LONDON: Despite President Donald Trump’s blustering that America benefits when oil prices surge, crunch time is fast approaching for both the war and the energy market.

He either ends the conflict quickly, or sky-high energy costs will force him to do so. The oil market may not have the same fearsome reputation as the bond market but, trust me, it can be equally savage in twisting a politician’s arm.

This week, the White House earned some breathing space thanks to the release of emergency reserves, plus the use of pipelines bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. But the extra time is measured in days, rather than weeks. Certainly, Trump does not have months.

WHAT CAN THE WHITE HOUSE DO?

My working assumption is that the oil market will add US$3 to US$6 a barrel to the headline price for every day - every single day - that the war continues. Monday to Friday, that’s US$15 to US$30. 

It’s bearable for another week, perhaps two, but any longer and the world will start to incur serious economic damage through soaring energy costs. Short of a very risky - and possibly illegal - intervention in the oil futures market, the White House doesn’t have more meaningful tools to wield to bring energy prices down.

Do I believe the Trump administration is seriously thinking about interfering with the futures market? You bet. Even the Biden administration considered it in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine, before realising it was too hazardous and unlikely to succeed.

The White House has already thrown everything it can at the problem. Sure, it can ask Congress to scrap federal fuel taxes, as Biden did in 2022. But that would take time - and may ultimately not win sufficient votes. US states, particularly those under Republican control, may also announce their own fuel-tax holidays, as some Democratic states did three years ago. Trump can waive some environmental rules for gasoline and diesel too. 

All those measures would buy time at home - but internationally, the damage from rising oil prices would continue. The White House, cornered, may try another tool: an export ban on US oil and refined products. That would certainly crash domestic prices, but send global ones soaring. It would be a tremendous mistake.

Ultimately, the only durable solution is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Here, the US seems to have realised that oil tankers won’t sail again until the hostilities end, after wasting a lot of time last week trying to solve a non-existent insurance problem. And, of course, Iran has a say in when and how any ceasefire, whether formal or tacit, starts. Tehran may not be willing to acquiesce.

NOT ALL DOOM AND GLOOM?

It’s not all gloom. Until now, the war’s impact on the global economy has been minimal. 

West Texas Intermediate, the US oil benchmark, has yet to end the day above the US$100-a-barrel level for a single day this year. Back in 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, WTI closed above the triple-digit level for nearly 83 consecutive days. For a crisis to manifest, oil prices need to remain high for a sustained period; that’s not happened yet.

With the conflict approaching the two-week mark, most drivers will have refuelled their cars once at most. Beyond benchmark oil, energy costs haven’t moved much. The crucial electricity market - the crux of the 2022 crisis - hasn’t reacted at all. Indeed, German wholesale power prices are today lower than a few weeks ago. Thus, inflation expectations haven’t changed much - yet. In rich nations, the outlook for economic growth hasn’t changed either - yet.

If the war was to end now, or in a few days, the global economy would barely remember it by mid-year. That’s crucial context when looking at the war throughout the lens of Wall Street or sovereign bonds, rather than oil. 

The energy market provided a good preview of what would happen if tankers start to traverse the Strait of Hormuz: US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright posted on social media, mistakenly, that a tanker had crossed, and prices plunged more than 10 per cent. It was an error, but an indication of how quickly prices can change. For now, however, the tanker traffic remains at a standstill.

If oil continues to rise, the market will resolve the problem the hard way: demand destruction, with prices high enough to drive consumption down. Here, the key is where that demand destruction happens.

At risk of sounding unkind, it matters less for the global economy if it occurs in a small country such as Bangladesh - where there are signs it’s already happening - than if a major nation such as Germany starts to curb its appetite, as happened in 2022 during the European energy crisis.

Initially, Trump aimed for a war lasting four to five weeks. With the third week about to commence, the expense in energy terms will continue to increase, but I think it remains manageable. Beyond that, though, every day the conflict continues, the inflation and economic risks mount. The White House surely knows the power of the oil market - just listen the parade of cabinet members doing live television interviews trying to talk down the market.

If the war goes on for months, extending into April and May, the scenario would be grim. The cost of oil would reach stratospheric levels, stoking inflation. But the bigger issue would be growth. Extend the war from days and weeks into months, and economists will need to start reducing their forecasts for gross domestic product - and not in a linear fashion. Stagflation could become a real risk.

SINGAPORE: If the Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint, then the airspace over Iran and much of the Middle East has become a flashpoint since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Hundreds of missiles and drones have been fired into the skies, prompting airspace closures and flight cancellations on a scale not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. With the war into its second week, what are the implications for the global aviation industry and how will it reshape future air travel?

LASTING RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE REGION

Let’s start with some numbers. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – contribute a sizeable chunk of airline traffic, especially in international and transit segments.

Numbers from the International Air Transport Association show the region’s airports, which serve as a gateway between Europe, Asia and Africa, accounting for about 15 per cent of global international transit traffic.

Before the outbreak of the war, there were at least 2,200 aircraft movements a day at the Dubai International Airport, one of the Gulf’s major aviation hubs. Over at the Hamad International Airport in Doha, at least 900 aircraft movements were recorded daily.

The Iranian airspace is also a crucial aviation artery before the war. As airlines avoided the skies over Ukraine and Russia, it was a strategically important aviation superhighway that handled over 1,000 flights a day.

But that was then.

The ramifications of the war are proving to be disastrous. Local reports within the GCC countries estimated up to 30,000 flight cancellations in the first week of the war. These have caused massive disruptions, spilling beyond the region.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES?

While the costs vary, executives who spoke to me off-the-record reckoned that the GCC carriers can expect daily losses of about US$2 billion. These are largely due to flight cancellations, airspace closures, higher costs due to longer routes and higher war-risk insurance premiums, refunds, and severe hub disruptions.

But this does not mean an upside for other airlines which also have to contend with rerouting flights, carrying extra fuel or making additional refuelling stops to guard against sudden diversions.

Major airlines are also unable to completely absorb the capacity lost from the Gulf carriers, due to the sheer volume of about 23,000 flights.

In addition, the battle for passengers is not necessarily a zero-sum game. While airlines compete for customers – sometimes at their rivals’ expense – they also understand that flooding the market with flights, which may result in overcapacity, is risky and could result in losses for everyone.

That said, there may be some winners in the near term. Cathay Pacific, for one, stand to gain most from the Gulf fallout.

Today, Cathay is a stronger airline than in 2019 when it suffered from protests that hurt Hong Kong’s economy and later, the pandemic. The airline has recovered and is pursuing a sound geopolitical strategy that closely aligns itself with China.

Operationally, Cathay’s jets can skirt current warzones, along the relatively safe corridors of Central Asia or simply fly through the vast Russian airspace. As a Chinese airline, it is not subjected to sanctions, unlike Western carriers that have been banned from or are avoiding the Russian airspace since 2022.

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

Moving forward, the sector is in for little reprieve.

Oil prices have been volatile this week on the back of jitters caused by the halt in shipping through the critical Strait of Hormuz, which is responsible for roughly 20 per cent of global oil consumption.

Correspondingly, prices for jet fuel have also risen. Jet fuel typically accounts for 30 per cent to 40 per cent of an airline’s operational costs, and is denominated in US dollars. Airlines whose revenues are in currencies that are weaker than the greenback will suffer the most on their bottom lines.

It is a given that airlines will impose fuel surcharges on passengers soon. Already, a handful of airlines have announced airfare hikes.

For the Middle East, will the glamour and glitz associated with Dubai and other Gulf cities fade away when the war is over, or will they make a full recovery?

The war in Iran has called into question the long-term economic sustainability of the GCC countries.

For Dubai, tourism, not oil, serves as the backbone of the city's economy. Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries are also focusing on other ways to drive their economies. As the world seeks alternatives to fossil fuel, a shift away from crude appears imperative to maintain the GCC’s role globally. This economic sustainability is key for the region’s airlines, which have been powered to success by their respective governments.

The war has also shown vulnerabilities of Middle Eastern carriers located in a volatile part of the world. Confidence in its hospitality and airline sectors will take a long time to recover, if at all.

Shukor Yusof is the founder of Endau Analytics, an independent aviation advisory firm based in Singapore.

SINGAPORE: The much-awaited constitutional amendment, advocated by Malaysia’s unity government to impose a 10-year term limit on the prime minister’s tenure, has failed. Requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament to amend the Constitution, the measure fell short by a mere two votes: 146 MPs voted for it, 44 abstained, 32 were absent and none opposed it.

This is a serious setback for the unity government, and the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition in particular. Aware of flagging support among its multi-ethnic urban voter base, PH is seeking to regain momentum.

With an eye on the looming state elections in Melaka and Johor and the next general election (GE) beyond that, the prime minister announced in his New Year’s address that the unity government would focus on key governance reforms.

These include a term limit on prime ministerial tenures; the separation of the positions of attorney general and public prosecutor; the establishment of an Ombudsman’s office to handle complaints against public organisations; and the introduction of a freedom of information law.

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The term limit was the first reform to be tabled and discussed in parliament. PH and its associated member parties have long sought this reform over the past three decades, most notably in the run-up to the 2018 general election. PH drafted a parliamentary bill on this following its victory, but progress was stymied by the 2020 Sheraton Move.

SOUND RATIONALE

The rationale for this measure is sound, given that, under Malaysia’s Westminster parliamentary system, there is no limit on prime ministerial tenures. Furthermore, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been personally receptive to the idea of a term limit. This is largely for reasons of age, given that he is 78 and has clocked in only three years in the top job.

A side benefit is that this is a nice way of upstaging his nemesis Mahathir Mohamad, who logged a cumulative 24 years in office. The senior politician has been criticised for centralising too much power in the executive office at the expense of checks and balances on other branches of government.

The reform, as tabled in parliament, envisaged a cumulative cap of 10 years for an individual serving as prime minister. This time limit would accrue, regardless of whether the person serves as prime minister in consecutive or intermittent periods. Upon the limit being reached, Cabinet would dissolve while the King chooses a new prime minister.

However, a GE need not be called until the existing five-year limit between polls is reached, and – crucially for Anwar’s reputation – the proposed measure is retroactive, meaning that he would be subject to the same maximum (if the measure were passed).

At one level, the current setback is understandable. Constitutional amendments are, by design, hard to engineer. Given the profusion of political parties, mustering a two-thirds majority is a hard task in today’s Malaysia.

Back in Barisan Nasional’s (BN) heyday, the Constitution was regularly amended, as BN’s dominance in parliament made mustering the votes relatively easy. However, the number of amendments has declined since 2008, after BN lost its two-thirds majority.

This also highlights that while the unity government has, in theory, 153 MPs supporting it, it is internally fissured. Furthermore, while the Anti-Party Hopping Law stops individual Members of Parliament (MPs) from leaving a party or coalition, it does not prevent them from voting against a specific policy, and, within the overall unity government bloc of MPs, there are a handful with little to lose.

While all the PH MPs voted for the measure, its partner coalition BN had several absentees, as did several smaller East Malaysian parties. The MP for Sembrong, Hishammuddin Hussein, is suspended from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). While the MP for the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), M Saravanan, is technically part of BN, his party has chafed at its political marginalisation. Similarly, those from East Malaysia have an uneasy relationship with the unity government and little to lose.

The unity government has stated that it will re-table the motion for the mid-year parliamentary session. This gives it time to canvass for support and potentially address issues from disgruntled MPs.

PROGRESS ON REFORMS WILL BE FRAUGHT

Looking ahead, however, progress on the announced reforms will be fraught. The unity government has just made a strategic retreat on another signature deliverable, the separation of the attorney general’s and public prosecutor’s offices.

As with the term limit, the rationale is sound: Separating the responsibility for providing legal advice to the nation from that of pursuing criminal cases can increase both offices’ impartiality.

However, this will be challenging, as Anwar does not have full support from his own party, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). A faction of 10 MPs affiliated with former PKR Deputy President Rafizi Ramli is pushing to limit the prime minister’s influence over the public prosecutor by establishing parliamentary oversight.

The argument is that splitting the two positions while retaining the influence of the prime minister over both offices would achieve little. PKR members have threatened to oppose this measure unless their concerns are substantially addressed. In response, the unity government has delayed this measure until the next parliamentary sitting. 

Where to from here? Given the difficulty of engineering a two-thirds majority, the unity government may be best served by addressing other long-standing reform pledges that do not require a constitutional amendment.

There are many, including Prime Minister Anwar simply relinquishing the finance portfolio, passing a Political Financing Act or requiring the appointment of key positions, such as the head of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, to be vetted by a bipartisan Parliamentary Select Committee.

If it wants to reap electoral dividends from a reform agenda, the government needs to move with alacrity. Pakatan Harapan 1.0 was faulted for assuming they would be in power for a full term. If more low-hanging fruit are not harvested in the coming months, voters may feel that the unity government assumes it has all the time in the world and simply stay home on election day.

Dr Francis E Hutchinson is a Senior Fellow and coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme at the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s website, Fulcrum.

TOKYO: Over the past week, Chinese social media has been gripped by a single obsession - how to raise a lobster. Not in a tank, but on your laptop.

Fervour for OpenClaw, the AI agent created by Austrian developer Peter Steinberger, has consumed China in recent weeks, emerging from a niche, nerdy tool sporting a crustacean logo to a national obsession. The programme sits on top of a large language model and does more than just chat - it takes action. 

Users can ask it to comb through emails, book travel, text your significant other “good morning” - or even trade crypto, depending on how much access you grant it. Hundreds of people, from school children to retirees, lined up outside of Tencent’s Shenzhen headquarters last Friday for a free OpenClaw installation event, a sign of how quickly domestic tech companies are pulling the foreign programme into their orbit.

A retired aviation engineer said he was just there to “keep up with the times”. A fourth-grader said he hoped to use it to help with his homework and to play games, according to videos shared by the tech giant. Elsewhere, entrepreneurs have been tinkering with the tool to create new apps, AI influencer businesses or just automate more parts of their life in a push for productivity.

JUMPING ON THE BANDWAGON

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Companies are capitalising on the mania - and investors are rewarding them. 

Tencent launched WorkBuddy, its own agent that’s fully compatible with OpenClaw, sending its Hong Kong-listed shares surging. Other firms, including Zhipu and MiniMax Group, also released their own compatible tools. 

Domestic firms see this as an opportunity to lock more consumers into their ecosystems. And because AI agents burn far more computing resources than chatbots, the bet is that more users will eventually translate into profits. 

Even local governments have joined in. Shenzhen’s Longgang district released draft guidelines offering subsidies and support for “one-person companies” built around AI agents. Other jurisdictions including Wuxi, Hefei and Suzhou followed suit with similar draft measures, eager to brand themselves as OpenClaw hubs.

A HIT ON JOBS?

It’s a vivid portrait of modern China, where tech trends spread at breakneck speed, and AI exuberance is among some of the highest in the world, all buoyed by state and private sector support. But this rush to turn the nation into the world’s largest agentic AI lab also exposes fragility. Beneath the fear-of-missing-out sprint is a workforce bracing for displacement.

That’s the dark side tech leaders try to blur. For more than a year, global executives have hyped up AI agents. And no matter how many panels I attend where they say the aim is to empower workers, I still don’t buy that the goal isn’t to replace them. The push for “one-person companies” only reinforces the fear that agents will shrink jobs, not create them.

This especially matters for policymakers in China, where youth unemployment has remained persistently high and the number of university graduates poised to enter the labor market this year is more than the population of Belgium. The pain this automation push inflicts on these recent graduates, and the parents who financed their degrees, will test the legitimacy of President Xi Jinping’s AI bet. 

As one China tech analyst wrote: “What looks like grassroots adoption is actually grassroots career panic, turbocharged by companies with something to sell.”
 

SECURITY FEARS

Then there’s the issue of security that’s been snagging AI agents’ broader global adoption. When a software can read your email, message your loved ones and even execute financial transactions, the risks don’t just add up, they compound.

As some researchers have noted, OpenClaw checks all the boxes for the “lethal trifecta” of cyber-risk: access to sensitive data, the ability to communicate externally, and exposure to untrusted content. Grant it access to your emails, documents, chat apps and payment tools, along with permission to take action autonomously, and things can go wrong fast.

And who is liable then? The rush for agents is happening faster than we can figure out the guardrails. Chinese authorities are now scrambling to respond, moving to restrict state-run enterprises and government agencies from running OpenClaw on office computers (or notify superiors if they already have). Making it secure enough for businesses to use is a major challenge that will take time.

COUNTING THE UPSIDES

But the scale of adoption in China does have upsides. 

OpenClaw’s open-source nature means thousands - if not hundreds of thousands - of tinkerers can improve it in parallel. In theory, that brings more scrutiny, faster bug discovery, and quicker iteration. It also helps explain why the tool has taken off in a country where open-source software is seen as a collective counterweight to AI platform gatekeepers.

This oversight could genuinely harden OpenClaw over time. But it isn’t a magic spell. In a hype cycle, security is often added after the first scandal. More eyeballs can help fix lurking safety issues, but only if developers aren’t pressured to ship new apps as fast as possible.

China is now running the world’s biggest real-world trial of AI agents, with ordinary people as the beta testers and their money and livelihoods on the line. The rest of the world should pay attention. Because in the rush to automate everything, China will be the first to show where this experiment snaps.

SINGAPORE: Singapore’s declining birth rate is a perennial topic which everyone, from parliamentarians to the man on the street, has opinions about.

What strikes me is that most commentary on this “existential challenge” has come from parents. Meanwhile, those who have yet to become parents are more often spoken about than heard from.

As of 2024, the median age of first-time fathers is 33.6, and for mothers, 31.9. This is how old my husband and I are. As DINKs (dual income, no kids), we are the subject of this national debate and the target of policies that might nudge us toward having children.

But amid the handwringing and coaxing, a neglected talking point is infertility – something my husband and I have been struggling with for over a year.

NOT A SWITCH YOU CAN FLICK ON

About 15 per cent of couples in Singapore experience infertility, with the causes split evenly between men and women. Though we may be a minority, the camp may grow as more couples marry and have children later in life. Fertility declines with age for both sexes, with women seeing a steeper drop past the age of 35.

For policymakers, raising fertility rates is a mammoth task with many moving parts. First, they need to convince people to get married, then convince couples to want children. With the number of singles in Singapore on the rise, and growing anxieties about the world children will inherit thanks to climate change and AI, it will take ingenuity and serious PR skills to craft pro-family narratives that aren’t overbearing.

Next, policymakers need to make having and raising children more feasible. This is where subsidies and incentives, as well as housing and education policies come in. There’s consensus that more needs to be done – whether it’s increasing childcare leave or strengthening provisions for flexible work arrangements.

But say all these efforts work and more couples decide to have a child. Biology may not immediately cooperate. Even in young and healthy adults, the chance of conception in any given month is only about 20 to 25 per cent. Couples who do not conceive within one year of trying are considered infertile.

REMINDERS OF A PERSONAL FAILURE

For couples dealing with infertility, it is painful to see discussions about babies take the national spotlight, or to face questions at festive gatherings about when our little one is coming. 

Everything can feel like a reminder of our personal failure. An acquaintance saying she had her first child without trying. A friend finding out she was already pregnant during a fertility screening.

Of course they don't mean ill – our condition is invisible. But when we muster our courage to confide in someone about it, they don’t always know how to respond. Well-meaning relatives have advised me and my husband to “just relax”, or that “these things take time”. 

Even healthcare professionals can be insensitive. When our gynaecologist handed us the results of our fertility check-up, he said our problem was “hardcore”.

I asked if he could advise on lifestyle and dietary changes that might improve our situation. He replied: “That would be like telling a cancer patient to try going out in the sun more.”

Since then, seeking help with infertility has been a task shrouded in secrecy and shame – to be discreetly discussed with specialists outside our insurance coverage, or obsessively researched on clinic websites and Reddit threads.

THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE NUMBERS

In the 2026 Committee of Supply debate, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Indranee Rajah said the government will work on raising awareness of fertility health, reviewing the assistance available to couples on their fertility journeys and improving workplace support for those undergoing fertility treatments.

But as policymakers flesh these out, it bears remembering that potential parents aren’t just data points or KPIs. Couples struggling to conceive cycle between desperate hope and crushing disappointment. What many of us want is empathy.

If someone opens up to you about their infertility, listen. Ask questions out of curiosity, not judgment. Resist the urge to give advice.

Though “When are you having children?” seems like harmless small talk, it can put people in an awkward position. Some may not want kids. Others may be going through fertility treatments that take a toll on the mind and body. And others may be grieving a pregnancy loss, or coming to accept that they may not become parents.

More often than not, we will force a smile and tell a half-truth.

Parents today do not have it easy. But spare a thought for the aspiring parents who want this more than anything. Before assuming that we need to be nudged and coaxed, hear us out.

Erin Low is Deputy Editor, Commentary at CNA Digital.

SINGAPORE: Smaller, cheaper and effectively disposable aircraft are rewriting the rules of modern warfare – and its latest battlefield are the skies over Iran. 

Since Israel and the United States launched their attacks on Iran on Feb 28, both sides have used low-cost kamikaze drones extensively. But how they have used these so far has differed sharply. 

The Ukraine war is widely recognised as the first full-out drone war, due to the immense usage. 

Ukraine has said it deploys about 9,000 different types of drones a day, while one think tank found that Russia launched more than 4,400 one-way drones in January alone. Drones were reportedly responsible for up to 80 per cent of those killed or injured on both sides. In a somewhat ironic turn, the US has asked Ukraine for help to fight Iranian drones. 

Lessons from these early drone wars will be important in developing countries’ own military playbooks.

A GAME OF DRONES

Iran’s drone objective is to deplete the air defence stocks of Israel, the US and the Gulf countries hosting US military facilities that Iran has targeted in its retaliation.

Its drone of choice is the Shahed-136. It is essentially a guided bomb that is flown into a target and detonated. It is slow and simple, and quick and cheap to manufacture.

And that is precisely the point. Iran does not need every drone to get through enemy air defences, just enough to saturate and overwhelm air defences or force the use of expensive, limited interceptor missiles. This was Iran’s play in the 12-day war last June that managed to pierce Israel’s sophisticated air defence system, as well as Russia’s approach to attacking Ukrainian infrastructure.

This time, Iran deployed waves of drones interspaced with missiles and scored some successes. Geolocated videos from social media of the ongoing conflict in Iran has shown that these drones have struck at least two military targets, including the base of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet in Manama, Bahrain and a US Army facility in Kuwait. 

These massed attacks appear to be having an effect, with the UAE’s defence ministry revealing that it intercepted 26 out of 35 (or 74 per cent) of Iranian drones launched at it on Tuesday (Mar 10). This was a significant drop from previous days of the conflict, having downed about 90 per cent to 95 per cent of larger numbers of drones in earlier waves.

This suggests that the US – the world’s most powerful military – still has gaps in its ability to defend itself against such new tactics. It is something that US defence officials have reportedly acknowledged, with Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine admitting that the drones have posed a bigger challenge than expected.

US HAS ITS OWN CHEAP DRONE

It is perhaps a testament to how effective the Shahed has been that the US has reverse engineered and is employing its own version. The Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) made its first combat appearance in Iran.

But where the Shahed is a tool of asymmetric warfare for Iran to bleed a technologically superior adversary, the LUCAS is about cost-effectiveness. From intercepting enemy missiles and drones to striking infrastructure, the US$35,000 drone holds its own against a US$2.4 Tomahawk cruise missile or a US$13 million THAAD interceptor missile.

A key factor in the current conflict is that the US and Israel rapidly established air superiority by degrading Iran’s air defence network that had already been severely weakened last June. 

This has meant that Israeli and American aircraft and drones have managed to operate over Iran with little opposition as they worked through a list of targets which included Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian missile and drone launchers. These strikes are primarily being carried out with manned aircraft but also with larger drones that are built to provide near-constant surveillance and launch munitions, not as kamikaze weapons.

Videos posted on social media purportedly taken from inside Iran show Israeli Hermes 900 and US MQ-9 Reapers in the air. 

These have long endurance – the Reaper can stay in the air for up to 27 hours and the Hermes 900 up to 36 hours. They can maintain constant surveillance over Iran for much longer than manned aircraft, which need to refuel and are limited by the need for their pilots and crews to rest between missions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA

While the Iran war has not spilled out of the Middle East, defence planners from Asia will have registered the sharp implications of how it is being fought.

First, LUCAS shows that the US is complementing its arsenal of high-end missiles with significantly cheaper and expendable assets. The US is already changing the way it will operate in the event of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, shifting away from operating large force grouping out of fixed bases in favour of smaller, more agile forces fighting from dispersed locations and the LUCAS could fit into this strategy.

One-way attack drones, with a relatively small and flexible deployment footprint, will likely figure prominently in the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific alongside a smaller number of more capable but more expensive weapon systems. This is the kind of asymmetric capability that the US is seeking, while China has been making advances in military capability.

Next, the US is burning through a prodigious amount of ballistic missile defence interceptors against Iranian ballistic missiles.

Even before the Iran war, experts had warned that the US and its Indo-Pacific allies do not have, and is producing nowhere near enough, the number of interceptors it needs should a conflict break out against China. This could call into question a vital aspect of the ability of the US military to conduct operations in the Indo-Pacific. 

It is perhaps a salutary lesson to defence planners about over-reliance on smaller numbers of high-tech, expensive weapons, and that it might be worth investing in a large quantity of cheaper, less sophisticated systems to work alongside them for maximum effect. 

Mike Yeo is the Indo-Pacific Bureau Chief for defence media outlet Breaking Defense. He has more than a decade of experience as a defence journalist, specialising in regional defence and security matters.

LONDON: After the wild swings in oil markets since the start of the Iran war, US President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the conflict will end soon has reignited hopes of more normal conditions in the not-too-distant future.

That seems far-fetched. We are in the midst of one of the biggest supply disruptions in the history of the energy market - an event the industry has feared for 40 years. And yet, now that it is here, no one seems prepared.

Even after accounting for diversions by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz has been reduced by at least 10 million barrels a day, according to our estimates. That’s nearly 2.5 times more than the Russian crude exports that were assessed to be at risk during the initial stages of the Ukraine war before Russian supply was directed to China and India instead of Europe. 

The flow of oil products and liquefied petroleum gas through the Strait of Hormuz has also been reduced by 5 million barrels per day and liquefied natural gas stuck at nearly the equivalent of nearly 85 million tonnes per annum, almost 20 per cent of global supply.

RISING VOLATILITY

Oil price volatility has skyrocketed. On Monday (Mar 9), the Brent crude benchmark swung around in a US$35 range, rising to nearly US$120 per barrel on fears the Strait would remain closed for a while and then falling on assumptions that the war would end imminently based on Trump’s comments.

Yet the G7 continues to discuss releases from strategic petroleum reserves and Asian economies are implementing energy conservation policies. If the impact of the war was truly going to be brief, why would such emergency policy actions be needed?

The market is right to fixate on the signals from the US and other governments. 

Ultimately, with every day that the Strait of Hormuz is effectively shut, the volume of energy lost climbs higher and higher. Volatility will remain elevated and we see crude prices continuing to rally until the point demand is curtailed given the volume of rising production cuts, which are north of 7 million barrels per day.

Indeed, even if large releases from emergency oil stockpiles manage to quell price increases in the near term, they would not fully make up for the more than 10 million barrels per day of lost flow, meaning the market will keep testing the resolve of the US administration. Finite stocks can rarely replace lost flows unless it is clear when the supply disruption will end, especially when the losses are of this magnitude. There is also no equivalent strategic gas stockpile to buffer large disruptions. 

The biggest question for us is what the new normal will look like, whenever it comes.

Clearly, it won’t look like the old status quo. Indeed, it may be wrong to assume that now that Iran has carried out its longstanding threat to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, the status quo ante for regional trade will be easy to restore.

Flows may resume fairly if the conflict ends with a ceasefire agreed by all sides but the risk calculations will be different going forward. It is far from clear that if the US achieves its stated objectives of degrading Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes and militarily weakening the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Middle East will be more stable than before the war. 

This is particularly the case if the Iranian regime remains in power but feels threatened on all sides, or if a power vacuum emerges in Tehran.

MAJOR REPERCUSSIONS FOR ASIA

This scenario has major repercussions for Asian buyers of Gulf energy. 

The conflict is clearly showing that the region, which is also home to all of oil’s spare capacity, remains vulnerable. The Strait of Hormuz will remain a chokepoint for global trade whatever measures are taken to try and limit the threat Iran can pose to the waterway. China, India, Japan and South Korea together receive almost 70 per cent of Middle Eastern crude flows through the Strait of Hormuz, meeting nearly half their combined crude requirements via this route. The imperative for Asian powers to safeguard their energy lifelines is therefore becoming ever more urgent.

This is especially important for China. Beijing has taken various steps to reduce these risks, including diversifying its imports with a goal to import no more than 20 per cent of total oil imports from any one source, as well as building up substantial domestic oil stockpiles.

But the limits of this strategy are tested when almost 50 per cent of Chinese crude imports originate from the Middle East. In the meantime, China’s leadership has urged local refineries to halt exports of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. We understand the Indian government is also asking state-owned refiners to prioritise domestic product supplies, similar to the approach taken by Thailand.

Security of supply will be forced back to the top of the agenda for governments in the new world order, much as it was after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. That will continue to reshape oil markets for a long time to come.
 

HONG KONG: The world has been scrambling and fretting over the erratic ways in which the United States is redefining its global role. Amid growing uncertainty and chaos, there is intense speculation over one question: What kind of role China will choose to play on the world stage? 

The shifting global narrative in favour of China is hard to miss. 

Scouring international media, one cannot help but notice a growing chorus of reports and commentaries painting a picture of China “winning” the geopolitical game and the AI race in the great power competition with the US, among other things.

But understand this: The praise for China has more to do with Western frustration and anger over US President Donald Trump’s disruptive policies rather than any unalloyed admiration for Beijing’s model.

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China is neither willing nor capable of filling the void left by the US. From a Chinese perspective, America’s further retreat from the international stage, particularly in the Eastern hemisphere, could bring more harm than benefits in the foreseeable future.

A STABLE AND RESPONSIBLE WORLD POWER

US actions over the past year have no doubt allowed China to enhance its image as a stable and responsible world power. 

Since Mr Trump’s second term began a little more than a year ago, he has launched a global tariff war, abducted a sitting head of state, blasted a “decaying” Europe and demanded the acquisition of Greenland. Since Feb 28, the US is in a war with Iran that shows little signs of de-escalation, while oil prices soar.

In January, Mr Trump signalled a further retreat by withdrawing the US from 66 international organisations, including various United Nations entities focused on climate, health and development.

Against this backdrop, China is boosting its soft power particularly in the Global South. 

More developing countries, seeking alternatives to Western-led institutions, are turning to China. Beijing-led international forums, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), have countries from Asia, Africa and beyond lining up to join or deepen their engagement.

NO ONE’S BIG BROTHER

But any optimism that China can and should do more to manage global affairs is misplaced. Beijing is neither politically willing nor financially and militarily capable of replacing the US – not in managing global affairs nor in providing security protections as the US does.

Take the US action to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. For decades, both Venezuela and Cuba have tried to deepen ties with China, with Beijing’s outstanding investments in Venezuela estimated at about US$10 billion now at the mercy of the US. The intervention has also squeezed Cuba, which relies heavily on Venezuelan oil. 

The best Beijing has managed is to repeatedly condemn the US action and seek reassurance that its oil supply would not be affected – to which Mr Trump has effectively agreed.

Similarly, with Iran, one of China’s major energy suppliers now under bombardment by US and Israeli jets, Beijing has merely voiced its strongest condemnation and offered moral support. The implicit message is clear: Any country hoping to count on Beijing as a big brother for protection will be disappointed in the foreseeable future.

Over the past decade, President Xi Jinping has moved away from Deng Xiaoping’s policy of biding time and keeping a low profile. Beijing has adopted an increasingly assertive stance on core issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea. International commentators often portray these moves as evidence of expansionist ambitions. 

Yet from China’s viewpoint, Taiwan and Hong Kong are integral territories, and it has legitimate security interests in the South China Sea, through which about 90 per cent of its maritime crude oil imports pass.

Beyond these core interests, China’s direct influence remains limited. This stems not only from a lack of power projection capabilities for distant interventions but from deliberate strategic choices.

Beijing recognises that overextension could jeopardise its primary focus on domestic economic development and stability. 

Getting entangled in far-flung conflicts would drain resources needed for internal challenges like technological self-reliance and social cohesion, while risking escalation with a still-superior US military. Prudence dictates prioritising resilience at home over global policeman duties.

LOW-KEY INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS

China’s reluctance was evident in several regional conflicts. 

Mr Trump has claimed he “ended 8 wars in just 8 months”. Whatever the debate on whether to give him credit, his claim included three conflicts at China’s doorstep: between Thailand and Cambodia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Pakistan and India. Notably, Pakistan, Thailand and Cambodia are very close to China, while Armenia and Azerbaijan seek closer ties with the SCO.

China’s interests would have been well-served by leading mediation, but its efforts proved limited and low-key compared to Mr Trump’s actions.

Tensions between China and Japan have escalated significantly over Taiwan following remarks in November 2025 by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. She described a Chinese attack on Taiwan as a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, opening the door to potential military intervention. Beijing responded with intense diplomatic and economic pressure. 

The timing, shortly after the Busan summit between Mr Xi and Mr Trump where Taiwan was not mentioned, suggests Ms Takaichi may have deliberately ratcheted up tensions to draw the US back into the region. Mr Trump has long signalled indifference toward Taiwan beyond its semiconductors.

China may take an increasingly assertive approach in defending its core interests, including Taiwan and the South China Sea, but it has remained very much restrained from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries. Putting its own house in order has been and will remain its top priority.

CHINA STILL RELIES ON US PRESENCE

Some Chinese nationalists have hailed Mr Trump’s efforts to reintroduce the “law of the jungle” as confirmation of the rise of the East and the decline of the West. 

But the truth is that a rising China still needs the US to play a stabilising role, even in its own backyard. 

In February, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to strengthen his country’s nuclear programme. The primary reason neither Japan nor South Korea has pursued their own nuclear weapons – despite possessing the technology – is the US security umbrella. One can only imagine the proliferation nightmare and regional instability if Washington were to fully withdraw from the area.

In this turbulent era, while China benefits from America’s inward turn, Beijing understands that true global leadership requires capabilities and commitments it is not yet ready – or eager – to assume. A rising China, focused on sustainable growth, still relies on the US presence in its backyard to maintain a delicate balance of power.

Wang Xiangwei is a former Editor-in-Chief of South China Morning Post. He now teaches journalism at Hong Kong Baptist University.

SINGAPORE: As the war in Iran deepens with little sign of resolution anytime soon, a question that small nations like Singapore increasingly face is what agency they have amid bigger powers acting on their own agendas.

The decision by the US and Israel to attack Iran on Feb 28 has sparked a conflict that threatens to engulf the Middle East and disrupt countries’ energy supplies.

As a small but influential player on the global stage, Singapore is often placed in an interesting position.

While not a major power able to dictate the direction of international geopolitics, Singapore’s leaders are often consulted for their views on global developments at fora ranging from the United Nations to the World Economic Forum and Munich Security Conference.

As a transport, technology and finance hub, Singapore’s policies and actions have had an outsized impact on the region and the world, and are keenly watched by investors and other states.

WHEN ELEPHANTS FIGHT

As the proverb goes, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” Smaller players like Singapore often find themselves on the decision-making sidelines when major powers make moves against one another.

In recent years, we have seen wars break out in Europe and the Middle East. While the tensions in Gaza seem to have eased slightly after a ceasefire, the latest turmoil in Iran will ratchet up the temperature in that region again. 

The impact on the proverbial “grass” has already been felt around the world. Oil and energy prices have surged, financial markets have tumbled amid increasing uncertainty, and the prognosis for global economic development in 2026 appears bleaker than it was prior to the conflict.

With a speedy end to the Iran war seemingly not a priority of Israel and the US, such global uncertainty looks set to persist in the near term at least.

A DELICATE BALANCING ACT

This brings us to the question of what Singapore can do in such scenarios. The tension between being a small but influential country is brought into focus when conflicts emerge abroad.

In these situations, it may seem that the only option available to smaller nations is to issue carefully worded statements that express concern and call for the cessation of hostilities, respect for sovereignty and human life, and adherence to international law.

A recent exception was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Along with its statements condemning the invasion, Singapore also imposed rare unilateral sanctions on Russia, targeting military exports, some Russian banks and financial transactions connected to Russia.

Last week, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said Singapore endorses the statement made by the ASEAN foreign ministers on the latest situation in the Middle East.

The statement expressed “serious concern” at the escalation of conflict in the Middle East, and urged parties to respect international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

Though this may seem to be another example of Singapore’s limited ability to influence international developments, the country faces unique circumstances.

As a multi-racial and multi-religious country that is open to information and influences from around the world, international conflicts often arouse different views among the domestic populace. On potentially contentious issues or developments, the government thus avoids taking a strong position that could result in animosity or unhappiness among local communities.

When it comes to foreign policy, Singapore’s long-held preference to maintain good relations among as many friends as possible means that excessively strong statements or official positions can mean the loss of strategic ambiguity, which can be invaluable when it comes to international diplomacy.

WHITHER SINGAPORE’S AGENCY?

At the same time, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong argued that Singapore is not without agency in an increasingly complex and unpredictable global environment. 

Speaking at the S Rajaratnam Lecture series organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Academy last year, Mr Wong said that, despite Singapore’s limitations as a small state, it cannot afford to be a passive bystander and should seek to shape its own destiny.

He said this can be done via three key thrusts: contributing actively to the stewardship of the global commons, championing deeper regional cohesion and integration, as well as strengthening its global network of partnerships. 

While Singapore looks outward to achieve these aims, it must balance sensitivities at home and with partners abroad. As the world evolves away from a stable rules-based global order into one that is marked by greater contestation, military and otherwise, this tightrope will become increasingly difficult to walk.

But as a small nation, retaining agency must remain a key national priority for the foreseeable future.

Nicholas Fang is founder and managing director of strategic consultancy Black Dot, and a former journalist and Nominated Member of Parliament. He writes a monthly column for CNA.