Are drones a revolution or the evolution of warfare? 

The nature and future of war, as being fought in Ukraine and now in the “excursion” into Iran, has been described as a “revolution” with the massive and ingenious use of drones, also known as unmanned vehicles. 

If this is indeed a revolution comparable to the invention of gunpowder, machine guns, submarines, aircraft and especially nuclear weapons, that has not yet been established. And if battlefields have been transformed by the ubiquitous presence of offensive, defensive and logistical drones, what might that mean for future armies, navies, air and space forces?

The history of unmanned vehicles dates back centuries. In 1849, Austria launched bomb-carrying balloons to strike Venice. Nikola Tesla, who pioneered alternating current, created a radio controlled boat in 1898. The British used the Hewitt-Sperry “flying bombs” and deHavilland Queen Bee radio controlled drones.

Germany’s V1 and V2 rockets were obviously unmanned as were its “Goliath” tracked vehicles used in the Russian Front. In Vietnam, as a Swift Boat skipper, I recall chasing after parachutes containing film taken by drones flying over the north that were supposed to land in the sea. Often many did not require the more dangerous task of retrieving them on territory controlled by the Viet Cong.

Since the first Gulf War in 1991, videos of Reaper and Predator drones incinerating a multitude of targets with Hellfire missiles were frequently aired in news reports. In the current conflict in Iran, vivid videos of U.S. standoff weapons — including U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles — flooded the media, as Iran’s small navy and air force was being eliminated. Tomahawk has been in service since the 1980’s costing, depending on the block model, up to $3.6 million.

But the critical question remains: Are drones and unmanned vehicles revolutionizing warfare? Ukraine has been the proving ground for both Russian and Ukrainian forces and drones. The action-reaction and counterresponse time in updating a drone’s tactics based on a day’s worth of combat is now measured in hours instead of days, weeks or months. 

The general hierarchy of drones is:

• First Person View kamikaze drones are small, high speed and inexpensively manufactured quadcopters. Russia reportedly is building 19,000 per a day for around $1,200 each.
• Long range strike drones like the Flamingo are capable of flying up to 3,000 kilometers at the cost of about $500,000
• Fixed wing surveillance drones such as Leleka and Furia used for reconnaissance, much as the U.S. Reaper and Predator drones
• Surface and subsurface sea drones, such as those Ukraine has used to sink much of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in port in Sevastopol, Crimea and to sweep mines.
• Interceptors such as the $2,000 Wild Hornet, used to shoot down Russian reconnaissance drones.

What then is the initial impact of drones on war? 

First, they have expanded the reach and lethality of the battlefield, as long-range attacks have been made by both Ukraine and Russia against the other. But other systems were capable of that. Second, drones have increased the capability of individuals on the battlefield across tactical, operational and strategic boundaries. That is different. Third, drones have reversed the cost-exchange ratio in which defending against them thus far — as the Iran war demonstrates — has become more expensive, giving smaller countries and organizations great advantage.

But the mark of being truly revolutionary is whether the character and nature of war have been profoundly changed. Despite the advent of modern weapons, precision strike and now drones, only one technology has achieved this: nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.  For the first and only time in history, these weapons meant that in war, there could be no winners — only losers. War could be existential for both sides as well as for non combatants who also would suffer from this devastation.

No matter how effective drones may prove — and they can indeed change the tactics, procedures and doctrine of war, as well as replace or augment traditional forces — they will not change the character or nature of conflict.  

With that stricture, until we answer basic questions on the strategic and non-tactical utility of drones, how to command and control drones and the associated logistics of buying, maintaining and supporting drones, what is transpiring in Ukraine is likely to stay in Ukraine.

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and former United Kingdom Defense Chief David Richards are the authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.