149
Disrupting the autocratization sequence: towards
democratic resilience
Anna Lührmann
ABSTRACT
Contemporary autocratization is typically the result of a long sequence of events and
gradual processes. How can democratic actors disrupt such autocratization sequences
in order to enhance democratic resilience? To address this question, this conclusion
presents an ideal-typical autocratization sequence and entry points for democratic
resilience. It builds on the findings of this special issue, extant research and a novel
descriptive analysis of V-Party data. In the first autocratization stage, citizens’
discontent with democratic institutions and parties mounts. Remedies lie in the
areas of a better supply of democratic parties and processes as well as in civic
education. During the second stage, anti-pluralists – actors lacking commitment to
democratic norms – exploit and fuel such discontent to rise to power. In order to
avoid the pitfalls of common response strategies, this article suggests “critical
engagement”, which balances targeted sanctions against radicals with attempts to
persuade moderate followers; and has the aim of decreasing the salience of anti-
pluralists’ narratives by means of democratic (voter) mobilization. Thirdly, once
autocratization begins, weak accountability mechanisms and opposition actors
enable democratic breakdown. Thus, resilient institutions and a united and creative
opposition are the last line of democratic defense.
The articles in this Special Issue demonstrate that processes of autocratization are
multi-faceted and multi-causal. Because diverse factors may contribute to democratic
failure,1 strategies for democratic resilience are heterogenous. Nevertheless, many con-
temporary processes of autocratization share one commonality: democracy rarely dies
overnight. Rather, “incumbents who accessed power in democratic elections gradually
but substantially undermine democratic institutions”.2 Such processes of democratic
erosion often span many years. In each step along that path, anti-pluralists – actors
lacking “commitment to key democratic processes, institutions, and norms”3 – chal-
lenge the resilience of democracies.
Building on such insights, I propose to schematize the process of autocratization
and its drivers into three ideal-typical stages: first, citizens’ discontent with democratic
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
Disrupting the autocratization sequence: towards
democratic resilience
Anna Lührmann
ABSTRACT
Contemporary autocratization is typically the result of a long sequence of events and
gradual processes. How can democratic actors disrupt such autocratization sequences
in order to enhance democratic resilience? To address this question, this conclusion
presents an ideal-typical autocratization sequence and entry points for democratic
resilience. It builds on the findings of this special issue, extant research and a novel
descriptive analysis of V-Party data. In the first autocratization stage, citizens’
discontent with democratic institutions and parties mounts. Remedies lie in the
areas of a better supply of democratic parties and processes as well as in civic
education. During the second stage, anti-pluralists – actors lacking commitment to
democratic norms – exploit and fuel such discontent to rise to power. In order to
avoid the pitfalls of common response strategies, this article suggests “critical
engagement”, which balances targeted sanctions against radicals with attempts to
persuade moderate followers; and has the aim of decreasing the salience of anti-
pluralists’ narratives by means of democratic (voter) mobilization. Thirdly, once
autocratization begins, weak accountability mechanisms and opposition actors
enable democratic breakdown. Thus, resilient institutions and a united and creative
opposition are the last line of democratic defense.
The articles in this Special Issue demonstrate that processes of autocratization are
multi-faceted and multi-causal. Because diverse factors may contribute to democratic
failure,1 strategies for democratic resilience are heterogenous. Nevertheless, many con-
temporary processes of autocratization share one commonality: democracy rarely dies
overnight. Rather, “incumbents who accessed power in democratic elections gradually
but substantially undermine democratic institutions”.2 Such processes of democratic
erosion often span many years. In each step along that path, anti-pluralists – actors
lacking “commitment to key democratic processes, institutions, and norms”3 – chal-
lenge the resilience of democracies.
Building on such insights, I propose to schematize the process of autocratization
and its drivers into three ideal-typical stages: first, citizens’ discontent with democratic
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc-
tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
RESILIENCE OF DEMOCRACY150
150
parties and democracy mounts (Stage 1), which enables adept anti-pluralists to rise to
power in elections (Stage 2) and then to erode democracy to the extent that is possible
given existing constraints (in Stage 3) (see Figure 1).
The articles in this special issue explore individual parts of this autocratization
sequence. Welzel focuses on the role of democratic norms and values for autocratiza-
tion and democratic resilience.4 Finkel and Lim present evidence on how civic edu-
cation may foster such traits.5 Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser shed light on the
voter potential of the most prevalent type of anti-pluralist party in Western Europe:
the Populist Radical Right.6 Somer, McCoy and Luke demonstrate that pernicious
polarization, which many such actors actively promote through wilful political
action, enables them to foster an autocratization agenda. 7 Laebens and Lührmann
show how accountability mechanisms may halt autocratization even after it has
begun.8 Boese et al. distinguish between factors contributing to the onset of autocra-
tization and those fostering the subsequent breakdown of democracy. 9
The contributions show that autocratization is not inevitable. Many democratic
regimes are able to “prevent or react to challenges without losing its democratic charac-
ter”.10 What entry points do democratic actors – citizens, politicians, civil society
groups, civil servants – have in this autocratization sequence where they can
enhance such democratic resilience?
This article addresses this question as follows. Firstly, I develop the idea of an auto-
cratization sequence and demonstrate the central role of anti-pluralist parties in this
sequence using data from V-Dem and the V-Party project. 11 In the subsequent
three sections, I elaborate on each of the three stages of autocratization in detail,
and outline sources of democratic resilience. I conclude with a summary of the
main resilience strategies and recommendations for future research.
The autocratization sequence: three stages to democratic breakdown
Structural and contextual challenges heighten the risk of autocratization. These include
an economic or financial crisis, inequality, migration, the salience of polarizing clea-
vages, the rise of new communications technologies and cultural transformation.12
Such challenges are one of several drivers and mediating factors that determine the
Figure 1. The autocratization sequence.
150
parties and democracy mounts (Stage 1), which enables adept anti-pluralists to rise to
power in elections (Stage 2) and then to erode democracy to the extent that is possible
given existing constraints (in Stage 3) (see Figure 1).
The articles in this special issue explore individual parts of this autocratization
sequence. Welzel focuses on the role of democratic norms and values for autocratiza-
tion and democratic resilience.4 Finkel and Lim present evidence on how civic edu-
cation may foster such traits.5 Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser shed light on the
voter potential of the most prevalent type of anti-pluralist party in Western Europe:
the Populist Radical Right.6 Somer, McCoy and Luke demonstrate that pernicious
polarization, which many such actors actively promote through wilful political
action, enables them to foster an autocratization agenda. 7 Laebens and Lührmann
show how accountability mechanisms may halt autocratization even after it has
begun.8 Boese et al. distinguish between factors contributing to the onset of autocra-
tization and those fostering the subsequent breakdown of democracy. 9
The contributions show that autocratization is not inevitable. Many democratic
regimes are able to “prevent or react to challenges without losing its democratic charac-
ter”.10 What entry points do democratic actors – citizens, politicians, civil society
groups, civil servants – have in this autocratization sequence where they can
enhance such democratic resilience?
This article addresses this question as follows. Firstly, I develop the idea of an auto-
cratization sequence and demonstrate the central role of anti-pluralist parties in this
sequence using data from V-Dem and the V-Party project. 11 In the subsequent
three sections, I elaborate on each of the three stages of autocratization in detail,
and outline sources of democratic resilience. I conclude with a summary of the
main resilience strategies and recommendations for future research.
The autocratization sequence: three stages to democratic breakdown
Structural and contextual challenges heighten the risk of autocratization. These include
an economic or financial crisis, inequality, migration, the salience of polarizing clea-
vages, the rise of new communications technologies and cultural transformation.12
Such challenges are one of several drivers and mediating factors that determine the
Figure 1. The autocratization sequence.
RESILIENCE OF DEMOCRACY151
151
“success” of the autocratization sequence. Addressing them in a timely and effective
manner shapes democratic resilience. Figure 1 includes some relevant challenges in
italics. The list is not exhaustive.
Building on the contributions to this special issue, I argue that the rise of anti-plur-
alists to power becomes more likely if the following three factors are contributing to
citizens’ discontent with democratic parties and institutions: Firstly, an inadequate
supply of democratic parties and processes; secondly, lacking support for democratic
norms, which may be fuelled by (asymmetrical) polarization; and thirdly, appealing
anti-pluralist leaders and parties that skilfully fuel and then exploit such discontent.
In order to achieve power, they need to win elections or be invited to join a coalition
government. Anti-pluralist mobilization and a lack of mobilization for democratic
alternatives contribute to such electoral success.
Even if anti-pluralists are in power, they do not have free reign to erode democracy.
Therefore, Boese et al. distinguish between onset and breakdown resilience. 13 In par-
ticular, constraints on the power of the executive may halt autocratization once it has
started. Institutions (legislature, judiciary, public administration) as well as opposition
actors (political parties, civil society groups, citizens) create such accountability mech-
anisms.14 These are critical for limiting the damage to democratic institutions, halting
autocratization, and paving the way for democratic recovery.
However, once anti-pluralists are in power, autocratization becomes more likely,
as Figure 2 illustrates. V-Party measures the degree of anti-pluralism in political
parties as the extent to which they lack “commitment to (i) the democratic
process; (ii) the legitimacy of political opponents; (iii) peaceful resolution of disagree-
ments and rejection of political violence; and (iv) unequivocal support for civil
Figure 2. Anti-pluralist party traits and electoral democracy (2000–2019).
Note: The Electoral Democracy Index ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The Anti-Pluralism Index ranges from
0 (pluralist) to 1 (anti-pluralist). N = 682.
151
“success” of the autocratization sequence. Addressing them in a timely and effective
manner shapes democratic resilience. Figure 1 includes some relevant challenges in
italics. The list is not exhaustive.
Building on the contributions to this special issue, I argue that the rise of anti-plur-
alists to power becomes more likely if the following three factors are contributing to
citizens’ discontent with democratic parties and institutions: Firstly, an inadequate
supply of democratic parties and processes; secondly, lacking support for democratic
norms, which may be fuelled by (asymmetrical) polarization; and thirdly, appealing
anti-pluralist leaders and parties that skilfully fuel and then exploit such discontent.
In order to achieve power, they need to win elections or be invited to join a coalition
government. Anti-pluralist mobilization and a lack of mobilization for democratic
alternatives contribute to such electoral success.
Even if anti-pluralists are in power, they do not have free reign to erode democracy.
Therefore, Boese et al. distinguish between onset and breakdown resilience. 13 In par-
ticular, constraints on the power of the executive may halt autocratization once it has
started. Institutions (legislature, judiciary, public administration) as well as opposition
actors (political parties, civil society groups, citizens) create such accountability mech-
anisms.14 These are critical for limiting the damage to democratic institutions, halting
autocratization, and paving the way for democratic recovery.
However, once anti-pluralists are in power, autocratization becomes more likely,
as Figure 2 illustrates. V-Party measures the degree of anti-pluralism in political
parties as the extent to which they lack “commitment to (i) the democratic
process; (ii) the legitimacy of political opponents; (iii) peaceful resolution of disagree-
ments and rejection of political violence; and (iv) unequivocal support for civil
Figure 2. Anti-pluralist party traits and electoral democracy (2000–2019).
Note: The Electoral Democracy Index ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The Anti-Pluralism Index ranges from
0 (pluralist) to 1 (anti-pluralist). N = 682.
RESILIENCE OF DEMOCRACY152
152
liberties of minorities”. 15 The thick black line on Figure 2 shows that the relationship
between the pre-electoral anti-pluralist traits of all (future) governing parties (2000–
2019) (x-axis) and V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index the year after the election is
negative.16 Thus, the more anti-pluralist parties appear before an election, the lower
the level of democracy when they take or regain power. Lührmann, Medzihorsky
and Lindberg demonstrate that this relationship in democracies holds in further
statistical tests.17
Some parties have demonstrated unequivocally anti-pluralist positions from early
on, such as the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), which brought Chavez to power
in Venezuela in 1998 and later evolved into the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV) (black circles on the right). The story is different for the Fidesz Party in
Hungary (dashed line) and the AKP in Turkey (grey line with triangle markers),
which only gradually became more anti-pluralist and subsequently eroded democratic
institutions step-by-step. In other cases, new party leaders or leading candidates have
shifted their party into an anti-pluralist direction, such as Donald Trump in the United
States in 2016 (line with squares).
Such anti-pluralists often use populist rhetoric to claim that they – and only they –
are the legitimate representatives of “the people” and that “the elites” are not to be
trusted.18 While a certain degree of skepticism of elites may be healthy for a democ-
racy, anti-pluralists use anti-elitism to undermine democratic political competition.
They challenge the pluralist foundation of democracy, which embraces “that societies
are composed of several social groups with different ideas and interests”.19 Such actors
may gain votes, but should not gain democratic legitimacy in a normative sense,
because their actions prevent citizens from exercising their democratic rights in the
future.20
Stage 1: mounting citizens’ discontent with democratic parties and
institutions
Democracies are consolidated if democracy is the “only game in town”. 21 Thus,
support for democracy among elites and citizens is conducive to democratic resilience.
Elites tend to support democratic norms if they trust political opponents to play by the
rules as well. 22 Such mutual trust is limited in countries with weak democratic insti-
tutions and a history of autocratization. This might explain why autocratization is
more likely in such countries, as Boese et al. demonstrate in this issue. 23
Contemporary autocratizers typically come to power through popular vote and not
military coups, which gives citizens an important role in autocratization processes.
Citizens turn away from democratic parties and candidates for two reasons: firstly,
out of discontent with the way democratic governments and parties perform (a lack
of specific support); secondly, because they are explicitly discontented with basic
democratic norms and procedures (a lack of diffuse support). 24 These sources of dis-
content can be interrelated and reenforce each other. For instance, declining specific
support may activate already existing diffuse non-support.
Rising discontent with democratic options increases the demand for alternatives,
but by far not all discontented citizens vote for anti-pluralist parties and candi-
dates. Therefore, it is also important to understand the supply side and how
anti-pluralist parties mobilize voters, which will be the focus of the next section
(Stage 2).
152
liberties of minorities”. 15 The thick black line on Figure 2 shows that the relationship
between the pre-electoral anti-pluralist traits of all (future) governing parties (2000–
2019) (x-axis) and V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index the year after the election is
negative.16 Thus, the more anti-pluralist parties appear before an election, the lower
the level of democracy when they take or regain power. Lührmann, Medzihorsky
and Lindberg demonstrate that this relationship in democracies holds in further
statistical tests.17
Some parties have demonstrated unequivocally anti-pluralist positions from early
on, such as the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), which brought Chavez to power
in Venezuela in 1998 and later evolved into the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV) (black circles on the right). The story is different for the Fidesz Party in
Hungary (dashed line) and the AKP in Turkey (grey line with triangle markers),
which only gradually became more anti-pluralist and subsequently eroded democratic
institutions step-by-step. In other cases, new party leaders or leading candidates have
shifted their party into an anti-pluralist direction, such as Donald Trump in the United
States in 2016 (line with squares).
Such anti-pluralists often use populist rhetoric to claim that they – and only they –
are the legitimate representatives of “the people” and that “the elites” are not to be
trusted.18 While a certain degree of skepticism of elites may be healthy for a democ-
racy, anti-pluralists use anti-elitism to undermine democratic political competition.
They challenge the pluralist foundation of democracy, which embraces “that societies
are composed of several social groups with different ideas and interests”.19 Such actors
may gain votes, but should not gain democratic legitimacy in a normative sense,
because their actions prevent citizens from exercising their democratic rights in the
future.20
Stage 1: mounting citizens’ discontent with democratic parties and
institutions
Democracies are consolidated if democracy is the “only game in town”. 21 Thus,
support for democracy among elites and citizens is conducive to democratic resilience.
Elites tend to support democratic norms if they trust political opponents to play by the
rules as well. 22 Such mutual trust is limited in countries with weak democratic insti-
tutions and a history of autocratization. This might explain why autocratization is
more likely in such countries, as Boese et al. demonstrate in this issue. 23
Contemporary autocratizers typically come to power through popular vote and not
military coups, which gives citizens an important role in autocratization processes.
Citizens turn away from democratic parties and candidates for two reasons: firstly,
out of discontent with the way democratic governments and parties perform (a lack
of specific support); secondly, because they are explicitly discontented with basic
democratic norms and procedures (a lack of diffuse support). 24 These sources of dis-
content can be interrelated and reenforce each other. For instance, declining specific
support may activate already existing diffuse non-support.
Rising discontent with democratic options increases the demand for alternatives,
but by far not all discontented citizens vote for anti-pluralist parties and candi-
dates. Therefore, it is also important to understand the supply side and how
anti-pluralist parties mobilize voters, which will be the focus of the next section
(Stage 2).