite, 3 1 3 , 314, 315;

R esponsibility, i 80

does not progress from o b je ct to o b je ct,

R estricted reality, 324

157; perfect system proceeds from abso­

R evelation, 2 8 7 , d 11, d 27

lute I,

R ew ard, 323

176; its ultim ate p rinciple not

outside the absolute I,

177, 2 0 8 ; is a

science, 8 9 , 164; unintelligible to the slave o f a system, 307 n ; its topic the

R iddle o f the world, 310, 310 n R ig h t, co ncep t o f r. based on concept o f p ractical possibility, 233 n ., N .R . § 6 5 ;

cogency o f the supersensuous, d 11; as a

see

whole, 195

§77, §83, §85

especially

§65,

§68,

§69,

§72,

n ; n atu ral righ t, § 1 6 2

Philosophizing, art of, IS Physical causality, N .R .§8, § 9

Sch em a, 198, 199, 2 09 n, 228, 2 28 n , i 71,

P ostulate, 2 8 8 n. 3 0 3 , 304, 31 1 , 3 1 4 , d 9

N .R . § 9 , r 10 Schw ärm erei, translated

Power, 2 0 1 , i 39 P ractica l, 2 3 , 154, 20 2 , 2 0 9 n, 2 1 6 ; prac tical assumption (A n n ahm e), 2 8 7 ; need (B ed ü rfn is), 286

as

enthusiasm ,

eccen tric fantasy, fan tastication , e c cen tri­ cities, utopianism , ecstasy, vagrancy of reason; see d 69

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Self-an n ih ilatio n , 200

269

d 2 1 ; and antithesis, 2 2 1 , 226

Self-aw areness (Selbstbew usstsein), 180

T h e tica l ju d g m en t, 37, i 99 , d 23 ; thetical

Skepticism , 153, 2 7 9 , 30 7 , 338 Slaves, 158

T h in g in itself (D ing an sich), 101, 101 n,

theorem , 2 1 8 , 2 2 9 , 230

Som ebody (Jem and , q uelqu 'un), i 34, d 9,

172,

189, 2 1 0 , 239 n , 2 9 8 , 302, 325,

34 0 , i 13, i 54, i 84

d 33 Soul, 3 2 1 , d 45

T h in g ify , i 22 , i 24

Sp ace, 194

T im e , 2 25, 227 n , 228, 319, i 107

Sp ecu lation, 172

T im e and space, 153

Sta te, 2 3 3 n Stoicism , 329

T o y o f reason (Spielw erk der V ernu nft), 291, 323, d 12

S u b ject, 165, 166, 298

T ran scen d en ce, 310, 314, r 5

Sublim ity, d 3

T ran scen d en t use o f categories, d 6

Su bstan ce, 192, 194, 203

T ran scen d en tal, d ialectic o f K a n t, 2 0 7 , 208;

Su bstan tiality, 194

freed om , 2 3 5 , 237; idealism , p 14; d eter­

Sui securus, i 70 Supersensuous world, 24, 2 0 1 , 205, 230 n,

m ination o f tim e, 228, i 107 T ra n sitio n from n onfin ite to fin ite, 313, 3 1 4 , 321 n, d 39

3 1 8 , i 2 5 , d 4 , d 11

T ru th , double, d 27

Sw itchblade, i 33 Syllogism , d 33 Synthesis, takes what is absolutely posited and posits it with qualification s, 2 0 3 n; all s. is p articu lar s., 22 5 ; its condition

U ltim ate, the, 155, 164 U n con d itional, 23, p 7, 164, 166, 179, 216, 2 3 5 . 247

is tim e, 2 2 8 ; its form s, 2 2 9 n ; without

U nconditionally posited, 106

opposition no s. necessary, 29 4 ; when

Unconscious, the (das Bewusstlose), i 97, d 4

ju d g in g objectively the subject is engaged

U nintelligible, 310

in s., 2 9 6 ; s. thinkable only if 1) p re­

U nity, 296, 297, d 22

ceded by an absolute unity, 2 ) term inated

U njust, th e (d er U n gerechte), 341

in an absolute thesis, 296-7

U ntu tored, d 11, d 12

Synthetic, ju dgm ents a p riori,

175,

194;

Utopianism (Schw ärm erei), 3 1 7 , 335 1

it. r " ,

propositions, 206 System , not o b je ct o f knowledge b u t o f an activity,

305;

not dead ch a ttel,

d 32;

V agrancy (Schw ärm erei), 339

strife o f systems, 2 9 3 , 3 0 4 , 307, 30 8 , 313,

V alidity, universal 304, 307, d 32

(A llgem eingültigkeit),

314, 32 9 , d 32

V ernu nft/ V erstand , 20, 23 V isionaries (Schw ärm er), 2 15 n , 291

T a n ta lic to rtu re, i 3

V oluntarism , i 63

T au to lo g y, d 33 T eleology, 161, 24 1 , i 9

W a ffle iron, i 33

T erro rs o f th e objective world, 157

W eakness, o f m ind, 158; o f reason, 210, 2 8 6 , 290, 291, 295, 340

T h a t, a first T h a t, d 35 T heorem s

(Sätze),

90,

230;

theorem

of

sufficient reason, 2 3 0 n “T h e o re tic a l" in the K an tian sense, 23, 100

W ill, o f all, N .R . § 7 1 ; form o f will, § 9 8 , §100;

general will, § 4 7 ,

§110,

§142,

§144,

§151;

§100, good

§102, will,

n, 154, 157, 176, 190, 2 0 2 , 209 n, 229,

157, individual will, N .R . § 1 1 0 , § 1 5 3 ,

2 3 0 , 2 3 8 n, N .R . § 1 , § 7 6 , i 87, r 2 T h e o retica l philosophy, 2 9 8 ; th. reason,

§ 1 5 5 , § 1 5 8 ; m atter o f will, § 8 9 , § 9 7 ,

T hesis, absolute, synthesis,

§ 1 4 2 , § 1 5 1 ; selfhood o f will, § 1 4 6 W iuen sch aftslehre, 304. 305, d 32

2 9 7 , 299 297:

327; is purpose o f any posila

a

phenom enon.

W orld , last goal of, 200; my m oral property,

N .R. § 7

270

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

In dex o f Names

Aenesidemus (see Schulze), 8 7 , 9 3 , 11 0 -1 1 ,

p 3, p 4 , p 7 , p 10, i 100, d 74, 219, r 6

p 1, i 101, d 2 0 , d 46 Aquinas, T h o m as, 61, i 13

Frank, M anfred, 26

A ristotle, i 35, d 35, d 55

Fuhrm ans, H orst, 219

Augustinus, 19, 36, 60, 154, i 7, i 10, i 23, i 35 , i 36, i 38, i 4 0 , i 75, i 76, i 96,

G arve, C hristian, 21, i 3

i 100, d 4 , d 12, d 17, d 2 4 , d 33, d 51,

G oethe, Jo h a n n W olfgan g, d 15

d 64 H arris, H .S ., 26, i 95 Baggesen, Je n s, 320 n , d 50

H eath , P eter, i 23

B eck , Ja k o b Sigism und, 153 n , i 2

Hegel, G eorg W ilhelm Friedrich , 198-99,

B eck , Lewis W h ite, d 75 Berkeley, G eorge, 21 1 -1 2 , 59, i 52, i 84,

61, i 11, i 12, i 43 , d 5, d 27, d 41 , d 51, d 81 H obbes, T h o m as, i 84

i 91 , r 5 B réh ier, Êm ile, i 12

H ölderlin, Fried rich , 27, A ppendix D

B olm an , Frederick de W olfe, 61

H um e, David, 19, 26, i 3, d 11, d 13, d 17, d 19, d 7 5 , r 5, r 36

B u b er, M artin , d 57 B u rtch a ell, Ja m es T un stead , 19

Ja c o b i, Friedrich H ein rich, 156, 185 n, 216, 3 1 3 , 31 8 , i 6 , i 95 , d 3 7 , r 7

C liiir e r , Ernst, i 74, r 9 C erf, W a lter, 26, i 95

Ja m es, W illiam , 61

Cesa, C laudio, 219 Crusius, C hristian August, 102, p 11

Jefferso n , T h o m as, 220 K an t, Im m an u el, 20-23; analytic and syn­

D eicarles, R en é, 101 n, 102, 3 0 8 n , 32324 , i 2 3 , i 76, i 79, i 101, d

33

th etic form , 104; synthetic unity o f ap p er­ ception, p 7; deduction o f categories, 105, 107, p 16, p 17; d ialectic, 206; em pirical

Eaton , R alph M ., i 23

I is never w ithout o b je ct, 60; facts are

Fich te, Jo h a n n G o ttlieb ; a ct o f positing, 24,

o f him self, 2 32 n ; ideas are n ot objects,

cond itional, p 6; faith , 19; genius ahead

17; art o f philosophizing, 18; A ugustine,

2 4 3 ; beyond Leibn iz’ form alism , p 13;

d 51 ; autonom y, d 2 7 ; awareness, a c t of,

misunderstood by K an tian s, 152-53, 289;

d 45 , o f things, d 21, d 58, d 5 9 ; com m on

noum enon, 22; o b jectified I, 206; K ant's

sense, d 2 1 ; dogm atism , i 8 4 ; eternity,

most

d 46 ; feeling, d 21; God, d 6 1 ; ground o f relation and distinction, d 23; I am I.

phenom enalism , 23, 212 n , i 92 ; his p re­

2 5, I 72;

)6 , 60, i 7, i 23, d 4 6 ; im m ortal,

2 42

n;

his

supposed principles, 155; purposiveness, i 120; his im m an en t realism , 212; subject

i 119;

intellectu al

its own o b je ct, 60; th eoretical and p ra c ­

i 78, d 4 ;

K ant,

24, i 4 (et

tical philosophy, 154, 176; U rform avail­

passim ); language, original, i 19; laws of thought,

pages,

task,

infinite

intuition ,

com pressed

d 20;

obed ience,

d 17;

philosophy, art of, 18, choice of, d 80,

ab le, 103, p 15. See also Appendix C. Kirk, Geoffrey Stephen, d 51 Kurz, G erhard, 26

In contrast to W L , i 27; Schulze-A enesi­ dem us, i 10, i 101; Spinoza, i 84, d 4 1 ;

Leibniz, G ottfried W ilhelm ; axiom o f co n ­

sw itchblade, i 33; task for a ground, d 63;

trad iction , 94; axiom o f sufficient reason,

th etir ju d g m en t, 37, d 23; things in th em ­

102-3; ultim ate axiom . 94; popularized

selves, r 32; waffle iron, i 33. See also

dogm atism , 300; rem nant o f form alism ,

271

THE UNCONDITIONAL IN HUMAN KNOWLEDGE p 13; em pirical idealist, 21 3 ; p rinciple o f

175; things in themselves, 213 n ; theory o f

identity,

freed om , 238 n ; laws o f thought, d 20

m onad ,

230; 186,

unlike 214,

K a n t,

i 91;

2 3 1 -3 2 ;

phenom ena,

21 5 ; pre-established harm ony, 186, 2 1 3 , 239; n ot purposes b ut harm ony, r 9; his

Rousseau, Je a n Jacq u es, 219, r 15, r 16,

N .R . § 3 3 , § 4 4 R oyce, Jo siah , d 17

transcendent realism , 212; things as such, 185; thing in itself, 231; i 111; golden vessels o f Egypt, 215 n Lessing, G otthold E p hraim , 24 3 , 3 1 3 , 326

Sch iller, Jo h a n n Christoph Fried rich , d 15 Schulze, G ottlieb Ernst, see Aenesidem us Spinoza, Benedictus de; his system,

151,

Lévy-Bruhl, L u cien , 153

3 1 3 -1 6 ; consistent dogm atism , i 84; sub-

L u th er, M artin, 19

lim est realism , r 2 7 ;

de Luynes, Louis-C harles duc de, i 23

31 7 ; his opponents, 194; determ ined the

M aim on, Salom on, 2 2 1 , p 5, i 85

lute could oppose a world to itself, 309-

his contrad iction ,

absolute as o b je ct, 242 n ; how the abso­ M arcel, G ab riel, i 3 4 , d 33

10; beatitud e, 322; causality, 3 1 5 ; why

M edicus, Fritz, 26, i 33, i 34, d 2 3 , d 34

Ethics?, 305; coun terpart to his Ethics,

M endelssohn, Moses, 185 n, i 6, r 36

159; existence, 315; freedom , 331 n ; God,

M eyer, Ludovicus, 185 n

196, 2 1 0 , 308 n 323-24, 331 n , i 46 , i 73,

M üller, Gustav Em il, 20, i 4 7 , d 81

i 79, d 3; infinite, d 41 ; intellectu al in ­ tu ition, 171, 317, 319; necessity, 331 n;

N ietham m er, Friedrich Im m an eu l, 24, i 4,

219

n o t-I turned into I, 185, 207; m ute p ain t­ ing,

Nietzsche, Fried rich , i 35, d 32, 61 Nuovo, V icto r, 26

155;

rationalist,

all

possibility,

102;

not

a

19; sub specie aeternitatis,

19] substance exists in no tim e, 203 n; absolute substance, 184; only one sub­

Parm enides, 19, 154, 318, i 11, i 4 3 , i 4 6 , i 4 8 , i 51, d 51

affections o f substance, i 5 4 -5 9 , i 62 ; u n ­

Plato, 15, 21 6 , 233 n, 308 n , 318, 325, d 4 3 , d 4 5 , d 57 Plotinus, 19, i l l ,

stance, i 42; substance o b jectified , i 35; cond itional in the n o t-I, 171 Staeh elin, Balthasar, d 57

i 12, i 4 6 , i 100, 154,

Sterne, Law rence, 320 n, d 49

d 51 Przywara, E rich , 19

T alleyran d , Charles M aurice de, r 5 T ertu llia n , i 63

R ah n er, K arl, d 57

T illic h , Paul Joh an n es, 26, i 35

R aven, J . E ., d 51 R ein hold, K arl L eonh ard ; axiom o f co n ­

V illers, Charles, 18

sciousness, 9 3 , 2 0 8 n; dem ands science solely by logic, 101 n; deduction o f form s, 110 n,

111; em pirical I as principle,

W o lff, Christian, 292, i 3