Is there any serious doubt truth doesn’t exist ?
My teacher (who is not a philosophy teacher ) said truth didn’t exist. However I know cogito ergo sum ( even if it’s all a simulation or sth , I know I’m what is called a human organism in the fabric of this world, real or fake ) , I also know the earth has to do 584 million miles relative to the sun to do a whole orbital rotation around it . So unless I’m missing something, what my teacher said isn’t correct . So truth exists. What is more likely is that we can’t appreciate reality entirely because our perception is tainted. In my philosophy class we always talked about everyone seeing the world with tainted glasses so it’s impossible to see reality. But that doesn’t imply reality doesn’t exist , we just don’t have the ability to reach it , and we may never will. But we can still reach to some truths . I know in 24 hours the earth would have moved 40k km and it will be night again .
I'm not sure about this characterization of 'Truth' - or at least, there's something odd about saying this:
it's pretty common to adopt a fallibilistic view, to not require absolute certainty in order to count some claim as true.
It would make sense to be a fallibilist about knowledge, where that means not requiring certainty in order for a justified true (etc) belief to count as knowledge. Unlike knowledge, truth (on typical views in epistemology) is a mind-independent matter. Whether something is true doesn't have anything to do with certainty or evidence, what the subject knows or thinks, and so on.
I would offer a slightly different way of thinking about 'Truth', and maybe it captures what was behind your thought to. (Or maybe this is just what you meant?) That is: Systems of belief often posture as holding absolute truth (Truth), where these systems of belief inevitably smuggle in questionable assumptions, ideology, or otherwise non-objective, non-absolute elements. And we might construe that simply by saying that 'Truth' isn't really true.
I don't see that as odd -- it's not the way that analytic epistemologists normally speak, certainly, but it makes sense to me as essentially another way of saying "truth ascriptions do not require certainty."
truth ascriptions do not require certainty.
If this means "a claim can be true even if the speaker is not certain of it" then that is uncontroversial and is not a distinctive tenet of any sort of postmodern view.
The rest of the comment seems to be about truths about which it's difficult or impossible to be certain. The point that seems needed instead of the current 'fallibilist' sentence is something like: "All claims are fallible." Which is very different than saying "A fallible claim can be true."
