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Research Articles

Democratic resilience in Africa: elections, opposition, and social movements

Matthew Gichohia Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, NorwayCorrespondencematthew.gichohi@cmi.no
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Lise Raknera Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway;b Department of Government, University of Bergen, Bergen, NorwayView further author information
Pages 609-631 | Received 24 Mar 2025, Accepted 30 Dec 2025, Published online: 27 Feb 2026

ABSTRACT

In the last decade, a consensus has emerged that we are now witnessing a global democratic decline. The democratic backsliding consensus is also extended to the African continent. Reflecting global trends, African incumbent leaders have strategically used the law and courts to control the contestation for power and participation, and also used sovereigntist claims to shield themselves from external scrutiny and pressures. But, three decades into the continent's multiparty era, politics in the region reflect a status quo: Democratic levels have largely remained the same since the 1990s. Seeking to explain this equilibrium of partial democratization, we revisit the arguments of “democratization by elections” and link the focus on elections to the study of social movements. Addressing cases that have experienced episodic challenges of autocratization, we argue that the routinization of elections has contributed to building democratic resilience against the autocratic ambitions of incumbents. Competitive elections provide a formal mechanism for translating the demands of social movements into political change, fostering greater accountability and institutional adaptability. Our analysis shows that social movements emerge in response to these episodic challenges of autocratization and that they  – in doing so  – strategically borrow from past movements while employing symbolic resonance to mobilize and sustain participation.

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Introduction

Three iconic cases of democratic resilience in Africa may serve as a starting point for reflecting on the state of democracy on the continent. In Malawi, on 8 May 2020, the Supreme Court nullified the 2019 re-election of President Peter Mutharika, upholding the Constitutional Court’s landmark ruling. The court cited widespread irregularities in the electoral organization and implementation and ordered a new election. On 23 June, in the midst of the Covid pandemic, Malawians went to the polls again and the incumbent president lost and unceremoniously left office. Second, in the run-up to Zambia’s August 2021 presidential elections, a wide consensus among local and international pundits held that President Lungu would win comfortably and that the elections would not be free and fair. The predictions were based on the fact that Zambia had suffered significant democratic backsliding under the Patriotic Front (PF) government and that electoral alternation was no longer deemed possible. But opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema and his United Party for National Development (UPND) party won a resounding victory in the September elections, despite a campaign in which the PF manipulated state resources, gained control of the judiciary and security forces, and introduced various anti-media laws to encourage its own voters and intimidate the opposition. Finally, in the recent elections in South Africa on May 29, 2024, the African National Congress (ANC) for the first time lost its parliamentary majority. Having governed South Africa since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC formed a centrist coalition government with its main rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Beyond doubt, South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission demonstrated integrity and was buttressed by a robust civil society and independent media, and the election results were never called into question.

Echoing other scholarly contributions to this special issue (see Lindberg), arguably, the three recent elections in Malawi and Zambia and South Africa suggest that democratic backsliding outcomes are not pre-determined. An important lesson from the 50 years of Third Wave-research is that a single explanatory variable to explain success and failure of third wave democratization is futile. Arguably, the three African cases referred to above speak to a recent phenomenon of democratic resilience, or the democratic regimes ability to absorb external challenges and internal stressors and to adapt to the changing functional conditions of democratic governance (see Merkel, this volume). Resilience is, therefore, the regime´s ability to resist or absorb threats and bounce back using democratic means of political participation, without losing its identity, structure, or function.Footnote1 The recent electoral experiences in Malawi, South Africa and Zambia suggest that competitive elections provide a significant “firewall” of resistance against executive aggrandizement and autocratization.

An emerging literature on democratic resilience shows that civil society and opposition forces may utilize similar mechanisms in attempts to reverse autocratization.Footnote2 Recent events across Europe, Latin America and Africa demonstrate that autocratization can be halted and reversed. Nord et al. refers to this as a form of “U-Turn” a form of regime transformation where a move towards autocratization is closely followed by and linked to processes of democratization.Footnote3 Gloppen and RaknerFootnote4 show that civil society and the political opposition may successfully employ similar mechanisms as autocrats to challenge democratic backsliding through democratic lawfare strategies.Footnote5 Arguably, in countries with electoral and pluralistic democratic traditions, civic and political actors are more likely to maintain an electoral support base, experience, and knowledge of mobilization that enables them to challenge incumbents’ attempts to close democratic space.

Resilience, however, can also refer to how regimes transform themselves in anticipation of critical transformations and to continue achieving their goals.Footnote6 Bouncing back is not always necessary. Leaders can instead look ahead and act in ways that will help maintain control despite the obstacles they face. They actively assess their current situations and resources to determine whether they are adequate to meet challenges ahead.Footnote7 Doing so helps them recognize threats to their positions and interests. Acts taken in anticipation of disturbances lead to stability. Stability can indicate that a system is effectively managing challenges without significant shifts because of its consistent adherence to democratic norms.

Why do some African regimes exhibit signs of democratic resilience despite widespread institutional fragility and pressures towards autocratization? An important reminder when discussing the state of democracy in Africa (and more generally) is that the narrative of an inevitable worsening of political and civil freedoms in which autocratic forces are always savvier and more resilient than democratic ones should be resisted. Building on findings by among others (LindbergFootnote8) emphasizing the routinization of contested elections, even in imperfect settings provides opportunities for citizen engagement, we argue that the routinization of elections has contributed to building democratic resilience against African incumbents' autocratic ambitions.Footnote9 But, moving beyond the focus on the administration of elections, and critically engaging with the notion of “democratization by elections,” we argue that competitive elections provide an institutionalized mechanism through which societies can address and resolve episodic threats to the regime. Elections provide a formal mechanism for translating the demands of social movements into political change, fostering greater accountability and institutional adaptability.

By combining insights from the study of electoral administration and social movements, we add to the literature on democratic resilience by emphasizing the linkages between persistent social movement mobilization and electoral contestation. Civic mobilization is pivotal for the protection of democratic gains, constantly challenging incumbents that seek to enhance executive powers by engineering new sets of legal amendments, acts, and decrees. These moments offer social movements the opportunity to mobilize diverse constituencies (student and labour unions, womens and youth movements), reminding them of democracy’s importance in the context and what was necessary to achieve it. Despite their sometimes short-lived nature, movements leave behind an infrastructure and legacy of tactics, organizational models, and symbols from which future civic mobilization efforts can draw. Here, we move beyond discussions of how social movements affect democratization efforts and focus on their contributions to democratic resilience in mainly hybrid regimes, which combine formal governance structures with informal societal relations.Footnote10

This blend means that social movements operate in ambiguous opportunity structures where they do have (some) room to maneuver but cannot rely on strong legal protections or impartial institutions. This uncertainty shapes their mobilization strategies including their tendency to mobilize around elections. Elections, as moments of contention, provide a calendar for civic mobilization and language around which diverse groups can rally. In essence, elections in hybrid regimes offer an arena for social movements to keep democratic aspirations alive. We reference social movements in autocratic regimes to demonstrate that their resistance tends to be sporadic and often fragmented because stage-managed elections, without real contestation, deny them of a credible and recurring opportunity structure around which to effectively coordinate and rally broad-based coalitions.

Following this introduction presenting our analysis and argument, we provide a brief overview of Africas democratic trajectories since the early 1990s. We then turn to the characteristics of democratic resilience on the continent and in doing so, revisit the significance of competitive elections as a way of civil society and the opposition to address incumbents´ attempts at autocratization. Employing insights from the social movement literature, we argue that competitive elections provide a formal mechanism for translating the demands of social movements into political change, fostering greater accountability and institutional adaptability. Social movements emerge in response to episodic challenges of autocratization and strategically borrow from past movements while employing symbolic resonance to mobilize and sustain participation.Footnote11 A concluding section summarizes the key arguments.

The third wave of democracy in Africa: limited progress and regression?

Seeking to capture what at the time appeared as a historical rise and decline of democracy worldwide, HuntingtonFootnote12 used the metaphor of waves cresting and residing to describe the third wave of democracy.Footnote13 Culminating with the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989–90, scholars and politicians alike agreed that countries across the world would mature into vibrant democracies with well-functioning market economies.Footnote14 The democratic wave swept through Africa in the early 1990s following protests that demanded political reform.Footnote15 A variety of movements came together during this period and campaigned for the replacement of authoritarian regimes with plural democracies.Footnote16 By the mid-1990s, through combined external and internal processes, most African nations had legalized political opposition and committed to multiparty electoral regimes. Many countries later adopted executive term limits, as unconstrained executive power had been one of the most fundamental challenges to democracy in the region.Footnote17

By 2010, elections in sub-Saharan Africa were routinized affairs, with at least 33 countries holding a second set of elections; a far cry from 1989 when only Botswana and Mauritius held regular multiparty elections.Footnote18 Regular elections became an established focal point for collective action to defend democracy whenever threatened. From this perspective, the 1990s transitions to multiparty rule represented watershed moments in Africa’s political trajectory as they provided regular, periodic, and anticipated opportunities for citizen coordination and participation. Whereas only a handful of countries maintained their multiparty constitutions after independence, post 1990, only two countries on the continent still outlaw multiparty elections.Footnote19

It is significant to our understanding of democratic backsliding and resilience to appreciate the distinct international component of Africas democratic trajectories post 1990.Footnote20 By the mid to late 1990s, enhanced and more concerted donor political conditionality forced incumbent regimes in highly indebted low-income countries to adhere to democratic norms, human rights, and good governance. As donor support to a much greater degree now was also extended to non-governmental entities, African governments monopoly on aid was significantly challenged. This provided civil society and opposition actors more political space in which to operate, as they were able to use international funding and support mechanisms to challenge incumbents at critical points. Following the return to multiparty democracy, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grew rapidly across the continent as part of Western governments´ push for democratization. The share of foreign aid channelled to Africa through NGOs rose from 1 to 20 per cent from 1990 to late 2000.Footnote21

Stalled democratization: the politics of the status quo

As argued and discussed in this Special Issue, in the last decade a consensus has emerged that we are now witnessing a global democratic decline.Footnote22 A distinctive feature of the current wave of attacks on democracy is its piecemeal and gradual nature and that it is increasingly happening within and through the law – often reinventing extant legal provisions, altering their meaning or application.Footnote23 The repression of civil society is another important dimension of the global democratic backsliding witnessed.Footnote24 Internationally, civil society associations are facing deteriorating legal and operational environments as governments pursue regulatory, administrative and extra-legal strategies to impede their work.Footnote25

This democratic backsliding consensus has also been extended to sub-Saharan Africa. Gyimah-Boadi suggested that the democratic gains in African countries have slowed, if not reversed, due to “the waning commitment to the democratic project on the part of political elites.”Footnote26 It is not simply that democratic rights have been under attack in countries such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, where entrenched incumbents have long limited participation and contestation, but that even among the region’s cases of democratic progress, such as Ghana and South Africa, basic freedoms have been curtailed by the illiberal impulses of those in power. As part of global trends of aid reduction and increasingly stricter regulations on foreign funding to non-governmental entities, African civil society associations are also experiencing a shrinking democratic space and new legislation hinders their ability to attract foreign funding and their right to explicitly criticize the regime.Footnote27

Arguably, Africa’s lack of democratic progress renders support to the broader global narrative of democratic backsliding. In this respect, earlier arguments that the transition to electoral politics would generate enough momentum to make democratic consolidation inevitable appear too optimistic.Footnote28 The many instances of governments clamping down on the rights of citizens, civil society, and the media reinforce the notion of democracy’s decline across the continent. Overall, it appears that African incumbents have been able to leverage their superior organizational, ideological, and financial resources to reinforce their dominance of the political system.Footnote29 As a result, the leaders who held onto or came to power through the initial liberalization of the 1990s often failed to sustain their commitment to democratic norms and practices.

Yet, analysing the democratic trajectories three decades after the initial transitions, Bleck and van de Walle find that a striking characteristic of the region is how little negative or positive regime change actually took place following the initial transitions in the 1990s.Footnote30 Once African countries started holding regular multiparty elections, they largely continued to do so. Regular elections became the default political option, while the military coups that used to lead to lengthy periods of non-electoral politics got overturned quickly due to both local and international pressures. Most African countries have retained the level of democracy they attained when they first completed their transition to multiparty politics by the mid-1990s. The countries that achieved the highest regional levels of democracy in 1995 are largely the same set of countries two decades later – namely, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa. The same is true at the other end of the spectrum, with cases like Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Sudan remaining among the most authoritarian over time. Of course, in this span of time, some countries have experienced large swings in the extent of their democratization due to the onset or conclusion of civil wars or other forms of large-scale political instability.

Reflecting on Africas democratic experiences over the past two decades, we find that they largely reflect status quo politics: There has been neither substantial progress nor regression in advancing political and civil liberties since the initial transitions of the early 1990s.Footnote31 Importantly, this observed democratic stagnation obscures the actual political battles playing out between incumbent elites attempting to stay in power and an opposing elite contesting control of the state. African incumbent leaders have strategically used the law and courts to control the contestation for power and participation in politics and they have used sovereigntist claims to shield themselves from the scrutiny or pressure from external actors. Opposition forces have also, at times, scored significant victories in securing democratic spaces, particularly when they are not directly challenging the core interests of the executive branch. Arriola et al.Footnote32 show that this status quo is reflected in the fact that Africa’s average liberal democracy scores effectively remained “a flat line” from the mid-2000s onwards.Footnote33

What factors may explain this equilibrium? The Afrobarometer surveys have long suggested that African publics “value democracy both as an end in itself and as a means to improved governance and welfare” (66) rather than in a purely instrumental manner, and that notions of fairness, freedom, rights, and political participation feature prominently in popular understandings of democracy.Footnote34 While the Afrobarometer has shown a slight decline in the public support for democracy in recent rounds, support remains comparatively strong and there is not much evidence that African middle classes are turning against democracy or that this decline has been accompanied by a commensurate increase in support for different kinds of autocratic rule.Footnote35

What about international factors? The “leverage–linkage” model of Levitsky and WayFootnote36 is insightful in predicting how much donors influence decision-making towards democratization in individual countries.Footnote37 Following the transitions to competitive electoral politics in the early 1990s, Western donors provided the main agency of restraint on governments, if an inconsistent one. Variation is apparent in the relationship between donors and governments across the continent. Western aid has also provided significant support to autocratic regimes such as Rwanda and Uganda and helped sustain long-lasting autocratic leaders. Kenya and Uganda’s relationship with the western donor countries has increasingly been shaped by the latter’s concern with prosecuting the “war on terror” in the Horn of Africa; a poor, aid-dependent country like Malawi can ill afford to alienate the donors and risk losing their support. In recent years, regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS have also provided sovereignty resources to governments, further promoting stability.Footnote38

Overall, with the decline of aid, the rise of China’s role in the region, the preoccupation with the “War on Terror,” and other factors, Western influence on domestic African politics has waned  – and this may have some clear implications for democracy support. The emergence of alternate trading partners for Africa, such as China, may have further lessened the ability and willingness of Western donors to impose political conditionality on their aid.Footnote39 Increased security concerns after 2001 have further undermined democracy promotion as anti-terrorism foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks, including the rise of radical Islam in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, began to dominate donor interests.Footnote40 Ultimately, donors may have come to the conclusion that they had already done enough to support African democratization.

Elections as mechanisms of democratic resilience in Africa

Arguably, the limited progress (and decline) witnessed in Africas democratic trajectory overall may also be interpreted as democratic resilience. As we argue elsewhere, democratization remains a contentious process across the continent as individual citizens, civil society groups, and political parties have persisted in mobilizing for the expansion of basic rights.Footnote41 Such continued mobilization has forced incumbent leaders to adapt their efforts to contain the pressure for further political liberalization (Ibid). In other words, incumbents have had to work harder and more creatively to keep democratization from continuing to unfold in their countries. When democratization appears to have stalled in some African countries, it is because incumbents have successfully hindered, not necessarily completely derailed, pro-democracy actors. Following from here, Cianetti and HanleyFootnote42 called for the end of the backsliding paradigm, warning that the focus on a linear path between democracy and autocracy forces scholars into a conceptual straightjacket similar to the so-called “transition paradigm.”Footnote43 Instead, they suggested that focus should be placed on the political dynamics of individual countries and their evolution over time. Arguably, demand for democracy and advocacy is still strong across the African continent, and in most countries large majorities see democracy as the best form of political rule. Pro-democracy activists, politicians, and citizens mobilize to overcome incumbent’s institutional advantages and in so doing, prevent countries from backsliding into authoritarianism.

Elections are central to modern governance, offering periodic opportunities for societies to affirm or contest political authority. In moments of crisis – economic breakdowns, legitimacy deficits, elite fragmentation, or mass uprisings – elections can function as an institutionalized mechanism to stabilize regimes. They serve as a structured platform to address discontent, mitigate threats, and reaffirm authority.Footnote44 Outcome-based theories of democracy, such as Przeworski’sFootnote45 and Huntington’sFootnote46, are founded on a premise that repeated elections will enhance and consolidate democratic political systems.Footnote47 Probing approaches that equate electoral victories with democratization and studies holding that repeated elections over time will lead to democratization, LindbergFootnote48 first presented the argument that African elections, even in the absence of fully functioning liberal democratic institutions, may play a significant role in processes of democratization.Footnote49 Focusing on the importance of repetitive elections and the routinization of electoral administration, Lindberg’s work suggests that elections, as political events, could initiate processes of democratization, even in hybrid regimes. With each election cycle, the political space would open further, and elections would subsequently become more meaningful and less manipulated, which in turn could create demands for further democratic reforms.

In many African states, the institutionalization of periodic elections – albeit often under constrained or hybrid democratic conditions – has transformed the political landscape in ways that enable opposition actors to mobilize popular support and challenge entrenched incumbents. Elections function as critical “focal points” that provide structured opportunities for political contention that were largely absent under post-independence one-party regimes or long-standing authoritarian rule.Footnote50 They direct public attention towards issues of governance while providing an institutionalized arena in which opposition parties and candidates can engage with citizens, articulate a coherent platform, and build durable support networks. In situations where legitimacy is in crisis – due to corruption, authoritarian overreach, or contested leadership – elections can reset political authority.Footnote51 They act as a formalized ritual of consent, giving elected leaders a mandate to govern while minimizing challenges to their legitimacy.Footnote52 In this way, elections have the ability to transform potentially disruptive conflicts into manageable political competition. Elections allow grievances to be expressed through votes rather than violence.Footnote53 They also reinforce institutional continuity, particularly during crises that threaten regime survival. By holding elections regularly, regimes demonstrate their commitment to constitutional norms and political institutions. Adherence to democratic norms, including regular elections, safeguards institutions from collapse. Institutional continuity according to BogaardsFootnote54 fosters public confidence and dilutes the effects of episodic threats.Footnote55

Elections impose reputational costs on incumbents who rely heavily on fraud or overt repression. As international and domestic election monitoring has become more common, incumbent elites face increased scrutiny from civil society organizations, media observers, and diplomatic actors. This, in turn, shifts their political calculus: blatant manipulation or violence against opponents risks international condemnation, donor pressure, and domestic backlash. Even when incumbents resort to subtler tactics of electoral malpractice, the highly visible context of elections enables opposition parties to frame their protests and claims of injustice in terms legible to both domestic and international audiences. The contested 2007 Kenyan election, for example, illustrated how credible opposition mobilization and subsequent mass protests forced incumbents to negotiate and ultimately share power, thereby underscoring the leverage the opposition can gain from elections in the right conjunctures.Footnote56

To be sure, there has been a tendency to place unrealistic expectations on the electoral process.Footnote57 Analyses of competitive democracies that have experiences of electoral turnovers in Africa suggest that democratic turnovers do not necessarily create democratic elites.Footnote58 On the contrary, a general pattern seems to suggest that new incumbents will seek to regress or stall democratic laws after assuming office. At the same time, it cannot be argued that elections are unimportant when they do not lead to political change. Elections, by creating space for politicians and voters to make reciprocal claims, may encourage people to demand both personal and local accountability.Footnote59 Following from here, the rhetoric of campaigns and local administration of elections may also encourage voters to think and behave as national citizens (Ibid.). Importantly, shifting the electoral contestation to issues of democracy and the protection of the constitution, the incumbent offers civil society and the opposition opportunities for mobilization.

When do elections become mechanisms of resilience?

Africas multiparty era is by and large a story of majority rule. On average, across the region, since 1990, legislative elections have resulted in the winning party garnering 53.4% of the vote and 63.4% of the seats, while the second biggest party lagging behind with 23.5% and 19.8% respectively.Footnote60 Yet, in a minority of cases, a small number of opposition parties have established themselves enough to be able to effectively compete in multi-party elections and act effectively as a legislative opposition. Between 1990 and 2021, 14 opposition parties in 12 countries across the region have received at least 25% of the vote in at least 2 successive elections.Footnote61 The lack of absolute ethnic or regional majorities in many African countries means that leaders cannot rely on static formulas, or their own groups, for political support to maintain power.Footnote62 Elite fragmentation is a common trigger for regime instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. A state’s political-social heterogeneity provides leaders with a range of possible combinations, rather than a pre-determined set of group representatives and interests.

Cooptation has, therefore, emerged as an adaptive mechanism and reflects the regime’s ability to adapt to episodic threats. This is because the strategy aligns the interests of political and economic elites with the regime. By offering access to resources, patronage, and positions of influence, regimes transform potential adversaries into allies. This inclusion neutralizes dissent, prevents fragmentation, and reduces the likelihood of violent conflict. SvolikFootnote63 notes that authoritarian regimes survive not by repressing all opposition but by strategically managing relationships with elites and opposition figures.Footnote64 ArriolaFootnote65 shows that coalition-building through cooptation is necessary in places where political alliances depend on elite networks and patronage systems.Footnote66 Coalition building through cooptation signals regime resilience by demonstrating flexibility in accommodating challengers without relinquishing core power structures. This strategic adaptation allows regimes to absorb shocks – economic crises, electoral protests, or intra-elite rivalries – while maintaining continuity.

Cooptation, however, is most effective when the opposition poses a credible threat. Democratic resilience requires meaningful political competition, which in turn necessitates a credible opposition. Electoral processes in Sub-Saharan Africa are often marred by irregularities, but the presence of a viable opposition ensures that elections remain contested spaces rather than foregone conclusions.Footnote67 When opposition parties gain significant electoral support, they demonstrate their ability to unseat the ruling regime through electoral competition. Electoral strength compels the incumbent to either negotiate or face destabilizing electoral defeat or mass uprisings. Kenyas coalition politics are illustrative: The electoral threat that Odinga posed to various presidents led to his cooptation into government. In 1997, for instance, Odinga was coopted into the ruling party KANU to avoid a hung parliament.Footnote68 He would later enter an internationally brokered power sharing agreement with Mwai Kibaki following the bitterly contested 2007 elections that drove the country to the brink of civil war. In 2018, Odinga was once again coopted into government by Uhuru Kenyatta after he declared himself the People´s President. Odinga repeatedly used electoral popularity and international backing to negotiate entry into various power-sharing arrangements.

Credible opposition movements can also increase external pressure on regimes by leveraging international norms, diplomatic support, and economic sanctions to force inclusion. A credible opposition with clear popular support increases international actors’ willingness to mediate political crises and push for power-sharing or elite inclusion. International actors use the opposition’s legitimacy to demand reforms or inclusion as a condition for continued engagement or aid. In Malawi (2020), international actors supported opposition-led judicial reforms that annulled the disputed presidential election. This external backing forced the regime to accept credible fresh elections, ultimately leading to opposition victory and cooptation into governance.Footnote69

Democratic resilience: the role of social movements

MerkelFootnote70 provides a framework for analysing how various societal structures contribute to the the durability and adaptability of democracies.Footnote71 Party systems and civil society not only offer mechanisms for mitigating democratic erosion but also serve as sites of contestation and renewal. It is possible that the current status quo documented across Africa is a dynamic equilibrium between growing demands for democracy and participatory politics, on the one hand, and executive efforts to contain them, on the other.Footnote72

The social movement literature helps us understand how protests and civic mobilization may occur as a response to undemocratic practices by the ruling elites attempting to prolong their stay in office. Senegal’s Yén a Marre movement, for example, successfully mobilized against President Wade's and later President Sall´s third term bids. The movement´s use of music has inspired movements in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo.Footnote73 MuellerFootnote74 argues that political grievances largely determine when protests will occur, while material grievances largely explain who is likely to participate in the protests. Bratton and van de Walle’sFootnote75 analysis of Africa´s democratic transitions underscores the continuities across waves of African protests, arguing that participatory forms of authoritarian rule were more likely to foster strong civil society groups.Footnote76 To understand resistance to autocratization, it is necessary to understand the opportunities inherent in the institutional context as well as the resources  – organizational, strategic, and normative  – that different actors bring to the contestations.

African social movements may be categorized into three phases: the first fought for independence, while the second occurred in the early 1990s and sought to do away with one-party or military rule in favour of democracy, and the third with the Arab Spring. The independence social movements, which included labour unions, universities, and members of the civil service, started off embracing non-violence but later embraced armed struggle following the first wave of liberation.Footnote77 The second wave of social movements opposed military and one-party state rule. The tactics employed by these movements were borrowed from their Eastern European counterparts in the later 1980s. Gyimah-Boadi traces the third wave of democracy’s foundation in Africa to Benin, where groups of civil servants, teachers and traders demonstrated and successfully demanded an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. This phenomenon became common across Africa, often involving the same civil society actors, as well as trade unions, lawyers, churches, academics and students.Footnote78 What distinguished the 1990s popular protests was that they expressed explicit political goals, and civil society was in the forefront of dislodging authoritarianism on the continent in the early 1990s, initiating and sustaining the processes of transition.Footnote79 In Zambia the coalition of trade unionists and opposition parties demanded a multiparty system and succeeded in beating Kaunda, the incumbent. In Cameroon, the publics withdrawal from the formal market (refusing to pay taxes), in favour of underground economic activity, forced President Biya to concede to a multiparty system.Footnote80 The third phase was spearheaded by youth using social media and popular culture to exchange information. These movements transcend socioeconomic and national boundaries to include diverse groups and issues.Footnote81

Africas social movements have emerged in response to episodic threats to democratic governance. These threats, such as authoritarian backsliding, electoral fraud, or constitutional manipulation, spur collective action as civil society and social movements mobilize to defend democratic norms. Episodic threats in sub-Saharan Africa often emerge in the context of elections, which are pivotal moments for democratic accountability but also periods of heightened political tension and vulnerability. Electoral processes – while symbolizing democracy – can also serve as flashpoints for undemocratic practices by the incumbent, such as vote rigging, intimidation of opposition parties, and attempts to manipulate outcomes through constitutional changes. Movements´ responses to threats to the electoral process reinforce their role as democratic watchdogs and contribute to democratic resilience. In this section, we discuss how social movements emerge in response to these episodic challenges and how they strategically borrow from past movements while employing symbolic resonance to mobilize and sustain participation.

Social movements and political parties

Electoral fraud is one of the most common triggers of social movements in sub-Saharan Africa. When citizens perceive elections as manipulated, mass mobilizations demanding transparency and accountability often follow. During Malawi’s 2019 elections, for example, claims of “Tippexed” tally sheets led to the “Anti-Ansah” protests, where citizens demanded the resignation of the electoral commission chairperson and called for fresh elections.Footnote82 The eventual annulment of the election results by the judiciary underscored how civic mobilization can lead to democratic course correction.Footnote83 Electoral disputes and the civic activism that follows often result in legal challenges, which test the strength and independence of judicial institutions, as seen in Kenya (2017) and Malawi (2019), when the judiciary annulled presidential elections.

These last two examples show the ways in which social movements, as the mobilizers of public pressure and the system´s watchdog, work with (and sometimes against) political parties, who contest elections and legislate. When these two actors work together, the social movements have brought mass legitimacy and maintained popular pressure, while the (opposition) parties provide and pursue institutional channels where demands are translated into political change (for example, contesting new elections or negotiating regime transitions). In Malawi, for example, the network of NGOs known as the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) organized mass demonstrations calling for the resignation of the Malawi Electoral Commission´s chair while the opposition filed petitions in court seeking the nullification of the 2019 election results and fresh re-run. In this case, the parties and the social movements reinforced each other to promote democratic resilience and curb the incumbent´s attempts to entrench themselves in power.

In some instances, social movements morph into political parties. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), for example, was the result of a broad social movement (including trade unions, students, and civic groups) deciding to contest elections as a party – a strategy that yielded a robust opposition force. Despite the MDCs popularity, the incumbent Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has used its influence over the electoral commission, media, and security forces to maintain office. Bobi Wine’s People Power movement eventually formalized into the National Unity Platform party to contest the 2021 Ugandan elections. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) has managed to maintain power by weakening the opposition before elections through violence/coercion and restrictions on rallies and media making it harder for the NUP and other parties to reach voters, especially in rural areas. This evolution can bring movements into the tent of party politics, but it also subjects them to the compromises of electoral competition. Some movements thus resist this path, preferring to remain as pressure groups influencing all parties from the outside. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lutte pour le Changement (LUCHA), a pro-democracy youth movement, has avoided aligning with the opposition or becoming a political party because they believe this will protect them from corruption and/or co-option. LUCHA activists have criticized opposition leaders for participating in power-sharing deals with the regime and refused to endorse them, arguing that true change must come from the people. While such movements share the opposition’s broad goals, they choose to apply pressure through civil resistance rather than electoral politics, which can cause friction in strategy and credit-claiming.

Social movement tactics/mechanism

Social movements also respond to perceived electoral illegitimacy through organized boycotts and nonviolent resistance. The suppression of opposition candidates and the militarization of the electoral process during Ugandas 2021 elections led to protests organized by the People Power Movement. The protests against the incumbent´s stolen electoral mandates signalled the incompatibility of authoritarian practices with democratic principles.Footnote84 The government´s crackdown on the movement and its affiliated parties stymied efforts to prevent Museveni´s sixth term in office. This contrasts with Malawi, where months of mass peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins at airports and government buildings contributed to the Constitutional Court annulling the 2019 election results, which paved the way for President Mutharika's defeat. Attempts to extend presidential term limits have also sparked movements that seek to preserve constitutional integrity. These movements help uphold the principle of the alternation of power, which is a cornerstone of democracy. In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré’s bid to amend Burkina Faso's constitution in 2014, following 27 years in power, led to mass protests that were led by the youth-driven Balai Citoyen (Citizen´s Broom) movement. These protests ultimately led to Compaoré’s resignation, demonstrating that movements can leverage constitutional crises to draw broad-based support and contribute to the regime´s resilience.Footnote85 The episodic nature of these threats compels movements to act decisively and often within short timeframes. This urgency requires the rapid mobilization and the strategic adoption of existing protest tools, narratives, and symbols that resonate with broad sections of the population. The strategies used by these movements, suggest that faced with immediate short-term crises such as fraudulent elections or attempts to challenge constitutional rights, they tap into reservoirs created by previous movements both locally and globally.

Strategic borrowing

The social movement literature helps us understand how strategic borrowing, the conscious adoption and adaptation of tactics, strategies, narratives, and organizational models from past movements – whether historical, domestic, or global – enhances current movements’ effectiveness. It highlights how movements build on the successes and failures of others, combining familiarity with innovation to suit current political and cultural contexts. TarrowFootnote86 argues that contentious ideas and tactics often diffuse across borders because they are “strategically modular”, meaning they can be lifted and applied in new settings.Footnote87 African activists have frequently observed protests abroad and adapted those methods at home. For example, the wave of Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 supplied African protesters, like those in Uganda´s Walk to Work, with a repertoire of tactics (mass sit-ins in public squares, viral slogans, social media campaigns) that could be borrowed and deployed against their own entrenched leaders.Footnote88 ⁣Strategic borrowing thus broadens movements’ toolkits by importing proven strategies for mobilization, organization, and resistance. Strategic borrowing, however, is not merely replication; it involves significant adaptation to local realities. As witnessed in the People Power Movement in Uganda, Bobi Wine adapted protest music from previous Ugandan struggles to reflect youth discontent with governance failures. The songs blended traditional African rhythms with modern critiques of the Museveni regime, which increased their accessibility and emotional resonance.Footnote89

There is also diffusion of tactics across the region that allows for learning. Senegal´s 2011 Y’en a Marre movement, which protested against ineffective government and registered youth to vote, inspired a similar youth-led mobilization in Burkina Faso. The 2014 Balai Citoyen (Citizen’s Broom) movement emerged in response to Blaise Compaoré’s government. Like in Senegal, the movement was founded by rappers and appealed to the youth through music.Footnote90 They organized sit-ins at public institutions, like hospitals and parastatals, to demand better service provisions. The protests against Compaoré's suggested referendum to the constitution extending his rule ultimately led to his resignation and fleeing the country (Mateos and ErroFootnote91). Nigeria’s 2020 #EndSARS protests, which mobilized against police brutality, borrowed heavily from the structure and organization of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in the United States, including leaderless mobilization and digital advocacy. The movement´s leaders also came from and used techniques from the 2012 Occupy Nigeria protests. In this way, movements engage in intergenerational borrowing: today’s campaign builds on yesterday’s groundwork. As Mampilly observes, protests advance in “stutter steps,” with setbacks followed by renewed action drawing on past experience. This cumulative learning process – a form of strategic borrowing over time – has been critical for keeping democratic aspirations alive.Footnote92 In the Nigerian case, though the military tried to violently suppress #EndSars and the Central Bank´s governor froze the accounts of participants, the Nigerian Police Force ultimately disbanded the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS).

Symbolic resonance

Symbolic resonance refers to social movements’ ability to evoke powerful emotional and cognitive connections through the use of symbols, narratives, and shared historical or cultural references.Footnote93 It serves as a tool for framing grievance and legitimizing protest actions. The way activists frame their cause can determine the resonance of their messaging. Symbols with resonance confer legitimacy and emotional weight to a movement – whether it’s a national flag, a religious or moral appeal, or even the human body itself as a canvas of protest. By marrying their goals to familiar and powerful symbols, movements inspire ordinary citizens to view the struggle as their own, thus protecting democratic values as a shared community imperative.

Symbols of past resistance are often invoked to frame current struggles as extensions of unfinished liberation projects. Zimbabwe’s 2016 #ThisFlag movement led by Pastor Evan Mawarire used the national flag as a central symbol to challenge state corruption and economic collapse. Movement leaders called for citizens to participate in a general strike since public protests were illegal. This action, in which nine million people participated, caused a national shutdown and inspired the 2017 movements responsible for Mugabe´s fall. The flag, previously monopolized by the ruling regime, became a rallying call and was reclaimed as a unifying emblem of people’s sovereignty and resistance.Footnote94 Following Mugabe´s ouster, ZANU-PF under President Mnangagwa, reclaimed the flag to legitimize the transition, and any attempts to use the flag in protest were met with repression. In the end, the flag was de-radicalized as a protest symbol and repurposed as a symbol of state power and patriotic loyalty.

The creation of martyrdom narratives strengthens movements by providing a human face to struggles and reinforcing moral urgency. In Senegal’s Y’en a Marre movement, the deaths of student protesters amplified demands for political accountability. Similarly, the killing of Nigerian protesters during the 2020 #EndSARS movement became a rallying point for sustained mobilization and international attention.Footnote95 Women in hybrid regimes also harness cultural beliefs around the female body to protest injustice. A mother’s nakedness in protest is a deeply taboo and symbolic act – effectively a curse upon those at whom it is directed. In Kenya, for example, displays of nudity towards men indicate a refusal to recognize their authority and break ties with them.Footnote96 In 1992, Kenyan women stripped naked to protest the incarceration and torture of their sons for advocating for multiparty elections. The government’s violent response to the women led to further mobilization of women’s organizations across the country.Footnote97 The result was the eventual release of their sons. Ebila and Tripp note that such gendered symbolic tactics, though under-studied in social movement theory, have recurred across Africa, as women protesters draw on cultural notions of honour, shame, and maternal authority to hold governments to account and demand justice.Footnote98

Social movements’ persistence signals the resilience of regimes. Their recurrence without breaking the system suggests that electoral strength strengthens the regime's durability. In these settings, movements act as valves through which grievances are raised and mobilization occurs cyclically around elections.Footnote99 The regimes ability to accommodate, co-opt, and selectively repress civic movements without destabilization contributes to its resilience.Footnote100 Authoritarian regimes often develop strategies to suppress, co-opt, or outlast resistance, like the use of state violence, legal restrictions on protests, disinformation campaigns, and the mobilization of loyalist groups to counter protests. While suppression may temporarily weaken protests, it can backfire, especially when the repression becomes overly violent, thereby eroding regime legitimacy and fuelling public outrage. Violent crackdowns can transform localized grievances into broader resistance, attracting both domestic and international support.

Regime resilience, however, exposes movements to long-term risks, such as fragmentation, fatigue, or the co-optation of leadership. When regimes successfully co-opt influential leaders or implement superficial reforms, movements may lose momentum or face internal divisions. The interaction between regime suppression and movement persistence reveals a symbiotic contestation in which movement resilience tests regime durability and vice versa. Ultimately, regimes that rely on repression risk creating conditions for renewed mobilization, as their very tactics often serve as catalysts for sustained opposition.

Conclusion: democratic resilience, elections and social movements in Africa

Africas democratic experience over the past two decades largely reflects status quo politics with neither substantial progress nor regression. While the average level of democracy on the continent has slipped back to where it was before the year 2000, the decline has been moderate, and most changes have occurred within regime categories – with democracies becoming less liberal and autocracies more repressive. Defying a generalized consensus of democratic backsliding on the continent, we have argued here and elsewhere (Arriola et al.Footnote101) that multiparty constitutions implemented in the early 1990s have been sustained, and where the opposition has been institutionalized, power has alternated between governments through elections. This does not mean that all African countries are alike, or that this equilibrium lies on a clear linear path between autocracy and democracy. Rather, each country needs to be understood as the unique product of its own history, actors, configuration of resources, social forces, and institutional legacies.

Following from more nuanced perceptions of democratic backsliding, the literature has turned from explaining democratic transition, consolidation, and backsliding towards specifying its quality, identifying its hazard rates (the probability that they will decay), and explaining authoritarian persistence. The emerging literature on democratic resilience shows that civil society and opposition may utilize similar mechanisms to reverse autocratization. Building on this literature, we have focused on Africa's hybrid regimes that maintain competitive elections and where opposition parties have established themselves enough to both effectively compete in multi-party elections and act as a legislative opposition. We find that the routinization of elections contributes to building democratic resilience against incumbents’ autocratic ambitions. Competitive elections provide a formal mechanism for translating the demands of social movements into political change, fostering greater accountability, and institutional adaptability. Such mobilization efforts force incumbents to adapt their strategies to contain the pressure for further political liberalization. Their standard tools of manipulation – corruption, fraud, and violence – are no longer enough to undercut the growing demand for representative and accountable governance. In this respect, incumbents have had to work harder and more creatively to prevent democratization from continuing to unfold in their countries. Even autocratic incumbents in autocracies such as Zimbabwe and Uganda have had to address increasing grievances among their citizenry.

Turning our attention to democratic resilience through persistent civic mobilization around electoral moments, we argue that civil society mobilization continues to be pivotal for the protection of democratic gains. They challenge incumbents who creatively seek to circumvent such limitations on their power by engineering new sets of legal amendments, acts, and decrees. A potential pro-democracy cleavage, though sometimes dormant, may effectively be mobilized by civil society, social movements, and opposition forces when democracy is threatened. Where civic and political opposition actors remain competitive and maintain a grassroots and electoral support base, a repertoire of resistance exists that autocratizing incumbents are not able to completely undermine. Returning to the three iconic electoral moments in Malawi, Zambia, and South Africa, resistance to autocratization appears possible before elections have been rendered meaningless. While not always succeeding in their attempts to safeguard the democratic gains in the constitution, civic mobilization formed around central constitutional issues appears instrumental for turnover in later elections.

By studying the strategies used by these movements, we learn how they tap into reservoirs created by previous movements both locally and globally. Future studies on social movements in hybrid regimes could consider the micro-mechanisms of mobilization. That is, how do activists perceive the opportunities and threats, make tactical decisions, and construct coalitions defined by uncertainty. Understanding these internal workings would help us get a handle on how internal power struggles and debates influence the tactics chosen and how regimes attempt to weaken movements from within by co-opting leaders and organizations. Scholars could also consider how new communication technologies alter the dynamics of mobilization and state control in hybrid regimes. In particular, whether the states capacity for surveillance and disinformation evolves in response to the mobilization efforts.

We end on a note of caution. Arguably, at the core of many democratic setbacks over the past decades is the failure of institutionalization – put differently, the capacity of many new democracies in the developing world has not kept pace with popular demands for democratic accountability. The piecemeal erosion of the democratic fabric of many African governments requires us to see democracy as a collection of multiple institutions and actors. Understanding the current backlash’s timing, manifestations, causes, and effects has significant policy relevance in a context where the international aid community is scaling back their support and the consequent potential for permanent change worldwide.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Lise Rakner acknowledges support from grant NFR314947-Elite Political Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies.

Notes on contributors

Matthew Gichohi

Matthew Gichohi is a Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, NO). His research focuses mainly on electoral politics, gender, and elite dynamics. His current research examines rights activism in autocratic settings.

Lise Rakner

Lise Rakner is a professor of political science, University of Bergen. She holds an affiliate position as Research Professor at the Chr. Michelsen Institute. Her research concerns processes of democratization and autocratization, human rights, and institutional reform.

Notes

1 Stollenwerk, Börzel, and Risse, “Theorizing Resilience-building in the EU’s Neighbourhood,” 1219–1238; Folke et al., “Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management,” 557–581.

2 Lührmann and Merkel, Resilience of Democracy; Gloppen and Rakner, “Legalised Resistance to Autocratisation in Common Law Africa,” 1–17.

3 Nord et al. “When Autocratization is Reversed: Episodes of U-Turns since 1900,” 1–24. Their dataset distinguishes between three forms of U-turn: authoritarian manipulation, democratic reaction, and international intervention. They conclude that more than 50 per cent of all autocratization episodes become U-Turns, and that the majority of U-Turns lead to restored or even improved levels of democracy.

4 Gloppen and Rakner, “Legalised Resistance to Autocratisation in Common Law Africa”.

5 Gloppen and Rakner, “Legalised Resistance to Autocratisation”.

6 Scheffer et al., “Anticipating Critical Transitions,” 344–348; Standish et al. “Resilience in Ecology,” 43–51.

7 Woods, “Resilience and the Ability to Anticipate”.

8 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; Lindberg, Democratization by Elections.

9 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa.

10 De Waal and Ibreck, “Hybrid Social Movements in Africa,” 303–324; Boege et al. “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’,” 7. We draw on existing classifications of African regimes drawing on indices (see Tambe 2024 and Cheeseman (2015) that distinguish between autocracies, weak or hybrid democracies and consolidated democracies.

11 Tarrow, The Language of Contention.

12 Huntington, The Third Wave.

13 Ibid.

14 Fukuyama, “Capitalism & Democracy,” 100–110; Møller and Skaaning, Democratization and Autocratization in Comparative Perspective.

15 Popular political protests erupted in twenty-eight of the region’s forty-eight countries and political reforms were initiated in part to preempt protest in another twelve countries Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiences in Africa, 116–117.

16 Bratton and van de Walle estimate that two-thirds of African democracy transitions between November 1989 and 1991 were initiated by protest movements (Ibid.).

17 Posner and Young, “Term Limits,” 260–278.

18 L Lynch and Crawford, “Democratization in Africa 1990–2010,” 275–310.

19 Bleck and van de Walle, Electoral Politics in Africa since 1990.

20 Rakner and van de Walle, “International Strategies,” 85–111 in Arriola et al. Democratic Backsliding in Africa?.

21 Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa,” 106–139.

22 Waldner and Lust, “Unwelcome Change,” 93–113; Huq and Ginsburg, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy,” 78–169; and Nord et al., “When Autocratization is Reversed”.

23 Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding,” 5–19; Huq and Ginsberg, “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy”; Ndulo, “Constitutions and Constitutional Reforms in African Politics,” 2–24.; Hyde, “Democracy’s Backsliding in the International Environment,” 1192–1196; Arriola, Rakner, and van de Walle, Democratic Backsliding in Africa?.

24 Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash, “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations,” 299–311.

25 Ibid.

26 Gyimah-Boadi, “Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment,” 101.

27 Gyimah-Boadi, “Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment”; Dupuy et al., “Hands Off My Regime”.

28 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa.

29 Albaugh, “An Autocrat’s Toolkit,” 388–414.

30 Bleck and van de Walle, Electoral Politics in Africa.

31 Arriola, Rakner, and van de Walle, Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

32 Arriola, Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa.

33 Ibid.

34 Bratton, Chu, and Lagos, “Who Votes? Implications for New Democracies,” 66.

35 Cheeseman, “Does the African Middle class Defend Democracy?”. Afrobarometer survey rounds since 2014 show a consistent preference for democracy. Over 5 rounds, approximately 66% of respondents believe that democracy, when compared to other government types, is preferred. Despite this, only 44% are satisfied with this system of government.

36 Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization”.

37 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.

38 The role of regional players in helping the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe counter western criticism and survive that country’s political crisis in the early 2000s is illustrative of this dynamic.

39 Devermont, “Implications of China’s Presence and Investment in Africa”; Moyo, Dead Aid.

40 Rakner and van de Walle, “International Strategies”.

41 Arriola, Rakner, and van de Walle, Democratic Backsliding in Africa?.

42 Cianetti and Hanley. “The End of the Backsliding Paradigm”.

43 Cianetti and Hanley, “The End of the Backsliding Paradigm,” 66–80.

44 Schedler, “The Politics of Uncertainty”.

45 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.

46 Huntington, The Third Wave.

47 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Huntington, The Third Wave.

48 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa; Lindberg, Democratization by Elections.

49 Ibid.

50 Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty.

51 Norris, Strengthening Electoral Integrity.

52 Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty.

53 Przeworski Democracy and the Market.

54 Bogaards, “Exchange”.

55 Ibid., 151–160.

56 Cheeseman, Collord, and Reyntjens, “War and Democracy,” 31–61.

57 Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, The Moral Economy of Elections in Africa.

58 Rakner, “Don’t Touch My Constitution! Civil Society Resistance to Democratic Backsliding in Africa´s Pluralist Regimes,” 95–105.

59 Lindberg, Democratization by Elections; Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis, The Moral Economy.

60 Bleck and van de Walle, Electoral Politics in Africa, 44.

61 Arriola, Rakner, and van de Walle, Democratic Backsliding in Africa?.

62 Basedau et al., “Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict?,” 752–779; Bratton, “Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns,” 621–632; Cheeseman and Ford, Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage; Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” 195–222.

63 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.

64 Ibid.

65 Arriola, Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa.

66 Arriola, Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa.

67 Walle, “Africa’s Range of Regimes,” 66–80.

68 Wahman, “Democratization and Electoral Turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond,” 220–243.

69 VonDoepp, “Resisting Democratic Backsliding,” 858–882.

70 Merkel, “Is There a Crisis of Democracy?”

71 Ibid., 11–25.

72 Arriola, Rakner, and van de Walle, Democratic Backsliding in Africa?

73 Lewis and Ross, “Insight – Connected and Angry, African Youth”.

74 Mueller, Political Protest in Contemporary Africa.

75 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiences in Africa.

76 Ibid.

77 de Waal and Ibreck, “Hybrid Social Movements”.

78 Gyimah-Boadi, “Ghana's Encouraging Elections,” 279.

79 Ibid., 278, Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiences in Africa.

80 Roitman, “Modes of Governing: The Garrison-Entrepot. Modes of Governing: The Garrison-Entrepot”.

81 Bangura, Youth-led Social Movements and Peacebuilding in Africa.

82 Tipp-Ex refers to the alleged use of a correction fluid – Tipp-Ex – allegedly to alter the recorded number of votes on signed (or unsigned) forms relayed to the national tally center in Blantyre. The anti-Ansah protests, refers to the demonstrations calling for the resignation of the chairperson of the Malawi Electoral Commission, Jane Ansah.

83 VonDoepp, “Resisting Democratic Backsliding”.

84 Kiija and Musasizi, Uganda Governance Trends Analysis Tracker 2024. The People Power Movement in Uganda was sparked by civil unrest after the incumbent president Museveni announced plans to extend his third-longest tenure in Africa by seeking re-election in 2021. The protests were led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, who is the MP for Kyadondo East constituency.

85 Bertrand, “Nothing Will Be as Before?”.

86 Tarrow, The Language of Contention.

87 Ibid.

88 Mutyaba, “From Voting to Walking”.

89 Pier and Mutagubya, “COVID-19 and the Ugandan Presidential Election,” 149–175.

90 Frère and Englebert, “Briefing: Burkina Faso—the Fall of Blaise Compaore,” 295–307.

91 Mateos and Erro, “Protest, Internet Activism, and Sociopolitical Change in Sub-Saharan Africa.”

92 Mampilly and Stewart, “A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements,” 15–45.

93 Tarrow, The Language of Contention; Tarrow, “Mentalities, Political Cultures, and Collective Action Frames,” 174–202.

94 Ncube, “Post-Election Dynamics in Zimbabwe,” 31–45.

95 Dambo et al., “Nigeria’s #EndSARS Movement and its Implication on Online Protests in Africa’s most Populous Country,” e2583; Ojedokun, Ogunleye, and Aderinto, “Mass Mobilisation for Police Accountability,” 1894–1903.

96 Fallon and Moreau, “Revisiting Repertoire Transition,” 323–340.

97 Tibbetts, “Mamas Fighting for Freedom,” 27–48.

98 Ebila and Tripp, “Naked Transgressions”.

99 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa.

100 Cheeseman, “Democracy in Africa”.

101 Arriola, Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa.

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