For decades, the alliance with Japan has been the cornerstone of U.S. security policy in East Asia. There are more than 80 U.S. military facilities in the country. It hosts about 50,000 U.S. military personnel, at a cost to Japan of some $3 billion per year.
“They and others are so spoiled from having ripped us off for 30, 40 years that it’s really hard for them to make a deal,” President Donald Trump declared. “I’ll write them a letter to say, ‘We thank you very much, and we know you can’t do the kind of things that we need, and therefore you pay a 30 percent, 35 percent’ or whatever the number is that we determined.”
Japan’s resistance is understandable, though. Trump would require that Japan offer the United States a plethora of concessions, including deals to import more U.S. rice and autos, to avoid a punitive 24 percent tariff.
Japan tried to make a deal. It sent negotiators to Washington more than half a dozen times. It offered concessions — to buy more U.S. gas and military hardware, for instance. But the deal on offer would still leave Japan facing a separate, 10 percent tariff Trump levied on everybody, as well as the crippling tariffs on steel and autos. These hurdles are massive compared with the average 1.6 percent tariff on Japanese goods that prevailed before Trump started upending long-standing trade relationships.
What’s more, Japan has no guarantee that any deal with Trump’s America will be final. Japan is not likely to forget that it already struck a trade deal with Trump, in 2019. And the United States is considering specific tariffs on many countries covering a variety of additional products, including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors and lumber. These could involve Japan even after it struck a deal.
Japan is hardly the only country resisting the Trump administration’s goal of striking 90 trade agreements in the 90 days since it suspended its “reciprocal tariffs” announced on April 2. The 90-day reprieve ends July 9. So far, the United States has struck a deal with Britain, another with Vietnam and a shaky trade ceasefire with Beijing — under which China will restart some exports of rare earth minerals that are vital to U.S. industry and military readiness.
To be clear: The status quo before Trump was not perfect. The Japanese car and (especially) rice markets are particularly difficult for foreigners to access. The effective way to achieve durable results would be to negotiate an agreement that offers gains for both nations, the United States lowering trade barriers that irk Japan in return for Japanese concessions.
The Trump administration miscalculates if it believes Japan — and many other countries — would welcome a deal with the United States that offers little or no upside beyond maybe avoiding Trump’s “reciprocal tariffs,” especially without certainty about America’s ultimate demands or the potential for another round of U.S. tariffs. The second mistake is shrugging off the potential costs of this approach to U.S. economic and national security.
If anything, China’s more assertive foreign policy, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and Moscow’s growing ties with Beijing make Japan a more important ally than ever. In Trump’s first term, his administration revived the Quad security arrangement with Australia, India and Japan — designed largely as a counterweight to China. Japan has ramped up its defense spending, overcoming the limits of a pacifist constitution written by the United States in the aftermath of World War II, and is working closely with the United States to develop joint military capabilities.
The United States needs allies — to protect itself and, yes, to trade with — and alliances cannot remain stable for long when they are clouded by mistrust and fear. America still has opportunities to deepen ties with friendly countries, creating a stable alternative to China’s network of global influence. Trump should not squander them.
